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EXHIBITS LIST 
REPORTER’S TRANSCRIPT: 
Reporter’s Transcript taken October 26, 2016, will be lodged with the Supreme Court. 
Claimant's Exhibits: 
I. Prior to October 14, 2001, date of accident:
1. Records of Glenns Ferry Medical Center for the Period October 11, 1985 to October 13,
2001
II. Following October 14, 2001, date of accident to October 5, 2009:
2. Records of Jeffrey F. Kieffer, D.C.
a. Report of October 11, 2012
3. Records of Glenns Ferry Health Center
a. Pharmaceutical Data
III. Following October 6, 2009, date of accident to August 27, 2013:
4. Records of Emergency Department, Elmore Memorial Hospital
5. Records of D. Peter Reedy, M.D.
a. Report to Berry, dated August 23, 2010
(1) Correspondence from Berry to Dr. Reedy, dated June 17, 2010
b. Report to Berry, dated December 10, 2011
c. Report to Berry, dated December 12, 2012
(1) Correspondence from Berry to Dr. Reedy, dated November 20, 2012
d. Report to Berry, dated November 2, 2015
(1) Correspondence from Berry to Dr. Reedy, dated October 28, 2015
e. Report to Attorney Augustine, dated January 7, 2016
(1) Correspondence from Attorney Augustine to Dr. Reedy, dated December
17, 2015
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f. Report to Berry, dated January 19, 2016
(1) Correspondence from Berry to Dr. Reedy, dated January 5, 2016
6. Records of Glenns Ferry Health Center
a. Completed Questionnaire by Vernon McCready, PA-C, dated January 19, 2016
(1) Correspondence to PA-C McCready, from Berry, dated November 5,
2015
(2) Correspondence to PA-C McCready, from Berry, dated December 14,
2015
(3) Correspondence to PA-C McCready, from Berry, dated January 6, 2016
7. Records of Mountain Home Physical Therapy:
8. Records of Orthopedic Associates/Drs. Schweiger, Hessing and Clawson
9. Records of Richard Hammond, M.D./Neurology of Twin Falls
10. Records of Michael Hajjar, M.D.
a. Report to T.J. Martin, State Insurance Fund, dated November 14, 2012
b. Report to Attorney Augustine, dated January 27, 2016
(1) Correspondence from Attorney Augustine to Dr. Hajjar, dated January 6,
2016
c. Report to Berry, dated February 19, 2016
(1) Correspondence to Dr. Hajjar from Berry, dated February 4, 2016,
without attachments
11. Diagnostic Procedure
IV. Following August 28, 2013 date of accident
12. Records of Nampa Medical
13. Records of Miers Johnson III, M.D./St. Alphonsus Medical Group
a. Mountain Home Physical Therapy
14. Records of Howard Shoemaker, M.D.
15. Records of Jeffrey F. Kieffer, D.C.
16. Records of Glenns Ferry Health Center
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17. Records of Paul Montalbano, M.D.
a. Report dated July 8, 2015
(1) Letter to Dr. Montalbano from Berry, dated June 22, 2015
18. Records of Mark J. Harris, M.D./Idaho Physical Medicine
19. Diagnostic Procedures
V. IME Reports
20. Mark J. Harris, M.D.
a. July 31, 2010 review of records
b. August 2, 2010 report
(1) Letter to Dr. Harris from State Insurance Fund, dated July 26, 2010
(2) Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment, Sixth Edition, p. 27
c. August 3, 2010 report
d. August 15, 2011 report
(1) Letter to Dr. Harris from State Insurance Fund, dated June 27, 2011
e. September 21, 2012 report
(1) Letter to Dr. Harris from State Insurance Fund, dated August 30, 2012
f. October 18, 2012 report
(1) Letter to Dr. Harris from State Insurance Fund, dated October 15, 2012
(a) Letter to T.J. Martin, State Insurance Fund from Berry, dated
October 4, 2012
21. Paul Montalbano, M.D.
a. Letter to Attorney Paul Augustine, dated April 26, 2013
(1) Letter to Dr. Montalbano from Attorney Augustine, dated April 2, 2013
b. Report dated October 8, 2015 to Attorney Augustine
(1) Letter to Dr. Montalbano from Attorney Augustine, dated September 30,
2015
c. Report dates October 3, 2016 to Attorney Augustine
(1) Letter to Dr. Montalbano from Attorney Augustine, dated September 27,
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22. Stanley Water, M.D.
23. Wright Physical Therapy FCE Report dated September 25, 2015
a. Letter to Wright Physical Therapy from Berry, dated September 2, 2015
24. Dictation of Richard Hammond, M.D., dated August 1, 2016 and October 5, 2016
a. Letter to Dr. Hammond from Berry, fated June 22, 2016
b. Letter to Dr. Hammond from Berry, dated July 1, 2016
c. Letter to Dr. Hammond from Berry, dated July 21, 2016
d. Letter to Dr. Hammond from Berry, dated October 11, 2016
VI. Medical Itemization re low back/lumbar presentment
NON-MEDICAL EXHIBITS: 
25. First Reports of Injuries
a. October 14, 2001 date of accident
b. October 6, 2009 date of accident
(1) Claimant Contacts dated November 20, 2009, December 21, 2009; and
June 7, 2010
(2) Policyholder Contact dated November 20, 2009
c. August 28, 2013 date of accident
26. Idaho Vehicle Collision Report re October 6, 2009, motor vehicle accident
a. Photographs by investigating officer
27. ICRD Reports
28. State Insurance Fund Title 72 Benefits paid Summary
a. Regarding the October 14, 2001 date of accident
b. Regarding the October 6, 2009 date of accident
(1) Permanent partial impairment conceded by Defendants
c. Regarding the August 28, 2013 date of accident
29. Copes of Correspondences
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a. Letter to State Insurance Fund/Mr. Martin from Berry dated December 14, 2011
b. Letter to Mr. Martin from Berry, dated March 7, 2012
c. Letter from Mr. Martin to Berry, dated March 12, 2012
d. Letter to Mr. Martin from Berry, dated October 15, 2012
e. Letter from Mr. Martin to Berry, dated November 14, 2012
f. Letter to Attorney Augustine from Berry, dated December 17, 2012
g. Letter to Attorney Augustine from Berry, dated March 4, 2013
h. Letter to Attorney Augustine from Berry, dated March 27, 2013
i. Letter to Attorney Augustine from Berry, dated May 6, 2013
j. Letter from Attorney Augustine to Berry, dated May 29, 2013
k. Letter to Attorney Augustine from Berry, dated January 13, 2016
l. Letter from Attorney Augustine to Berry, dated February 16, 2016
m. Letter to Mr. Ayala from Mr. Robert Meyers, dated December 3, 2014
n. Letter to Attorney Augustine from Berry, dated August 22, 2016
o. Letter to Attorney Augustine from Berry, dated October 11, 2016
30. Defendants’ Response to Discovery
a. Defendants’ Answers to Interrogatories to Defendants, dated January 24, 2014
(1) Defendants’ Answers to Continued Interrogatories, dated January 5, 2016
(a) Defendants’ Supplemental Answers to Continued Interrogatories
to Defendants, dated February 2, 2016
(2) Defendants’ Supplemental Answers to Interrogatories to Defendants,
dates February 2, 2016
b. Defendants’ Response to Requests for Production of Documents to Defendants,
dated January 24, 2014, (excerpts)
(1) Defendants’ Answers to Continued Requests for Production of
Documents to Defendants, dated January 5, 2016
c. Defendants’ Answers to Interrogatories to Defendants re: August 28, 2013,
Accident at Issue in I.C. 2013-024075, dated January 5, 2016
d. Defendants’ Answers to Requests for Production of Documents to Defendants  re:
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August 28, 2013, Accident at Issue in I.C. 2013-024075, dated January 5, 2016 
e. Defendants’ Supplemental Answers to Claimant’s Interrogatories and Requests for
Production of Documents to Defendants, dated October 11, 2016
f. State Insurance Fund’s Claims File (excerpts) as attached to Defendants’ Notice of
Compliance with Order Granting Motion to Compel, dated August 18, 2016
31. Claimant’s Response to Discovery
a. Claimant’s Answers to Interrogatories dated October 7, 2013 regarding I.C. No.
2001-520958
b. Claimant’s Answers to Interrogatories dated October 7, 2013 regarding I.C. No.
2009-029533
c. Claimant’s Supplemental Answers to Interrogatories dated January 11, 2016
regarding I.C. Nos. 2001-520958; 2009-029533; and, 2013-024075
(1) Claimant’s Second Supplemental Answers to Defendants’ First set of
Interrogatories to Claimant, dated September 22, 2016 (Re: I.C. Nos.
2001-520958; 2009-029533; and, 2013-024075)
d. Claimant’s Answers to Defendants’ Second Set of Interrogatories to Claimant,
dated September 19, 2016
32. Vocational Report of Nancy J. Collins, Ph.D., dated February 2, 2016
a. Letter to Dr. Collins from Berry, dated December 16, 2015
b. Letter to Dr. Collins from Berry, dated February 5, 2016
c. Letter to Dr. Collins from Berry, dated September 28, 2016
33. Transcript of Deposition of Claimant, taken November 10, 2015, (to be produced at
hearing)
Defendants' Exhibits: 
1. Records from Paul J. Montalbano, M.D.
2. Records from Michael V. Hajjar, M.D.
3. D. Petere Reedy, M.D. Concurrence with IME
4. Howard W. Shoemaker, M.D. Letter dated 2-04-16
5. Paid Cost Summary
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6. Claimant’s Answers to Defendants’ Discovery
7. Claimant’s Tax Returns
8. ICRD Records
9. Bill Jordan’s Employability Report
10. Deposition Transcript of Claimant taken on November 10, 2015
Depositions: 
1. Deposition of Claimant taken on November 10, 2015 (see Defendants’ Exhibit 10)
2. Deposition of Richard John Hammond, M.D., taken December 16, 2016
3. Deposition of Paul J. Montalbano, M.D., taken April 26, 2017
4. Deposition of Nancy J. Collins, Ph.D., taken June 20, 2017
5. Deposition of William C. Jordan, taken June 20, 2017
Additional Documents: 
1. Commission’s Letter to Parties Re: Possible Reassignment to Commissioners, dated January
3, 2018 
2. Letter from L. Clyel Berry Re: Requesting Referee Powers, not Commissioners, write the
final decision, filed January 11, 2018 
3. Claimant’s Post-Hearing Opening Brief, filed September 29, 2017
4. Defendants’ Post-Hearing Brief, filed October 23, 2017
5. Claimant’s Post-Hearing Reply Brief, filed November 2, 2017
WORKERS' COMPENSATION 
COMPLAINT 
Claimant's Name & Address 
Mario Ayala 
47456 St. Hwy 78 
Mountain Home, ID 83647 
Employer's Name & Address 
Robert J. Meyers Farms, Inc. 
3221 North 3300 East 
Twin Falls, ID 83301-0000 
  
 
State & County in Which Injury Occurred 
State ofidaho Countv of Elmore 




Twin Falls, ID 83303-0302
Workers' Compensation Insurance Carrier's 
(Not Adjustor's) Name & Address 
Idaho State Insurance Fund 
P.O. Box 990004 
Boise, ID 83799 
Date of Injury/Manifestation of Occupational Disease 
10/6/09 
When Injured, Claimant was Earning an Average 
Weeklv Warre of� nursuant to LC. S72-419. 
Describe How Injury/Occupational Disease Occurred (What Happened) 
Claimant was involved in a single-vehicle motor vehicle accident, during the course of his �mployment. 
Nature of Medical Problems Alleged As a Result of Accident or Occupational Disease 
1. Cervical injury with radiculopathy into the left upper extremity;
2. Left shoulder/upper extremity injuries;
3. Right upper extremity injuries; 0-
4. Lumbar spine injury with radiculopathy.
What Workers' Compensation Benefits are You Claiming at This Time? ';:, .. )
L Continuation/reinstatement of medical benefits, generally, and specifically regarcling Cl)limant's lumbar 
spine/low back; and, 
2. Fees, pursuant to I.C. §72-804
Date on Which Notice of Injury was Given to Employer 
10/6/09 
To Whom You Gave Notice 
Robert Meyers 
How Notice Was Given: (X) Oral (X) Subsequent Written ( ) Other, Please Specify 
Issue or Issues Involved: 
I. Whether Claimant's current need for medical care, generally, and specifically involving Claimant's low
back/lumbar spine, as recommended by Drs. Reedy and/or Hajjar, is causally related to or resultant of the
October 6, 2009, accident and injury at issue herein, to any extent, such that responsibility for the same rests
with or npon Defendants herein.
2. Upon date that Claimant achieves medical stability/maximum medical improvement, whether and to what
extent Claimant presents with permanent impairment;
3. Whether, at the time of maximum medical improvement/clinical stability, Claimant will present with
permanent disability in excess of impairment, specifically to encompass whether Claimant presents as totally
and pemmnently disabled pursuant to theories of odd-lot, or otherwise;
4. Whether any of Claimant's permanent impairment and/or permanent disability in excess of impairment is by
reason of causes or conditions preexisting the October 6, 2009, injury at issue herein; and,
5. Whether, as oftl1e date of any hearing herein, Defendants have responsibility for Claimant's fees, pursuant to
LC. § 72-804.
Do You Believe This Claim Presents a New Question of Law Or a Complicated Set of Facts? ( )Yes (X) No 
If so Please state why. 
Noticc�£::omplaints_against the !nduslrial S1wcial fndemni/v Fund must be in. accordance with Idaho Code § 72-334 !!ljg_ 
filed on fonn l.C. I 002 
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Physicians Who Treated Claimant (Name & Address) 
ER staff, Elmore Memorial Hospital, Mountain Home, Idaho; Physicians and/or staff associated with Glenns Ferry Medical Center; Richard Hammond, M.D., care of St. Luke's Clinic Neurology of Twin Falls, Twin Falls, Idaho; Michael Hajjar, M.D., Boise, Idaho; Gregory Schweiger, M.D., Boise, Idaho; Mark Clawson, M.D., Boise, Idaho; Jeffrey Hessing, M.D., Boise, Idaho; and, D. Peter Reedy, M.D., Boise, Idaho; 
What Medical Costs Have You Incurred To Date? 
What Medical Costs Has Your Employer Paid? If any? $ ___ What Medical Costs Have You Paid, If any? $ __ _ 
IAM INTERESTED IN MEDIATING THIS CLAIM,IF THE OTHER PARTIES AGREE. ( ) Yes ( ) No 
Date 
Please answer the set of questions immediately below only i 
Name and Social Security Number Date of Death 
of party filing Complaint 
Was filing party dependent on deceased? Did filing party live with deceased at time of accident? Yes No Yes No 
CLAIMANT MUST COMPLETE, SIGN AND DATE THE ATTACHED MEDICAL RELEASE FORM 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the /1it'uay of A/4v.t.mb.t.,,- , 2012, I caused to be served a true and correct copy of the foregoing Complaint upon: 
Employer's Name & Address 
Robett J. Meyers Farms, Inc. 
3221 North 3300 East 
Twin Falls, ID 83301 
Surety's Name & Address 
Idaho State Insurance Fund 
P.O. Box 990004 
Boise, ID 83 799 
Via: ( ) Personal Service of Process Via: ( ) Personal Service of Process 
(X) Regular U.S. Mail (X) Regular U.S. Mail 
( ) I have not served a copy of the Comp 
NOTICE! An employer or Insurance Company served with a Complaint must file an Answer on Form LC. I 003 with the Industrial Commission within 21 days of the date of service as specified on the certificate of mailing to avoid default. Jf no answer is filed, a Default Award may be entered! 
Further information may be obtained from: Industrial Commission, Judicial Division, 317 Main Street, Boise, Idaho 83720-6000 (208) 334-6000. 
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INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
P.O. BOX 83720 
BOISE, ID 83720-0041 
Patient Name: -'-3M'-;a...,r'-lir.occ--A~y~a~l~a ______ _ 
  
Address: ______________ _ 
Phone Number: ____________ _ 
  
(Provider Use Only) 
Medical Record Number: ____ _ 
( ) Pick Up Copies ( ) Fax Copies 
( ) Mail Copies 
ID Confirmed by: ______ _ 
AUTHORIZATION FOR DISCLOSURE OF HEALTH INFORMATION 
I hereby authorize to disclose health information as specified: ----------------------Provider Name- must be specific for each provider 
To: ------------------------------------------Insurance Company/Third Party Administrator/Self-Insured Emp/oyer!ISIF, their attorneys or patient's attorney 
Street Address 
City State 
Purpose or need for data: 
(e.g. Workers' Compensation Claim) 











( ) Pathology 
( ) Radiology Reports 
( ) Entire Record 
Date(s) of Hospitalization/Care: 
Zip Code 
( ) Other: Specify---------------------------------I understand that the disclosure may include information relating to (check if applicable): 
( ) AIDS or HIV 
( ) 
( ) 
Psychiatric or Mental Health Information 
Drug/Alcohol Abuse Information 
I understand that the information to be released may include material that is protected by Federal Law (45 CFR Part 164) and that the information may be subject to redisclosure by the recipient and no longer be protected by the federal regulations. I understand that this authorization may be revoked in writing at any time by notifying the privacy officer, except that revoking the authorization \Von 't apply to information already released in response to this authorization. I understand that the provider will not condition treatment, payment, emolhnent, or eligibility for benefits on my signing this authorization. Unless otherwise revoked, this authorization will expire upon resolution of worker's compensation claim. Provider, its employees, officers, copy service contractor, and physicians are hereby released from any legal responsibility or liability for disclosure of the above information to the extent indicated and authorized by me on this form and as outlined in the Notice of Privacy. My signature below authorizes release of all infomiation specified in this authorization. Any questions that I have regarding disclosure may be directed to the privacy officer of the Provider specified above. 
Signature of Patient Date 
Legal Representative & Relationship to Patient/Authority to Act Date 
Title Date 
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161008 (Rov. H/0• 
ANSWER TO COMPLAINT 
I.C. N0 .. _--=20=0=9·-=-02=9=53=3'--_ INJURY DATE. _ __,_10=/0:...:4=/2=00=9 __ _ 
_x_ The above-named employer or employer/surety responds to Claimant's Complaint by 
stating: 
_ The Industrial Special Indemnity Fund responds to the Complaint against the ISIF by stating: 
CLAIMANT'S NAME AND ADDRESS CLAIMANT'S ATTORNEY• S NAME AND ADDRESS 
M~rloAyala L. Clyel Berry 
47456 State Hwy 78 Attorney at Law 
Mountain Home, ID 83647 PO Box 302 
Twin Falls, ID 83303-0302 
EMPLOYER'S NAME AND ADDRESS WORKERS• COMPENSATION INSURANCE CARRIER'S (NOT ADJUSTOR• S) NAME 
Robert J. Meyers Farms, Inc. AND ADDRESS 
3221 North 3300 East State Insurance Fund 
Twin Falls, ID 83301-0000 P. o. Box 83720 
Boise, ID 83n0-0044 
ATTORNEY REPRESENTING EMPLOYER OR EMPLOYER/SURETY (NAME ATTORNEY REPRESENTING INDUSTRIAL SPECIAL INDEMNITY FUND (NAME AND 
AND ADDRESS) ADDRESS) 
Paul J. Augustine 
Augustine Law Offices, PLLC r--_, 
P.O. Box 1521 
c:::-, -~ Boise, ID 83701 
:-·, . ' 
' ' 
___ j 








That the accident alleged In the Complaint actually occurfa;d on or~'.'bout the time claimed. 
X 2. That the employer/employee relationship existed. .. 
X 3, That the parties were subject to the provisions of the Idaho Workers' Compensation Act. 
X 4. That the condition for which benefits are claimed was caused by an accident arising out of 
and In the course of Claimant• s employment. 
NA NA 5, That, If an occupational disease Is alleged, manifestation of such disease Is or was due to 
the nature of \he employment In which the hazards of such disease actually exist, are 
characteristic of and peculiar to the trade, occupation, process, or employment. 
X 6. That notice of the accident causing the Injury, or notice of the occupational disease, was 
given to the employer as soon as practical but not later than 60 days after such accident or 60 
days of the manifestation of such occupational disease. 
X 7. That the rate of wages claimed Is correct. If denied, state the average weekly wage 
pursuant to Idaho Code,§ 72-419: $461.64 
X 8. That the alleged employer was Insured or permissibly self-Insured under the Idaho Workers' 
Compensation Act, 
12. What benefits, if any, do you concede are due Claimant? 
Nona, 
Answer? Pagel of2 
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11, State with specificity what matters are In dispute and your reason for denying liability, together with any affirmative defenses, 
1. Defendants deny each and every allegation of the Complaint not specially admitted herein. 
2. Defendants deny that claimant's lumbar symptoms or any injury to his lumbar spine was caused by his 10/04/09 Industrial accident. 
3. Claimant is not entitled to any additional impairment other than what has already been paid. 
Under the Commission rules, you have 21 days from the date of service of the Complaint to answer the Complaint. A 
copy of your Answer must be malled to the Commission and a copy must be served on all parties or their attorneys by 
regular U.S. mail or by personal service of process, Unless you deny liability, you should pay Immediately the 
compensation required by law, and not cause the claimant, as well as yourself, the expense of a hearing. All 
compensation which is concededly due and accrued should be paid, Payments due should not be withheld because a 
Complaint has been filed. Rule 3.D,, Judicial Rules of Practice and Procedure under the Idaho Workers' Compensation 
Law, applies. Complaints against the Industrial Special Indemnity Fund must be flied on Form I.C. 1002. 
I AM INTERESTED IN MEDIATING THIS CLAIM, IF THE OTHER PARTIES AGREE. X YES - NO 
DO YOU BELIEVE THIS CLAIM PRESENTS A NEW QUESTION OF LAW OR A COMPLICATED SET OF FACTS? IF SO, PLEASE STATE. 
NO, 
Amount of Compensation Paid to Date Dated Signature of Defendant or Altorney 
i 
J 
t J Docembe6 2012 \\ PPD TTD Medical ' 
$16,741.00 $14,268.76 $93,069.17 
i 
! 
PLEASE COMPLETE ' 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
f j.,, . 
• . 1 
I hereby certify that on the lP day of December, 2012 I caused to be seNed a true and correct copy of the foregoing ANSWER upon; 
CLAIMANT'S NAME AND ADDRESS 
Mario Ayala 
c/o L. Clyel Berry 
PO Box 302 
Twin Falls, ID 83303-0302 
Via: _ personal service of process 
tJ regular U.S. Mall 
Answer-Pago 2 of 2 
EMPLOYER AND SURETY'S 
NAME AND ADDRESS 
State Insurance Fund 
1216 W. State Street 
Boise, ID 83720 
Via: _ personal service of process 
regular u.s.jvlaiJ 
// () \ 
I L,X,>- .J 
Signature\ 
:) 
INDUSTRIAL SPECIAL INDEMNITY FUND 
(If appllooblo) 
Via: _ personal service of process 
_ regular U.S. Malt 
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L. CLYEL BERRY, CHARTERED 
ATIORNEX AND COUNSELOR AT LAW 
P.O.BOX302 
Thin Falls, JD 83303-0302 
Telephone: 208/734-9962 
F,·1x Number: 208/734-9963 
IdU10 State Bar No. 1897 
BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 




ROBERT J. MEYERS FARMS, INC., 
Employer, 
and 






ROBERT J. MEYERS FARMS, INC., 
Employer, 
and 
STATE INSURANCE FUND, 
Surety, 
Defendants. 
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COMES NOW Claimant, in the above-referenced matters, causes and 
claims, pursuant to Rule 3 (B) of the Judicial Rules of Practice and Procedure, and 
hereby moves and petitions the Idaho State Industrial Commission for its Order of 
Consolidation, consolidating the above-referenced claims and actions for all further 
purposes herein. 
This Motion is made upon the grounds and for the reason that 
Claimant's injuries alleged and set-forth within ihe above-referenced actions may 
have resulted, either in whole or in part, by either the occurrence described within 
and giving rise to Claimant's cause asserted by and within his Complaint filed in 
IC No. 2001-520958; I.C. No. 2009-029533; or, by reason of the combination 
thereof, and/or that Defendants may have "common" defenses thereto, such that 
there are common issues presented by and within each of the above-captioned 
actions by reason of which the respective liability of Defendants therein cannot be 
determined except upon consolidation within a single proceeding. 
DATED this _Ip__ day of May, 2013. 
MOTION FOR ORDER OF CONSOLIDATION - 2 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
• · l hereby certify that I am a resident attorney of the State of Idaho and 
that on the _(9_ day of May, 2013, I served a copy of the foregoing document by 
depositing a true copy thereof in the United States mail, postage prepaid, 
addressed to the following: 
Paul J. Augustine 
AUGUSTINE LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
P.O. Box 1521 
Boise. ID 83701 
MOTION FOR ORDER OF CONSOLIDATION. 3 
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ROBERT J. MEYERS FARMS, INC., 
Employer, 
and 





ORDER TO CONSOLIDATE 
Pursuant to the Motion to Consolidate filed by Claimant's counsel on May 7, 2013, 
the Industrial Commission of the State of Idaho hereby ORDERS that those claims 
presently pending before the Commission known as IC Numbers 2009-029533 and 
2001-520958 are consolidated into a single proceeding. Future pleadings require reference 
to the two IC numbers listed above, but only a single document need be filed with the 
Commission. ~ 
DATED this~ day of May, 2013. 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
Michael E. Powers, Referee 
ORDER TO CONSOLIDATE - 1 
10
ATTES!: ~, .. · · .. 
,4jl(IJJ(J . /~ •. 
Assistant Cornm'ssion Secn;tary 
,· \ ,', 
··• ... · ..., t); II•/.\ • 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
-th 
I hereby certify that on the &I./ day of May, 2013, a true and c01Tect copy of the 
foregoing ORDER TO CONSOLIDATE was served by regular United States mail upon each 
of the following persons: 
L CL YEL BERRY 
PO BOX 302 
TWIN FALLS ID 83303 
PAUL J AUGUSTINE 
PO BOX 1521 
BOISE ID 83701 
ge 
ORDER TO CONSOLIDATE - 2 
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i 
L. CLYEL BERRY, CHARTERED 
ATTORNEY AND COUNSELORATIAW 
P.O. BOX 302 . 
Twm Falls, HJ 83303-0302 
Telephone: 208/734-9962 
Fax Number: 208/73,f,..9963 
Idaho State Bar No, 1897 
BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
MARIO A VALA, 
Claimant, 
vs. 
ROBERT J. MEYERS FARMS, INC., 
Employer, 
and 






ROBERT J. MEYERS FARMS, INC., 
Employer, 
and 




































1.C. No. 2001-520958 
I.C. No. 2009-029533 
MOTION FOR ORDER 
OF CONSOLIDATION 
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COMES NOW Claimant, in the above-referenced matters, causes and 
claims, pursuant to Rule 3 (B) of the Judicial Rules of Practice and Procedure, and 
MOTION FOR ORDER OF CONSOLIDATION -1 
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hereby moves and petitions the Idaho State Industrial Commission for its Order of 
Consolidation, consolidating the above-referenced claims and actions for all further 
purposes herein. 
Claimant advises that, pursuant to that Order to Consolidate, dated 
May 24, 2013, I.C. Nos. 2009-029533 and 2001-520958 were consolidated. Thusly, 
the instant Motion seeks to consolidate I.C. No. 2013-024075 into those 
proceedings, such that the three claims/actions are consolidated into a single 
proceeding. 
In support of the instant Motion, Claimant notes that both the employer 
and the employer's surety is "common" as among and between each of the three 
claims. Further, Defendants may have "common" defenses thereto, such that there 
are common issues presented by and within each of the above-captioned actions by 
reason of which the respective liability of Defendants together with the entitlement 
of Claimant to workers' compensation benefits cannot be determined except upon 
consolidation of said claims within a single proceeding. 
DATED this _/_L_ day of March, 2014. 
L. Clyel Berry 
Attorney for Claimant 
MOTION FOR ORDER OF CONSOLIDATION - 2 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I am a resident attorney of the State of Idaho and 
that on the -1J_ day of March, 2014, I served a copy of the foregoing document by 
depositing a true copy thereof in the United States mail, postage prepaid, 
addressed to the following: 
Paul J. Augustine 
AUGUSTINE LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
P.O. Box 1521 
Boise, ID 83701 
MOTION FOR ORDER OF CONSOLIDATION -3 
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ROBERT J. MEYERS FARMS, INC., 
Employer, 
and 






ORDER TO CONSOLIDATE 
i) t) 
(., ( j 
Pursuant to the Motion to Consolidate filed by Claimant's counsel on March 12, 
2014, the Industrial Commission of the State of Idaho hereby ORDERS that those claims 
presently pending before the Commission known as IC Numbers 2009-029533, 
2001-520958, and 2013-024075 are consolidated into a single proceeding. Future 
pleadings require reference to the three IC numbers listed above, but only a single 
document need be filed tfiith the Commission. 
DATED this ,98 day of March, 2014. 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
ORDER TO CONSOLIDATE - 1 
15
~~ 1~~;-UO 
c;·'··'" , •i VJ 1\ i 
' ',~ ,o ) 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
tb_ 
I hereby ce1iify that on the '98 day of March, 2014, a ttue and correct copy of the 
foregoing ORDER TO CONSOLIDATE was served by regular United States mail upon each 
of the following persons: 
L CL YEL BERRY 
POBOX302 
TWIN FALLS ID 83303 
PAUL J AUGUSTINE 
PO BOX 1521 
BOISE ID 83701 
go 
ORDER TO CONSOLIDATE - 2 
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L. CLYEL BERRY, CHARTERED 
ATTORNEY AND COUNSELOR AT LAW 
P.O.BOX 302 
Twm Falls, ID 83303-0302 
Telep/Jone: 208/734-9962 
Fax Number. 208/734-9963 
IdahoStateBarNo. 1897 
BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 




ROBERT J. MEYERS FARMS, INC., 
Employer, 
and 



















I.C. No. 2009-029533 
I.C. No. 2001-520958 
I.C. No. 2013-024075 
CLAIMANT'S MOTION TO 
ENFORCE AGREEMENT TO 
SETTLE; ALTERNATIVE 
MOTION FOR IMMEDIATE 
RE-SETTING OF HEARING; 
AND, FOR SANCTIONS, 
SPECIFICALL Y:--:TO .. ,~_ 
ENCOMPASS FEES --
L::_ ,::y, 
C0 __ , 
"~ 
V) r:;? 
Claimant herein, Mr. Mario Ayala, by and through his counsel of 
record hereby moves the Commission for its Order enforcing the parties' specific 
agreement/settlement of February 17, 2016. 
Relevant facts herein are clear and simple. Defendants, by and 
through Attorney Augustine, requested that Mr. Ayala submit his demand for 
settlement, by correspondence to counsel dated February 9, 2016. Hearing was set 
for February 18, 2016. Defendants were aware that Claimant had fully prepared for 
hearing. Claimant's Rule 10 Disclosure had been mailed to Mr. Augustine upon 
CLAIMANT'S MOTION TO ENFORCE AGREEMENT TO SETTLE; ALTERNATIVE MOTION FOR 
IMMEDIATE RE-SETTING OF HEARING; AND, FOR SANCTIONS, SPECIFICALLY TO 
ENCOMPASS FEES - 1 
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February 5. As requested by Defendants, Mr. Ayala's settlement demand was 
faxed to Mr. Augustine by counsel's correspondence of February 9, 2016. That 
proposal was specific that, " ... any settlement of this matter would require 
reservation of prospective/future medical benefits or the submission of a set-aside 
proposal to Medicare." It was further provided that the settlement proposal was only 
open to the point of hearing. Thereafter, this matter was negotiated by and through 
a series of telephone conversations between Mr. Augustine and counsel. 
Upon February 17, 2016, exactly one day prior to hearing herein, the 
parties reached settlement during and within a telephone conversation between Mr. 
Augustine and counsel, which was specific as to new monies to be paid; and, that 
"[m]edicals are reserved from the settlement, both past and prospective." These 
terms of the settlement were confirmed by counsel's fax to Mr. Augustine of 
February 17, 2016. By reason of the parties' agreement, Mr. Augustine's office 
advised the Commission on February 17, 2016, " ... that the parties have reached 
settlement in the above referenced matter. Accordingly the hearing on calendar for 
February 18, 2016 should be vacated." Pursuant to that representation, the 
Commission entered its Order Vacating Hearing dated and filed February 17, 2016. 
Counsel received his license to practice law in this state upon April 12, 
1976. Thereafter, during and throughout the following forty years to current date, 
counsel's practice has emphasized the representation of Title 72 claimants and, to 
lesser extent, injured individuals in civil matters. During this period counsel has 
represented Title 72 claimants in matters in which State Insurance Fund was the 
CLAIMANT'S MOTION TO ENFORCE AGREEMENT TO SETTLE; ALTERNATIVE MOTION FOR 
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responsible surety, in multiple and numerous occasions. Throughout this period of 
time counsel had never been involved in a claim against the Fund wherein the Fund 
had, through its attorney, agreed to specific terms of a settlement and thereafter 
refused to follow-through with the same. Counsel had absolutely no reason to 
suspect otherwise in the instant matter. 
Following the February 17, 2016, settlement of this matter, affiant 
advised Mr. Ayala, that the Fund would then prepare the formal Agreement which 
would be executed by the parties and submitted to the Commission for review and 
approval. Upon approval, the Fund would then issue settlement monies, which 
could be anticipated within approximately six weeks of February 17, 2016, absent 
question or concerns by the Commission upon review of the Agreement. 
In due course, the Fund did prepare a proposed Lump Sum 
Agreement. However, with the exception of the amount of the new 
monies/consideration for settlement, the Fund refused and is continuing to refuse to 
conform the Agreement to the specific negotiated-for terms of settlement reached 
upon February 17, 2016, being that "[m]edicals are reserved from the settlement, 
both past and prospective." 
During the negotiations which culminated in the February 17, 2016, 
settlement, it was emphasized by counsel to Mr. Augustine that the reservation of 
medicals was absolutely required, both to protect Mr. Ayala from the potential 
subrogation claims of his non-industrial health insurers; and, to protect Mr. Ayala 
and his counsel, prospectively, from the risk that Mr. Ayala would require medical 
CLAIMANT'S MOTION TO ENFORCE AGREEMENT TO SETTLE; ALTERNATIVE MOTION FOR 
IMMEDIATE RE-SETTING OF HEARING; AND, FOR SANCTIONS, SPECIFICALLY TO 
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treatment related to his low back, potentially to encompass multi-level fusion, 
following his 65th birthday the expenses for which would be submitted to Medicare, 
such that Medicare would have potential cause against Mr. Ayala and counsel. 
These terms were clearly expressed and agreed to by Mr. Augustine upon behalf of 
Defendants herein. Absolutely, there would not have been any settlement upon 
February 17, 2016, and this matter would have proceeded with and through hearing 
the next day, being February 18, 2016, but for Mr. Augustine advising of the 
acceptance of these terms. 
Most disturbing is certain of Mr. Augustine's correspondence to 
counsel of April 18, 2016, wherein he states that, 
I disagree with (counsel's) characterization of our 
'agreement' reached in February 17, 2016. The only 
enforceable 'agreement' is a lump sum signed by all the 
parties. Since we have not been able to reach an 
'agreement' with regard to the language of the lump 
sum, we do not have an enforceable 'agreement.' 
Clearly, Mr. Augustine was noting I.C. §§ 72-404 and/or 711. However, the first 
inquiry must be pursuant to I.C. § 72-711. It there states "[i]f the employer and the 
afflicted employee reach an agreement in regard to compensation under this law, a 
memorandum of the agreement shall be filed with the Commission, .... " Very 
clearly, an "agreement" was reached by the parties herein upon February 17, 2016. 
The terms of the agreement were simple and clear. That agreement was indeed 
characterized as a "settlement" by Attorney Augustine's office in correspondence to 
the Commission of February 17, 2016. That being the case, pursuant to I.C. § 72-
711, it is thereafter required that, " ... a memorandum of the agreement shall be filed 
CLAIMANT'S MOTION TO ENFORCE AGREEMENT TO SETTLE; ALTERNATIVE MOTION FOR 
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with the Commission." (Emphasis added.) It is the obligation of the Fund in this 
matter to take reasonable steps to comply with this mandate, by submitting a 
memorandum of the agreement to be filed with the Commission. Defendants' 
argument should only prevail if the Commission concludes that, upon consideration 
of counsel's correspondence to Mr. Augustine of February 17, 2016, and Attorney 
Augustine advising the Commission upon that date that the parties had reached a 
"settlement," the parties did not reach an "agreement." Otherwise, the Fund should 
be required to submit a memorandum/Lump Sum Agreement conforming to the 
terms of that settlement. Any other result would open the doors to exactly that 
which this Commission should not and can not allow, being the exact result sought 
to be achieved by the Fund and its attorney in the instant matter, that at a point in 
time at which it would be impossible to prepare and submit a formal Lump Sum 
Agreement to the Commission prior to hearing, for Title 72 defendants to make any 
and all representations to a claimant necessary for that claimant to agree to 
"settlement," and to vacate hearing, only thereafter to be faced, as in the instant 
matter, with the surety and the surety's counsel refusing to abide by the terms of the 
settlement after the hearing had been vacated. 
In the recent matter of Salinas v. Bridgeview Estates and Old 
Republic Insurance Company, I.C. 2011-014120, filed March 4, 2016, the 
Commission commented upon what it demanded regarding the attorney's behavior 
in Title 72 matters. There, the Commission determined that, 
... the 'no-holds-barred' mentality which is often a part of 
civil litigation has no place in workers' compensation 
CLAIMANT'S MOTION TO ENFORCE AGREEMENT TO SETTLE; ALTERNATIVE MOTION FOR 
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proceedings. Unlike civil litigation, which is truly an 
adversarial-based process, the goal of workers' 
compensation-to provide an injured employee with those 
statutory benefits to which the worker is entitled-should 
be shared by all parties. While honest differences of 
opinion may well exist when seeking to determine 
benefit entitlement, attempting to gain an advantage 
through gamesmanship, hyper-technical application of 
the procedural rules, subterfuge, harassment in any 
form, production delay, and similar tactics, will not be 
tolerated. 
The Commission then determined that JRP 16 is broad enough to sanction such 
abusive conduct and noted that I.C. § 72-715 addresses misbehavior and 
obstruction of the hearing process and provides penalties therefor. I.C. § 72-708 
provides that process and procedure under and pursuant to Title 72, Idaho Code, 
" ... shall be as summary and simple as reasonably may be and as far as possible in 
accordance with the rules of equity." Such is echoed by reference to Rule 1A, JRP, 
and notes that, " ... the Commission shall make such order, ruling or award as it 
determines is reasonable and just." 
Also pertinent to the instant controversy is JRP 3E, regarding filing of 
"other paper(s) of a party represented by an attorney." Although the February 17, 
2016, correspondence to the Commission from Mr. Augustine's office was signed 
by Mr. Augustine's Legal Assistant, it is clear that the same was under Mr. 
Augustine's directive. As such, that correspondence, advising the Commission of 
the "settlement" of the parties and that hearing scheduled for the following day 
should be vacated, was required to have been made " ... with sufficient grounds to 
support it, and that it is not submitted for delay or any other improper purpose." 
CLAIMANT'S MOTION TO ENFORCE AGREEMENT TO SETTLE; ALTERNATIVE MOTION FOR 
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Irrespective of the above-referenced theories, Rules and/or statutes, it 
is undeniable but that the "settlement" referenced by Attorney Augustine's February 
17, correspondence to the Commission, which was specific as to the condition that 
"medicals are reserved from the settlement, both past and prospective," was 
intended by Defendants to be relied upon by Mr. Ayala and his counsel in agreeing 
that the hearing, scheduled for the following day, be vacated. Most certainly, the 
doctrine of quasi-estoppal should now preclude Defendants from asserting that the 
"settlement" referenced within Mr. Augustine's office's February 17 correspondence 
to the Commission is not enforceable, as it was not reduced to writing and signed 
by the parties, which position is inconsistent with Defendants' prior 
position/representation to both Claimant/Claimant's counsel and to this Commission 
of February 17, 2016. Quasi estoppal applies when: 
(1) the offending party took a different position than his 
or her original position, and (2) either (a) the offending 
party gained an advantage or caused a disadvantage to 
the other party; (b) the other party was induced to 
change positions; or, (c) it would be unconscionable to 
permit the offending party to maintain an inconsistent 
position from one he or she has already derived a 
benefit or acquiesced in. 
Vawter v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 155 Idaho 903, 318 P.3d 893, 900-901 
(2014). Remarkably, Mr. Augustine was counsel for respondent ISIF, in that 
matter. 
As of instant date, as above-noted, Mr. Ayala has been deprived the 
benefit of the agreement made with Defendants upon February 17, 2016, and will 
continue to be so deprived until the resolution of this matter. Counsel has been 
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required to expend his office's resources in an effort to resolve this matter with 
Defendants and thereafter in bringing this controversy to the attention of the 
Commission. If the Commission fails to grant the instant Motion by requiring 
Defendants to conform to the specific terms of the "settlement" reached on February 
17, 2016, such that this matter is re-set, it must be noted that Defendants had 
absolute knowledge that counsel was in the process of closing his office by 
Claimant's earlier Motion to Vacate and Advance Date of Hearing, and thusly will be 
required to maintain his office and staff for the period required to proceed with and 
through hearing herein; the parties' post-depositions; and, post-hearing briefing, at a 
cost and/or expense which may well result in counsel's representation of Claimant 
being a net economic loss to counsel and his office. 
Alternatively, if the Commission determines that Defendants are 
neither bound by the February 17, 2016, agreemenUsettlement, or otherwise are 
estopped from asserting that the same is not enforceable, Claimant respectfully 
petitions the Commission that this matter be immediately re-set for hearing, to 
minimize the prejudice in economic consequences suffered by Claimant and 
counsel by reason of Defendants' conduct herein. 
Claimant and his counsel further respectfully petition the Commission 
for its Order imposing sanctions against Defendants by reason of Defendants' 
above-referenced and described conduct, with said sanctions to encompass 
Claimant's counsel's fees, at his hourly rate, for his recorded time from and 
following February 17, 2016, to the date of either the resolution of this matter or the 
CLAIMANT'S MOTION TO ENFORCE AGREEMENT TO SETTLE; ALTERNATIVE MOTION FOR 
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date that Claimant's Title 72 claim proceeds to hearing, which time has been 
exhausted solely by reason of Defendants' wrongful conduct herein; and, the 
reimbursement of counsel of the "hard" costs and overhead in keeping counsel's 
office open, maintained and staffed to the conclusion of any post-hearing briefing of 
the parties from and following June 1, 2016, the date at and by which it had been 
counsel's intent to vacate his offices. 
DATED this o2 / day of April, 2016. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I am a resident attorney of the State of Idaho and 
that on the/21_ day of April, 2016, I served a copy of the foregoing document by 
depositing a true copy thereof in the United States mail, postage prepaid, 
addressed to the following: 
Paul J. Augustine 
AUGUSTINE LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
P.O. Box 1521 
Boise, ID 83701 
L. Clyel 
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D ORIGINAL 
PAUL J. AUGUSTINE ISB 4608 
AUGUSTINE LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
1004 W. Fort Street 
Post Office Box 1521 
Boise, ID 83701 
Telephone: (208) 367-9400 
Facsimile: (208) 947-0014 
Attorneys for Employer/Surety 
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ROBERT J. MEYERS FARMS, INC., 
Employer, 
and 
STATE INSURANCE FUND, 
Surety, 
Defendants. 
IC No. 2009-029533 
2001-520958 
2013-024075 
DEFENDANTS' OPPOSITION TO 
CLAIMANT'S MOTION TO 
ENFORCE AND FOR SANCTIONS 
Defendants, by and through their counsel ofrecord, Paul J. Augustine of Augustine Law 
Offices, PLLC, hereby oppose potiions of Claimant's Motion dated April 21, 2016. Specifically, 
Defendants' oppose the Claimant's Motion to Enforce the "alleged" agreement referenced by 
Claimant's counsel in his February 17, 2016 con-espondence and Claimant's Motion for 
DEFENDANTS' OPPOSITION TO CLAIMANT'S MOTION TO ENFORCE AND FOR SANCTIONS - I 
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Sanctions to include attorneys' fees. As discussed in greater detail below, Defendants' do not 
oppose Claimant's Motion for a hearing on the merits of this matter. 
The crux of the Claimant's refusal to sign the proposed lump sum is his counsel's 
concern over potential subrogation claims for low back treatment billed to his insurer and 
Medicare issues for which Mr. Berry requested a hold harmless provision. Secondly, 
Defendants' counsel never made representations to Mr. BetTy that the Defendants' would carve 
out past unbilled medicals from the agreement or that the Defendants would not dispute future 
liability for low back treatment. Third, Defendants' agree to a hearing on the merits of the case. 
Claimant is still employed by his time of injury employer and thus has not suffered any prejudice. 
Lastly, there is no proof of any affirmative representations by Defendants' counsel to "reserve" 
past medicals or hold Mr. Berry harmless from any Medicare claims in the future for continued 
denial low back claims (other than his self-serving written letter of February 17, 2016). As a 
result his request for sanctions should be denied. 
On February 1, 2016 Defendants' requested that the Claimant submit a settlement 
proposal, in part because the Fund had not received any claims for medical expenses after 
October 2014 from any of the Claimant's providers. On February 9, 2016 Defendants' reiterated 
their request for a settlement demand. Later that day, Claimant's counsel provided Defendants 
with a settlement demand, including a statement requiring a reservation of any future medical 
benefits or the submission of a set aside proposal to Medicare. Consistent with the State 
Insurance Fund's practice to keep future medicals open as long as they have been accepted and 
not been disputed by the Fund, no Medicare set aside would be required. Notably Mr. Berry did 
DEFENDANTS' OPPOSITION TO CLAIMANT'S MOTION TO ENFORCE AND FOR SANCTIONS - 2 
27
not request reservation of past medicals as he now contends. 
Two days before the hearing, Februaiy 16, 2016, Defendants' counsel corresponded with 
Claimant's counsel to inform him of the following: (I) that the policy holder could not appeai· 
live due to kidney dialysis and (2) relaying a settlement offer. In this letter Defendants 
specifically informed Claimant and Claimant's counsel that the medicals would remain open "but 
denied on the low back based upon the opinions of his treating physicians and the fact that they 
billed his private health insurance rather than the State Insurance Fund." See Ex. 3. 
Shortly after receipt of this letter, both counsel negotiated a settlement figure. The 
settlement was designed to compensate Claimant for his alleged disability, close out any and all 
claims but left medicals open (disputed on the low back) because of the Claimant's Medicare 
eligibility consistent with prior correspondence. Apparently Claimant's counsel had a different 
understanding of the State Insurance Fund's offer regarding future medicals. But this was 
unknown to Defendants' counsel as his office informed the Commission at approximately 1 :38 
p.m. on February 17, 2016 that the case had settled based upon his conversation with Claimant's 
counsel. 
Later that day, unbeknownst to Defendants' counsel, Claimant's counsel sent a letter to 
Defendants' counsel which was faxed at 4:23 p.m. This correspondence reiterated the settlement 
amount and misstated that all medicals were reserved from the settlement both past and 
prospective. Rather, as indicated in Claimant's original demand only prospective medicals were 
to remain open but denied for future low back treatment. In Mr. Berry's correspondence of 
Februaiy 17, 2016 (which was received after the Commission was notified of the settlement), he 
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acknowledges that the Fund disputes any responsibility for Claimant's low back injury since 
October 2014 when his treating physicians stopped billing the Fund and began billing the 
Claimant's private health insurer. Then, for his own reasons, he added a concern over 
subrogation rights which was not previously expressed and never agreed to by Defendant when 
they made their settlement offer. Apparently Mr. Berry became concerned over the potential 
subrogation rights of the health insurers that were billed by Claimant's treating physician for his 
low back. It was not until 4:23 p.m. on the eve of hearing after the Commission had been 
notified of the settlement that the issue of subrogation was raised by Claimant's counsel. 
Moreover, Mr. Berry's letter was not received by defense counsel until the following day, 
February 18, 2016 due to its late receipt after counsel's assistant and counsel went home. 
Defendants never agreed to carve out of the settlement the subrogation rights of the 
Claimant's health insurer for his low back treatment which the Claimant's own treating physician 
indicated were not related to his original industrial accident. See Ex. 2. This is one of the major 
reasons Claimant's counsel has not agreed to the settlement agreement. In subsequent 
discussions designed to alleviate Mr. Berry's concerns over the subrogation rights of Claimant's 
health insurers, Defendants' counsel discovered that one of the health insurers had waived its 
subrogation rights and, tln·ough defense counsel's efforts the other health insurer (Select Health) 
agreed to waive its subrogation rights once it received correspondence from Dr. Montalbano 
(Claimant's treating physician) opining that Claimant's treatment after October 2014 was 
unrelated to his original industrial accident. 
Shortly thereafter Defendants' counsel amended the lump sum agreement to reflect that 
DEFENDANTS' OPPOSITION TO CLAIMANT'S MOTION TO ENFORCE AND FOR SANCTIONS - 4 
29
the State Insurance Fund was denying any past or future medical benefits/claims related to the 
Claimant's low back condition based upon Dr. Montalbano's opinion. At the time Defendants' 
counsel indicated to Mr. Beny that the Fund would not agree to a "hold harmless" language in 
the settlement agreement as Mr. Beny requested with regard to the subrogation claims and 
prospective Medicare claims involving Claimant's low back. Ex. 6. 
There is no basis for the Claimant's claims that Defendants should be estopped from 
denying the "agreement" which the Claimant alleges was reached on the day before the hearing 
in his late afternoon con-espondence of February 17, 2016. First, this self-serving 
con-espondence did not accurately reflect the understanding and agreement of the parties, 
specifically with respect to Claimant's medical bills both past and future for his low baack. 
Second, Defendants never made a representation to Claimant in writing or verbally that they 
would protect Claimant and his counsel from any subrogation claims relating to his low back 
condition or any future claims related to his low back that may be billed through Medicare. As a 
result there are no representations upon which an estoppel claim can be based. Third, the 
Claimant has not been prejudiced in any way by the failure of the parties to reach an agreement. 
Claimant is still gainfully employed by his time of injury employer. Claimant is not foreclosed 
from having a hearing on the merits of his claim. In fact, Defendants' counsel indicated to Mr. 
Beny and that if a hold harmless was a deal killer the Fund was prepared to go to hearing on the 
merits of the case. Ex. 6. Defendants are currently prepared to go to hearing on the merits of the 
case. As a result there is no prejudice to the Claimant and the application of estoppel is not 
wanted. 
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Since the Claimant and Defendants' have not signed a lump sum agreement approved by 
the Commission, there is no enforceable settlement agreement between the parties. The 
Commission cannot force the Defendants' to protect Mr. Beny as he would like because they 
will not agree to it. In Backes v. Depe11dable Fabricatio11, IC 2007-016312, the defendant/surety 
attempted to enforce a settlement agreement which was in writing but not signed by the claimant. 
Since the claimant did not sign the agreement, the Commission would not enforce the 
settlement. As opposed to this case, Backes the parties had agreed to the terms of the agreement 
but the claimant refused to sign. The Commission denied the Motion, stating: 
"A comi cannot make a contract for the patiies which the parties themselves 
have not agreed upon. Green v. Beaver State Contractors, Inc., 93 
Idaho 741,743,472 P.2d 307,309 (1970); Brothers v. Arave, 67 Idaho 171, 
175, 174 P. 2d 202,206 (1946). Similarly, the Commission cannot overstep 
its authority by attempting to enforce a settlement offer that has not been 
accepted by the Claimant or yet approved by the Commission. . . . Until a 
settlement offer is signed by all the parties, it remains merely an offer ... the 
Commission cannot enforce an action that does not yet exist by agreement of 
the parties." (See attached Order) 
Therefore, since the Claimant refused to sign the proposed lump sum drafted by Defendants, the 
Commission cannot enforce the agreement or the Claimant's counsel's understanding of the 
alleged agreement reflected in his February 17, 2016 correspondence. 
Finally, Claimant's argument that he is entitled to attorneys' fees or sanctions is 
unwarranted and not supported by Idaho Code § 72-804 or law. First, this whole dispute has 
been about protecting Mr. Berry. Mr. Berry has requested a hold harmless regarding the 
subrogation claims and future Medicare claims related to the Claimant's low back condition for 
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his own reasons not to protect the Claimant. It has always been the State Insurance Fund's 
contention to close the entire claim of the Claimant with the medicals left open on those injuries 
which his treating doctors believe are related to his 2009 accident. Since the Claimant's treating 
physician acknowledged that Claimant's current low back condition is unrelated to his industrial 
accident in 2009 and stopped billing the State Insurance Fund for said treatment in 2014, there 
would be no reason why the State Insurance Fund would suddenly agree to either litigate or pay 
those benefits. Since the Claimant will now have his day in Court, Claimant is not entitled to 
attorneys' fees for his counsel's misunderstanding of the terms of the agreement and his pursuit 
of a hold harmless which was never agreed to by the parties. 
DATED this )M day of May, 2016. 
AUGUSTINE LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
ustine - Of the Fitm 
r Employer/Surety 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the J/:_ dayofMay, 2016, I caused to be served a true copy 
of the foregoing DEFENDANTS' OPPOSITON TO CLAIMANT'S MOTION TO ENFORCE AND 
FOR SANCTIONS, by the method indicated below, and addressed to each of the following: 
L. Clyel Berry 
PO Box 302 
Twin Falls, ID 83303-0302 
Attorney for Claimant 




DEFENDANTS' OPPOSITION TO CLAIMANT'S MOTION TO ENFORCE AND FOR SANCTIONS - 8 
33




DEPENDABLE FABRICATION, INC., 
Employer, 
and 





DEFENDANTS MOTION TO 
ENFORCE SETTLEMENT 
Fl LED 
JUN 18 2015 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
The above-captioned case went to hearing on November 29, 2013. The parties presented 
evidence and the case was continued for the taking of post-hearing depositions and briefing. No 
post-hearing depositions or briefing occurred. In February 2014, the parties agreed to settle the 
case for a lump sum. Defendants prepared and forwarded the settlement documents to 
Claimant's counsel, who reviewed and approved them. Despite discussing the settlement 
documents with his counsel, Claimant did not sign the proposed settlement documents. Claimant 
then left the state and has not responded to repeated communication attempts from com1scl. On 
November 4, 2014, Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss. Claimant's counsel opposed the 
dismissal or the claim, stating the lack of legal or equitable reason to dismiss. A telephone 
conference was held on March 2, 2015 with counsel for the parties. On March 9, 2015, 
Defendants filed a Motion to Enforce Acceptance of Settlement. On March 30, 2015, Claimant's 
counsel filed an Affidavit responding to the Motion to Enforce, detailing his conversation with 
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Claimant regarding the lump sum offer before Claimant left the state and subsequent attempts to 
contact Claimant to accept the lump sum offer. On April 8, 2015, Referee Alan Taylor filed an 
Order Denying Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and Order to Show Cause relating to the above-
captioned case. Neither party responded to this Order with briefing regarding Defendant's 
Motion to Enforce Acceptance of Settlement. 
A Court cannot make a contract for the patties which the parties themselves have not 
agreed upon. Green v. Beaver State Contractors, Inc., 93 Idaho 741, 743, 472 P.2d 307, 309 
(1970); Brothers v. Arave, 67 Idaho 171, 175, 174 P.2d 202, 206 (1946). Similarly, the 
Commission cannot overstep its authority by attempting to enforce a settlement offer that has not 
been accepted by the Claimant or yet approved by the Commission. Absent Claimant's assent to 
the terms of settlement, we have no way of ascertaining whether it is in his best interests. See 
Idaho Code § 72-404. Until a settlement offer is signed by all the patties, it remains merely an 
offer. Despite the unusual circumstances surrounding this case and the desire of the involved 
attorneys to bring it to a close, the Commission cannot enforce an action that does not yet exist 
by agreement of the patties. The Commission therefore DENIES the Defendant's Motion to 
Enforce Acceptance of Settlement. IT rs SO ORDERED. 
DATED this lag-th day of T l,(;V 2015. 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
R.D. Maynard, Cha'an 
• 
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Thomas P, Baskin, Commissioner 
ATTEST: 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby ce11ify that on the {i_~y of <.J1J,.,t.l' , 20 I 5, a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS MOTION TO ENFORCE SETTLEMENT 
was served by regular United States Mail upon each of the following; 
STARR KELSO 
PO BOX 1312 
COEUR D'ALENE ID 83816 
PAUL J AUGUSTINE 
PO BOX 1521 
BOISE ID 83701 
ka 
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ROBERT J. MEYERS FARMS, INC., 
Employer, 
and 






ORDER ON CLAIMANT'S 
MOTION TO ENFORCE 
On April 25, 2016, Claimant filed a Motion to Enforce Agreement to Settle; Alternative 
Motion for Immediate Re-Setting of Hearing; and, For Sanctions, Specifically to Encompass 
Fees. With this motion, Claimant asks that the Commission enforce the "agreement/settlement" 
that the pai1ies verbally entered on February 17, 2016. In the alternative, he asks that the case be 
re-set for hearing. 
The above-captioned case was scheduled to go to hearing on February 18, 2016. 
Immediately prior to hearing, the pai1ies purp011edly reached a verbal understanding for 
settlement of the case. Defendant's counsel promptly notified the Commission that a settlement 
had been reached and that the hearing set for the following day should be vacated. The 
Commission vacated the hearing accordingly. Later that day, Claimant's counsel faxed a letter 
to Defendant's counsel reiterating what he believed the settlement agreement to entail. 
ORDER ON CLAIMAN'TS MOTION TO ENFORCE - 1 
37
According to Defendant's counsel, this correspondence misstated the agreement. Subsequently, 
the parties have been unable to agree upon the specific terms of the agreement and no settlement 
has actually been signed. 
A lump sum settlement agreement becomes a final decision when approved by the 
Commission. Idaho Code §72-404; Davidson v. H.H. Keim Co., 110 Idaho 758, 718 P.2d 1196 
(1986). The Commission will approve a settlement only when it appears that the settlement is in 
the best interests of the parties. A Court cannot make a contract for the paiiies which the parties 
themselves have not agreed upon. Green v. Arave, 67 Idaho 171, 175, 174 P.2d 202,206 (1946). 
From the voluminous filings submitted in suppmi of and in opposition to the motion to enforce, 
we conclude that while the parties may have thought they had reached agreement, they did not, 
in fact, have a shared understanding of the terms of settlement. We will not enforce a settlement 
where there is no meeting of the minds. Simply, there is no agreement to enforce, much less an 
agreement which is in the best interests of the patiies. Since there is no agreement, Claimant's 
motion to enforce agreement to settle is DENIED. 
In the alternative, Claimant asks that the matter be re-set for hearing. Since the paiiies 
are in obvious disagreement regarding the settlement of this case and neither pai'ly has an 
objection to re-setting this matter for heai-ing, Claimant's motion to re-set for hearing is 
GRANTED. 
Finally, Claimant asks that the Commission impose sanctions, specifically, attorney fees, 
against Defendants for their conduct in refusing to honor the verbal agreement entered on 
February 17, 2016. Idaho Code§ 72-804 provides that if an employer contested a claim without 
reasonable ground, or neglected or refused within a reasonable time after receipt of a written 
claim for compensation to pay to the injured employee, the employer shall pay reasonable 
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attorney fees in addition to the compensation provided by this law. The plain language of Idaho 
Code § 72-804 requires that an award of attorney fees be assessed when the Commission 
determines defendants have unreasonably denied benefits. Bradley v. Washington Group 
International, 141 Idaho 655, 659, 115 P.3d 746, 750 (2005). Claimant's request for attorney 
fees at this time is premature. Since the delay in this case is due to the parties inability to reach a 
settlement in the matter, and the case will be re-set for hearing, Claimant's request for attorney 
fees should be addressed at that time. Therefore, Claimant's motion for sanctions is 
DISMISSED. 
Accordingly, Claimant request for enforcement is DENIED, Claimant's motion to reset 
for hearing is GRANTED and Claimant's motion for sanctions is DISMISSED. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
DA TED this 7{:'1. day of '.J v//h../ , 2016, 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on -Ji!} day of C[L1/l,-Lt , 2016, a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing ORDER ON CLAIMANT'S MOTION TO ENFORCE was served by regular 
United States Mail upon each of the following: 
L. CL YEL BERRY 
POBOX302 
TWIN FALLS ID 83303-0302 
PAUL J AUGUSTINE 
PO BOX 1521 
BOISE ID 83701 
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} 
L. CLYEL BERRY, CHARTERED 
ATTORNEY AND COUNSELOR AT LAW 
P.O.BOX302 
Thw Falls, ID 83303-0302 
Telephone: 208/784-9962 
Fax Number: 208/734-9963 
Idaho Sta.te Bar No. 1897 
BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 




ROBERT J. MEYERS FARMS, INC., 
Employer, 
and 
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COMES NOW Claimant by and through counsel of record herein and 
hereby requests that hearing herein, set for October 26, 2016, encompass an issue 
not set-forth by that Notice of Hearing filed July 19, 2016, or requested by or within 
Claimant's Request for Calendaring, dated September 2, 2015, or Defendants' 
Response to Request for Calendaring, dated September 20, 2015, as follows: 
Whether, if it is determined that Claimant's low back injury, condition 
and/or presentment is causally related to or resultant of the industrial 
accidents/occurrences forming the basis of the instant consolidated 
proceeding; that Claimant does not yet present at maximum medical 
improvement related to said low back presentment; and, that 
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additional medical care, treatment and/or services are reasonably 
required by reason of said low back presentment, that the 
Commission reserve jurisdiction herein upon the issues of Claimant's 
entitlement to permanent impairment and permanent disability, 
inclusive of odd-lot status, with said issues to be 
considered/determined at the conclusion of Claimant's reasonably 
required medical care and achieving maximum medical improvement. 
In support of the instant Motion, counsel notes that the industrial 
occurrences which Claimant alleges his low back presentment is causally related to 
or resultant of occurred greater than five years ago, such that absent the 
Commission's reservation of jurisdiction Claimant would be precluded from 
asserting entitlement to either additional permanent impairment or disability, 
following the Commission's decision in the instant consolidated proceeding. 
DATED this~ day of August, 2016. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I am a resident attorney of the State of Idaho and 
that on the lk_ day of August, 2016, I served a copy of the foregoing document by 
depositing a true copy thereof in the United States mail, postage prepaid, 
addressed to the following: 
Paul J. Augustine 
AUGUSTINE LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
P.O. Box 1521 
Boise, ID 83701 
u 
L. Clyel 
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ROBERT J. MEYERS FARMS, INC., 
Employer, 
and 





ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR 
ADDITION OF ISSUE 
Claimant's Motion for Addition of Issue was filed August 23, 2016. No response having 
been received and good cause appearing therefor, 
The Industrial Commission of the State of Idaho hereby ORDERS that Claimant's motion 
is GRANTED. The hearing currently scheduled on October 26, 2016, at 10:00 a.m., for one day, 
City of Twin Falls, will include the following issue: 
Whether, if it is determined that Claimant's low back injury, condition 
and/or presentment is causally related to or resultant of the industrial 
accidents/occurrences forming the basis of the instant consolidated 
proceeding; that Claimant does not yet present if rrraximum medical ~-...........,, 
improvement related to said low back presentment; and, thaf"additional 
medical care, treatment and/or services are reasonably required by reason of 
said low back presentment, that the Commission reserve jurisdiction herein 
upon the issues of Claimant's entitlement to permanent impairment and 
permanent disability, inclusive of odd-lot status, with said issues to be 
considered/determined at the conclusion of Claimant's reasonably required 
medical care and achieving maximum medical improvement. 
DATED this 1:L_ day of September, 2016. 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
·1duUuti£~ IJ»t¾" 
Michael E. Powhs, Referee 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the / day of September, 20 I 6, a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing ORDER GRANTING MOTIO"'-1 FOR ADDITION OF ISSUE was served by regular 
United States Mail upon each of the following persons: 
L CLYEL BERRY 
PO BOX 302 
TWIN FALLS ID 83303 
PAUL J AUGUSTINE 
PO BOX 1521 
BOISE ID 83701 
!£.-mailed to Dean Willis 
go 0' -~ /;,~,. __ ,_,_,_ 
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ORIGINAL 
PAUL J, AUGUSTINE ISB 4608 
AUGUSTINE LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
1004 W. Fort Street 
Post Office Box 1521 
Boise, ID 83701 
Telephone: (208) 367-9400 
Facsimile: (208) 947-0014 
Attorneys for Employer/Surety 
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ROBERT J. MEYERS FARMS, INC., 
Employer, 
and 
ST A TE INSURANCE FUND, 
Surety, 
Defendants. 





Defendants Robert J. Meyers Farms, Inc. and State Insurance Fund, by and through their 
attorney of record, Paul J. Augustine, of the firm Augustine Law Offices PLLC, and pursuant to Rule 
10 of the Judicial Rules of Practice and Procedure, hereby notifies the Industrial Commission that it 
has served upon all other parties hereto complete, legible and accurate copies of all exhibits to be 
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offered into evidence at the hearing of the above-entitled matter. Said hearing is presently scheduled 
to begin at I 0:00 a.m. on October 26, 2016. 
The exhibits Defendants intend to offer at the Hearing are attached hereto. 
Exhibit "I" Records from Paul J. Montalbano, M.D. 
Exhibit "2" Records from Michael V. Hajjar, M.D. 
Exhibit "3" D. Peter Reedy, M.D. Concurrence with IME 
Exhibit "4" Howard W. Shoemaker, M.D. Letter dated 2-04-16 
Exhibit "5" Paid Cost Summary 
Exhibit "6" Claimant's Answers to Defendants' Discove1y 
Exhibit "7" Claimant's Tax Returns 
Exhibit "8" ICRD Records 
Exhibit "9" Bill Jordan's Employability Repmi 
Exhibit "IO" Deposition Transcript of Claimant taken on November 10, 2015 (the 
Original will be filed with the Industrial Commission) 
In addition, Defendants reserve the right to introduce any exhibit(s) offered by any other party and any answer: 
the Judicial Rules of Practice and Procedure under the Idaho Worker's Compensation Law, 
Defendants hereby notify the Industrial Commission that they intend to call the following 
witnesses at the hearing set for 10:00 a.m. on October 26, 2016. 
I) Jodi Scheiferstein ( via telephone) 
2) Robe1i J. Meyers 
3) Morgan Meyers 
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DATED this ~ay of October, 2016. 
AUGUSTINE LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
Attorneys r Employer/Surety 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the /~1" day of October, 2016, I caused to be served a true 
copy of the foregoing DEFENDANTS' RULE 10 DISCLOSURE, by the method indicated below, 
and addressed to each of the following: 
L. Clyel Berry 
PO Box 302 
Twin Falls, ID 83303-0302 
Attorney for Claimant 
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L. CLYEL BERRY, CHARTERED 
ATTORNEY AND COUNSELOR AT LAW 
P.O.BOX302 
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Fax Nwnber: 208/734-9963 
Idaho SUJ.te Bar No. 1897 
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COMES NOW Claimant, Mario Ayala, through counsel of record 
herein and pursuant to Rule 10 of the Judicial Rules of Practice and Procedure and 
hereby discloses Exhibits and Witnesses which Claimant may offer into evidence 
upon behalf of Claimant at the hearing of this matter, as follows: 
MEDICAL EXHIBITS: 
I. Prior to Ostober 14, 2001, date of accident 
1. Records of Glenns Ferry Medical Center for the period October 11, 
1985 to October 13, 2001 
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II. Following October 14, 2001, date of accident to October 5, 2009 
2. Records of Jeffrey F. Kieffer, D.C. 
a. Report of October 11, 2012 
3. Records of Glenns Ferry Health Center 
a. Pharmaceutical Data 
111. Following the October 6, 2009, date of accident to August 27, 2013 
4. Records of Emergency Department, Elmore Memorial Hospital 
5. Records of D. Peter Reedy, M.D. 
a. Report to Berry, dated August 23, 2010 
(1) Correspondence from Berry to Dr. Reedy, dated June 17, 2010 
b. Report to Berry, dated December 10, 2011 
c. Report to Berry, dated December 12, 2012 
(1) Correspondence from Berry to Dr. Reedy, dated November 20, 
2012 
d. Report to Berry, dated November 2, 2015 
(1) Correspondence from Berry to Dr. Reedy, dated October 28, 
2015 
e. Report to Attorney Augustine, dated January 7, 2016 
(1) Correspondence from Attorney Augustine to Dr. Reedy, dated 
December 17, 2015 
f. Report to Berry, dated January 19, 2016 
(1) Correspondence from Berry to Dr. Reedy, dated January 5, 
2016 
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6. Records of Glenns Ferry Health Center 
a. Completed Questionnaire by Vernon Mccready, PA-C, dated 
January 19, 2016 
(1) Correspondence to PA-C Mccready, from Berry, dated 
November 5, 2015 
(2) Correspondence to PA-C Mccready, from Berry, dated 
December 14, 2015 
(3) Correspondence to PA-C Mccready, from Berry, dated January 
5,2016 
7. Records of Mountain Home Physical Therapy 
8. Records of Orthopedic Associates/Ors. Schweiger, Hessing and 
Clawson 
9. Records of Richard Hammond, M.D./Neurology of Twin Falls 
10. Records of Michael Hajjar, M.D. 
a. Report to T.J. Martin, State Insurance Fund, dated November 14, 
2012 
b. Report to Attorney Augustine, dated January 27, 2016 
(1) Correspondence from Attorney Augustine to Dr. Hajjar, dated 
January 6, 2016 
c. Report to Berry, dated February 19, 2016 
(1) Correspondence to Dr. Hajjar from Berry, dated February 4, 
2016, without attachments 
11. Diagnostic Procedures 
IV. Following August 28, 2013 date of accident 
12. Records of Nampa Medical 
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13. Records of Miers Johnson Ill, M.D./St. Alphonsus Medical Group 
a. Mountain Home Physical Therapy 
14. Records of Howard Shoemaker, M.D. 
15. Records of Jeffrey F. Kieffer, D.C. 
16. Records of Glenns Ferry Health Center 
17. Records of Paul Montalbano, M.D. 
a. Report dated July 8, 2015 
(1) Letter to Dr. Montalbano from Berry, dated June 22, 2015 
18. Records of Mark J. Harris, M.D./ldaho Physical Medicine 
19. Diagnostic Procedures 
V. IME Reports 
20. Mark J. Harris, M.D. 
a. July31,2010reviewofrecords 
b. August 2, 2010 report 
(1) Letter to Dr. Harris from State Insurance Fund, dated July 26, 
2010 
(2) Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment, Sixth 
Edition, p. 27 
c. August 3, 2010 report 
d. August 15, 2011 report 
(1) Letter to Dr. Harris from State Insurance Fund, dated June 27, 
2011 
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e. September 21, 2012 report 
(1) Letter to Dr. Harris from State Insurance Fund, dated August 
30,2012 
f. October 18, 2012, report 
(1) Letter to Dr. Harris from State Insurance Fund, dated October 
15,2012 
(a) Letter to T.J. Martin, State Insurance Fund from Berry, 
dated October 4, 2012 
21. Paul Montalbano, M.D. 
a. Letter to Attorney Paul Augustine, dated April 26, 2013 
(1) Letter to Dr. Montalbano from Attorney Augustine, dated April 
2,2013 
b. Report dated October 8, 2015 to Attorney Augustine 
(1) Letter to Dr. Montalbano from Attorney Augustine, dated 
September 30, 2015 
c. Report dated October 3, 2016 to Attorney Augustine 
(1) Letter to Dr. Montalbano from Attorney Augustine, dated 
September 27, 2016 
22. Stanley Waters, M.D. 
23. Wright Physical Therapy FCE Report dated September 25, 2015 
a. Letter to Wright Physical Therapy from Berry, dated September 2, 
2015 
24. Dictation of Richard Hammond, M.D., dated August 1, 2016 
a. Letter to Dr. Hammond from Berry, dated June 22, 2016 
b. Letter to Dr. Hammond from Berry, dated July 1, 2016 
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c. Letter to Dr. Hammond from Berry, dated July 21, 2016 
d. Letter to Dr. Hammond from Berry, dated October 11, 2016 
VI. Medical Itemization re low back/lumbar presentment 
NON-MEDICAL EXHIBITS: 
25. First Reports of Injuries 
a. October 14, 2001 date of accident 
b. October 6, 2009 date of accident 
(1) Claimant Contacts dated November 20, 2009, December 21, 
2009;and,June7,2010 
(2) Policyholder Contact dated November 20, 2009 
c. August 28, 2013 date of accident 
26. Idaho Vehicle Collision Report re October 6, 2009, motor vehicle 
accident 
a. Photographs by investigating officer 
27. ICRD Records 
28.State Insurance Fund Title 72 Benefits Paid Summary 
a. Regarding the October 14, 2001 date of accident 
b. Regarding the October 6, 2009 date of accident 
(1) Permanent partial impairment conceded by Defendants 
c. Regarding the August 28, 2013 date of accident 
29. Copies of Correspondences 
a. Letter to State Insurance Fund/Mr. Martin from Berry dated 
December 14, 2011 
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b. Letter to Mr. Martin from Berry, dated March 7, 2012 
c. Letter from Mr. Martin to Berry, dated March 12, 2012 
d. Letter to Mr. Martin from Berry, dated October 15, 2012 
e. Letter from Mr. Martin to Berry, dated November 14, 2012 
f. Letter to Attorney Augustine from Berry, dated December 17, 2012 
g. Letter to Attorney Augustine from Berry, dated March 4, 2013 
h. Letter to Attorney Augustine from Berry, dated March 27, 2013 
i. Letter to Attorney Augustine from Berry, dated May 6, 2013 
j. Letter from Attorney Augustine to Berry, dated May 29, 2013 
k. Letter to Attorney Augustine from Berry, dated January 13, 2016 
I. Letter from Attorney Augustine to Berry, dated February 16, 2016 
m. Letter to Mr. Ayala from Mr. Robert Meyers, dated December 3, 
2014 
n. Letter to Attorney Augustine from Berry, dated August 22, 2016 
o. Letter to Attorney Augustine from Berry, dated October 11, 2016 
30. Defendants' Response to Discovery 
a. Defendants' Answers to Interrogatories to Defendants, dated 
January 24, 2014 
(1) Defendants' Answers to Continued Interrogatories, dated 
January 5, 2016 
(a) Defendants' Supplemental Answers to Continued 
Interrogatories to Defendants, dated February 2, 2016 
(2) Defendants' Supplemental Answers to Interrogatories to 
Defendants, dated February 2, 2016 
Claimant's Rule 10 Disclosure - 7 
55
b. Defendants' Response to Requests for Production of Documents 
to Defendants, dated January 24, 2014, (excerpts) 
(1) Defendants' Answers to Continued Requests for Production of 
Documents to Defendants, dated January 5, 2016 
c. Defendants' Answers to Interrogatories to Defendants re: August 
28, 2013, Accident at Issue in I.C. 2013-024075, dated January 5, 
2016 
d. Defendants' Answers to Requests for Production of Documents to 
Defendants re: August 28, 2013, Accident at Issue in I.C. 2013-
024075, dated January 5, 2016 
e. Defendants' Supplemental Answers to Claimant's Interrogatories 
and Requests for Production of Documents to Defendants, dated 
October 11, 2016 
f. State Insurance Fund's Claims File (excerpts) as attached to 
Defendants' Notice of Compliance with Order Granting Motion to 
Compel, dated August 18, 2016 
31. Claimant's Response to Discovery 
a. Claimant's Answers to Interrogatories dated October 7, 2013 
regarding I.C. No. 2001-520958 
b. Claimant's Answers to Interrogatories dated October 7, 2013 
regarding I.C. No. 2009-029533 
c. Claimant's Supplemental Answers to Interrogatories, dated 
January 11, 2016, regarding I.C. Nos. 2001-520958; 2009-029533; 
and, 2013-024075 
(1) Claimant's Second Supplemental Answers to Defendants' First 
Set of Interrogatories to Claimant, dated September 22, 2016 
(Re: I.C. Nos. 2001-520958; 2009-029533; and, 2013-024075) 
d. Claimant's Answers to Defendants' Second Set of Interrogatories 
to Claimant, dated September 19, 2016 
32. Vocational Report of Nancy J. Collins, Ph.D., dated February 2, 2016 
a. Letter to Dr. Collins from Berry, dated December 16, 2015 
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b. Letter to Dr. Collins from Berry, dated February 5, 2016 
c. Letter to Dr. Collins from Berry, dated September 28, 2016 
33. Transcript of Deposition of Claimant, taken November 10, 2015, (to be 
produced at hearing) 
DISCLOSURE OF PROBABLE WITNESSES: 
1. Claimant, Mario Ayala. 
2. PA-C Vernon Mccready, of Nampa, Idaho, to be taken by post-
hearing deposition. 
3. Drs. Schweiger, Hessing and Clawson, care of Orthopedic Associates, 
of Boise, Idaho, to be taken by post-hearing deposition. 
4. Michael Hajjar, M.D., of Boise, Idaho, to be taken by post-hearing 
deposition. 
5. D. Peter Reedy, M.D., of Boise, Idaho, to be taken by post-hearing 
deposition. 
6. Miers Johnson, Ill, M.D., of Boise, Idaho, to be taken by post-hearing 
deposition. 
7. Bryan Wright DPT, care of Wright Physical Therapy, of Twin Falls, 
Idaho, to be taken by post-hearing deposition. 
8. Richard Hammond, M.D., care of St. Luke's Clinic - Neurology of Twin 
Falls, Idaho, to be taken by post-hearing deposition. 
9. Nancy J. Collins, Ph.D., of Boise, Idaho, to be taken by post-hearing 
deposition. 
DATED this jJ_ day of October, 2016. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I am a resident attorney of the State of Idaho and 
that on the 13th day of October, 2016, I served a copy of the foregoing document, by 
depositing a true copy thereof in the United States mail, postage prepaid, upon the 
following: 
Paul J. Augustine 
AUGUSTINE LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
P.O. Box 1521 
Boise, ID 83701 
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ROBERT J. MEYERS FARMS, INC., 
Employer, 
and 





ORDER REGARDING HEARING 
EXHIBITS 
Referee Michael E. Powers conducted a hearing in Twin Falls on October 
26, 2016. At hearing, the Referee reserved ruling of certain of Claimant's proposed 
exhibits. After having had the opportunity to review the hearing transcript and 
comments of counsel, the following exhibits are hereby admitted into the record: 
Claimant's Exhibits: 
► 20 and 21 
► 20B 1 and 2 
► E-1 and F-1 and F-l(a) 
► 3-A 
► 29-L 
► 20 B-2 
► 695 E-H 
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Recognizing that there was some confusion regarding the admission/non-
admission of exhibits at hearing, the Referee invites the parties to timely inform the 
Commission if there are any further additions, modifications, or anything else of 
significance regarding this order. 
ot/,J 
DATED this~·- day of November, 2016. 
INDUSTRIAL CO MISSION 
ATTEST: . ' ,;, 
-d'}rvq 1'1i,ei102W'y _,.··. 1,. 
Assistant Comis~iop: Secpetary 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
·-J!J. 
I hereby certify that on the /g day of November, 2016, a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing ORDER REGARDING HEARING EXHIBITS was served by 
regular United States Mail upon each of the following persons: 
L CL YEL BERRY 
PO BOX 302 
TWIN FALLS ID 83303 
PAUL J AUGUSTINE 
PO BOX 1521 
BOISE ID 83701 
,, <?/ ••• w,~ .•. ,. 
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) 
L. CLYEL BERRY, C;l-IARTERED 
ATTORNEY AND COUNSELOR AT LAW 
P.O.BOX302 
Tif'in Fa.is, ID 83303-0302 
Telephone: 208/734-9962 
Fax Number: 208/733-3619 
Idaho State Bar No. 1897 
BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
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Employer, 
and 



















I.C. No. 2009-029533 
1.C. No. 2013-024075 
CLAIMANT'S MOTION 




COMES NOW Claimant by and through counsel of recofd anclhereby 
respectfully requests that the Commission clarify its November 18, 2016, Order 
Regarding Hearing Exhibits. Said Order determined that certain of Claimant's 
proposed exhibits \Vere admitted into the recoid 1 as fo!lo\ivs: 
"20 and 21 
20B1 and 2 
E-1 and F-1 and F-1 (a) 
3-A 
29-L 






Comparing the Commission's November 18, 2016, Order with the 
October 26, 2016, Hearing Transcript, at page 8, L. 12 through page 18, L. 10 
together with Claimant's Rule 10 Exhibits, Claimant wishes to confirm that the 
following of Claimant's Exhibits are admitted of record herein: 
Exhibit 2 and 2.a. 
Exhibit 3, commencing with page 116, being the Encounter Report, for 
September 14, 2007, and Exhibit 3.a. 
Exhibits 4-VI 
Exhibits 25.b. through 27 
Exhibit 28.b. through 33 
Conversely, the only exhibits within Claimant's Rule 10 Disclosure not 
admitted are as follows: 
Exhibit 1 
Exhibit 3, from and including page 46 through and including page 115 - . 
Exhibit 25.a. 
Exhibit 28.a. 
DATED this~ day of November, 2016. 
L. Clyel erry 
Attorney for Claimant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I am a resident attorney of the State of Idaho and 
that on the R day of November, 2016, I served a copy of the foregoing document 
by depositing a true copy thereof in the United States mail, postage prepaid, 
addressed to the following: 
Paul J. Augustine 
AUGUSTINE LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
P.O. Box 1521 
Boise, ID 83701 
L. 
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To: Page 2 of 4 2016-12-30 19:06:04 (GMT) 1-20,8-947-0014 From: ALlgLJstine Law Offices PLLC 
PAUL ,I. AUGUSTINE ]SB 4608 
AUGUSTIN!,.LAW ()Fl'ICES, f'LLC 
1004 W. Fort Sttcc1 
Post Office Box 1521 
Bois~, ID 8370 I 
Telephone: (208) 167-9400 
Facsimile: (208) 947-0014 
Attorneys for Employe!'/Surety 




ROBE.RT J. iVIEYERS FARMS., INC.,. 
Employer, 
and 
STATE INSURANCE FUND, 
Surely, 
Defondanls. 
JC No. 2009-029533 
2001-520958 
2013-024075 
l)EJ1'ENOANTS' RESPONSE TO 
CLAIMANT A'S MOTION F'OR 
CLAR1FlCATION OF ORDER 
REGARDlNG HEARING EXHIBITS 
F D 
Defondm1t~. l:,y and through their coun.sd of record, Paul J. Augustine ofAugustine Law 
Offices, PLLC. hereby Responds to Claimant's Motion for Clarificntion of Order Regarding 
Hearing Exhib.its 4S follows: 
I. Defendants agree with Claim~nt's motion that Exhibits 2 and 2.a., Exhibit 3 
DEFENDANTS' R!'SPONSE TO Cl,AIMANT'S M~JTION FOK CLARlFICATION OF ORDER RFGARfl!NG 
HEARING EXHIBITS - I 
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To: Page 3 of 4 2016-12-30 19:06:04 (GMT) 1-2,~8-947-0014 From: Augustine Law Offices PLLC 
c'ownwncing on page 1.16, Exhibit 3,11., Exhibits 4-VL E'xbibit.s 25.b. through 27 and Exhibit 
28.b, through 33 sho1ild all be.admitted. Additiomilly, Dcfondi111ts contend 1hal Exhibit 3 from 
page 48 through pt1gc 1 15 should also .be ndmitted as DefrndMts did ncli object the admission of 
these-re~ord$ nndrequt:sted that all of' Claimant's .Exhibits other than which Defendants did not 
,1hject 10 be admitted. 
PATED ihis 1;,;:.!'(foy of December, 2016. 
AU(JlJST!NE LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
Paul J. Aq ,stine - Ofthe Fim1 
Attorncvs r Ernployer/Surety , u . . . . 
DEFENDANTS' RESPONSCro CLAIMANT'S MOTION FOR CLAIR!P!CATION OF ORDER REGARDING 
HEARING EXHIBITS. 2 
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To: Page 4 of 4 2016-12-30 19:06:04 (GMT) 1-?_gB-947-0014 From: Al!gustine Law Offices PLLC 
CERTIFICATE OF SJ;RVICE 
lHEREBYCERTIFY that on the!i,f:, dayofDecen1ber, 2016, J caused to b.e served a true 
copy of the foregoing DEFENDANfS' RESPONSE TO CLAIMANT'S MOTION FOR 
CLARIFICATJON OF ORDER REGARDING HEARING EXHIBJTS, by the method indicated 
below, and addresBed.to each of the following: 
L Clyel Berry 
STGPHAN, K \I ANVIG, STONE & TRAINOR 
P OBox 83 
Twip.FaJ.ls,ID 83303-008., 
Atrnrney.fbr Claimant 





DEFENl.)1\NTS' RESPONSE TO CLAIMANT'S MOTION FOR CLARIFICATION or ORDER REGARDING 
HEARING EXHIBITS- .1 
12/30/2016 FRI 12:08 [TX/RX NO 6544] lilJ004 
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01/03/2017 11:49AM FAX 2087333619 SKS&T 
STEPHAN, KVANVIG, STONE & TRAINOR 
L. Clyel Berry - ISB #1897 ' 
P. 0. Box 83 
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ROBERT J. MEYERS FARMS, INC., 
Employer, 
and 
STATE INSURANCE FUND, 
Surety, 
Defendants. 
I.C. No. 2009-029533 
I.C. No. 2013-024075 
CLAIMANT'S OBJECTION; MOTION 
TO STRIKE; AND, REPLY TO 
DEFENDANTS' RESPONSE TO 
CLAIMANTS' MOTION FOR 
CLARIFICATION OF ORDER 
REGARDING HEARING EXHIBITS 
Claimant, by and through counsel of record, hereby objects and replies to 
Defendants' Response to Claimant's Motion for Clarification of Order Regarding Hearing 
Exhibits, as follows: 
CLAIMANT'S OBJECTION; MOTION TO STRIKE; AND, REPLY TO DEFENDANTS' 
RESPONSE TO CLAIMANTS' MOTION FOR CLARIFICATION OF ORDER 
REGARDING HEARING EXHIBITS - 1 
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STEPHAN, KVANVIG, STONE & TRAINOR 
L. Clyel Berry - ISB #1897 
P. 0. Box 83 





Attorney for Claimant 
JI.~ ' 
! 
BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 




ROBERT J. MEYERS FARMS, INC., 
Employer, 
and 
STATE INSURANCE FUND, 
Surety, 
Defendants. 
LC. No. 2009-029533 
LC. No. 2013-024075 
CLAIMANT'S OBJECTION; MOTION 
TO STRIKE; AND, REPLY TO 
DEFENDANTS' RESPONSE TO 
CLAIMANTS' MOTION FOR 
CLARIFICATION OF ORDER 
REGARDING HEARING EXHIBITS 
Claimant, by and through counsel of record, hereby objects and replies to 
Defendants' Response to Claimant's Motion for Clarification of Order Regarding Hearing 
Exhibits, as follows: 
CLAIMANT'S OBJECTION; MOTION TO STRIKE; AND, REPLY TO DEFENDANTS' 
RESPONSE TO CLAIMANTS' MOTION FOR CLARIFICATION OF ORDER 
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OBJECTION AND MOTION TO STRIKE 
Claimant's Motion for Clarification was dated and bears a Certificate of 
Service of November 22, 2016. Rule 3F2 provides a period of fourteen (14) days from the 
filing of a Motion for the opposing party to file_ a response. Defendants' Response to 
Claimant's Motion was dated December 30, 2016, filed thirty-eight (38) days following the 
filing of Claimant's Motion for Clarification, and is thusly untimely by a period of twenty-four 
(24) days, without excuse, explanation or justification by Defendants. Upon said basis, 
Claimant respectfully petitions the Idaho State Industrial Commission to strike the same 
as being untimely. 
REPLY TO DEFENDANTS' RESPONSE 
Should the Commission fail to grant Claimant's Motion to Strike Defendants' 
Response, Claimant notes that Defendants concur with Claimant's Motion for Clarification 
in all respects excepting pages 48 through 115 within Claimant's Exhibit 3, which 
Defendants wish admitted. Defendants' request is based upon the argument that, 
... Defendants did not object the admission of these records 
and request that all of Claimant's Exhibits other than which 
Defendants did not object to be admitted. 
In the instant matter, it is clear that there was no agreement by and between 
the parties for the admission of any "joint exhibit or exhibits." In fact, comparing 
Defendants' Rule 1 O Disclosure to Claimant's Rule 10 Disclosure, it is seen that there was 
significant overlap and/or duplication as between the proposed exhibits to be offered by 
Defendants and those instruments and/or records within Claimant's Rule 10 Disclosure. 
Such overlap and/or duplication of exhibits was the subject of the colloquy between 
counsel and Referee Powers within the Transcript of Hearing, commencing at line 16 on 
CLAIMANT'S OBJECTION; MOTION TO STRIKE; AND, REPLY TO DEFENDANTS' 
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page 31 through page 32, line 14. Simply stated, Defendants could have offered any 
exhibit which they wished to be admitted of record in these proceedings by complying with 
Rule 10, JRPP. Defendants were and are withouJ basis in seeking the admission of 
record of any of the documents and/or records identified within Clamant's Rule 10 
Disclosure. Specifically, referencing the language set-forth within Claimant's Disclosure 
at page 1 thereof, it is provided that, 
Claimant, Mario Ayala, through counsel of record and pursuant 
to Rule 10 of the Judicial Rules of Practice and Procedure 
hereby discloses Exhibits and Witnesses which Claimant may 
offer into evidence upon behalf of Claimant at the hearing of 
this matter, ... 
Most certainly, there was no affirmation, promise, representation or otherwise 
upon behalf of Claimant that each of the instruments and/or records set-forth within 
Claimant's Disclosure would be offered into evidence by Claimant at hearing. 
In fact, Claimant did not offer into evidence that portion of Exhibit 3, from 
page 48 through page 115 thereof. As that portion of Exhibit 3 was not offered into 
evidence by Claimant, there was no reason for Defendants to object to the admission of 
the same. Claimant did offer into evidence that portion of Exhibit 3, commencing with 
page 116, being Claimant's presentment to Glenns Ferry Health Center on September 14, 
2007, greater than two (2) years prior to the October 6, 2009, accident at issue in these 
proceedings. 
Prior to the commencement of the October 26, 2016, hearing, Claimant 
withdrew the October 14, 2001, claim which had been part and parcel of these 
consolidated proceedings, leaving at issue the 2009 and 2013 claims. The portion of 
Claimant's Exhibit 3 withdrawn and not offered into evidence by Claimant relates to a 
myriad of medical presentments by Claimant for the period December 4, 2001 through May 
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21, 2007, and was disclosed by Claimant as potential exhibits prior in time to the decision 
to withdraw the 2001 claim from these proceedings. Even were these records relevant to 
the 2009 or 2013 claims, Defendants are without basis to argue for the admission of any 
portion of Claimant's Exhibits not offered into evidence by Claimant. 
As noted by Rule 10F, JRPP, "[t]he filing of a document ... does not signify 
its admission in evidence, .... " In summary, there was no agreement by and between 
Claimant and Defendants that any of the documents and/or instruments identified within 
Claimant's Rule 10 Disclosure would, in fact, be offered into evidence at hearing. Rather, 
the Disclosure clearly stated that the identified documents, records and/or instruments 
were those " ... which Claimant may offer into evidence ... at the hearing of this matter, .... " 
Clearly Defendants did not rely upon Claimant's Rule 10 Disclosure, to any extent, as 
evidenced by the extent of the overlap and/or duplication as between Claimant's and 
Defendants' Disclosures. Allowing Defendants to "bootstrap" records and/or documents 
into the record in this manner is believed to be without precedent; most certainly conflicts 
with Rule 10, JRPP; and, should not be allowed. 
Dated this 2_ day of January, 2017. 
STEPHAN, KVANVIG, STONE & TRAINOR 
1/1 
By_........\,...,D,~.c::_~..L.---+----
L. Clyel Be[ 
Attorney for Claimant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I am a resident attorney of the State of Idaho and that on 
the 1.2_ day of January, 2017, I served a copy of the foregoing document by facsimile to 
the following: 
Paul J. Augustine 
AUGUSTINE LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
Fax No.: (208) 947-0014 
L. Clyel B 
\ 
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ROBERT J. MEYERS FARMS, INC., 
Employer, 
and 





ORDER ON CLAIMANT'S MOTION 
TO STRIKE; 
AMENDED ORDER REGARDING 
HEARING EXHIBITS 
On November 23, 2016, Claimant filed a Motion for Clarification of Order Regarding 
Hearing Exhibits. Defendants' Response to Claimant's Motion for Clarification of Order 
Regarding Hearing Exhibits was filed December 30, 2016. 
On January 3, 201 7, Claimant filed an Objection; Motion to Strike, and Reply to 
Defendants' Response to Claimant's Motion for Clarification of Order Regarding Hearing 
Exhibits. 
With regard to Claimant's Objection and Motion to Strike, the motion is GRANTED. 
Defendants' Response to Claimant's Motion for Clarification of Order Regarding Hearing 
Exhibits was untimely. No request for extension was received prior to the date that 
Defendant's response was due. 
With regard to Claimant's Motion for Clarification of Order Regarding Hearing 
Exhibits, the motion is GRANTED, and the following exhibits are admitted: 
ORDER ON CLAIMANT'S MOTION TO STRIKE; AMENDED ORDER REGARDING 





► Exhibit 2 and 2.a. 
► Exhibit 3, commencing with page 116, and Exhibit 3.a. 
► Exhibits 4-VI 
► Exhibits 25.b. through 27 
► Exhibit 28.b. through 33 
DATED this day of January, 2017. 
ATTEST· • ··· . ··· 
. c'1unc1· (.1/fJ1\ fw,ci ; 




Michael E. Powers, Referee 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the /0-/i.Lday of January, 2017, a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing ORDER ON CLAIMANT'S MOTION TO STRIKE; AMENDED ORDER 
REGARDING HEARING EXHIBITS was served by regular United States Mail upon each of 
the following persons: 
L CL YEL BERRY 
PO BOX 302 
TWIN FALLS ID 83303 
PAUL J AUGUSTINE 
PO BOX 1521 
BOISE ID 83701 
ge o/, •• If,~ .•• ,. 
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OlUGINAL 
PAUL J. AUGUSTINE ISB 4608 
AUGUSTINE LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
1004 W. Fort Street 
Post Office Box 1521 
Boise, ID 83701 
Telephone: (208) 367-9400 
Facsimile: (208) 947-0014 
Attorneys for Employer/Surety 
1011 JAN 10 P 3: 10 
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ROBERT J. MEYERS FARMS, INC., 
Employer, 
and 
STATE INSURANCE FUND, 
Surety, 
Defendants. 
IC No. 2009-029533 
2001-520958 
2013-024075 
DEFENDANTS' RESPONSE TO 
CLAIMANT A'S MOTION FOR 
CLARIFICATION OF ORDER 
REGARDING HEARING EXHIBITS 
Defendants, by and through their counsel of record, Paul J. Augustine of Augustine Law 
Offices, PLLC, hereby Responds to Claimant's Motion for Clarification of Order Regarding 
Hearing Exhibits as follows: 
1. Defendants agree with Claimant's motion that Exhibits 2 and 2.a., Exhibit 3 
DEFENDANTS' RESPONSE TO CLAIMANT'S MOTION FOR CLARIFICATION OF ORDER REGARDING 
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commencing on page 116, Exhibit 3.a., Exhibits 4-VI, Exhibits 25.b. through 27 and Exhibit 
28.b. through 33 should all be admitted. Additionally, Defendants contend that Exhibit 3 from 
page 48 through page 115 should also be admitted as Defendants did not object the admission of 
these records and requested that all of Claimant's Exhibits other than which Defendants did not 
object to be admitted. 
DATED this ;-;,-l"day of December, 2016. 
AUGUSTINE LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
stine - Of the Firm 
Attorneys r Employer/Surety 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the~ day of December, 2016, I caused to be served a true 
copy of the foregoing DEFENDANTS' RESPONSE TO CLAIMANT'S MOTION FOR 
CLARIFICATION OF ORDER REGARDING HEARING EXHIBITS, by the method indicated 
below, and addressed to each of the following: 
L. Clyel Berry 
STEPHAN, KV ANVIG, STONE & TRAINOR 
PO Box 83 
Twin Falls, ID 83303-0083 
Attorney.for Claimant 
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STEPHAN, KVANVIG, STONE & TRAINOR 
L. Clyel Berry - ISB #1897 
P. 0. Box 83 





Attorney for Claimant 
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ROBERT J. MEYERS FARMS, INC., 
Employer, 
and 
STATE INSURANCE FUND, 
Surety, 
Defendants. 
1.C. No. 2009-029533 
1.C. No. 2013-024075 
CLAIMANT'S MOTION FOR, LEAVE: 
TO RE-EXAMINE AND/OR; ~ECALL 
RICHARD J. HAMMOND, M:D .. 
Comes now Claimant, by and through counsel of record herein, and hereby 
petitions the Idaho State Industrial Commission for leave allowing Claimant to recall and/or 
re-examine Richard J. Hammond, M.D., in the instant proceedings. The instant Motion is 
made for the reasons and upon the grounds as set-forth within the Affidavit of Richard J. 
CLAIMANT'S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO RE-EXAMINE AND/OR RECALL RICHARD J. 
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Hammond, M.D. and/or the Affidavit of Claimant's counsel, Clyel Berry, of even date 
herewith. 
Central to the instant Motion is the fact that Claimant's medical expert, Dr. 
Richard Hammond, a board-certified neurologist, had been provided with basically all of 
Claimant's medical records for the period commencing approximately two years prior to his 
October 6, 2009, motor vehicle accident through the date of the hearing herein, inclusive 
of several disks containing and/or setting-forth the actual diagnostic studies involving Mr. 
Ayala's low back, generally, and specific to the L3-4, L4-5 and L5-S1 levels. That prior to 
his deposition, Dr. Hammond had personally reviewed all of the medical records submitted 
to him with the exception of the disks having the diagnostic studies, which Dr. Hammond 
had been unable to open. Unfortunately, Dr. Hammond had not advised counsel of his 
lack of success in opening these disks prior to the taking of his deposition. Otherwise, 
Berry would have vacated and re-set Dr. Hammond's deposition, to afford Dr. Hammond 
sufficient time to resolve the difficulty with the disks and/or to obtain duplicate disks of said 
diagnostic studies for Dr. Hammond's pre-deposition review. 
Although Dr. Hammond did personally review the radiologists' respective 
reports concerning the diagnostic studies contained within the disks, to the extent that the 
Commission may find it significant that Dr. Hammond did not review the actual film of the 
diagnostic studies, such that Mr. Ayala and his claim may be prejudiced thereby, Claimant 
respectfully requests leave to recall Dr. Hammond as witness in these proceedings so as 
to allow Dr. Hammond to testify regarding the various diagnostic studies above-referenced 
together with the significance thereof upon Dr. Hammond's opinion and testimony upon the 
issues of the causal relation of Mr. Ayala's low back presentment from and following the 
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October 6, 2009, motor vehicle accident and current need of medical treatment related 
thereto, inclusive of surgery, to said October 6, 2009, accident. 
In effect, the instant Motion is analogous to a motion made pursuant to I.C. 
§ 72-719(3), to correct the potential of Mr. Ayala suffering manifest injustice to the extent 
that his pending claims may be adversely affected by Dr. Hammond's difficulty in opening 
the disks setting-forth the referenced diagnostic studies and/or by the lack of knowledge 
by Berry of said fact, such that Dr. Hammond's post-hearing deposition could be vacated, 
to be re-set following Dr. Hammond's personal review of said diagnostic studies. 
In the consideration of the instant Motion, it must be noted that Defendants 
will not suffer bias or prejudice upon the Commission's granting the same, as Defendants' 
counsel, Mr. Augustine, participated in Dr. Hammond's deposition via telephonic 
conference call such that Mr. Augustine would not be required to duplicate efforts or 
resources exhausted in traveling from Boise to Twin Falls and return for the deposition. 
Upon the granting of the instant Motion, Dr. Hammond's continued testimony would be 
limited to the correction of hours/time spent in records review and his examination of Mr. 
Ayala; and, his personal review of the disks of Mr. Ayala's diagnostic studies, inclusive of 
the significance thereof upon the issues of causal relation, etiology of Mr. Ayala's low back 
and related symptomatology, and need for further medical care/treatment related thereto. 
DATED This~ day of January, 2017. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I am a resident attorney of the State of Idaho and that on 
the D_ day of January, 2017, I served a copy of the foregoing document by depositing 
a true copy thereof in the United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to the following: 
Paul J. Augustine 
AUGUSTINE LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
P.O. Box 1521 
Boise, ID 83701 
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Attorney for Claimant 
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ROBERT J. MEYERS FARMS, INC., 
Employer, 
and 
STATE INSURANCE FUND, 
Surety, 
Defendants. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss. 
County of Twin Falls. ) 
I.C. No. 2009-029533 
1.C. No. 2013-024075 
AFFIDAVIT OF RICHARD J. 
HAMMOND, M.D. 
COMES NOW Richard J. Hammond, M.D. and, being first duly sworn on 
oath, deposes and states as follows: 
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1. That affiant is a board-certified neurologist, who has been licensed to 
practice medicine by and within the State of Idaho continuously for the 
past twenty-five (25) years, during and within which period of time 
affiant's practice encompassed general neurology, specifically 
including the diagnosis and treatment of diseases and/or injuries of 
and to the brain, spinal cord, nerves, musculature, and the spine, 
inclusive of related symptomatology. 
2. Upon an infrequent basis, affiant reviews a non-patient's medical 
records and conducts neurological examination upon the individual in 
what is commonly referenced as an "independent medical 
examination." Recently, affiant reviewed pertinent medical records 
and conducted two neurological examinations upon Mr. Mario Ayala 
at the request of Mr. Ayala's legal counsel, Clyel Berry, related to Mr. 
Ayala's pending Idaho workers' compensation claims related to 
accidents occurring on or about October 6, 2009, and August 28, 
2013. 
3. The medical and related data/records provided affiant by Clyel Berry 
relative to Mr. Ayala's pending industrial claims are identified as 
follows: 
a. Records from Glenns Ferry Health Center for the period 
September 14, 2007, through October 5, 2009. 
b. First Report of Injury dated November 17, 2009. 
c. Records of Jeffrey F. Kieffer, D.C. 
(1) Notation of Dr. Kieffer dated October 11, 2012. 
d. Records of Emergency Department, Elmore Memorial Hospital, 
AFFIDAVIT OF RICHARD J. HAMMOND, M.D. -2 
83
following the October 6, 2009, accident. 
e. Records of Dr. Reedy inclusive of his correspondence to T.J. 
Martin, with the Fund, dated January 8, 2010; and, his reports 
to Clyel Berry dated August 23, 201 O; December 10, 2011; 
December 12, 2012; November 2, 2015; and, January 19, 
2016 together with Dr. Reedy's report to Attorney Augustine of 
January 7, 2016. 
f. The completed Questionnaire of PA-C McCreedy, dated 
January 19, 2016. 
g. Records of Orthopedic Associates/Ors. Schweiger, Hessing 
and Clawson. 
h. Records of Michael Hajjar, M.D. 
(1) Report to T.J. Martin, State Insurance Fund, of 
November 14, 2012. 
(2) Report to Attorney Augustine, dated January 27, 2016. 
(3) Report to Attorney Berry, dated February 19, 2016. 
Reports upon diagnostic procedures, as follows: 
(1) November 20, 2009, MRI of the cervical spine without 
contrast. 
(2) February 15, 2010, SP cervical myelogram. 
(3) February 15, 2010, x-rays of the cervical spine. 
(4) February 15, 2010, CT myelogram of the cervical spine. 
(5) February 15, 2010, MRI of the brain, without contrast. 
(6) May 20, 2010, post-op x-rays of the cervical spine. 
(7) August 23, 2010, MRI of the left shoulder without 
contrast. 
(8) May 23, 2011, cervical MRI both with and without 
contrast. 
(9) January 16, 2012, lumbar MRI without contrast. 
(10) April 3, 2012, lumbar myelogram. 
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(11) April 3, 2012, x-rays of the lumbar spine. 
(12) April 3, 2012, CT myelogram of the lumbar spine. 
(13) October 22, 2014, lumbar spine x-rays. 
(14) October 31, 2014, lumbar spine CT with contrast. 
(15) October 31, 2014, lumbar myelogram. 
(16) March 20, 2015, NM bone scan with SPECT. 
j. Records of Miers Johnson Ill, M.D./St. Alphonsus Medical 
Group 
(1) IME report of Howard Shoemaker, M.D., dated October 
6, 2014. 
k. Records of Paul Montalbano, M.D. 
(1) Report to Berry dated July 8, 2015. 
I. Operative Report, Mark Harris, M.D., for April 30, 2015, 
bilateral L4-5 facet injections. 
m. IME reports: 
(1) Mark J. Harris, M.D., 
(a) July 31, 2010 review of records 
(b) August 2, 2010 report 
(c) August 3, 2010 report 
(d) August 15, 2011 report 
(e) September 21, 2012 report 
(f) October 18, 2012, report 
(2) Paul Montalbano, M.D.: Report to Attorney Augustine 
of October 8, 2015 
(3) FCE report from Wright Physical Therapy, dated 
September 25, 2015 
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n. Disks of diagnostic imaging studies related to: 
(1) November 20, 2009, MRI of the cervical spine without 
contrast. 
(2) February 15, 2010, SP cervical myelogram. 
(3) February 15, 2010, x-rays of the cervical spine. 
(4) February 15, 2010, CT myelogram of the cervical spine. 
(5) February 15, 2010, MRI of the brain, without contrast. 
(6) August 23, 2010, MRI of the left shoulder without 
contrast. 
(7) May 23, 2011, cervical MRI both with and without 
contrast. 
(8) January 16, 2012, lumbar MRI without contrast. 
(9) April 3, 2012, lumbar myelogram. 
(10) April 3, 2012, x-rays of the lumbar spine. 
(11) April 3, 2012, CT myelogram of the lumbar spine. 
(12) May 20, 2010, cervical spine x-ray. 
4. That affiant's deposition was taken in Mr. Ayala's pending industrial 
claims by Clyel Berry upon December 16, 2016. Prior to said 
deposition, affiant had reviewed the entirety of the medical and 
related data which he had been provided by Clyel Berry excepting the 
disks containing the diagnostic imaging studies, which affiant had 
attempted to review but had been unsuccessful in opening said disks 
and/or the contents thereof upon multiple occasions, with the 
exception of certain of Mr. Ayala's plain film x-rays. 
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5. That affiant had not advised Clyel Berry of his lack of success in 
reviewing the disks containing Mr. Ayala's diagnostic studies prior to ,,,-~,~•-··• .cc"'•'·"" 
the taking of affiant's December 16, 2016, deposition. 
6. That following affiant's December 16, 2016, deposition, affiant 
received an inquiry from Clyel Berry regarding two topics, being the 
hours/time spent by affiant in his review of Mr. Ayala's above-
referenced records and in his two examinations of Mr. Ayala during 
the course of affiant's independent medical examination of Mr. Ayala; 
and, requesting that affiant confirm whether and to what extent affiant 
had personally reviewed Mr. Ayala's diagnostic studies/results which 
were within the above-referenced disks. Upon receipt of said inquiry, 
affiant again attempted to open the disks setting-forth and containing 
Mr. Ayala's diagnostic studies, and was successful in doing so. 
7. That upon affiant's personal review of Mr. Ayala's diagnostic 
studies/the results of said diagnostic studies set forth within the 
above-referenced disks, such review does not change affiant's 
opinions, conclusions or deposition testimony, that prior to the 
October 6, 2009, motor vehicle accident, Mr. Ayala did not present 
with significant condition or injury of, to or involving his low back, 
specifically involving the L3-4, L4-5, and/or L5-S1 levels; that Mr. 
Ayala's manifestation of symptomatology related to his low back from 
and following the October 6, 2009, motor vehicle accident was and 
remains causally related to and resultant of said motor vehicle 
accident; and, that Mr. Ayala currently presents as requiring referral 
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to a neurosurgeon for probable surgical procedures in treatment of 
injuries and/or presentments causally related to and resultant of said 
October 6, 2009, motor vehicle accident. Rather, said diagnostic 
' 
studi~s are such so as to reinforce and strengthen affiant's opinions 
and deposition testimony In that regard. 
! 
8. That t,he instant affidavit is made upon matters regarding which affiant 
would be competent to testify In the Instant proceedings. 
DATED thls21-- day of January, 2017. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this fl day of January, 2017. 
' 
Notary Public for Id 
Residingat: __ .....1-.....L=-,;;;=::::--_;__ 
My Commission Expires: _ _,_--'---1,'---"t\\=1-b:._.. 
GINA BEACH 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
STATE Of IDAHO 
MY COMMISSION EXPIRES: 
September 15, 2020 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
ti<) I hereby certify that I am a resident attorney of the State of Idaho and that on 
the,d_L day of January, 2017, I served a copy of the foregoing document by depositing 
a true copy thereof in the United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to the following: 
Paul J. Augustine 
AUGUSTINE LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
P.O. Box 1521 
Boise, ID 83701 
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Attorney for Claimant 
BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 




ROBERT J. MEYERS FARMS, INC., 
Employer, 
and 
STATE INSURANCE FUND, 
Surety, 
Defendants. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss. 
County of Twin Falls. ) 
1.C. No. 2009-029533 
1.C. No. 2013-024075 
AFFIDAVIT OF L. CLYEL BERRY IN 
SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR 
LEAVE TO RE-EXAMINE AND/OR 
RECALL RICHARD J. HAMMOND, 
M.D. 
COMES NOW L. Clyel Berry and, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes 
and states as follows: 
AFFIDAVIT OF L. CLYEL BERRY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR LEAVE TO RE-
EXAMINE AND/OR RECALL RICHARD J. HAMMOND, M.D. - 1 
90
1. That your affiant is an. attorney duly licensed to practice law by and 
within the State of Idaho, and is counsel of record for Claimant, Mario 
Ayala, herein. Further, affiant hereby makes representations as to 
facts and matters regarding which he would be competent to testify 
before the Commission in these proceedings. 
2. That affiant did, upon behalf of Claimant herein, retain Dr. Richard 
Hammond, a board-certified neurologist, for the purpose of 
conducting a medical records review and neurological examination 
upon Claimant, and to thereafter give opinions in this matter. Affiant's 
correspondences to Dr. Hammond together with the identification and 
description of records submitted to Dr. Hammond for review are of 
record as Cl's Ex. 24.a-d. Encompassed within the records and/or 
matters submitted to Dr. Hammond for review were reports upon 
diagnostic procedures identified in paragraph "9" at Cl's Ex. p. 659q; 
and, diagnostic imaging disks for the procedures identified and set-
forth as "a-k" at Cl's. Ex. p. 659t, together with the diagnostic imaging 
disk identified at Cl's. Ex. p. 659v. 
3. Following records review and examinations of Mr. Ayala, Dr. 
Hammond authored two reports, dated August 1 and October 5, 2016, 
collectively of record as Cl's. Ex. 24. Following hearing in this matter, 
affiant scheduled Dr. Hammond's post-hearing deposition which was 
taken upon December 16, 2016. At the conclusion of that deposition, 
rather than have Dr. Hammond read and sign the deposition 
transcript, it was set-forth that counsel for the parties would read the 
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transcript of the deposition, " ... and ifwe have questions, then we can 
approach (Dr. Hammond) to see whether or not (his) responses were 
by reason of error or mistake or misunderstanding of questions." 
HammondDepo., p.130, LL.1-8. 
4. Upon affiant's review of the transcript of Dr. Hammond's deposition, 
affiant approached Dr. Hammond regarding two topics, being the 
accuracy of Dr. Hammond's estimate of time involved in his records 
review and examinations upon Mr. Ayala; and, whether and to what 
extent Dr. Hammond had reviewed the actual diagnostic imaging 
disks which he had been provided. Responsive to this inquiry, affiant 
was advised by Dr. Hammond that he had underestimated the actual 
hours involved in his records review and examinations upon Mr. 
Ayala; and, potentially of greater significance, that prior to his 
deposition Dr. Hammond had attempted to "open" the diagnostic 
imaging disks but had not been successful until following the taking 
of his deposition. Thusly, certain of Dr. Hammond's testimony and 
opinions were based upon the radiology reports flowing from the 
diagnostic studies as opposed to his personal review of the actual 
film/disks. 
5. That affiant had not been made aware and was without knowledge of 
Dr. Hammond's inability to open and review the diagnostic studies 
upon the imaging disks submitted to him prior to Dr. Hammond's 
deposition. Had affiant been made aware or otherwise had 
knowledge of this fact, affiant would have facilitated Dr. Hammond's 
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personal review of the actual diagnostic studies set-forth upon the 
imaging disks by confirming that the difficulty experienced by Dr. 
Hammond had been resolved, or by affiant ordering additional copies 
of said disks for Dr. Hammond's review prior to his deposition, even 
if the same resulted in the deposition as scheduled being vacated and 
re-set. 
6. Upon affiant receiving Dr. Hammond's confirmation that he had been 
unsuccessful in his attempts to review the diagnostic studies set-forth 
upon the imaging disks, affiant contacted Defendants' counsel, Mr. 
Paul Augustine, and inquired whether Mr. Augustine/Defendants 
would stipulate to Dr. Hammond's deposition to being re-opened to 
allow Dr. Hammond to testify regarding his personal review of Mr. 
Ayala's diagnostic studies, by correspondence dated January 25, 
2017. By Mr. Augustine's correspondence to affiant dated January 
26, 2017, Mr. Augustine advised that Defendants would not agree to 
stipulate to re-opening Dr. Hammond's deposition, whereupon affiant 
prepared the instant Motion. 
7. It is not believed that allowing Dr. Hammond's deposition to be re-
opened would result in prejudice to Defendants in that Defendants' 
counsel's participation in Dr. Hammond's original deposition was by 
telephonic conference call, such that no travel or related expenses 
were incurred by Defendants or their counsel. Should Defendants/Mr. 
Augustine so choose, Defendants' participation in the continuance of 
Dr. Hammond's deposition could also be via telephonic conference 
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I 
call. Dr. Hammond's testimony will be no different than had he have 
been successful in opening the imaging disks prior to his deposition, 
or had advised affiant of his inability to open said disks, such that 
affiant would have ensured that Dr. Hammond's deposition would not 
have been taken until after his personal review of the diagnostic 
imaging studies. During a telephone conversation between Dr. 
Hammond and affiant, Dr. Hammond advised that upon personal 
review of the diagnostic imaging studies, Dr. Hammond's deposition 
testimony and opinions would not change, with the exception that his 
personal review of the diagnostic imaging studies strengthened the 
basis for those opinions and testimony, such that there is potential 
that Mr. Ayala's claim related to his low back presentment may be 
compromised and/or prejudiced should the instant Motion be denied. 
Dated this o?'f day of January, 2017. 
L. Clyel erry 
Attorney for Claimant 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this ~day of January, 2017. 
l,1ELODY E KREFT 
Notary Public 
State of Idaho 
-
- . 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I am a resident attorney of the State of Idaho and that on 
the fl_ day of January, 2017, I served a copy of the foregoing document by depositing 
a true copy thereof in the United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to the following: 
Paul J. Augustine 
AUGUSTINE LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
P.O. Box 1521 
Boise, ID 83701 
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Attorney for Claimant 
BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 




ROBERT J. MEYERS FARMS, INC., 
Employer, 
and 
STATE INSURANCE FUND, 
Surety, 
Defendants. 
1.C. No. 2009-029533 
1.C. No. 2013-024075 
CLAIMANT'S REQUEST FOR 
ENTRY OF ORDER UPON 
CLAIMANT'S MOTION FOR 
CLARIFICATION OF ORDER 
REGARDING HEARING EXHIBITS, 
INCLUSIVE OF CLAIMANT'S 
OBJECTION AND MOTION TO 
STRIKE DEFENDANTS' 
RESPONSE TO CLAIMANT'S 
MOTION FOR CLARIFICATION 
COMES NOW Claimant, Mario Ayala, by and through counsel of record and 
hereby respectfully requests that the Idaho State Industrial Commission enter it/! qrq~~ . 
C" f L i'" t t 
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upon Claimant's Motion for Clarification of Order Regarding Hearing Exhibits, dated 
November 22, 2016, inclusive of Claimant's Objection and Motion to Strike Defendants' 
Response to Claimant's Motion for Clarification, made within Claimant's Reply to 
Defendants' Response, dated January 3, 2017. 
Summarized, the issue regarding the admission and/or withdrawal of certain 
of Claimant's exhibits is limited to Cl's Ex. 3, at pages 48-115, being a portion of Claimant's 
medical records maintained by Glenns Ferry Health Center for the period December 4, 
2001, approximately 8 years prior to the October 6, 2009, motor vehicle accident at issue 
herein, to May 21, 2007, approximately 28 months prior to said motor vehicle accident, 
withdrawn by Claimant as part and parcel of Claimant's withdrawal of the October 14, 
2001, claim which had been encompassed within these consolidated proceedings. 
Although it is not Claimant's intent to re-state or argue matters set-forth within 
Claimant's Motion for Clarification; his reply to Defendants' Response to Claimant's Motion 
for Clarification; or, the Affidavit of Berry in Support of Motion, which Claimant respectfully 
requests the Commission to re-visit, Claimant must again note that Defendants' Response 
to Claimant's Motion was not filed for a period of 38 days following the filing of Claimant's 
Motion for Clarification, being 24 days after the period of any response by Defendants to 
said Motion had ended, pursuant to JRPP 3F2. This long overdue "after thought" filing by 
Defendants was the subject of Claimant's Motion to Strike and should not be rewarded by 
the Commission. 
The instant Motion is made upon the grounds and for the reasons that the 
parties are currently proceeding with and through their respective post-hearing medical 
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depositions such that it becomes important for the parties to have firm knowledge as to 
what is or is not of record herein. 
DATED This _j_ day of February, 2017. 
STEPHAN, KVANVIG, JONE & TRAINOR 
By __ -'-,L_.J= _ _i.__-1-------
L. Clyel Ber 
Attorneys for Claimant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I am a resident attorney of the State of Idaho and that on 
the_/_ day of February, 2017, I served a copy of the foregoing document by depositing 
a true copy thereof in the United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to the following: 
Paul J. Augustine 
AUGUSTINE LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
P.O. Box 1521 
Boise, ID 83701 
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PAUL J. AUGUSTINEISB 4608 
AUGUSTINE LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
1004 W. Fort Street 
Post Office Box 1521 
Boise, ID 83701 
Telephone: (208) 367-9400 
Facsimile: (208) 947-0014 
Attorneys for Employer/Surety 
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ROBERT J. MEYERS FARMS, INC., 
Employer, 
and 
STATE INSURANCE FUND, 
Surety, 
Defendants. 
IC No. 2009-029533 
2001-520958 
2013-024075 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO 
STRIKE THE AFFIDAVIT OF 
RICHARD J. HAMMOND, M.D. 
DATED JANUARY 27, 2017 
Defendants, by and through their counsel of record, Paul J. Augustine of Augustine Law 
Offices, PLLC, hereby move the Commission for an Order striking the Affidavit of Richard J. 
Hammond, M.D. purportedly submitted in support of Claimant's Motion for Leave to Re-Examine 
and/or Recall Richard J. Hammond, M.D. The basis of this motion is that Dr. Hanunond's affidavit 
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contains opinion testimony which was given after his completed deposition and constitutes an 
attempt by Claimant and his counsel to present additional opinion testimony following his post 
hearing deposition. As such, the opinion testimony stated by Dr. Hammond in his affidavit is not 
evidence and violates Rules 10.E. and 10.F. of the Judicial Rules of Practice and Procedure. 
In his Affidavit, Dr. Hammond admits that he only reviewed CDs of the Claimant's imaging 
studies after his deposition. He then stated in his affidavit that based upon his review of these films 
his opinions regarding causation provided in his deposition have not changed. Rule 10.E. of the 
Judicial Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Industrial Commission clearly states "that evidence 
presented by post hearing depositions shall be evidence known or available to the party at the time of 
the hearing and shall not include evidence developed, manufactured or discovered following the 
hearing." In this particular case, Dr. Hammond gave an opinion in his deposition and is attempting 
now to supplement this opinion in an affidavit which was made in support of a motion to reopen his 
deposition. The Claimant's Motion to Reopen Dr. Hammond's deposition (his only retained expert) 
was made after Claimant's counsel and Dr. Hammond realized the shortcomings in his deposition. 
In attempt to circumvent the Rules of the Practice and Procedure of the Industrial Commission, Dr. 
Hammond has given a second opinion which was not presented in his deposition. As a result, Dr. 
Hammond's affidavit containing this opinion should be stricken from the record and not accepted as 
evidence in this hearing. 
DATED this lb faayofFebruary,2017 
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AUGUSTINE LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
By------'-----~----+\---------
Paul J. Augu 
Attorneys fo 
·ne - Of the Firm 
mployer/Surety 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the lo+'- day of February, 2017, I caused to be served a true 
copy oftheforegoingDEFENDANTS' MOTION TO STRIKE THE AFFIDAVIT OF RICHARD J. 
HAMMOND, M.D. DATED JANUARY 27, 2017, by the method indicated below, and addressed to 
each of the following: 
L. Clyel Berry 
PO Box 83 
Twin Falls, ID 83303-0083 
Attorney for Claimant 
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AUGUSTINE LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
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Post Office Box 1521 
Boise, ID 83701 
Telephone: (208) 367-9400 
Facsimile: (208) 947-0014 
Attorneys for Employer/Surety 
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ROBERT J. MEYERS FARMS, INC., 
Employer, 
and 
STATE INSURANCE FUND, 
Surety, 
Defendants. 
IC No. 2009-029533 
2001-520958 
2013-024075 
DEFENDANTS' OPPOSITION TO 
CLAIMANT'S MOTION FOR 
LEA VE TO RE-EXAMINE AND/OR 
RECALL RICHARD J. HAMMOND, 
M.D. 
Defendants, by and through their counsel of record, Paul J. Augustine of Augustine Law 
Offices, PLLC, hereby oppose Claimant's Motion on the grounds that (I) reopening Dr. Hammond's 
deposition is contrary to Rule 10.E. of Judicial Rules of Practice and Procedure; (2) reopening Dr. 
Hammond's deposition would prejudice Defendants and Defendants' counsel; and (3) since Dr. 
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Hammond is Claimant's own retained expert, any mistakes or shortcomings in his testimony should 
not be con-ected by reopening his deposition. 
Claimant seeks to reopen and re-examine Dr. Hammond on the grounds that Dr. Hammond 
allegedly had difficulty opening the disc containing Claimant's imaging studies. Claimant maintains 
it would be a "manifest injustice" ifhe were not able to reopen Dr. Hammond's deposition in light of 
Dr. Hammond's failure to review the images. 
There are several reasons why the Commission should deny Claimant's request to reopen and 
re-examine Dr. Hammond. First, the Rule 10 of the Judicial Rules of Practice and Procedure very 
clearly indicate that the Claimant is entitled to one post hearing deposition of each expe1t for the 
purpose of perpetuating his or her testimony. In this particular case, Dr. Hammond was specifically 
retained for purposes of litigation by Claimant's counsel. Claimant's counsel noticed several post 
hearing depositions including the depositions ofDrs. Hammond, Hajjar, Reedy and Wright. The first 
deposition taken was of Dr. Hammond. The deposition was taken on December 16, 2016. It 
commenced at 2:25 p.m. and lasted until 5:36 p.m., over three hours. Prior to the deposition there 
was a snow storm which prohibited Defendants' counsel from attending the deposition in person. As 
a result Defendants' counsel had to attend the deposition by telephone. This is the first time 
Defendants' counsel has attended a post hearing deposition of the Claimant's expe1t by telephone in 
over twenty four years of practice. 
The deposition resembled a ping pong match. Claimant's counsel examined Dr. Hammond 
and then conducted four additional redirect examinations of Dr. Hammond after cross examination 
by Defendants' counsel. For Claimant's counsel to argue that additional information is needed from 
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Dr. Hammond by way of second deposition or reopening of the original deposition is disingenuous. 
Further proof is that following Dr. Hammond's deposition, Claimant's counsel vacated all additional 
depositions of medical providers in this case. Obviously said decision was made after reviewing Dr. 
Hammond's deposition and concluding that Dr. Hammond's testimony was sufficient to establish 
their claim of causation in this case. 
At the close of Dr. Hammond's deposition he was given the opportunity to review and sign 
his deposition transcript. Claimant's counsel on his own represented that in lieu of reading and 
signing that he could make corrections to the words attributed to him in his deposition if counsel 
found issues with the deposition transcript. It was never stipulated or agreed by Defendants' counsel 
that upon review of the deposition the parties could reopen his deposition to take additional 
testimony if the basis of his testimony was insufficient. 
Since Dr. Hammond was a retained expert paid for by Claimant's counsel, it was incumbent 
on Claimant's counsel and Dr. Hammond to be adequately prepared for deposition. IfDr. Hammond 
could not personally review the imaging films that were provided to him by Claimant's counsel prior 
to his deposition, he easily should have been in contact with Claimant's counsel to inform him of this 
fact. Regardless, it appears from the basis of the documents which Claimant filed in suppmi of his 
motion that Dr. Hammond's failure to review the CDs does not materially affect his opinions given 
in the deposition. Of course, Dr. Hammond over the course of three hours had ample opportunity to 
,..,,._,-,._.,,-... -~ --'~'°"'~"-"•'""·' . 
provide numerous opinions beyond that which were expressed in his original medical repmis in this 
case. 
This is the second attempt in the span of two weeks by Claimant's counsel to attempt to 
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reopen a case to conect flaws in the presentment of his case. The other case is Hartgrave v. City of 
Twin Falls and SIF. There is no basis in the Commission's rules or the Idaho Rules of Civil 
Procedure as adopted by the Idaho Industrial Commission to reopen the post hearing deposition of an 
expert to provide additional information or additional opinions or to clarify the opinions given in the 
deposition. In review of the Commission's decisions demonstrate that Dr. Hannnond has been 
retained numerous times by Claimant's counsel to provide expert opinions in lieu of opinions from 
treating physicians. Since he is a commonly hired expert retained by Claimant's counsel any 
shortcomings in his preparation or in the opinions that he gave in his post hearing deposition cannot 
now be corrected by claiming ignorance or lack of preparation. 
Finally, if the Commission is inclined to bend the rules to allow Dr. Hammond to be re-
deposed, Claimant should be required to pay the attorneys' fees and costs of Defendants' counsel in 
personally attending the deposition. Contrary to Claimant's counsel's representations in his 
Affidavit in Support of Claimant's Motion, defense counsel needs to be present because Dr. 
Hammond will be reviewing films and it will be critically important for Defendants' counsel to 
personally observe Dr. Hammond's review of the films and what he believes are important aspects of 
the films so that Defendants' expert, Dr. Montalbano, is adequately apprised of Dr. Hammond's 
opinion and the basis of said opinion prior to his deposition. 
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants' respectfully request that the Commission deny 
Claimant's Motion to Re-Examine and/or Reopen the deposition of Dr. Hammond. 
. (n-1--
DATED this-~ day of February, 2017 
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PAUL J. AUGUSTINE, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says: 
1. The undersigned affiant is the attorney of record for the Defendants in this 
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case. As such, all facts are based upon the affiant' s personal knowledge. 
2. The Claimant scheduled numerous post hearing depositions in this case. These 
included the depositions of Dr. Richard Hammond, Dr. Michael Hajjar, Dr. Peter Reedy and Dr. 
Brian Wright. 
3. The paities agreed to take all of the medical expett opinions prior to deposing their 
vocational experts. 
4. Dr. Hammond's deposition was taken on December 16, 2016 in Twin Falls, Idaho. 
During the day there was a significant snowstonn/ice storm which made travel from my office in 
Boise to Dr. Hammond's office in Twin Falls extremely difficult and dangerous. As such, rather 
than unnecessarily postponing the deposition, I notified Claimant's counsel and Dr. Hammond's 
office that I would appear by telephone. An-angements were made to call into Dr. Hammond's office 
to call in by telephone to paiticipate in his deposition. 
5. This was the first time in my twenty five years of practice that I have agreed to attend 
a post hearing deposition of an opposing party's expe1t by telephone rather than in person. The only 
reason I decided to attend by telephone was due to significant and developing weather conditions 
which made travel treacherous. I did not want to prejudice the Claimant by postponing the 
deposition because he had noticed several other depositions of treating physicians. 
6. The deposition commenced at 2:25 p.m. Following Claimant's counsel direct 
examination and my cross examination, Claimant's counsel conducted four additional redirect 
exaininations of Dr. Hammond. As a result, the deposition lasted over three hours and continued 
until 5:36 p.m. During that time neither Claimant's counsel nor Dr. Hammond indicated that his 
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inability to review the CDs or open the CDs of Claimant's imaging studies had any detrimental effect 
on his ability to testify to various opinions. At the end of the deposition, Claimant's counsel noted 
that in lieu of reading and signing his deposition, that the parties could review the deposition 
transcript and contact him if there were any corrections that needed to be made. I never agreed to 
allow Claimant's counsel to review Dr. Hammond's deposition and reopen the deposition ifhe felt 
that Dr. Hammond's testimony lacked foundation or was incomplete. Rather, the sole purpose of 
Mr. Beny' s representation was to allow the attorneys to review the deposition transcript and suggest 
any corrections to the words attributed to Dr. Hammond, if necessaiy. 
7. If the Commission allows Claimant to reopen Dr. Hammond's deposition, then I will 
need to be physically present at the deposition because it is my understanding that the deposition will 
require Dr. Hammond to review the actual imaging studies of the Claimant and he will demonstrate 
how these imaging studies allegedly support his opinion. I will need to observe Dr. Hammond's 
references to the actual films pointing out these alleged issues so that I can explain the basis of his 
opinions to Dr. Montalbano, who is expected to testify on behalf of Defendants. As a result, it would 
greatly prejudice Defendants if I were to attend any reopening of Dr. Hammond's deposition by 
telephone. 
8. I believe that if the deposition is reopened Claimant's counsel should be required to 
pay my fees and travel costs associated with attending Dr. Hammond's reopening of his deposition 
and/or re-examination. The basis for this request would be Rule 16 for Claimant's violation of Rule 
10.E. 
FURTHER YOUR AFFIANT SA YETH NAUGHT. 
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COMES NOW Claimant, by and through counsel of record, L. Clyel Berry, 
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Re-Examine and/or Recall Richard J. Hammond, M.D.; and Defendants' Motion to Strike 
the Affidavit of Richard J. Hammond, M.D., dated January 27, 2017. 
Claimant seeks leave to re-examine and/or recall Dr. Richard Hammond in 
the instant matter. From Defendants' Opposition, Defendants' objections are upon the 
grounds that: 
(1) Reopening Dr. Hammond's deposition is contrary to Rule 1 0.E. of the Judicial 
Rules of Practice and Procedure: 
Reviewing J.R.P.P. 10.E., the only possible section thereof relevant to the 
instant issue is set-forth within subsection 4. There, it is stated that, 
[u]nless the Commission, for good cause shown, shall 
otherwise order ... , the evidence presented by post-hearing 
deposition shall be evidence known by or available to the party 
at the time of the hearing and shall not include evidence 
developed, manufactured, or discovered following the hearing. 
Experts testifying post-hearing may base an opinion on 
exhibits and evidence admitted at hearing as well as on expert 
testimony developed in post-hearing depositions. 
Rule 10.E.4., J.R.P.P., does not apply to the instant dispute. The CD disks 
containing the diagnostic film currently at issue come within " ... evidence known by or 
available to the party at the time of hearing .... " As such, had Dr. Hammond been able to 
"open" the disks prior to his deposition, he most certainly would have been able to testify 
regarding his review of the same. 
Further, even if re-opening Dr. Hammond's deposition to allow his testimony 
upon review of the diagnostic film came within the Rule, upon a showing of good cause, 
the Commission could most certainly allow the same. 
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Defendants assert that Rule 10 of the Judicial Rules" ... very clearly indicates 
that the Claimant is entitled to one post-hearing deposition of each expert for the purpose 
of perpetuating his or her testimony." Having read Rule 10 upon multiple occasions, 
counsel is unable to identify the basis or source supporting Defendants' position in this 
regard. Claimant attaches a true and correct copy of his Notice of Post-Hearing 
Deposition to Perpetuate Testimony of Richard Hammond, M. D., dated October 11, 2016, 
as Exhibit "A" hereto. As is clearly stated therein, said Notice provided that the deposition 
would be " ... commencing on Friday, December 16, 2016, at 3:00 p.m., and continuing 
thereafter .... " Had Dr. Hammond advised counsel that he had been unable to open the 
disks setting-forth Mr. Ayala's diagnostic studies during the course of his deposition, the 
deposition would have, in fact, been continued to allow Dr. Hammond to do so prior to the 
conclusion of that deposition. 
(2) Re-opening Dr. Hammond's deposition would prejudice Defendants and 
Defendants' counsel: 
Defendants/Defendants' counsel overreach. It must be realized that from the 
conclusion of Dr. Hammond's December 16, 2016, deposition to the point in time that 
counsel approached Defendants' attorney, Mr. Augustine, to advise that Dr. Hammond had 
been unable to open the CDs containing Mr. Ayala's diagnostic studies, absolutely not one 
thing in the instant matter had changed. Defendants had not taken any of their noticed 
post-hearing depositions. Simply stated, allowing Dr. Hammond's deposition to be re-
opened would result in no greater prejudice to Defendants or Defendants' counsel than 
had Dr. Hammond been successful in opening the disks setting forth the diagnostic studies 
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prior to his deposition, and testified concerning the same during the course of that 
deposition. 
In fact, taking Defendants' counsel at his word, in reviewing Defendants' 
Opposition as well as Mr. Augustine's Affidavit in Opposition, allowing Claimant to re-open 
Dr. Hammond's deposition is actually seen to be fortuitous to Defendants. Mr. Augustine 
argues that upon December 16, 2016, the date of Dr. Hammond's deposition, " ... there was 
a significant snow storm/ice storm which made travel from (Mr. Augustine's) office in Boise 
to Dr. Hammond's office in Twin Falls extremely difficult and dangerous." Augustine 
Affidavit, paragraph 4. Mr. Augustine then argues that, 
[i]fthe Commission allows Claimantto reopen Dr. Hammond's 
deposition, then (Mr. Augustine) will need to be physically 
present at the deposition because it is (Mr. Augustine's) 
understanding that the deposition will require Dr. Hammond to 
review the actual imaging studies of the Claimant and he will 
demonstrate how these imaging studies allegedly support his 
opinion. (Mr. Augustine) will need to observe Dr. Hammond's 
references to the actual films pointing out these alleged issues 
so that (Mr. Augustine) can explain the basis of his opinions to 
Dr. Montalbano, who is expected to testify on behalf of 
Defendants. As a result, it would greatly prejudice Defendants 
if (Mr. Augustine) were to attend any re-opening of Dr. 
Hammond's deposition by telephone. 
Thusly, it is seen that any prejudice to Defendants would have been realized 
and suffered had Dr. Hammond been able to open the diagnostic disks prior to his 
December 16, 2016, deposition and testified thereasto, as Mr. Augustine did not personally 
attend the same. 
Defendants' counsel stresses that Dr. Hammond's deposition" ... was the first 
time in (Mr. Augustine's) 25 years of practice that (he) had agreed to attend a post-hearing 
deposition of an opposing party's expert by telephone rather than in person." Obviously, 
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allowing Claimant to re-call Dr. Hammond regarding his personal review of Mr. Ayala's 
diagnostic studies will enable Defendants' counsel to be personally present during the 
course of Dr. Hammond's testimony regarding the same, which Mr. Augustine stresses is 
required. Again taking Mr. Augustine at his word, but for adverse weather conditions he 
would have personally attended Dr. Hammond's deposition as originally scheduled. He 
advises that it would have "greatly prejudiced" Defendants had Dr. Hammond's testimony 
upon personal review of those diagnostic studies been during Mr. Augustine's participation 
in that deposition by telephone. 
Most certainly, Claimant and counsel could understand had Mr. Augustine 
personally traveled from Boise to Twin Falls to attend and participate in Dr. Hammond's 
deposition, to then be faced with duplication of time in being required to again travel to 
Twin Falls if Dr. Hammond's deposition were allowed to be re-opened. Such is not the 
case. 
General Observation and Argument 
This is not an instance where Dr. Hammond's deposition was taken upon 
behalf of Claimant and then, after that deposition was concluded, Claimant/Claimant's 
counsel attempted to "bolster" Dr. Hammond's testimony by then submitting new or 
additional data to Dr. Hammond for review in conjunction with a Motion for Leave to Re-
Open. Rather, the record is clear that Dr. Hammond was provided with disks obtained 
from Mr. Ayala's medical providers which contained Mr. Ayala's diagnostic studies prior to 
his December 16, 2016, deposition. Unfortunately, Dr. Hammond was not successful in 
his attempts to open those disks to personally review those diagnostic studies prior to the 
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taking of his deposition. Further, Dr. Hammond did not advise Claimant or his counsel of 
that fact until after his deposition had been concluded. 
Defendants appear to over look the fact that the instant proceedings are not 
about Dr. Hammond or Claimant's counsel. Rather, these proceedings are, simply and 
surely, to provide that " ... sure and certain relief for injured workmen and their families ... " 
promised by I.C. § 72-201. In construing the statute, Idaho's Supreme Court has held that 
" ... the humane purposes which (Title 72) seeks to serve leave no room for narrow, 
technical construction." Hattenburg v. Blanks, 98 Idaho 485, 567 P.2d 829 (1977). 
Ironically and incredulously, Defendants' counsel characterizes Claimant's 
Motion for Leave as an attempt to" ... bend the rules." Quite the contrary. Mr. Ayala's claim 
presents, just as each and every Title 72 claim presents, with " ... the primary purpose ... 
being the attainment of justice in each individual case." Hagler v. Micron Technology, 
Inc., 118 Idaho 596, 798 P .2d 55 (1990). In Title 72 proceedings, strict rules of procedure 
are not required to be followed, and it is the duty of the Commission to conduct its 
proceedings so as to promote justice and not to pervert the same. Feuling v. Farmer's 
Co-Op Ditch Co., 54 Idaho 326, 31 P.2d 683 (1934). Clearly, " ... process and procedure 
under (Title 72) shall be ... as far as possible in accordance with the rules of equity." I.C. 
§ 72-708. 
Somewhat inconsistently, Mr. Augustine argues that, " ... it would greatly 
prejudice Defendants if (he) were to attend ... Dr. Hammond's deposition by telephone," 
should Dr. Hammond's deposition be re-opened. Ironically, Mr. Augustine is now seen to 
be complaining, loudly, that Dr. Hammond's deposition may be re-opened to allow Dr. 
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Hammond to testify regarding his personal review of Mr. Ayala's diagnostic studies, when 
Mr. Augustine could be personally present during the course thereof. 
Re-opening Dr. Hammond's deposition would not result in any greater 
prejudice to Defendants than had Dr. Hammond been able to open the disks of Mr. Ayala's 
diagnostic studies prior to the taking of his deposition. In fact, accepting the argument of 
Defendants, Defendants are actually benefitted by Dr. Hammond being unable to open 
the disks of Mr. Ayala's diagnostic studies, thereby facilitating Mr. Augustine's personal 
attendance at and participation in Dr. Hammond's deposition pertaining to the same upon 
Claimant's Motion being granted. 
Defendants' objection to re-opening Dr. Hammond's deposition represents 
nothing more or less than "gamesmanship." In this regard, Mr. Augustine makes three 
representations to the Commission which need to be addressed. First, Mr. Augustine 
represented that, "[p]rior to (Dr. Hammond's) deposition there was a snow storm which 
prohibited Defendants' counsel from attending the deposition in person." Mr. Augustine 
was not "prohibited" from attending Dr. Hammond's deposition in person. The roadways 
between Boise and Twin Falls, where the deposition was held, were not closed. In fact, 
the court reporter for Dr. Hammond's deposition was Mr. Jeff LaMar, with M&M Court 
Reporting Services, who drove to Twin Falls from Boise the day of the deposition. Counsel 
affixes a true and correct copy of the cover page of/for Dr. Hammond's December 16, 
2016, deposition transcript noting/identifying the court reporter, upon which counsel affixed 
Mr. LaMar's business card, as Exhibit "B." Rather, upon the final question being asked 
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Dr. Hammond and Dr. Hammond responding thereto, Mr. Augustine advised that he was 
rushed, as his daughter was in the hospital in Boise. 
Secondly, Mr. Augustine represented to the Commission that 
" ... following Dr. Hammond's deposition, Claimant's counsel 
vacated all additional depositions of medical providers in this 
case. Obviously said decision was made after reviewing Dr. 
Hammond's deposition and concluding that Dr. Hammond's 
testimony was sufficient to establish their claim of causation in 
this case." 
This representation is abjectly false. Counsel affixes a true and correct copy of 
correspondence to counsel from M&M Court Reporting Service, dated December 28, 2016, 
which was the "cover" to counsel being provided with the transcript of Dr. Hammond's 
deposition, as Exhibit "C". By correspondence to Mr. Augustine dated December 20.2016, 
counsel advised Mr. Augustine that he would not be taking the post-hearing depositions 
of other medical providers and that said correspondence constituted the notice thereof 
required by Rule 1 0E2, providing Defendants opportunity to object to those depositions 
being vacated. Claimant's formal Notice vacating those depositions bear a Certificate of 
Mailing of December 29, 2016, being one day prior to counsel's receipt of the transcript of 
Dr. Hammond's deposition. 
Thirdly, Mr. Augustine states that, "[i]n review of the Commission's decisions 
demonstrate that Dr. Hammond has been retained numerous times by Claimant's counsel 
to provide expert opinions in lieu of opinions from treating physicians." (Emphasis added). 
In considering this representation by Mr. Augustine, counsel also reviewed the Commission 
website, and found that counsel had retained Dr. Hammond upon four occasions, in 
CLAIMANT"S REPLY TO DEFENDANTS' OPPOSITION TO CLAIMANT'S MOTION 
FOR LEAVE TO RE-EXAMINE AND/OR RECALL RICHARD J. HAMMOND, M.D.; 
AND, RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO STRIKE THE AFFIDAVIT OF 
RICHARD J. HAMMOND, M.D., DATED JANUARY 27, 2017 - 8 
118
Walker; Naveros; Lindsey; and, the instant matter. Of course, in the instant matter, prior 
to Dr. Hammond being retained by counsel, Dr. Hammond presented as one of Mr. 
Ayala's treating physicians with respect to the industrial accidents at issue. Thusly, there 
are three occasions where counsel retained Dr. Hammond where Dr. Hammond was not 
a treating physician. In Dr. Hammond's deposition he testified that for the past 25 years 
he had been in practice in Twin Falls as a board-certified neurologist. Thusly, counsel had 
retained Dr. Hammond prior to the instant matter at an average of once every 8.3 years. 
It is respectfully suggested that if Mr. Augustine wishes to paint a picture, the image should 
accurately portray the subject. 
Mr. Augustine next argues that if Dr. Hammond's deposition " ... is reopened 
Claimant's counsel should be required to pay (Mr. Augustine's) fees and travel costs 
associated with his attending the same, " ... for Claimant's violation of Rule 10E." First, 
there was no violation of Rule 10E by either Claimant or his counsel. Secondly, Mr. 
Augustine was content to participate in Dr. Hammond's original deposition by telephone. 
Most certainly, Mr. Augustine could choose to participate in any re-opening of Dr. 
Hammond's deposition in the same manner, and would not be required to incur or exhaust 
costs or fees in traveling from Boise to Twin Falls and return. Counsel is hard-pressed to 
understand Mr. Augustine's argument that he should be required to pay for Mr. Augustine's 
travel to be personally present during Dr. Hammond's testimony regarding his personal 
review of Mr. Ayala's diagnostic film, when Mr. Augustine clearly stated that it was the 
utmost of importance that he be personally present during Dr. Hammond's testimony and 
that he would have traveled to Twin Falls for Dr. Hammond's deposition but was precluded 
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from doing so by inclement weather. If Dr. Hammond's deposition is re-opened, Mr. 
Augustine will be required to do nothing more than that which he advised he would have 
done. There will be no duplication of time, costs or fees suffered by either Mr. Augustine 
or his clients. Further, referencing Rule 16, it is seen that sanctions are reserved for 
" ... violation or abuse of (the Commission's) rules or procedures." The instant matter 
presents without any such violation. 
DATED This if day of February, 2017. 
STEPHAN,KVAN 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I am a resident attorney of the State of Idaho and that on 
the _1/r}__ day of February, 2017, I served a copy of the foregoing document by depositing 
a true copy thereof in the United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to the following: 
Paul J. Augustine 
AUGUSTINE LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
P.O. Box 1521 
Boise, ID 83701 
CLAIMANT'S REPLY TO DEFENDANTS' OPPOSITION TO CLAIMANT'S MOTION 
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AND, RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO STRIKE THE AFFIDAVIT OF 
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1.C. No. 2009-029533 
I.C. No. 2001-520958 
1.C. No. 2013-024075 
NOTICE OF POST-HEARING 
DEPOSITION TO PERPETUATE 
TESTIMONY OF RICHARD 
HAMMOND, M.D. 
Notice of Post-Hearing Deposition for Perpetuation of Testimony of Richard 
Hammond, M.D. 
TO: DEFENDANTS and their counsel of record: 
YOU WILL PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that Claimant will take testimony 
on oral examination of Richard Hammond, M.D., before a Court Reporter and 
Notary Public with the firm of M & M Court Reporting commencing on Friday, 
December 16, 2016, at 3:00 p.m., and continuing thereafter from day to day until 
such time as the taking of the deposition may be adjourned, at the offices of Richard 
Hammond, M.D., St. Luke's Clinic Neurology, 738 North College Road, Suite C, 
Notice of Post-Hearing Deposition to Perpetuate Testimony of Richard Hammond, M.D. -
1 
122
Twin Falls, Idaho, at which time and place you are notified to appear and
 take such 
part in the examination as you may deem proper. 
This deposition will be taken pursuant to Rule 1 OE, JRPP together 
with the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, and is taken in lieu of having said
 deponent 
appear at hearing. 
DATED this / ( day of October, 2016. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I '1ereby certify that I am a resident attorney of the State of Idaho and 
that on the _J_[_ day of October, 2016, I served a copy of the foregoing document 
by depositing a true copy thereof in the United States mail, postag
e prepaid, 
addressed to the following: 
Richard Hammond, M.D. 
St. Luke's Clinic Neurology 
738 North College Road, Suite C 
Twin Falls, ID 83301 
M&M Court Reporting Services 
P.O. Box 2636 
Boise, ID 83701-2636 
Paul J. Augustine 
AUGUSTINE LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
P.O. Box 1521 
Boise, ID 83701 
Notice of Post-Hearing Deposition to Perpetuate Testimony of Richa
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L. Clyel Berry 
L. Cly el Berry, Chtd. 
Magic Valley Bank Building 
P.O. Box 302 
Twin Falls ID 83303-0302 
RE: Ayala v, Robert J. Meyers Farms 
December 28, 2016 
I, 
Case No. IC 09-029533; 01-520958; 13-024075 (Industrial Commission) 
Deponent: Richard J. Hammond, MD 
Taken on 12/16/2016 
M & M Job No. 44105B4 
Dear Mr. Berry: 
Enclosed is your copy of the above-named witness's testimony, along with 
the original transcript. 
The original transcript is being forwarded to you as the deponent has 
waived reading and signing of this transcript. 
Very truly yours, 
M & M Court Reporting Service 
cc: Paul J. Augustine 
File 
127




ROBERT J. MEYERS FARMS, INC., 
Employer, 
and 





ORDER DENYING CLAIMANT'S 
MOTION FOR LEAVE TO RE-EXAMINE 
AND/OR RECALL RICHARD J. 
HAMMOND, M.D.; 
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' 
MOTION TO STRIKE THE AFFIDAVIT 
OF RICHARD J. HAMMOND, M.D., 
DATED JANUARY 27, 2017 
On January 30, 2017, Claimant filed his Motion for Leave to Re-Examine and/or Recall 
Richard J. Hammond, M.D., with Affidavit of L. Clyel Berry in support of and Affidavit of 
Richard J. Hammond, M.D. 
On February 10, 2017, Defendants filed their Opposition to Claimant's Motion for 
Leave to Re-Examine and/or Recall Richard J. Hammond, M.D.; Affidavit of Paul J. 
Augustine in Opposition to Claimant's Motion for Leave to Re-Examine and/or Recall Richard 
J. Hammond, M.D.; and Defendants' Motion to Strike the Affidavit of Richard J. Hammond, 
M.D. Dated January 27, 2017. 
On February 17, 2017, Claimant' filed a Reply to Defendants' Opposition to Claimant's 
Motion for Leave to Re-Examine And/Or Recall Richard J. Hammond, M.D.; And; Response 
to Defendants' Motion to Strike the Affidavit of Richard J. Hammond, M.D. Dated January 
27, 2017. 
After reviewing the pleadings of the parties, the Referee finds that Claimant had ample 
opportunity to examine Dr. Hammond regarding his review of materials, including a CD 
containing diagnostic films. Dr. Hammond could have, but did not, testify regarding his 
inability to open that CD at or before his deposition, which lasted about 3 hours. 
ORDER DENYING CLAIMANT'S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO RE-EXAMINE AND/OR RECALL RICHARD J, 
HAMMOND, M.D.; 
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO STRIKE THE AFFIDAVIT OF RICHARD J, HAMMOND, 
M.D., DATED JANUARY 27, 2017 -1 
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The Referee is led to understand that Dr. Hammond would not change his deposition 
testimony based on his review of the CD once he was able to open the same. Therefore, the 
re-opening of the record to allow for further deposition of Dr. Hammond would be a waste of 
judicial resources, counsels' time and energy and in violation of Rule 10, JRP. 
Therefore Claimant's Motion for Leave to Re-Examine and/or Recall Richard J. 
Hammond, M.D., is DENIED. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Affidavit of Richard J. Hammond, M.D. is 
stricken, as such is irrelevant in that his review of the CD would not change his opinion and is 
also a violation of JRP Rule 1 0(E). 
Accordingly, Defendants' Motion to Strike the Affidavit of Richard J. Hammond, M.D. 
Dated January 27, 2017 is GRANTED. 
it, 
DATED this le:_ day of March, 2017. 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
1._i' •·, [',;: ;' l /1) ='P/t,Wr_µ)f/?~ 
''- Michael E. Powers, Referee 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
+Ji 
I hereby certify that on the 6 day of March, 2017, a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing ORDER DENYING CLAIMANT'S MOTION FOR LEA VE TO RE-EXAMINE 
AND/OR RECALL RICHARD J. HAMMOND, M.D.; ORDER GRANTING 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO STRIKE THE AFFIDAVIT OF RICHARD J. 
HAMMOND, M.D., DATED JANUARY 27, 2017 was served by regular United States Mail 
upon each of the following persons: 
L CL YEL BERRY 
PO BOX 302 
TWIN FALLS ID 83303 
PAUL J AUGUSTINE 
PO BOX 1521 
BOISE ID 83701 
go 
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HAMMOND, M,D,; 
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Employer, 
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FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, 
AND ORDER 
FI l E 
09 
This matter came before the Industrial Commission for hearing on October 26, 2016. 
Appearing for Mario Ayala (Claimant) was L. Clyel Berry, Esq. Appearing for Defendants 
Robe1i J. Meyers Farms, Inc. (Employer) and its worker's compensation surety, the State 
Insurance Fund (Surety), was Paul Augustine, Esq. The testimony of Claimant and Morgan 
Meyers was adduced at hearing. The testimony of William Jordan, Nancy Collins, PhD, Paul 
Montalbano, M.D., and Richard Hammond, M.D., was taken by way of post-hearing deposition. 
At hearing, Defendants' Exhibits 1 through 10 were admitted into evidence. Claimant identified 
proposed Exhibits 1 through 33, but withdrew Exhibit 1, and pages 46 through 115 (inclusive) of 
Exhibit 3, Exhibit 25(a), and Exhibit 28(a). 1 Pursuant to Commission Orders of November 18, 
1 Pages 46-115 of Exhibit 3 consists of records from GFHC, and cover visits from 2004-2007. These records contain 
certain references to pre-injury low back/SI joint pain, and were reviewed by William Jordan and relied upon by 
Mark Han-is, M.D., (See Cit. Ex. 20, p. 601, 629). Claimant's counsel referenced some of these records in his 
November 5, 2015 letter to Vernon Mccready, PA-C. (Cit. Ex. 6, p. 349).These records are also implicit in 
Claimant's acknowledgement that he suffered from episodic bouts of low back pain in the years preceding the 2009 
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2016 and January 10, 2017, the balance of Claimant's proposed exhibits are admitted into 
evidence. 
Per the Commission's Orders of July 19, 2016 and September 14, 2016, the following 
matters are at issue: 
1. Whether Claimant's condition is due in whole or in part to a pre-existing injury or 
disease or cause not work-related; 
2. Whether Claimant is entitled to reasonable and necessary medical care as 
provided for by Idaho Code § 72-432, and the extent thereof; 
3. Whether Claimant is entitled to temporary partial and/or temporary total disability 
(TPD/TTD) benefits, and the extent thereof; 
4. Whether Claimant is entitled to permanent partial impairment (PPI) benefits, and 
the extent thereof; 
5. Whether Claimant is entitled to permanent partial disability (PPD) in excess of 
permanent impainnent, and the extent thereof; 
6. Whether Claimant is entitled to permanent total disability pursuant to the odd-lot 
doctrine, or otherwise; 
7. Whether apportionment for a pre-existing condition pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-
406 is appropriate; and, 
8. Whether Claimant is entitled to attorney fees due to Employer/Surety's 
unreasonable denial of compensation as provided for by Idaho Code § 72-804. 
accident (See Cit. Ex. 20, p. 635). It seems preferable to consider the original of these notes rather than rely on 
second hand synopses. Therefore, and notwithstanding the Commission's previous accession to Claimant's proposal 
to withdraw these Exhibits, these portions of Exhibit 3 are considered in this decision. However, exclusion of these 
records would not change any aspect of the Commission's decision; as noted, there is other evidence ofrecord 
which establishes that Claimant did have some pre-injury low back symptoms. 
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9. Whether, if it is determined that Claimant's low back injury, condition and/or 
presentment is casually related to or resultant of the industrial accidents/occurrences forming the 
basis of the instant consolidated proceeding; that Claimant does not yet present at maximum 
medical improvement related to said low back presentment; and that additional medical care, 
treatment and/or services are reasonably required by reason of said low back presentment, that 
the Commission reserve jurisdiction herein upon the issues of Claimant's entitlement to 
permanent impairment and permanent disability, inclusive of odd-lot states, with said issues to 
be considered/determined at the conclusion of Claimant's reasonably required medical care and 
achieving maximum medical improvement. 
This matter was calendared for hearing following the consolidation of three claims; an 
accident of October 14, 2001 involving an injury to Claimant's back, an accident of October 6, 
2009 involving multiple injuries to Claimant, and an accident of August 28, 2013 involving 
injuries to Claimant's right knee. At hearing, Claimant signified his intention to withdraw from 
consideration in the cun-ent proceeding, the October 14, 2001 claim. Accordingly, this matter is 
before the Industrial Commission for consideration of the October 6, 2009 and August 28, 2013 
accidents only. 
At hearing, the parties expressed their agreement that Claimant suffered a compensable 
injury to his right knee as a consequence of the August 28, 2013 accident, which injury 
eventually resulted in the need for a total knee arthroplasty. Similarly, the parties agreed that as 
a consequence of the October 6, 2009 motor vehicle accident, Claimant suffered injuries to his 
neck, left shoulder, and left elbow. Claimant has undergone surgical treatment for each of these 
injuries. Defendants have accepted responsibility for related medical care, income benefits owed 
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to Claimant during his period of recovery, and impairment attributable to the neck, shoulder, 
elbow, and knee. 
Claimant contends that the evidence demonstrates that his low back condition is causally 
related to the 2009 motor vehicle accident, and that he is entitled to medical and income benefits 
related to that injury. Claimant asserts that should the Commission determine that Claimant's 
low back condition is causally related to the 2009 accident, it is inappropriate to consider 
Claimant's claim for disability at this juncture; Claimant requires further medical treatment for 
his low back and the Commission should retain jurisdiction over this case pending such 
treatment. In the alternative, Claimant contends that if the Commission determines that 
Claimant's low back condition is not a compensable consequence of the 2009 motor vehicle 
accident, Claimant is nevertheless totally and permanently disabled as a result of those injuries 
which the parties acknowledge to be causally related to the accidents of 2009 and 2013. In this 
regard, Claimant contends that the FCE performed by PT Wright best delineates the 
limitations/restrictions referable to Claimant's injuries, and as demonstrated by the testimony of 
Dr. Collins, these limitations/restrictions leave Claimant totally and permanently disabled. 
Defendants dispute that the October 9, 2009 industrial accident caused anything more 
than a temporary aggravation of Claimant's documented pre-existing degenerative artlu·itis of the 
lumbar spine, and that to the extent Claimant may require further medical treatment for his low 
back, those consequences of Claimant's low back condition are entirely referable to Claimant's 
pre-existing low back condition and/or the natural progression of that condition unrelated to the 
October 9, 2009 motor vehicle accident. Defendants contend that PT Wright's FCE is flawed, 
and that the assertion of total and permanent disability is denigrated by the fact that Claimant has 
been continuously employed in his time-of-injury job since the 2009 accident. Defendants 
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contend that the evidence demonstrates that Claimant has a fund of essential skills which 
continue to make him a valuable employee and that he does not enjoy continued employment by 
virtue of his own superhuman effort or the Employer's sympathy. In view of Claimant's ongoing 
successful employment at his time-of-injury job, and the fact that no physician has authored 
limitations/restrictions for Claimant, Defendants contend that Claimant has failed to prove 
entitlement to disability in excess of impairment paid to date. 
This matter was originally heard by Referee Powers. At the time this matter came under 
advisement, on November 3, 2017, the assigned Referee faced a significant case backlog that 
would result in a delay of this decision. In an effort to minimize the anticipated delay, the 
Commission contacted the parties to suggest that the case be decided on the record by the 
Commission. The parties responded, stating that due to observational credibility issues relating to 
Claimant's presentation at hearing, they preferred to have the case decided by the Referee who 
observed Claimant at hearing. However, as developed infra, the outcome in this case does not 
depend on an assessment of whether Claimant appeared to testify credibly at hearing. It does, to 
some extent, depend on a comparison of Claimant's testimony, with other evidence of record. 
While we are sensitive to the desires of the parties, our obligation to manage our docket to 
promote timely decisions supports assignment of this matter to the Commission. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Claimant was . At the time of hearing, he was  
 Claimant was born in Mexico and attended school there for three years. He moved to the 
United States in 1974 and became a U.S. Citizen in 1992. He spoke no English when he moved 
to the United States. Claimant has pursued no formal education in the United States. He learned 
English on his own, and has good conversational English language skills. (Tr., p. 34:12-22). He 
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also testified that as time has passed, his English language abilities have improved. (Tr., pp. 
53:15-2; 132:7-16). He has poor Spanish and English reading/writing skills. 
2. Claimant did not admit to having any particular problem communicating with his 
physicians in connection with the treatment/evaluation he received following the accident. He 
testified that if he initially does not understand a question posed by a physician, he will ask for 
clarification. (Tr., p. 151: 14-25). Nor do the medical records in evidence suggest that Claimant's 
providers/evaluators had any particular difficulty communicating with him. For example, in his 
August 2, 2010 report, Dr. Han-is reported that Claimant provided the history recorded. Dr. 
Han-is noted that Claimant was a "good historian." (Cit. Ex. 20, p. 602). In connection with his 
evaluation of September I 0, 20 I 0, Dr. Hammond noted that Claimant "can give a lucid history 
and has no language dysfunction." (Cit. Ex. 9, p. 458). In a follow-up visit of October 1, 2013, 
an employee of Dr. Hammond's office updated history taken from Claimant. She also noted that 
Claimant did not require an interpreter, and that his language preference was English. (Cit. Ex. 
9, p. 466). Finally, Claimant's counsel acknowledged in his June 22, 2016 letter to Dr. 
Hammond, that Claimant speaks English well enough that Claimant does not require an 
interpreter to converse with English speakers. (Cit. Ex. 24, p. 659i). 
3. Between 1974 and 1995, Claimant was employed primarily as a laborer on farms 
and ranches in the vicinity of Bruneau, Idaho. He was briefly employed by a trailer 
manufacturer in Boise where his job involved installing electrical wiring in trailers. He was 
employed as a laborer, not as an electrician. In 1995, he commenced his employment with 
Meyers Farms, Employer herein. Claimant was initially employed as the fa1m foreman, and still 
works in that capacity. Even though Claimant has always directed one or two employees since 
1995, he was, before 2009, more of a working foreman. He testified that between 1995 and 
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2009, he did "everything" on the farm, including some heavy physical labor. (Tr., pp. 61 :3-
62:12). Claimant knows how to weld, and has some skills as a mechanic. However, his real 
value to Employer is his specific knowledge of the in-igation system, and how to maximize that 
system for the benefit of crops grown by Employer. Since the 2009 accident, Claimant does less 
heavy lifting, and gives more direction to his subordinates to perform this work. He intends to 
continue working for Employer as long as he can. Claimant's tax records reflect that for 2015, 
he earned approximately $43,000 in his job for Employer, approximately twice as much as he 
earned in 2009. (Tr., p. 169:3-13). 
4. Morgan Meyers, one of the principals of Meyers Farms, testified to the business 
of Meyers Fatms. Employer controls approximately 12,000 acres of fmmland, at three different 
locations. Employer's Bruneau operation is managed by Claimant, whose expertise regarding 
the Bruneau fatm in-igation system is important to that operation's success; the Bruneau tract is 
somewhat "gravelly" and does not hold water well, making in-igation management that much 
more impotiant. According to Mr. Meyers, Claimant possesses the peculiar skills needed to 
make that operation successful. (Tr., pp. 173:14-185:19). Claimant does not require much in the 
way of supervision, and Meyers relies on Claimant to delegate work as Claimant sees fit. In 
addition to his expertise with the farm's in-igation system, Meyers depends on Claimant a great 
deal to oversee and supervise the annual harvest at Bruneau. Meyers testified that he would hire 
Claimant today, and that his knowledge and expertise is so impotiant that Meyers "would be in a 
panic" if Claimant decided to leave or retire. (Tr., pp. 189:13-190:1). 
Pre-Injury Medical Condition 
5. Claimant testified that immediately prior to the October 6, 2009 motor vehicle 
accident, he had no limitations on his ability to perform his work. Specifically, Claimant denied 
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any problems with his neck, left shoulder, left elbow, or low back immediately prior to October 
6, 2009. (Tr., pp. 82:15-85:12). However, the record reflects that Claimant did have periodic 
problems with low back pain/discomfort in the years prior to the October 6, 2009 motor vehicle 
accident. On November 6, 2001, Claimant was referred to chiropractor Jeffery Kieffer, D.C., by 
John Booth, PA-C for care of low back pain. PA Booth noted that Claimant had received no 
relief from conventional medical intervention. Evidently it was thought that chiropractic 
treatment might offer some relief. (Cit. Ex. 2, p. 31). However, Dr. Kieffer's records appear to 
reflect that he treated Claimant following November 6, 2001 for a principal complaint of cervical 
spine and upper extremity complaints. Nevertheless, Dr. Kieffer's January 3, 2002 report to the 
State Insurance Fund reflects that among his diagnoses of Claimant was a diagnosis of lumbar 
segmental joint dysfunction. (Cit. Ex. 2, p. 37). 
6. On March 1, 2004, Claimant saw Dr. Kieffer with complaints of low back 
soreness. On March 8, 2004, he was again seen with complaints of low back pain and bilateral 
leg numbness. (Cit. Ex. 2, pp. 38-39). In a statement dated October 11, 2012, Dr. Kieffer, 
referring to the 2004 notes, stated: 
This is to verify that I evaluated and treated Mr. Ayala on two occasions for lower 
back and lower extremity "numb feeling" as secondary complaints to a cervical 
and mid-scapular injury. These treatment dates were March 1 and March 8, 2004. 
There were no significant objectives finding regarding his lower back complaints 
at that time. . ... 
(Cit. Ex. 2, p. 45). It is unclear at whose instance the October 11, 2012 statement was prepared, 
or what information/representations accompanied that request. 
7. On June 23, 2004 Claimant was seen at the Glenns Ferry Health Center (GFHC) 
with a principal complaint of low back pain/soreness in the SI area. No neuroradicular 
symptoms were noted. The note reflects that Claimant expressed "multiple past experience[ s ]" 
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of similar discomfort. (Clt. Ex. 3, p. 65). Right SI soreness was noted on July 15, 2004 at the 
GFHC. On May 21, 2007, Claimant was again seen at the GFHC with complaints of right hip 
and SI joint pain "for over two years, with no recent trauma," although he did admit to an injury 
to this part of his back in 1974.2 He admitted to discomfort associated with sitting in a tractor 
and walking in the fields. He did not complain of any neuroradicular symptoms. (Clt. Ex. 3, p. 
115). 
8. On Febrnary 25, 2009, Claimant underwent a musculoskeletal exam as part of his 
encounter of that date. Findings were as follows: 
On examination, the patient walks with a normal gait. There is no visible 
scoliosis. The shoulders and pelvis are well-balanced. There is no tenderness over 
the spine or SI joints. There is no inguinal adenopathy. There is full spine range of 
motion without pain, and the patient can touch their toes. There is full hip range 
of motion bilaterally. There is a negative Patrick's test, and a negative straight leg 
raising test on both sides. Motor strength is 5/5 in both lower extremities, and 
sensation is intact to light touch in both legs. Knee jerk and ankle jerk reflexes are 
2+ bilaterally, and toes are downgoing. There is no clonus. 
(Cit. Ex. 3, p. 129). 
9. The GFHC notes of September 9, 2009 and October 5, 2009 figure prominently in 
the paiiies' arguments concerning whether or not Claimant's current low back complaints are 
causally related to the October 6, 2009 motor vehicle accident. Those notes deserve particular 
attention. On September 9, 2009, Claimant presented with the following history: 
Established patient for evaluation of 
1. back pain. 
Location of symptoms: the upper back, mid back, and low back, 
Symptom(s) are described as persistant [sic] and achey [sic], Severity: mild and 
stable. 
Onset is/was abrnpt. Symptoms have persisted for about one week. 
Context: Pt/ felt like he had an "internal fever" and felt restless and achey [sic]. 
His back along the paraspineous [sic] muscle straps, bilaterally have ached. He 
denies any vomiting but had some nausea. No change in bowel or bladder 
2 Per Dr. Hammond, hip pain is an indicator of nerve root impingement. (Hammond Depo., p. 39: 1-8). 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND ORDER - 9 
138
function. Modifying factors include: OTC drugs, which does not alleviate or 
worse the problem. 
Denies drowsiness; trouble falling asleep; 
Repotis appetite loss; which is/are mild; fatigue, restlessness, which is/are mild; 
restless sleep, muscle cramps, which is mild; 
(Cit. Ex. 3, p. 136). Claimant denied fever. Examination of his back revealed mild vertebral 
muscle spasm. Claimant's diagnosis was obesity and back pain. Lab work was ordered and 
weight loss was recommended. Prescriptions for Cyclobenzaprine and Naprosyn were written. 
(See Cit. Ex. 3, pp. 136-140). 
10. Claima~t again presented to the GFHC on October 5, 2009, the day before the 
subject October 6, 2009 motor vehicle accident. He presented with complaints of a cough, which 
he described as a longstanding condition related to exposure to cold air and other irritants. 
Claimant was also noted to be obese. He reported mild joint pain, muscle aches, and back pain. 
Claimant's musculoskeletal exam was positive for grinding at the lateral aspect of the lateral 
joint line of the right knee. Diagnoses at this visit included obesity, asthma, and back pain. 
Claimant's prescription for Naprosyn was refilled, as were other prescriptions related to obesity 
and diabetes. 
11. To other providers, Claimant also gave some history of low back problems 
predating the October 6, 2009 motor vehicle accident. When seen by D. Peter Reedy, M.D., on 
January 8, 2010, Claimant reported a past history of chiropractic visits for low back problems. 
(Cit. Ex. 5, p. 150). In his letter of January 7, 2016, Dr. Reedy proposed that the treatment notes 
from the GFHC reflect that Claimant was treated for complaints of low back pain immediately 
preceding the subject accident. Dr. Reedy also acknowledges that prior to the subject accident, 
Claimant suffered from a degenerative condition of the lumbar spine. He likened the subject 
accident to "the straw that broke the camel's back." (Cit. Ex. 5, p. 186). In a follow-up letter to 
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Claimant's counsel of January 19, 2016, Dr. Reedy acknowledged that Claimant had periodic 
episodes of low back pain which predated the 2009 motor vehicle accident, which was 
unsurprising to Dr. Reedy based on Claimant's vocation. (Cit. Ex. 5, p. 187). 
12. Vernon McCready, PA-C, too, was asked by Claimant's counsel to comment on 
the nature of the complaints with which Claimant presented at the time of his evaluation by PA 
McCready and/or his staff on September 9, 2009 and October 5, 2009. 
13. On November 5, 2015, December 14, 2015, and again on January 5, 2016, 
Claimant's counsel queried PA McCready about the nature of the problems with which Claimant 
presented on September 9, 2009 and October 5, 2009, suggesting a narrative that Claimant's 
problems were more-or-less systemic in nature and not reflective of a mechanical low back 
injury. (Cit. Ex. 6., p. 358). Also important in Claimant counsel's November 5, 2015 letter to PA 
McCready is the representation, which appears with some regularity in letters to Claimant's 
treating/evaluating physicians, that Claimant is the type of person who, on presenting for medical 
care, will only reference a primary complaint, declining to reference complaints of secondary 
importance: 
From my perspective, Mario presents as a straight-forward but rather 
unsophisticated individual. Following the industrial motor vehicle accident, Mario 
focused his complaints upon what was then causing him the greatest difficulty and 
produced the greatest symptomatology. Although logical, this approach results in 
an absence of medical records for other than primary or more obvious 
presentments, and oft-times in confusion or medical disagreement upon the issue 
of causal relation of the medical presentment to the injury at question. 
(Cit. Ex. 6, p. 351). This assertion finds little, if any, support in the record, and must be 
distinguished from a related assertion, discussed infra, that Claimant did not discuss his post-
injury low back complaints with Dr. Reedy because Dr. Reedy instructed Claimant to hold off 
discussing his low back until Dr. Reedy had completed his treatment of Claimant's cervical spine 
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condition. PA McCready failed to respond to the November 5, 2015 letter, the December 14, 
2015 letter, but finally did respond to the January 5, 2016 letter. Rather than provide a narrative 
response, PA Mccready simply acceded to the prepared statements offered by Claimant's 
counsel. (Cit. Ex. 6, p. 348). 
Accident of October 6, 2009 and Subsequent Low Back Complaints 
14. The accident giving rise to the first of the two claims in this consolidated 
proceeding occutTed on October 6, 2009. On that date, Claimant was operating a Meyers Farms' 
vehicle heading north on Highway 51, intending to pick up a part for a piece of farm machinery 
when his left front tire blew out, causing his vehicle to pull to the left. Claimant over-corrected, 
and struck the guard rail on the right side of the road. The vehicle then came back across the 
roadway, hitting the west guard rail. (Clt. Ex. 26, p. 679). Claimant was not wearing a seatbelt 
at the time of the accident. He testified he was thrown about the interior of the cab in the course 
of the accident. Afterwards, he was driven to his home by a passerby and transported later that 
day to the Elmore Medical Center (EMC) in Mountain Home. 
15. The EMC records of October 6, 2009 reflect that Claimant presented with a 
laceration to his left hand and with a history of striking his left chest wall as his vehicle swerved 
back and fotth. Claimant denied any injury to his head, neck, abdomen, or other injuries. He 
admitted only to the hand laceration and chest contusion. Claimant was examined, and other 
than the aforementioned injuries to his left hand and chest wall, no abnormalities were noted. 
Diagnosis on discharge was left chest wall contusion and left hand contusion, with puncture 
wounds. Claimant was seen again in follow-up on October 13, 2009 at EMC complaining ofleft-
sided rib pain and left anterior shoulder pain that radiated into the left arm. He stated that these 
symptoms began shortly after the accident of October 6, 2009. Claimant denied neck pain. 
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Neurological exam of the upper and lower extremities was normal. Gait was intact. The 
discharge diagnosis was expanded to include left rib fracture and left shoulder contusion. (Cit. 
Ex. 3, p. 148). 
16. On October 16, 2009, PA McCready evaluated Claimant at GFHC. Claimant's 
primary complaint was diminished urinary stream, a complaint for which he had been seen in the 
past. Secondarily, Claimant presented for removal of sutures from his left hand and an 
authorization to return to work. 
17. The November 4, 2009 chart note from the GFHC reflects that while Claimant did 
complain of left shoulder and left arm pain, he specifically denied low back pain or difficulty 
walking. Next, the GFHC records contain two separate chart notes, both signed by PA 
McCready, and both dated November 12, 2009. The first note from 11 :41 a.m. reflects that 
Claimant was seen in follow-up for his neck and left upper extremity discomfort. The second 
note from 12:01 p.m. reflects that Claimant was seen for treatment of a chronic urinary problem. 
Neither of the November 12, 2009 notes reference the low back. 
18. The GFHC record from November 16, 2009 reflects continued complaints of neck 
and left upper extremity symptoms. PA McCready recommended MRI evaluation of the cervical 
spine. PA McCready's note reflects that Claimant specifically denied low back pain or difficulty 
walking. (Cit. Ex. 6, p. 205). In treatment notes dated November 30, 2009 and December 11, 
2009, PA McCready also specifically noted that Claimant denied complaints of low back 
discomfort or difficulty with walking. (Cit. Ex. 6, pp. 206-211 ). 
19. While none of the aforementioned post-accident medical records reference 
complaints of low back or lower extremity difficulty, (even when Claimant appears to have been 
asked whether he had problems in these areas) the record does contain other references to post-
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accident back pain. The Notice oflnjury and Claim for Benefits prepared on or about November 
17, 2009 reflects that as a result of the October 6, 2009 accident Claimant suffered injuries as 
follows: "Cut and btuised hand when hit driver's side window and hutt back." (Cit. Ex. 25, p. 
673). On November 20, 2009, a State Insurance Fund investigator contacted Claimant to discuss 
the occun-ence of the 2009 accident. In a claimant contact repmt, Claimant described the 
following problems which he evidently related to the subject accident: 
How are you doing? left arm is numb. neck. back entire back. No strength in my 
left arm. both hands went numb. left hand worse. Cut on left hand. 
Please give a brief description of your job: farming 
Please give a description of what you were doing when the accident occurred. 1 
was going to get some patt in town and on hwy 51. I was coming up on the patt of 
the road where the guard rails were on both sides of the road and my left front tire 
blew out on the pickup. it all happened so fast. I pulled to[ o] hard on the steering 
wheel and over con-ected too far and hit the other guard rail. Both of my hands 
went numb. After hit the first guard rail on the right side and I went to grab the 
steering wheel I could not feel my left hand at all, shook my right hand it had 
some feeling. Accident happened about 2:30-3 :00pm 10-04-09 
Describe the nature of your injury. Injuries from cart accident, left hand. back, 
neck (Emphasis in original). 
(Cit. Ex. 25, p. 674a). 
20. The Industrial Commission Rehabilitation Division opened its file on Claimant in 
March of 2010. While the Rehabilitation Division's initial April 18, 2010 interview of Claimant 
does not reflect that Claimant described complaints of low back pain, a subsequent note of May 
12, 2010 does reflect that Claimant described complaints of numbness in his legs when standing 
at physical therapy for over 30 minutes. 
21. The first post-accident medical record making reference to Claimant's low back 
or lower extremities is Dr. Reedy's letter of January 8, 2010 to PA McCready, who had refen-ed 
Claimant to Dr. Reedy for evaluation. Per Dr. Reedy's letter, Claimant presented on January 8, 
2010 with the following complaints: 
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As you know, he is a pleasant  fa1m foreman out at Robert J. Meyers 
farms in Twin Falls who comes in complaining of pain "everywhere." He has 
neck pain and left arm pain primarily that arose from a work related motor vehicle 
accident in October 2009. He tells me that if he stands for 20-25 minutes his legs 
go numb. He has seen a chiropractor in the past for low back problems but he has 
never had a neck problem before this. He tried oral steroids without much relief. 
(Cit. Ex. 5, p. 150). Therefore, per the history recorded by Dr. Reedy, Claimant did relate his 
neck and left arm pain to the 2009 motor vehicle accident. However, Dr. Reedy's note does not 
explicitly reflect that Claimant also related his complaints of bilateral leg numbness to the motor 
vehicle accident. On exam, Claimant had findings suggestive of a cervical spine injury. Also, it 
was noted that lumbar range of motion was mildly decreased, although station and gait were 
normal. Deep tendon reflexes were 2+, and both ankle jerks were missing. Dr. Reedy went on 
to treat Claimant for his cervical spine condition, eventually performing surgery on Claimant's 
cervical spine on February 19, 2010, to include microdiscectomies at C5 thru C6 followed by 
instrumented fusions at the same levels. Claimant was seen in follow-up by Dr. Reedy on 
multiple occasions, but it was not until Dr. Reedy's December 5, 2011 office visit with Claimant 
that Claimant's low back and lower extremities are again referenced. On December 5, 2011, Dr. 
Reedy's office notes reflect that in addition to ongoing complaints with his cervical spine, 
Claimant presented with complaints of leg numbness and low back pain "ever since 10/09 
accident," which had never been investigated. Claimant also described more low back pain in the 
3-4 weeks prior to December 5, 2011. (Cit. Ex. 5, p. 168). 
22. The December 5, 2011 office visit is further memorialized in Dr. Reedy's 
December 10, 2011 letter to PA McCready. This letter contains further information concerning 
the history of Claimant's low back and lower extremity complaints that was not captured in the 
December 5, 2011 chart note: 
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He also complains about low back pain that he has had since the accident but that 
was never investigated, He said that when I first saw him I said lets work on the 
neck first and then we will deal with the lumbar issue but it never came up again. 
He describes what sounds like neurogenic claudication in that he can go into a 
store and walk around for 15-20 minutes but then he has bilateral leg pain, 
especially in the thighs when he is walking and he needs to sit down to get some 
relief. I think he certainly should have gotten an MRI of the lumbar spine and I 
will ask his attorney to get his case reopened so that we may pursue the lumbar 
end of things. I will also suggest to his attorney that he get a second opinion about 
his neck. 
(Cit, Ex. 5, p. 166). This letter does not reflect that Dr. Reedy has a recollection of instructing 
Claimant, in December of 2009, that Claimant's back and lower extremity complaints would be 
sorted out after Dr. Reedy dealt with Claimant's cervical spine. (Indeed, Dr. Reedy's January 8, 
2010 note does not reflect that he told Claimant to hold his low back complaints in abeyance). 
The letter only reflects that in December of 2011 Claimant came to Dr. Reedy stating that Dr. 
Reedy had previously told Claimant that investigation of Claimant's lumbar spine would be 
deferred pending treatment of the cervical spine. 
23. However, in his December 10, 2011 letter to Claimant's counsel, Dr. Reedy 
reported the following history of Claimant's low back complaints following the 2009 motor 
vehicle accident: "In addition, his lumbar spine, which he has complained about since the 
accident, has never been investigated and I would request authorization to perform an MRI if you 
get his case file reopened." (Clt. Ex. 5, p. 176). If Claimant persistently claimed about low back 
and lower extremity complaints following the 2009 motor vehicle accident, he either did not 
share these complaints with Dr. Reedy, or Dr. Reedy failed to make note of these symptoms. 
24. Nor does Claimant appear to have shared his persistent low back complaints with 
his attorney prior to December of 2011. Counsel's June 17, 2010 letter to Dr. Reedy describes 
Claimant's cervical spine and left upper extremity complaints and poses a number of questions to 
Dr. Reedy about Claimant's residual functional capacity, and whether Claimant is at risk for 
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accelerated degeneration of cervical spine segments above and below the C5-C7 fusion. 
However, that letter does nothing to suggest that counsel was aware of an as yet untreated low 
back complaints. 
25. Between January of2010 and December of 2011, Claimant also continued to be 
seen at the GFHC. (See Cit. Ex. 6). The GFHC note of March 15, 2010 makes no reference to 
Claimant's low back or lower extremities. The April 2, 2010 note reflects that Claimant was 
able to walk with a normal gait with no visible signs of scoliosis. He had full spinal range of 
motion without pain and was able to touch his toes. Hip motion was full bilaterally. Patrick's 
test was negative and Claimant had negative straight-leg raising on both sides. Motor strength 
was 5/5 in both lower extremities and sensation was intact to light touch in both legs. Knee jerk 
and ankle jerk reflexes were 2+ bilaterally. Identical findings were noted in an April 7, 2010 
chart note and Claimant reported that the back pain associated with his cough was gone. The 
June 4, 2010 office visit note makes no reference to Claimant's low back or lower extremities 
and Claimant specifically denied that there were additional symptoms to report. On June 21, 
2010 Claimant presented to the GFHC with complaints of back pain which Claimant described 
as "new." Claimant's discomf01i was located in the right mid-back. He described a sudden 
onset of symptoms for three days. Claimant was seen in follow-up for these complaints of mid-
back pain on July 21, 2010. On the occasion of that visit, PA McCready noted the same mid-
back pain with symptoms persisting for about a month. On exam, Claimant had tightness in the 
paraspinous musculature of the lumbar spine with spasm from T12 to SI. By August 17,. 2010, 
Claimant's complaints persisted in the right mid-to-lower back. PA McCready noted the 
persistence of symptoms over the past three months with insidious onset. However, on exam, no 
back abnormalities were noted. GFHC chart notes from August 30, 2010 reflect a past medical 
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history of chronic back pain and a 1975 right leg fracture. However, on the occasion of the 
August 30 exam, Claimant denied back pain or difficulty walking. On October 1, 2010 Claimant 
reported back pain, among his other complaints. GFHC notes from October 22, 2010, November 
1, 2010, January 6, 2011, January 11, 2011 and February 11, 2011 make no reference to low 
back or lower extremity symptoms. A chart note from June 3, 2011 does reflect arthritic 
complaints in Claimant's wrists, ankles, and feet. However, no complaints of low back 
pain/discomfort are referenced. Gait and station were normal. Claimant's hips were normal, 
bilaterally. A chart note from August 3, 2011 does not reflect low back complaints, but does 
note that Claimant presented with normal gait and an ability to stand without difficulty. The note 
referencing the office visit of August 23, 2011 reflects that Claimant denied muscular weakness, 
tingling, or numbness. The August 23, 2011 chart note does not reflect any back complaints. 
Claimant had normal gait and station. Similar findings were noted in the October 14, 2011 office 
visit. 
26. Then, in the chart note memorializing a December 1, 2011 visit, Claimant 
presented to PA McCready with the following complaints: 
The patient is a  other race, Hispanic or Latino male who presents a 
history of lumbar region pain which began two weeks ago. He describes the pain 
as moderate in severity and radiating into the right leg and left leg. The onset of 
the back pain was gradual and began without a clear precipitating event. 
The pain is aggravated by prolonged standing and sitting. The pain is alleviated 
by change of position and rest. He states that the pain does not wake him from 
sleep and the pain is improved in the morning. He also complains of left leg 
paresis, right leg paresis and cough, right lung discomfort, rhinorrhea ... 
(Cit. Ex. 6, p. 288). Neurologic exam of Claimant's lower extremities was normal. PA 
Mccready diagnosed Claimant as suffering from sciatica. Five days later, Claimant was seen by 
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Dr. Reedy, who noted Claimant's low back and lower extremity complaints which had not been 
referenced in Dr. Reedy's records since January of 2010. 
27. Following Claimant's cervical spine surgery, Dr. Reedy referred Claimant to 
Gregory Schweiger, M.D., for evaluation of persistent left upper extremity complaints. Dr. 
Schweiger first saw Claimant on April 28, 2010. His note does not reflect that Claimant 
described any lumbar spine or lower extremity problems. MRI evaluation of Claimant's 
shoulder demonstrated a rotator cuff tear. 
28. Dr. Schweiger arranged for Claimant to be seen by Dr. Hessing, who first 
examined Claimant on November 2, 2010. (Cit. Ex. 8, p. 409). Dr. Hessing reported that 
Claimant injured his shoulder in the 2009 motor vehicle accident as well as his cervical spine. 
Dr. Hessing noted that Claimant had suffered from left shoulder pain since the motor vehicle 
accident. Per Dr. Hessing, Claimant's August 23, 2010 left shoulder MRI was read as showing a 
large intrasubstance tear of the supraspinatus tendon. EMG evaluation of Claimant's left upper 
extremity was also thought to show an ulnar neuropathy at the elbow. Dr. Hessing 
recommended shoulder surgery to include probable rotator cuff repair and decompression of the 
shoulder joint. (Cit. Ex. 8, p. 409). Dr. Hessing's initial evaluation of Claimant does not reflect 
that Claimant presented with complaints of low back or lower extremity problems. 
29. On November 2, 2010 Claimant was also evaluated by Mark Clawson, M.D., for 
suspected left cubital tunnel syndrome. Dr. Clawson's initial evaluation does not reflect any 
complaints of low back or lower extremity problems. 
30. On December 9, 2010, Claimant underwent left ulnar nerve neurolysis and 
anterior subcutaneous nerve transposition performed by Dr. Clawson, along with a left shoulder 
decompression, labral debridement, and rotator cuff repair performed by Dr. Hessing. 
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31. Claimant was rated and released by Dr. Hessing for his shoulder injury on April 
20, 2011. Dr. Hessing reported that Claimant was working at his regular job, and felt that his 
residual left shoulder symptoms were tolerable. Claimant did note some residual neck difficulty, 
but Dr. Hessing noted that Claimant would be seen by Dr. Reedy for care/evaluation of these 
complaints. Dr. Hessing gave Claimant an impairment rating of 5% of the upper extremity and 
released him to return to his pre-injury job without restriction. 
32. On November 8, 2011, Claimant was seen for a closing evaluation by Dr. 
Clawson. Dr. Clawson noted that recent electrodiagnostic testing demonstrated normal nerve 
function in the left upper extremity. Claimant described symptoms that were more compatible 
with cervical spine pathology. Dr. Clawson also noted, for the first time, that Claimant presented 
with complaints of lower back pain. Dr. Clawson recommended that Claimant visit with Dr. 
Reedy regarding his neck and low back complaints. (Cit. Ex. 8, p. 456). 
33. As Claimant neared medical stability following his cervical spine surgery, Surety 
arranged for Claimant to be evaluated by Mark J. Harris, M.D. In his July 26, 2010 introductory 
letter, TJ Martin, Claims Examiner for Surety, introduced Claimant to Dr. Harris. He provided 
Dr. Harris with all medical records in possession of the Fund relating to Claimant's claim and 
provided a very brief history of Claimant's treatment. Importantly, Mr. Martin indicated that in 
his last conversation with Mr. Ayala, Claimant indicated that he was having some lower 
extremity pain and numbness. Mr. Martin's letter coincides with the GFHC treatment notes from 
June 21, July 21, and August 7, 2010 reflecting new onset of back pain. Mr. Martin posed a 
number of questions to Dr. Harris relating to Claimant's cmTent status, need for medical 
treatment, impairment, and restrictions. Dr. Harris saw Claimant for evaluation on August 2, 
2010. He took history from Claimant concerning the occurrence of the accident, his post-
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accident symptoms, and his treatment to date. Dr. Harris also elicited from Claimant a 
description of Claimant's then-current complaints. Dr. Harris reported these complaints as 
follows: 
CURRENT STATUS: The examinee's chief complaint is decreased range of 
motion and pain in the neck and left arm pain. I asked him several times in several 
different ways if he has any other areas of concern and he stated no. It was not 
until later that I asked him about the left leg symptoms and he stated those have 
now resolved and he has no further concerns about that area. He reports difficulty 
with pain, primarily located in the neck and left arm. Pain is described as stabbing 
in the left shoulder anteriorly, laterally, and down the arm into the fingers, 
specifically the small, ring, and long fingers. He states he always has numbness in 
the thumb and index fingers as well. The pain is worsened by resting his arm after 
work and improved by taking pain medications. The pain is reported as constant. 
On a scale of 0/10 which is no pain and 10/10 which is excruciating pain he 
rep011s the pain is a 6-7/10. During the past month he has averaged 2/10-3/10 with 
a high of 10/10 and a low of2/10-3/10. The examinee also reports difficulty with 
activity using the left hand carrying over 20 pounds and difficulty with grip. He 
denies any symptoms prior to the motor vehicle collision on 10/06/09. 
(Clt. Ex. 20, p. 603). Therefore, Claimant was provided with a number of opportunities to 
describe all symptoms from which he was then suffering. Claimant was specifically asked about 
lower extremity complaints. Claimant said that his lower extremity complaints had resolved and 
were no longer an issue. Claimant did not describe any low back complaints, Dr. Harris did 
relate Claimant's cervical spine and left upper extremity complaints to the subject accidents and 
proposed that Claimant was in need of further medical care for treatment/evaluation of these 
conditions. Neve11heless, he felt that Mr. Ayala was capable of working at his time-of-injury job 
since he was evidently doing so at the time of Dr. HatTis' evaluation. However, pending MRI 
evaluation of the shoulder, Dr. Harris felt it appropriate to limit Claimant's lifting to 50 pounds. 
34. By letter dated June 27, 2011, Mr. Martin again asked for Dr. Harris to evaluate 
Claimant as he neared medical stability following the surgeries perfo1med by Drs. Hessing and 
Clawson. Mr. Martin asked Dr. Harris to ascertain whether Claimant was at a point of medical 
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stability, and if so, whether he had permanent impairment referable to his work injuries, as well 
as work-related limitations/restrictions. 
35. Claimant was seen by Dr. Harris for the second time on August 15, 2011. Dr. 
HatTis again asked Claimant to describe his cmTent complaints. Those complaints included left 
hand pain with some residual pain in the shoulder and neck. Claimant described his discomfort 
as cramping pain. He described the pairl as constant. Dr. Harris did not record any low back or 
lower extremity difficulties as described by Claimant. Dr. Harris felt that Claimant had reached 
medical stability following his neck, shoulder, and elbow surgeries. Dr. Harris felt that Claimant 
was entitled to a 6% whole person impairment for his neck condition, a 5% upper extremity 
impairment for his shoulder condition, and no impairment for his ulnar nerve condition. 
36. Dr. Harris noted that as of August 15, 2011, none of Claimant's treating 
physicians had imposed restrictions on Claimant's functional activities. However, Dr. Harris felt 
that Claimant should use caution in overhead activities and heavy lifting even though his treaters 
had not issued such restrictions. (Cit. Ex. 20, p. 618). 
37. As developed infra, after Claimant presented to Dr. Reedy in December of 2011 
with complaints of low back pain, Dr. Reedy referred Claimant to Michael Hajjar, M.D., for 
evaluation of the low back complaints. Dr. Hajjar eventually requested authorization to perform 
an L4-S1 decompression and fusion. By letter dated August 30, 2012, Claims Examiner Martin 
asked Dr. Harris to review additional records generated since August 15, 2011, and to provide 
his analysis of whether Claimant's low back condition is causally related to the subject 2009 
motor vehicle accident. By letter dated September 21, 2012, Dr. Harris noted that at the time of 
his initial evaluation of Claimant, Claimant had been asked to describe his problems and only 
reported neck and left ann injuries. The pain diagram filled out by Claimant only denoted 
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burning and stabbing pain in the left upper shoulder area. Dr. Hanis also noted the September 9, 
2009 chart note from the GFHC and the May 21, 2007 chart note from the same facility, both of 
which, as discussed above, reference low back pain. Concerning the May 21, 2007 chart note, 
Dr. Harris noted: 
In reviewing the records from John Booth on 05/21/07 it shows hip pain under the 
subjective main complaint: "This is a  farmer complaining of right hip 
and SI area pain for over two years with no recent trauma. He did have injury to 
the area in 1974; no fracture. He has more pain after Inactive [sic] sitting in 
tractor and then tries to walk. He also has progressive pain in the lateral hip when 
walking in the fields. He expresses no new radicular or neuritic pain." 
(Cit. Ex. 20, p. 629). Dr. Harris also had the opportunity to review records generated by Drs. 
Clawson, Schweiger, and Hessing at Orthopedic Associates. Dr. Harris enoneously described 
Dr. Clawson's note of November 8, 2011 as having been authored on October 6, 2009. As 
developed above, Dr. Clawson's note of November 8, 2011 contains the first reference in the 
Orthopedic Associates notes of "lower back pain." At any rate, following his review of the 
records supplied by the State Insurance Fund, Dr. Han·is opined that Claimant's complaints of 
low back pain are not causally related to the industrial accident. This conclusion is based on Dr. 
Hanis' observations that there is evidence of low back pain which predates the subject accident 
and no medical evidence suppotting the proposition that Claimant presented with complaints of 
low back pain following the subject accident. (Cit. Ex. 20, p. 630). Based on Dr. Hanis' letter of 
September 21, 2012, Surety denied responsibility for Claimant's low back condition, 
38. Following Dr. Reedy's letter to PA McCready of December 10, 2011, 
authorization for MRI evaluation of Claimant's lumbar spine was requested. That study was 
performed on January 16, 2012 and was read as follows: 
LUMBAR DISK LEVELS: 
Ll-2: Nonna! for age. 
L2-3: Normal for age. 
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L3-4: Disc desiccation with mild bulging. Mild bilateral facet arthropathy. Mild 
canal and mild bilateral foraminal stenosis. 
L4-5: Disc desiccation with mild bulging. Moderate bilateral facet degeneration. 
There is mild canal and moderate bilateral foraminal stenosis. 
L5-S 1: Disc desiccation with mild bulging. Moderate bilateral facet degeneration. 
There is mild canal and moderate bilateral foraminal stenosis. 
CONCLUSION: Old Tl2 compression fracture with mild height loss. No acute 
fracture. No listhesis. 
Lumbar spondylosis with moderate bilateral L4/5 and L5/S 1 foraminal stenosis. 
There is mild canal and foraminal stenosis elsewhere, as detailed above. 
Clt. Ex. 11, p. 488. Thereafter, Dr. Reedy ordered a CT myelogram of Claimant's lumbar spine 
which was performed on April 3, 2012. That study was read as follows: 
Stable mild ve1iebral spurring throughout the lumbar spine. Mild deformity of the 
ventral thecal sac contour paiiicularly at the L4-5 level to a lesser extent through 
out the lumbar spine without significant lateralizing mass effect. In particular 
there is no significant displacement of lumbar nerve roots or underfilling of the 
nerve root sleeves at Ll-L5 levels. There is underfilling of the thecal sac at the 
lumbosacral junction and for opacification of the S 1 nerve root sleeves. There is 
facet a1ihropathy at L4-5 and L5-S 1 levels. There is no new significant vertebral 
malalignment. 
Cit. Ex. 11, p. 489 
39. In April of 2012, Dr. Reedy refe1Ted Claimant to Dr. Hajjar for fmiher evaluation 
of Claimant's lumbar spine. 
40. Dr. Hajjar first saw Claimant on June 23, 2012. At that time, Claimant gave a 
history to Dr. Hajj ar that he suffered from back and lower extremity pain which Claimant related 
to the motor vehicle accident of October 6, 2009. Dr. Hajjai· reviewed prior radiological studies, 
concluding that they demonstrated anterolisthesis at L4-5 "likely degenerative in nature." Dr. 
Hajjar also noted findings of bilateral recess stenosis and foraminal stenosis at L4-5 and L5-S 1. 
Per Dr. Hajjar, the studies demonstrated impingement of both the L4 and L5 nerve roots. Dr. 
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Hajjar counseled Claimant that his back condition might be amenable to surgical treatment. He 
recommended a bone scan to further evaluate Claimant's low back. When seen again by Dr. 
Hajjar on August 7, 2012, Claimant expressed continuing back and lower extremity pain, as well 
as difficulties with standing, walking, and other activities. Dr. Hajjar reiterated Claimant's 
radiographic findings, apparently consisting largely of degenerative pathology. Dr. Hajjar 
recommended L4 through SI decompression and fusion. 
41. By letter dated November 14, 2012 to Claims Examiner Martin, Dr. Hajjar 
responded to the several reports generated by Dr. Harris by this date. Dr. Hajjar erroneously 
noted that Dr. Hanis had not, by this time, expressed an opinion on the etiology of Claimant's 
low back complaints.3 Regardless, Dr. Hajjar stated that like Dr. Reedy, he believed Claimant's 
low back complaints are causally related to the subject accident, although his November 14, 
2012 letter to Claims Examiner Martin does not elaborate on what persuaded him to this point of 
view. Time passed, and Dr. Hajjar was not again quizzed about the causation issue until the date 
of hearing approached. 
42. By letter dated January 6, 2016, Defense counsel provided Dr. Hajjar with the 
pre-injury treatment records from the GFHC generated in the fall of 2009, and invited Dr. Hajjar 
to revisit the question of the cause of Claimant's low back and lower extremity complaints. In 
his response of January 27, 2016, Dr. Hajjar acknowledged receipt of the GFHC records from 
September 9, 2009 and October 5, 2009. His review of those records led him to agree with Paul 
Montalbano's, M.D., view that, at most, Claimant suffered a temporary and self-limiting 
exacerbation of his lumbar spine condition as a consequence of the October 6, 2009 accident. 
(Cit. Ex. 10, p. 472A). However, there the matter did not rest because, on Febrnary 4, 2016, 
3 In his September 21, 2012 report, Dr. Han-is explained that certain pre-injury medical records, including GFHC 
records from May 21, 2007 and September 9, 2009 supported his conclusion that Claimant's low back complaints 
are not causally related to the subject accident. 
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Claimant's counsel authored an extensive letter to Dr. Hajjar in which Dr. Hajjar was again . 
invited to visit the issue of the cause of Claimant's current low back complaints and need for 
surgery. Counsel's February 4, 2016 letter is worthy of further comment. As he did in other 
letters to providers/evaluators, Claimant's counsel introduced his questions with the following 
narrative: 
From my perspective, Mr. Ayala presents as a rather straight-forward but rather 
unsophisticated individual. Mr. Ayala's principal language is Spanish, although 
he can and does communicate in English at a base level. Following his industrial 
motor vehicle accident, Mr. Ayala focused his complaints upon what was then 
causing him the greatest difficulty and produced the greatest symptomatology. 
Although logical, this approach results in an absence of medical records for other 
than primary or more obvious presentments and oft-times in confusion or medical 
disagreement upon the issue of casual relation of the medical presentment to the 
injury in question, following a delay in appropriate diagnosis and treatment of that 
condition. 
(Cit. Ex. 10, p. 472G-472H). Concerning Claimant's past medical history, while Claimant's 
counsel did synopsize for Dr. Hajjar the GFHC records from September 14, 2007 forward, he did 
not advise Dr. Hajjar of earlier records from GFHC which do reflect a history of low back 
symptomatology. (Clt. Ex. 10, p. 472i). For example, Dr. Hajjar does not appear to have been 
made aware of the May 21, 2007 notes which reflect complaints of right hip and SI joint 
discomfort for two years without recent trauma. (Cit. Ex. 3, p. 115). Further, as he did in his 
letter to PA McCready of January 5, 2016, Claimant's counsel proposed to Dr. Hajjar that the 
complaints with which Claimant presented to PA McCready on September 9 and October 5, 
2009 were not of the type that warranted further workup for injury to the low back. (Cit. Ex. 10, 
p. 472J). Claimant's counsel further represented that Dr. Reedy confinned that he told Claimant 
to hold his low back complaints in abeyance until Dr. Reedy had finished treating Claimant's 
cervical spine. (Cit. Ex. 10, p. 4 72J). (Dr. Reedy has never confirmed that he recalls having this 
conversation with Claimant.) Finally, in his February 4, 2016 letter to Dr. Hajjar, Claimant's 
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counsel represented that Claimant's low back and lower extremity symptomatology has persisted 
ever since the October 6, 2009 motor vehicle accident. This is, assuredly, an asse1tion which 
Claimant now makes, but to say that it is a fact is not completely accurate; the record just as 
easily supp01ts the proposition that Claimant's low back complaints have waxed and waned 
following the October 6, 2009 motor vehicle accident. 
43. With that background, Claimant's counsel then asked Dr. Hajjar whether it would 
be appropriate to revisit the opinion he gave to Defense counsel on January 27, 2016. 
44. In his February 19, 2016 letter to Claimant's counsel, Dr. Hajjar did, indeed, 
revise his opinion. Informing Dr. Hajjar's change of hea1t is his conclusion that the GFHC 
records do not demonstrate any history of low back complaints prior to the subject accident. 
Concerning the notes of September 9, 2009 and October 5, 2009, Dr. Hajjar concluded that these 
notes suggest a condition that "sounds more like a flu" versus any type of mechanical low back 
issue. He also noted that PA McCready did not order any follow-up radiological testing which 
would have been a logical next step had PA McCready entertained the possibility of mechanical 
low back problems in September 2009. These records and reasoning caused Dr. Hajjar to change 
his opinion and rejoin Dr. Reedy in supporting a causal relationship between the motor vehicle 
accident and Claimant's low back complaints. (See Cit. Ex. 10, p. 472E-F). 
45. On August 28, 2013, Claimant suffered the second of the two accidents which are 
the subject of this proceeding. On that date, Claimant fell from an 8 foot ladder, landing on his 
feet, but, in the process, flexing his right knee. He experienced the immediate onset of right knee 
pain. He was initially evaluated at the Nampa Medical Center on the day of accident. He was 
seen for fmther treatment of his right knee by Miers Johnson, M.D., on September 11, 2013. Dr. 
Johnson noted Claimant's history of prior right knee surgeries, but also noted that Claimant had 
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had no significant problems with the right knee since the last surgery in 1987. He noted that as 
of the 2013 right knee injury, Claimant had been working full time, without restrictions, even 
though he had some pain/discomfort in his low back and lower extremities.' Claimant admitted 
. to being able to drive farm equipment, but to having trouble with any climbing or prolonged 
standing or pivoting. Claimant did not believe that the 2013 accident aggravated his low back 
condition and, indeed, no such assertion is made in these proceedings. MRl evaluation of the 
right knee revealed severe tri-compartmental degenerative changes and a chronic fracture of the 
posterior tibial plateau and the posterior lateral tibia. Also noted was a chronic avulsion of the 
posterior cruciate ligament tibial insertion. Within all tluee compartments of the knee, areas of 
full thickness cartilage loss were identified. Dr. Johnson noted that while Claimant assuredly 
had pre-existing osteoarthritis of the knee, some of the findings were likely referable to the 
subject accident. Dr. Johnson recommended a right total knee arthroplasty, and this procedure 
was performed on or about May 6, 2014. (Cit. Ex. 13, p. 514). Dr. Johnson released Claimant 
from care on or about September 24, 2014. At that time, Claimant denied any pain in the right 
knee, noting that he was driving tractor and otherwise performing his job. He denied any trouble 
walking on uneven surfaces, although he did admit to some difficulty after long periods of time 
on his feet. However, Dr. Johnson noted that Claimant related this discomfort to his back. 
Claimant indicated that long periods of standing and walking produced pain radiating into both 
anterior thighs and legs, and that he had permanent numbness in his left anterior thigh. 
46. On September 22, 2014, Dr. Johnson released Claimant to full duty work. He did 
not give Claimant any restrictions regarding walking related to Claimant's right knee 
arthroplasty. However, he did believe that Claimant should be followed for his low back and 
lower extremity complaints. (Cit. Ex. 13, p. 525). 
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47, Dr. Johnson referred Claimant to Fred Shoemaker, M.D., for the purposes of 
rating Claimant's right knee injury. That rating was performed on October 6, 2014. Claimant 
told Dr. Shoemaker that he felt he had had a good result from the knee replacement surgery. 
Based on Claimant's good outcome, confirmed by clinical exam, Dr. Shoemaker felt it 
appropriate to give Claimant a 21 % impairment rating of the lower extremity referable to his 
right knee, one-half of which Dr. Shoemaker related to Claimant's pre-existing right knee 
condition. Dr. Shoemaker was aware that Dr. Johnson had released Claimant without 
restrictions, but Dr. Shoemaker did not speak to limitations/restrictions as part of his evaluation. 
(Cit. Ex. 14, pp. 538-540), 
48. From the record it appears that Dr. Johnson referred Claimant to Paul 
Montalbano, M.D., for further care/evaluation of Claimant's low back condition. Dr. Montalbano 
saw Claimant for the first time on October 15, 2014. Claimant gave Dr. Montalbano a history of 
the October 6, 2009 accident, and that he had suffered from low back pain ever since that event. 
Sh01tly after the motor vehicle accident, Claimant described noting bilateral and anterior thigh 
discomfort as well as numbness and tingling into his extremities going down into the lateral 
aspect of his leg to his foot. He denied having any lower extremity symptomatology prior to the 
motor vehicle accident, He described his back pain as constant burning pain at level 7 on a scale 
0/10. Dr. Montalbano recommended new imaging of Claimant's lumbar spine to include x-rays 
and MRI evaluation. Instead, it appears that a myelogram and post-myelogram CT were 
performed on October 31, 2014. The post-myelogram CT was read as follows by Jeffrey 
Pugsley, M.D.,: 
T12-Ll: 2 mm of grade 1 retrolisthesis ofT12 on LI with mild disc height loss. 
Mild central canal narrowing secondary to the retrolisthesis, Mild right neural 
foraminal narrowing secondary to the retrolisthesis. 
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Ll-12: 2 mm of grade I retrolisthesis of LI on 12 with mild disc height loss. 
Mild central canal narrowing secondary to the retrolisthesis, small disc bulge, and 
mild facet arthropathy. Moderate right and mild left neural foraminal nan·owing 
secondary to the retrolisthesis and facet arthropathy. 
12-13: Mild central canal nano wing secondary to a small disc bulge and mild 
facet arthropathy. Mild bilateral neural foraminal narrowing secondary to facet 
arthropathy and disc bulge. 
13-14: Mild central canal nanowing secondary to a small disc bulge and mild 
facet arthropathy. Mild bilateral neural foraminal nanowing secondary to facet 
arthropathy and disc bulge. 
14-15: Mild central canal narrowing secondary to a small disc bulge and 
moderate facet arthropathy. Moderate to severe bilateral neural foraminal 
narrowing secondary to endplate osteophytes and facet arthropathy. 
15-S I: Mild central canal nanowing secondary to severe facet arthropathy. 
Severe right and moderate left neural foraminal nerve secondary to facet 
arthropathy and endplate osteophytes. 
(Cit. Ex. 19, pp. 591-592). Flexion/extension films of the lumbar spine demonstrated multi-level 
degenerative disc disease, most pronounced at T12-Ll, multi-level facet degeneration, most 
prominent at 13-4 thru LS-SI, and a Grade I retrolisthesis of LI on 12, unchanged on 
flexion/extension. 
49. In his letter to Dr. Johnson of November 7, 2014, Dr. Montalbano expressed his 
agreement with Dr. Pugsley's interpretation of the post-myelogram CT. On exam, Claimant's 
muscle strength was 5/5 in both upper and lower extremities. Claimant did exhibit antalgic gait 
and station. Deep tendon reflexes were normal, and Claimant's sensory exam was intact. 
50. Claimant was again seen by Dr. Montalbano on February 25, 2015, following a 
course of physical therapy. He presented with continued complaints of low back pain and lower 
extremity symptomatology. Dr. Montalbano ordered a bone scan in an effort to further sort out 
Claimant's problems. That study, performed on March 20, 2015, showed uptake at the right 14-5 
facet joint, and bilaterally at 15-Sl. (See Cit. Ex. 19, p. 595). In his note of April 8, 2013, Dr. 
Montalbano described the bone scan results as "quite mild." Dr. Montalbano recommended a 
facet joint injection from which Claimant enjoyed only limited improvement. Subsequent 
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neurological exam was n01mal. Dr. Montalbano recommended continuation of conservative 
modalities, including physical therapy and weight loss. 
51. By June 3, 2015, Dr. Montalbano rep01ied that Claimant was much improved 
with conservative modalities. Based on Claimant's improvement, and his limited findings on the 
post-myelogram CT, Dr. Montalbano did not believe that Claimant was a surgical candidate. 
52. By letter dated June 22, 2015, Claimant's counsel queried Dr. Montalbano as to 
whether or not Claimant's lumbar spine condition is causally related to the subject MV A. Again, 
Claimant's counsel made the representation that Claimant's practice, when meeting with treaters, 
is to withhold history of secondary complaints and reference to treaters/evaluators only those 
problems that are of greater significance. (Cit. Ex. 17, p. 577) 
53. Claimant's counsel's letter of June 22, 2015 does reflect that he provided Dr. 
Montalbano with selected medical records, including records from Dr. Reedy and Mountain 
Home Physical Therapy. Counsel's letter does not reflect that he provided Dr. Montalbano with 
copies of the September 9 and October 5, 2009 chart notes from the GFHC, but Counsel did 
offer the following comments concerning Claimant's pre-injury low back complaints: 
Upon Dr. Hajjer recommending lumbar surgery, the State Insurance Fund 
required that Mr. Ayala undergo an IME by Dr. Mark Harris, with Idaho Physical 
Medicine & Rehabilitation. Dr. Hanis' opinions were not upon actual 
examination of Mr. Ayala, but were based upon a review of medical records 
provided by the State Insurance Fund. Following the records review, Dr. Harris 
noted that Mr. Ayala did present prior to the October 6, 2009, motor vehicle 
accident with sporadic complaints of low back symptomatology. When 
questioned about this, Mr. Ayala responded that he is a "faim-worker," and that 
all farm-workers experience low back pain upon occasion. 
(Cit. Ex. 17, p. 579). Therefore, while Dr. Montalbano was generally apprised of Claimant's 
sporadic pre-injury back complaints, he was not specifically apprised of the September 9 and 
October 5, 2009 GFHC visits, nor was he provided with copies of those notes. He was, however, 
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provided with a synopsis of some of Claimant's medical contacts between October 5, 2009 and 
December 2011 chronicling Claimant's complaints of low back and lower extremity discomfort. 
Dr. Montalbano was asked whether, against this background, he would agree that the medical 
evidence establishes a causal connection between the motor vehicle accident and Claimant's 
cmTent low back condition. Dr. Montalbano's reply of July 8, 2015 reveals something about the 
assumptions he made in forming a response to Counsel's question. Dr. Montalbano premised his 
conclusions on the observation that it was "clear" that Claimant suffered from symptomatic low 
back complaints "since that motor vehicle accident," but that he had been "asymptomatic" prior 
to the motor vehicle accident. Therefore, Dr. Montalbano concluded that Claimant's 
symptomatology is directly related to the October 6, 2009 MV A. 
54. By letter dated September 30, 2015, Defense counsel provided Dr. Montalbano 
with the GFHC records from September 9, 2009 and October 5, 2009 and inquired of Dr. 
Montalbano how or whether those records would cause him to revisit his opinion that Claimant's 
low back complaints are causally related to the subject motor vehicle accident. In his reply of 
October 8, 2015 Dr. Montalbano explained that the opinions contained in his July 8, 2015 letter 
to Claimant's counsel were based on limited medical records. After reviewing the pre-injury 
GFHC records, Dr. Montalbano stated: 
After reviewing the additional medical records provided to me via your office, it 
is quite clear that Mr. Mario G. Ayala was symptomatic in terms of low back pain 
on at least two separate occasions. He was evaluated for low back pain on 
September 9, 2009 and once again on October 5, 2009. The latter was one day 
prior to his motor vehicle accident of October 6, 2009, in which Mr. Ayala 
attributes all of his symptomatology to be related to. Within these two visits of 
September 9, 2009, as well as October 5, 2009, Mr. Ayala started on treatment on 
two separate occasions for low back pain and even received a prescription for a 
nonsteroidal anti-inflammatory agent in order to manage such pain. 
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(Cit. Ex. 21, p. 639). Dr. Montalbano concluded that, at most, the October 6, 2009 motor vehicle 
accident caused but a temporary sprain/strain which he would have expected to be of relatively 
short duration. Dr. Montalbano's October 8, 2015 letter suggests that any care required later than 
4-6 weeks after the motor vehicle accident would be related to Claimant's underlying 
degenerative condition. In his letter of October 3, 2016, Dr. Montalbano stated that none of the 
records/materials generated by Dr. Hammond would cause him to revise any of his previously-
stated opinions. 
55. Dr. Montalbano's testimony was taken by way of post-hearing deposition. Dr. 
Montalbano testified that he had the oppmtunity to review both the 2012 and 2014 post-
myelogram CT studies. Those studies did not reveal any progression of Claimant's condition 
between 2012 and 2014. Dr. Montalbano also testified that none of the post-accident lumbar 
spine studies provide any suppmt for the proposition that Claimant suffered an acute injury to his 
lumbar spine as a consequence of the motor vehicle accident. (Montalbano Depo., pp. 29:24-
30:22; 37:8-38:9; 92:21-93:12; 116:12-22). While Claimant's lumbar spine studies do 
demonstrate severe multi-level degenerative arthritis, facet disease, and anterolisthesis, neither 
the studies, nor Dr. Montalbano' s clinical examination demonstrated that Claimant has 
impingement of existing nerve roots. (Montalbano Depo., pp. 12:19-13:15; 16:23-17:6; 65:3-
66: 17). On exam, Claimant's lower extremity symptoms did not follow a dermatomal pattern 
suggestive of nerve root compromise. (Montalbano Depo., pp. 13:7-15; 16:23-6). Because of the 
lack of findings suggestive of nerve root compromise/radiculopathy, Dr. Montalbano does not 
believe that Claimant is a surgical candidate, especially after Claimant experienced improvement 
in symptoms following the course of physical therapy ordered by Dr. Montalbano. 
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56. Dr. Montalbano originally opined that based on Claimant's lack of pre-injury low 
back symptoms, and the development of symptoms following the accident, it followed that 
Claimant's low back condition must be, in some respect, referable to the subject accident. Dr. 
Montalbano changed his mind after reviewing the September 9 and October 6, 2009 GFHC 
notes. Contrary to the narrative proposed by Claimant's counsel, Dr. Montalbano saw nothing in 
those notes which suggested that Claimant's low back complaints were mediated by some type 
of systemic ailment such as the flu, or other illness. Medications prescribed for Claimant on 
September 9, 2009, Naprosyn and Flexeril, are medications typically prescribed for 
musculoskeletal pain. (Montalbano Depo., pp. 26:24-28:23; 79:25-92:7). Therefore, from his 
review of the medical records, Dr. Montalbano concluded that in the years preceding the October 
6, 2009 motor vehicle accident, Claimant had periodic problems with low back pain and that 
immediately prior to the motor vehicle accident, he had one of these episodes. 
57. Dr. Montalbano recognized that Claimant's course following the subject accident 
is equally important. For example, he appears to concede that if Dr. Reedy is conect in 
supposing that Claimant had "unrelenting" low back/lower extremity discomfort since the 
subject accident, this fact would auger in favor of a conclusion that the subject acciderit did 
something to aggravate or accelerate Claimant's low back problems on a permanent basis. 
However, the medical records do not support the proposition that Claimant suffered from 
persistent/unrelenting low back pain ever since the subject accident. (Montalbano Depo., pp. 
30:23-31:19; 32:11-37:3). Based on the failure of the record to document persistent and 
unrelenting low back pain following the October 6, 2009 MV A, the existence of medical records 
which document a lack of low back symptoms/findings at various times after the October 6, 2009 
accident, and other medical records which document new occurrences of low back pain 
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following periods of no low back symptomatology, Dr. Montalbano believed that the subject 
accident caused, at most, a temporary exacerbation of Claimant's documented pre-existing low 
back condition. 
58. Richard Hammond, M.D., first saw Claimant on September 10, 2010, on refen-al 
from PA Mccready. Dr. Hammond took a history from Claimant concerning the accident and 
the cervical spine surgery previously performed by Dr. Reedy. Dr. Hammond noted that since 
the accident Claimant suffered from continued pain across the top of his left shoulder and had 
difficulty using his left arm. Dr. Hammond did not report that Claimant presented with any 
complaints of low back or lower extremity pain. Nor did Dr. Hammond's clinical exam suggest 
any findings indicative of low back problems. Dr. Hammond believed that Claimant had 
possible ulnar nerve and left shoulder problems and recommended further evaluation. (See Cit. 
Ex. 9, pp. 458-459). Dr. Hammond next saw Claimant on October 1, 2013 for complaints of 
blacking out. On the occasion of that visit, Dr. Hammond noted that Claimant did have some 
low back complaints for which he had been evaluated by Dr. Hajjar. Also noted was the 2013 
industrial injury to Claimant's right knee. Claimant was next seen by Dr. Hammond on August 
1, 2016, at the instance of Claimant's counsel. Counsel re-introduced Claimant to Dr. Hammond 
by way of a letter dated June 22, 2016.4 Among other things, Claimant's counsel inquired of Dr. 
Hammond whether Claimant's low back condition is causally related to the October 6, 2009 
motor vehicle accident. To Dr. Hammond, Claimant gave a history of having significant low 
back pain commencing immediately after the subject motor vehicle accident. Concerning the 
September 9, 2009 and October 5, 2009 GFHC notes, Claimant told Dr. Hammond that the back 
4 As he did with Dr. Hajjar, Counsel synopsized Claimant's pre-injury medical history, noting that Claimant had not 
presented to tjle GFHC with any low back complaints between September 14, 2007 and September 9, 2009. 
Claimant's Counsel did not include a synopsis of GFHC and Kieffer Chiropractic records generated between 
November 200 I and September of 2007. As noted infi'a, these records do reference episodes of low back, SI joint, or 
hip pain during this time frame. 
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complaints he had prior to the motor vehicle accident were of an entirely different nature than the 
low back complaints he developed thereafter. He reiterated that his low back complaints have 
been persistent since the motor vehicle accident. Based on Claimant's history, the records 
provided by Claimant's counsel , and his examination of Claimant, Dr. Hammond concluded that 
Claimant's low back condition is causally related to the subject accident. 
59. Dr. Hammond's deposition was taken on December 16, 2016. He testified that 
Claimant had radiographic evidence of 14-5 anterolisthesis with significant bilateral stenosis at 
LS-SI. Dr. Hammond testified that Claimant's anterolisthesis closed-off Claimant's 
neuroforamina, bilaterally, causing exiting nerve root impingement. Concerning the GFHC 
records from September 9, 2009 and October 5, 2009, Dr. Hammond agreed with Claimant's 
counsel that these notes are consistent with Claimant's treatment for some type of systemic 
complaint, as opposed to a musculoskeletal low back complaint. (Hammond Depo., pp. 17:18-
20:19). At most, Dr. Hammond believed that the September 9 and October 5, 2009 chart notes 
reflected muscular pain, while Claimant's cutTent complaints are referable to a structural 
abnormality. (Hammond Depo., pp. 20:20-21: 17). 
60. Concerning his September 10, 2010 evaluation of Claimant, Dr. Hammond 
testified that unless Claimant had presented with significant low back or lower extremity 
problems, he probably would not have made note of these, since he was seeing Claimant for left 
upper extremity problems. (Hammond Depo., p. 59:3-19). However, review of Dr. Hammond's 
September 10, 20 IO chart note demonstrates that he did talce a complete history from Claimant 
that involved inquiries well beyond the ambit of the nature and extent of Claimant's left upper 
extremity complaints. His history and exam of Claimant included Claimant's eyes, ears, nose and 
throat, cardiovascular, respiratory, gastrointestinal, genital/urinary, musculoskeletal, neurologic 
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and neurogenic systems. Claimant was invited to admit to any problems in these areas. Dr. 
Hammond also conducted a limited exam of Claimant's lower extremities. Knee jerk and ankle 
jerk were 1 +. Claimant's i,;ait and station were normal. Per Dr. Hammond, the knee and ankle 
jerk findings, though not normal, were not significant enough to warrant follow-up at that time. 
(Hammond Depo., p. 61 :6-24). In summary, in September of 2010, Dr. Hammond noted nothing 
regarding Claimant's low back which would have caused him to refer Claimant for further 
evaluation or treatment. 
61. Dr. Hammond testified that trauma can be one cause of anterolisthesis of the type 
seen in Claimant's lumbar spine. (Hammond Depo., pp. 15:21-16:19). However, he also 
acknowledged that wear and tear in populations that perfmm heavy labor "can certainly cause" 
anterolisthesis. (Hammond Depo., p. 85:15-21). Dr. Hammond believes that the subject accident 
caused injury to Claimant's lumbosacral spine and is responsible for Claimant's need for 
surgery. His reasons for coming to this conclusion are several. Dr. Hammond was willing to 
acknowledge that Claimant did have disease of the lumbar spine which predated the subject 
accident. However, he believed that the pre-injury and post-injury medical records he reviewed 
support the conclusion that the subject accident aggravated the pre-existing condition. Dr. 
Hammond believed that Claimant's pre-injury complaints consisted of a one or two-time visit to 
PA McCready for complaints oflow back pain on September 9, 2009 and October 5, 2009, while 
his post-injury complaints have been persistent and umelenting. (Hammond Depo., pp. 42: 11-
43:7; 79:1-13; 92:15-93:23; 107:18-108:14; 109:23-110:12; 111:14-24; 123:6-124:1). Dr. 
Hammond did not believe that the GFHC notes of September 9, 2009 and October 5, 2009 were 
significant. 
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62. Dr. Hammond was not provided with medical records generated by Dr. Kieffer 
and the GFMC, and discussed at~ 5-7, infra. Those records cover a period from a 2001 through 
May, 2007 and do reflect more longstanding complaints of hip/low back discomfort. It is 
unknown whether, or how, the additional notes which he did not see would cause him to amend 
any of the opinions he expressed concerning the significance of the subject accident to the 
development of Claimant's cun-ent low back condition. 
63. As noted, Dr. Hammond's opinion is also suppotted by his belief that Claimant's 
complaints were different in character following the motor vehicle accident and have been 
persistent and unrelenting since that time. In this belief he joins with Dr. Reedy: 
Q: [By Mr. Ben-y]: Basically, Dr. Reedy advised Mr. Augustine that just 
because Mr. Ayala may have had a backache once in a while prior to the motor-
vehicle accident that - - and here I'm quoting " ... does not preclude the fact that 
the exacerbation of the accident led to the persistent, unrelenting pain in the back 
and leg with neurogenic claudication-like symptoms, and he clearly has pathology 
to demonstrate the validity of those claims." Do you agree with that? 
A: I couldn't have said it better. 
(Hammond Depo., p. 111:14-24). However, as developed inji·a, the medical records do not 
supp01t the conclusion that Claimant's low back/lower extremity complaints have been persistent 
and unrelenting since the subject accident, at least until the late fall of 2011. 
64. Dr. Hammond was in general agreement with the FCE performed by Brian 
Wright, DPT. However, he believed that it might be appropriate to assign more of Claimant's 
sitting, standing, and walking restrictions to the low back condition as opposed to Claimant's 
knee injury. 
65. As noted, Dr. Reedy treated Claimant through December 2011, but thereafter, 
engaged in some back-and-forth with Claimant's counsel concerning the etiology of Claimant's 
low back complaints. In a letter dated November 20, 2012, Claimant's counsel introduced a 
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number of questions to Dr. Reedy by first synopsizing medical records tending to support the 
proposition that while Claimant may have had some periodic flares of low back pain prior to the 
subject accident, his complaints have been persistent and unrelenting since the subject accident. 
Claimant's counsel asked Dr. Reedy to confirm that Claimant's low back complaints were, in 
some respect, referable to the subject accident. In his response of December 12, 2012, Dr. Reedy 
stated: 
I clearly think Mr. Ayala's lumbar presentment and need for surgery that both I 
and Dr. Hajjar issued is causally related to the October 6, 2009 motor vehicle 
accident. Obviously, he did have pre-existing spine (he had worked hard for a 
living fol' his entire life)! However, he was asymptomatic until the time of the 
MV A which precipitated the need for intervention. Please contact me if I can be 
of any further assistance. 
(Cit. Ex. 5, p. 177). Counsel's November 20, 2012 letter did not specifically refe!'ence the much-
discussed GFHC records of September 9, 2009 and October 5, 2009. 
66. By letter dated December 17, 2015, Defense counsel advised Dr. Reedy that Dr. 
Montalbano had ultimately concluded that Claimant's low back condition is not referable to the 
subject accident. He also provided Dr. Reedy with copies of the chart notes from September 9, 
2009 and October 5, 2009, which Dr. Montalbano had found to be significant. He asked for Dr. 
Reedy's comment. By letter dated January 7, 2016, Dr. Reedy acknowledged that Claimant had a 
pre-existing degenerative condition of the lumbar spine, but proposed that the subject accident 
was a "straw that broke the camel's back," causing Claimant to suffer "persistent unrelenting" 
pain in the back and leg since the motor vehicle accident. (Cit. Ex. 5, p. 186). He minimized the 
GFHC notes from September 9, 2009 and October 5, 2009, explaining that just because Claimant 
had a back ache prior to his industrial accident did not mean that the industrial accident did not 
cause additional injury to Claimant's lumbar spine. (Cit. Ex. 5, p. 186). In a January 19, 2016 
follow-up letter to Claimant's counsel, Dr. Reedy again elaborated on his view of what is and is 
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not significant in this case in terms of Claimant's clinical presentation. He stated Claimant may 
well have suffered from periodic bouts of low back pain prior to the motor vehicle accident, and 
he clearly did have degenerative disease of the lumbar spine prior to the industrial accident; 
however, it was only following the industrial accident that Claimant suffered from persistent and 
intractable low back pain, and therefore, the motor vehicle accident is directly related to 
Claimant's cunent lumbar spine condition. (Cit. Ex. 5, p. 187). 
Further Discussion Concerning Claimant's Lumbar Spine 
67. It is well established by a long line of authorities that in any proceeding before the 
Industrial Commission, a claimant has the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the 
evidence, all facts essential to his recovery. See Ball v. Daw Forest Products Co., 136 Idaho 
155, 30 P.3d 933 (2001); Evans v. Hara's, Inc., 123 Idaho 473, 849 P.2d 932 (1993). Where 
medical causation is at issue, a claimant must provide medical evidence that supports the claim 
for compensation to a reasonable degree of medical probability. Langley v. State Industrial 
Special Indemnity Fund, 126 Idaho 781, 890 P.2d 732 (1995). Probable is defined as having 
more evidence for than against. Fisher v. Bunker Hill Co., 96 Idaho 341, 528 P.2d 903 (1974). 
Magic words are not necessary to convey that a doctor's opinion is given with the requisite 
degree of medical probability; all that is needed is testimony demonstrating the physician's plain 
and unequivocal conviction that a causal connection exists between an accident and an injury. 
See Jensen v. City of Pocatello, 135 Idaho 406, 18 P Jd 211 (2001 ). 
68. In the instant matter, the parties have devoted reams of exhibits, testimony, and 
argument for and against the proposition that Claimant's lumbar spine condition is, in some 
respect, causally related to the subject accident. The opinions are numerous, and vacillating, but 
th~y generally acknowledge that Claimant has degenerative disease of the lumbar spine which 
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predated the subject accident. All physicians who have reviewed the films taken in connection 
with evaluation of Claimant's lumbar spine acknowledge that there is no finding in any of those 
studies which, standing alone, constitutes evidence of acute injury of Claimant's lumbar spine. 
The studies alone do not provide evidence sufficient to demonstrate that the subject accident 
contributed something to Claimant's pre-existing low back condition. However, while the 
radiographic evidence demonstrates longstanding disease of the lumbar spine, the studies are not 
inconsistent with the proposition that these processes may have been aggravated by the subject 
accident. As is not uncommonly the case, the objective medical evidence must be correlated with 
Claimant's history and clinical examination to inform an opinion on whether or not the subject 
accident did cause some permanent injury to Claimant's lumbar spine. 
69. It is clear from review of the causation opinions in this case that the 
treating/evaluating physicians are cognizant of the importance of c01Telating the objective 
medical evidence with Claimant's history, clinical presentation, and exam. The parties, too, 
recognize the importance of this correlation, and have pulled out the stops to posit questions to 
treating/evaluating physicians premised on the facts they deem most important to their case. 
70. Having reviewed the record in its entirety, and having considered the writings and 
testimony of all the physicians who have rendered an opinion on the cause of Claimant's low 
back condition, the Commission concludes that Claimant has failed to demonstrate, to a 
reasonable degree of medical probability, that his cmTent low back complaints are causally 
related to the subject accident. 
71. First, the radiological studies unambiguously establish that Claimant has multi-
level degenerative disease of the lumbar spine which predated the subject accident. The record 
also establishes that Claimant presented, in the years preceding the October 6, 2009 accident 
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with periodic complaints of low back pain. Claimant endorses this, as does Dr. Reedy. (Cit. Ex. 
5, pp. 179, 180, 187; Cit Ex. 20, p. 635). However, Dr. Hammond was not aware of the Kieffer 
Chiropractic and GFHC records which reflect some complaints of low back/hip pain between 
2001-2007. On September 9, 2009, Claimant was seen at the GFHC for a number of complaints, 
including, inter a/ia, low back pain. He was seen again on October 5, 2009, the day before the 
subject accident, with complaints of a cough, which he described as longstanding and mild joint 
pain, muscle aches, and back pain. Having reviewed the testimony and records of the numerous 
providers who have commented on the September 9 and October 5, 2009 notes, the evidence 
does not establish that the back pain or low back pain with which Claimant presented on those 
occasions was simply a manifestation of a systemic illness such as the flu. PA McCready's 
January 19, 2016 reply to counsel's check-the-box questionnaire is not particularly persuasive, 
and it is given little weight. Such evidence is always regarded with some skepticism. Rather 
than the physician's unalloyed opinion, what is received is an opinion fotmulated by the party 
offering it, to which the physician is asked to give his assent. It is unclear whether PA 
McCready's reply represents his actual opinion, or was simply his way to buy some peace; 
Claimant's counsel contacted him on three occasions seeking a response to certain questions, and 
only obtained it after advising PA Mccready that failing a written response, it would be 
necessary to notice McCready's deposition. Further, PA McCready's response does not 
discount the possibility that the complaints with which Claimant presented on September 9, 2009 
included musculoskeletal low back complaints. All that PA McCready admitted to is that as of 
September 9, 2009 and October 5, 2009, Claimant's low back complaints did not indicate 
"serious or significant" injury to the low back. How serious or how significant an injury 
Claimant's symptoms might have indicated, is left to speculation. PA McCready next signified 
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his agreement with the assertion that absent the October 5, 2009 accident, he would not have 
expected Claimant to "thereafter" present with a significant low back injury as later documented 
by Drs. Hajjar and Reedy in 2012. The term "thereafter" admits a lot ofleeway, and it is unclear 
how or whether PA McCready' s opinion might change if Claimant did not develop significant 
low back symptoms until several months following the accident or, if, he had waxing and waning 
symptoms between the date of the subject accident and Dr. Reedy's chart note in December of 
2011. Accordingly, PA McCready's January 19, 2016 response to Claimant's counsel is not 
especially probative of the question of whether Claimant's low back condition is related to his 
MVA. 
72. Both Dr. Hammond and Dr. Montalbano have speculated on the significance of 
the complaints with which Claimant presented on September 9 and October 5, 2009. In general, 
Dr. Montalbano's reasoning is more persuasive. He has pointed out that Naprosyn and Flexeril 
are typically prescribed for musculoskeletal complaints, thus denigrating the suggestion that 
Claimant merely had the flu. He also noted that ff PA McCready had suspected the flu, he would 
undoubtedly have ordered a quick flu test in addition to the other labs he ordered. Dr. 
Montalbano also noted other of PA McCready's findings that ran counter to a systemic condition 
or infection as the explanation for Claimant's presenting complaints. Dr. Hammond was far less 
persuasive in this regard. 
73. The most problematic, and hardest fought, aspect of this case lies in making some 
determination as to whether or not, or to what extent, Claimant suffered from low back 
complaints following the October 5, 2009 accident. Based on the medical opinions that have 
been adduced, if Claimant's low back complaints following the 2009 accident were persistent 
and unrelenting, it would be rather easy to conclude that the subject accident must have 
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aggravated Claimant's pre-existing low back disease; objective findings consistent with an 
accident caused aggravation of a pre-existing condition could be correlated with a medical 
history of new and unrelenting back and lower extremity symptoms since the accident to support 
the conclusion that the accident caused permanent injury to Claimant's iow back. On the other 
hand, if the evidence is more susceptible of a conclusion that Claimant did not present with 
persistent low back complaints following the subject accident until the late fall of 2011, then .it 
becomes much more difficult to conclude that the subject accident is implicated in the cause of 
Claimant's low back condition. The evidence on this issue is conflicting but, as developed 
below, the record offers less support to the proposition that Claimant suffered from persistent 
and unrelenting low back pain since the October 5, 2009 MVA, and more support to the 
proposition that his low back complaints began, in earnest, in late 2011. 
74. Claimant testified that he has suffered from low back and lower extremity 
numbness unremittingly since the accident of October 6, 2009. (Claimant Depo., p. 33:11-22; 
Tr., p. 95: 13-17). However, there are multiple post-accident medical records which are silent on 
the issue of whether Claimant complained of low back and lower extremity pain; these records 
admit the possibility that Claimant had low back symptomatology which he simply did not 
describe to his providers. However, the post-accident medical records generated between the date 
of accident and the late fall of 2011 contain an equal number of records in which Claimant 
specifically denied low back/lower extremity symptoms, or which reference an exam of the low 
back and lower extremities which turned up nothing untoward. These records are much harder to 
reconcile with Claimant's current insistence that he has suffered from unrelenting low back/ 
lower extremity symptomatology ever since the subject accident. Moreover, the post-injury 
medical records generated between the date of accident and the late fall of 2011 also reflect that 
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on several occasions when Claimant did complain of back or low back discomfort the onset of 
these problems was not related to the subject accident, but was described as being of more recent 
origin. It is clear that Claimant did describe suffering from back pain immediately after the 
accident to Employer and the SIP. It is also clear that he complained of back pain in the spring 
of 2010, and again, in the late fall of 2011. However, these records are not sufficient to support a 
finding that Claimant's symptomatolog_y following the motor vehicle accident was persistent and 
unrelenting in light of the other medical records which show that Claimant's history oflow back 
symptomatology following the motor vehicle accident was, at most, intermittent. Dr. Reedy was 
prepared to acknowledge that on a pre-injury basis Claimant suffered from intermittent low back 
and/or lower extremity problems. Claimant's post-accident history does not persuasively 
demonstrate more significant or persistent low back symptoms, at least not until the fall of 2011. 
Of particular interest, are medical records from a number of sources generated in the late fall of 
2011. These records reflect a new onset of low back and lower extremity discomfort in 
November of 2011. 
75. Claimant has explained the failure of the medical records to uniformly reflect 
persistent and unrelenting low back pain since the subject accident by his practice to only 
reference to the many providers he saw following the subject accident his most predominant 
complaint, leaving unstated any secondary complaint such as low back and lower extremity 
discomfort. Having reviewed Claimant's testimony, both at hearing, and at the time of his 
prehearing deposition, there is little-if-any support for this proposition in the record. For 
example, following cervical s.pine surgery Claimant was refe1Ted to Mountain Home Physical 
Therapy. He was first evaluated at that facility on March 25, 2010, and was last seen on June 9, 
2010. Claimant was again referred to Mountain Home Physical Therapy by Dr. Hessing 
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following Claimant's shoulder and elbow surgery. During the first session of physical therapy 
(March 25, 2010 - June 9, 2010) Claimant was seen for treatment on 31 occasions. Claimant 
contends that the physical therapy chart notes from March 25, April 7, April 19, April 27, and 
May 25 reflect that Claimant presented on those occasions to the physical therapist with 
complaints of hip/lower extremity pain. The notes reflect that throughout the course of physical 
therapy, Claimant's primary complaints related to his neck and left upper extremity. However, 
on March 25, 2010 the therapist noted that Claimant had complaints of pain in the left foot. (Cit. 
Ex. 7, p. 361). The note from April 7, 2010 reflects that Claimant complained about hip soreness 
after riding the bike. The chart note from April 19, 2010 reflects that Claimant presented with 
complaints that his hip had been bothering him more and was waking him at night. The chart 
note from April 27, 2010 reflects that Claimant's hip did better with a different type of exercise 
bicycle. The note from May 25, 2010 reflects that Claimant told his doctor about his hip pain but 
the doctor did not have an answer. Therefore, for the period March 25, 2010 through June 11, 
2010 there is reference to hip discomfort in four of the 31 chart notes. They do not reveal 
complaints of low back pain or lower extremity numbness. Between January 18, 2011 and April 
7, 2011 Claimant was seen at Mountain Home Physical Therapy on 21 occasions. These notes 
make no reference to complaints of hip or lower extremity discomfort. In all, the Mountain 
Home Physical Therapy records lend little support to the proposition that Claimant complained 
of persistent and unrelenting back and lower extremity discomfort at all times following the 
industrial accident of October 5, 2009. However, these records do denigrate Claimant's other 
insistence that the medical records do not contain reference to low back complaints either 
because (I) he only told physicians about his mo~t significant complaint; or (2) Dr. Reedy 
counseled Claimant to withhold discussion of the low back until Claimant's neck/upper 
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extremity complaints were dealt with. Nor do the PT notes support the proposition that if 
Claimant was seeing a paiticular provider for his neck or upper extremity complaints, he would 
not discuss any other complaints he was having with such provider. 
76. As noted, Dr. Reedy has reported that Claimant told Dr. Reedy in December of 
2011 that he (Dr. Reedy) had advised Claimant back in January of 2010 that Dr. Reedy would 
concentrate first on Claimant's neck problem, and after resolution of the same, attention would 
be turned to the low back. Dr. Reedy has never endorsed this; he has only reported that this is 
what Claimant has said. That the nairntive proposed by Claimant to Dr. Reedy in December of 
2011 does not accurately represent a discussion had between Dr. Reedy and Claimant in January 
of 2010 is perhaps best demonstrated by Dr. Reedy's letter of November 18, 2010 to PA 
McCready. By that time, Claimant was thought to be medically stable following his cervical 
spine fusion performed by Dr. Reedy. However, rather than take-up the next of Claimant's 
complaints, i.e. his low back, which had been held in reserve pending resolution of Claimant's 
cervical spine condition, Dr. Reedy released Claimant from his care. (Cit. Ex. 5, p. 164) 
77. Claimant saw Dr. HatTis for the purposes of an IME. Dr. Han-is was not 
designated to treat Claimant for his back, shoulder, or any other condition. Claimant was invited 
to describe the nature and extent of the complaints he related to the work accident and low back 
complaints were not among those described. Claimant treated with Dr. Clawson for his left 
upper extremity, yet in November of 2011 shared with Dr. Clawson the low back complaints he 
was having. In shmt, Claimant's explanation for the failure of the medical record to document 
persistent and umelenting complaints in the low back is not persuasive. The record better 
supports the proposition that Claimant suffered from periodic, but not unrelenting, low back and 
lower extremity discomfo1t between October 6, 2009 and the late fall of 2011, just as he had 
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suffered from periodic bouts of low back pain in the years prior to October 6. 2009. The opinions 
of Dr. Reedy, Dr. Hammond, and Dr. Hajjar are all premised on the assumption that Claimant's 
low back symptomatology increased precipitously following the industrial accident. This 
assumption is important because it provides support for the proposition that Claimant's objective 
degenerative changes were more likely-than-not aggravated by the subject accident. Otherwise, 
how is one to explain the sudden and precipitous worsening described by Claimant? Absent this 
underlying assumption there is little-to-no support for the proposition that the objective changes 
noted on radiology studies are, in some respect, referable to the subject accident. As described 
by Drs. Hammond, Montalbano, and Reedy, Claimant's lumbar spine films demonstrate 
degenerative findings with no clear evidence of an acute injury which could be related to the 
subject accident. For these reasons, Claimant has failed to establish that his low back condition 
is causally related to the subject accident. 
Further Findings and Discussion Relating to Neck, Left Upper Extremity, and Right Knee 
78. As initially explained, the parties are in agreement that Claimant's cervical spine, 
left shoulder, left ulnar nerve, and right knee injuries are causally related to the accidents of 2009 
and 2013. There remains the issue of Claimant's disability referable to these compensable 
conditions. 
79. Dr. Reedy released Claimant to return to work without restriction on May 20, 
2010. (Cit. Ex. 5, p. 161). He continued to follow Claimant during Claimant's treatment with 
Dr. Clawson and Dr. Hessing. By June of 2011, Claimant presented with complaints of 
experiencing acute cervical discomfort after he tilted his head and felt a "pop" in his neck. 
Follow-up MRI evaluation did not reveal anything untoward although Dr. Reedy did comment 
on persistent foraminal encroachment at the C6-7 level. On December 10, 2011, Claimant 
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presented to Dr. Reedy with continuing complaints of having difficulty turning his neck, more so 
on the left than the right. Dr. Reedy did not believe that Claimant's situation could be improved 
by further surgery, but recommended that Claimant obtain a second opinion. (Cit. Ex. 5, p. 166). 
Dr. Reedy has not seen Claimant since December 5, 2011, and, despite Claimant's recurrent 
cervical spine complaints, did not ever revise his release to return to work without restrictions, at 
least not until he received a copy of the September 25, 2015 FCE performed by PT Wright. On 
November 2, 2015, nearly four years after he last saw Claimant, Dr. Reedy expressed his full 
agreement with the restrictions proposed by PT Wright and the apportionment of those 
restrictions between Claimant's cervical spine/upper extremity complaints and his low back 
condition. (Cit. Ex. 5, p. 182). Concerning the impai1ment referable to Claimant's cervical spine 
condition, Dr. Reedy defeITed to the rating proposed by Dr. HaiTis. (Cit. Ex. 5, p. 173). 
80. Dr. Hessing, who performed Claimant's left shoulder surgery, was aware of 
Claimant's work as a farm laborer. (Cit. Ex. 8, p. 415). Following surgery, he gave Claimant a 
5% upper extremity rating and released Claimant to return to work at his preinjury job without 
restrictions. (Cit. Ex. 8, p. 445). 
81. Dr. Clawson, who performed Claimant's ulnar nerve surgery, released Claimant 
to return to work without restrictions, and without reference to residual impairment, on January 
11,2011. 
82. Claimant was first seen by Miers Johnson, M.D., for treatment of his right knee, 
on September 11, 2013. Dr. Johnson's note of that date reflects that Claimant described working 
as a farm laborer, without restrictions, although he did complain of some lower extremity and 
low back difficulties. Following the right knee arthroplasty perfo1med by Dr. Johnson, he noted, 
on July 14, 2014, that Claimant was doing quite well vis-a-vis the right knee: 
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He seldom has trouble with the knee except maybe the next day after physical 
therapy and if he tries to kneel on his kneecap. He is driving a tractor and 
otherwise doing his job. He has trouble walking on uneven ground. He is able to 
walk, but has trouble when he is on his feet for very long periods of time. Most of 
this seems secondary to his back ... 
(Cit. Ex. 13, p. 522). On September 22, 2014 Claimant was released from care by Dr. Johnson 
with these comments: 
Patient can work full duty. I have no restrictions regarding his walking with his 
total knee. His biggest problem seems to be sciatica and should be re-evaluated 
by the spine surgeon. 
(Cit. Ex. 13, p. 524). Dr. Johnson did not offer impairment rating for Claimant's right knee 
arthroplasty. In this regard, he deferred to Dr. Shoemaker. 
83. Dr. Shoemaker saw Claimant for the purposes of evaluation on October 6, 2014. 
Dr. Shoemaker noted Claimant's pre-existing right knee surgeries, as well as the surgery 
performed by Dr. Johnson. He gave Claimant a 21% impairment rating of the lower extremity 
based on Claimant's good surgical outcome and the fact that Dr. Johnson did not deem it 
necessary to provide Claimant with any pennanent restrictions. Dr. Shoemaker apportioned one-
half of the 21 % lower extremity rating to Claimant's documented pre-existing right knee 
problems. (See Cit. Ex. 14, pp. 539-540). In his report, Dr. Shoemaker referenced a separate 
"activity status report" which he prepared, and which discussed work restrictions/precautions 
applicable to Claimant. However, that document is not contained in the record. 
84. At the instance of Defendants, Claimant was evaluated by Dr. Harris following 
Claimant's release by Drs. Hessing, Clawson, and Reedy. To Dr. Harris, Claimant described the 
requirements of his job and indicated that as of August 15, 2011 he was perfonning this work 
without physician-imposed restrictions. (Cit. Ex. 20, p. 614). Claimant complained of neck and 
upper extremity discomfort, but no low back/lower extremity difficulties. Dr. Ha1Tis gave 
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Claimant a 6% whole person rating for his cervical spine, concurred with Dr. Hessing's 5% 
upper extremity rating for the left shoulder and awarded no impairment for the left ulnar nerve 
transposition surgery performed by Dr. Clawson. (Cit. Ex. 20, pp. 617-618). Concerning 
permanent limitations/restrictions, Dr. Harris offered the following: 
At this point, Mr. Ayala has no work restrictions as noted by the treating 
physicians in this case and I would agree that he should use caution in overhead 
activities and heavy lifting, although no permanent restrictions are given or 
suggested. 
(Cit. Ex. 20, p. 618). 
85. Claimant's counsel referred Claimant to Brian Wright, DPT, for the purpose of a 
I 
functional capacities evaluation. In his cover letter, Counsel cautioned PT Wright that because 
Claimant's low back condition might ultimately be determined to be unrelated to the 2009 
accident, it would be important for PT Wright to distinguish between limitations/restrictions 
referable to Claimant's right knee/neck/left upper extremity injuries and his low back condition. 
(See Cit. Ex. 23, pp. 656-659). PT Wright performed this functional capacity evaluation on 
September 25, 2015. PT Wright noted that Claimant participated in the evaluation with "full 
objective signs of maximum effort and cooperation." He also noted that "between similar 
functional tests, client consistently performed as expected and these findings correlated well with 
each other." PT Wright did not have access to the job site evaluation prepared by the ICRD. He 
relied on Claimant to describe the functional components of his job, and this informed his 
ultimate conclusion that the physical abilities demonstrated on exam constituted a significant 
barrier to Claimant's performance of his job. Per PT Wright, the limitations referable to 
Claimant's specific areas of injury are as follows: 
1. Cervical spine/neck, status-post microdiskectomy and fusion by Dr. Reedy -
This particular presentment is responsible for the limitations in the following 
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functional categories: Waist to floor lifting, waist to crown lifting, lift-cany, 
elevated activity and forward bend - stand activities. 
2. Left upper extremity, status -post left ulnar nerve neurolysis, anterior 
subcutaneoustransposition by Dr. Clawson. This particular presentment is 
responsible for the limitations in the following functional categories: Waist to 
floor lifting, waist to crown lifting, lift-cal1"y and elevated activity. 
3. Left shoulder, status-post arthroscopic subacromial decompression, distal 
claviculectomy, labral and joint debridement with rotator cuff repair by Dr. 
Hessing. This particular presentment is responsible for the limitations in the 
following functional categories: Waist to floor lifting, waist to crown lifting, lift-
cal1"y and elevated activity. 
4. Right knee, status-post right TKA by Dr. Johnson. This particular presentment 
is responsible for the limitations in the following functional categories: Walking 
(low back is contributing 20-40% of this in my opinion), Waist to floor lift (low 
back is contributing 20-40% to this), lift-ca11"y (I 0-20% contribution from low 
back), forward bend - stand (20-40% contribution) and sitting (60-80% 
contribution from the low back). 
5. Low back/ lumbar spine, cu11"ently presenting as non-surgical. This particular 
presentment is responsible for the limitations in the following functional 
categories: Walking (low back is· contributing 20-40% of this in my opinion), 
Waist to floor lift (low back is contributing 20-40% to this) lift-can-y (10-20% 
contribution from low back), forward bend - stand (20-40% contribution) and 
sitting (60-80% contribution from the low back). 
(Cit. Ex. 23, p. 647). 
86. Conceming his findings relating to Claimant's low back, PT Wright did not 
explain his conclusion that 20-40% of Claimant's waist-to-floor lifting limitation should be 
attributed to Claimant's low back condition. For example, does this mean that since Claimant 
was found to be capable of occasional waist-to-floor lifting in the range of 15 pounds, 
subtracting out the low back condition's contribution to this limitation would result in increasing 
Claimant's waist-to-floor lifting by 20-40%? Neither Mr. Jordan nor Dr. Collins were able to 
offer any insights on this question, and PT Wright was not deposed. 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND ORDER - 52 
181
87: In summary, there is general agreement that Claimant has the following 
impairments referable to his industrial injuries: cervical spine - 6% of the whole person; left 
shoulder - 5%; upper extremity; ulnar nerve transposition - 0%; right knee - 21 %; lower 
extremity -- 50% attributable to pre-existing condition, 50% referable to 2013 accident. 
Claimant's low back condition is not deemed stable and ratable. 
Vocational Testimony 
88. William Jordan conducted a forensic vocational evaluation of Claimant at the 
instance of Defendants. His report reflects that Claimant has been employed primarily as a farm 
laborer/foreman since approximately 1990, Since 1999, Claimant has been employed by Meyers 
Farms. Social Security earnings records reflect a steady annual increase in earnings since 1999, 
the only exception being the years 2009, 2010, and 2013, when Claimant lost time from work 
referable to his work-related injuries. In 2008, for example, the year preceding the 2009 
accident, Claimant earned $24,170. In 2015, Claimant's earnings are reported at $42,911. Mr. 
Jordan had the opportunity to interview both Claimant and Robert Meyers, the principal of 
Meyers Farms. Per Mr. Meyers, Claimant is a good worker who Meyers expects to retain as an 
employee, notwithstanding that Claimant has been forced to modify how he performs his work 
as faim foreman, From Mr. Meyers, Mr. Jordan recorded the following: 
Mr. Meyers indicated that he was aware that the Claimant has modified his work 
activities so that he does less lifting: he estimated that the Claimant probably lifts 
a maximum of 50 pounds. He uses equipment for lifting, can get help with lifting 
or he can delegate heavier lifting to the other two employees. The Employer 
stated that the Claimant still does about all of the same job tasks that he has 
always done - he just goes about it a little differently. 
Mr. Meyers indicated that the Claimant possesses knowledge that is helpful on the 
farm. He gave the example of how they draw water out of the river using pumps. 
The 14 pivots that they use for irrigating have to be balanced to manage the use of 
the water. The Claimant is in charge of this task. 
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Mr. Meyers reiterated that he is not planning on terminating the employment 
relationship with the Claimant as he continues to be productive, although he noted 
that he has heard through some of the chemical distributors that the Claimant has 
been considering quitting. Mr. Meyers is aware that the Claimant is getting older, 
and is approaching full Social Security Retirement age ( approximately within the 
next year). 
(Def. Ex. 9, pp. 207-208). Mr. Jordan also elicited from Claimant, Claimant's sens
e of his 
functional abilities. Per Mr. Jordan, Claimant's sense of what he can do from a fu
nctional 
standpoint is somewhat more generous than the maximum functional capabilities outline
d by PT 
Wright. Mr. Jordan noted that Claimant has a fund of agricultural skills valuable to his
 current 
employer, and to other similarly-situated employers. Mr. Jordan's report illustr
ates the 
importance of understanding the extent and degree of Claimant's limitations/restrictions
: absent 
limitations/restrictions, as might be suggested by the work releases of Drs. Hessing, C
lawson, 
Harris, and Johnson, Claimant has suffered no disability as a consequence of the work
 injuries 
since he has no functional limitations that would impede his ability to engage in gainful 
activity. 
On the other hand, Mr. Jordan acknowledged that if one accepts the limitations/res
trictions 
identified in the September 2015 FCE, Claimant has suffered significant loss of his a
bility to 
engage in gainful activity as compared to the labor market access he enjoyed prior to t
he 2009 
accident. Based on Claimant's status as an able-bodied individual, and taldng into acc
ount his 
relevant non-medical factors, Mr. Jordan proposed that Claimant had access to appro
ximately 
17% of his labor market prior the 2009 accident. However, assuming the limitations/res
trictions 
identified in the September 2015 FCE, Claimant has lost 62% of his pre-injury labor mar
ket with 
an anticipated wage loss of 32%. Employing a convention frequently utilized by vo
cational 
rehabilitation experts, Mr. Jordan proposed that the limitations/restrictions outlined in t
he FCE, 
coupled with Claimant's non-medical factors, yield disability in the range of 47%, inc
lusive of 
PPL (62 + 32 = 94 + 2 = 47). 
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89. Nancy Collins, Ph.D., was engaged by Claimant's counsel to perform a forensic 
vocational assessment of Claimant's residual employability following the subject accidents. Her 
report appears at Claimant's. Exhibit 32. She reviewed medical records, interviewed Claimant, 
and undertook an assessment of Claimant's employability. Her report reflects that the subjective 
complaints described by Claimant have been consistent. Over time she noted that none of 
Claimant's treating physicians, with the exception of Dr. Reedy, felt that Claimant required any 
physician-imposed limitations/restrictions following his dates of medical stability. Even Dr. 
Reedy initially proposed no limitations/restrictions. Dr. Collins did note that the FCE imposed 
significant restrictions, and these were generally adopted by Dr. Reedy and Claimant's expert, 
Dr. Hammond. Dr. Collins also took a detailed history from Claimant concerning his subjective 
sense of what he can and cannot do. Claimant's subjective sense of his functional abilities is 
much more consistent with the FCE than it is with the opinions of his treating physicians. 
Generally speaking, Dr. Collins found that the FCE results are consistent with the ability of 
Claimant to perform limited light-duty work. Per Dr. Collins, Claimant's skills are as a farm 
laborer and foreman. He also has supervisory skills and some skills in operating/repairing faim 
and inigation equipment. Although Dr. Collins did not perform an analysis of Claimant's 
percentage access to his labor mai-Icet on a pre-injury basis, she did conclude that based on 
Claimant's age, education, work experience, and other non-medical factors, he was best suited to 
working as a farming supervisor, agricultural equipment operator, farm worker/laborer, or 
landscaper/grounds keeper. 
90. As did Mr. Jordan, Dr. Collins acknowledged that absent functional 
limitations/restrictions, Claimant has suffered no loss of earning capacity as a consequence of the 
subject accidents. However, considering the limitations/restrictions suggested by the FCE, led 
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Dr. Collins to propose that Claimant is totally and permanently disabled at present. Although Dr. 
Collins acknowledged that she did not understand how to apply PT Wright's attempt to subtract 
low back limitations from the totality of Claimant's limitations, she believes that even if 
Claimant's low back restrictions are not considered, Claimant is totally and permanently disabled 
by virtue of his knee, neck, and left upper extremity limitations. Dr. Collins is of the opinion that 
were it not for Claimant's "superhuman" effort, and the accommodation offered by a 
"sympathetic employer," Claimant would not be employed at this time, and absent his current 
job, he is, essentially, totally and permanently disabled. On the matter of the effort Claimant has 
gone to in order to retain employment, Dr. Collins noted that he has been forced to delegate work 
he can no longer perform to his subordinates, and to work longer hours in order to accomplish 
the things he can still do. At the time of her post-hearing deposition Dr. Collins acknowledged 
that if Claimant has no limitations/restrictions, he has no disability. However, Dr. Collins did 
not consider this assumption in formulating her opinion. Her concluding remarks make it clear 
that it is her opinion that Claimant is 100% disabled but for the one job he is currently 
perfmming for an accommodating and sympathetic employer. 
Discussion and Further Findings Relating to Claim of Disability 
91. Claimant contends that he is totally and permanently disabled under the odd-lot 
doctrine. Defendants contend that Claimant has suffered no disability, but if he has, it is less than 
total and permanent. Moreover, Defendants contend that Claimant's less-than-permanent and 
total disability must be apportioned between the subject accident and a pre-existing condition 
pursuant to the provisions ofldaho Code § 72-406. 
92. "Permanent Disability" or "under a permanent disability" results when. the actual 
or presumed ability to engage in gainful activity is reduced or absent because of permanent 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND ORDER- 56 
185
impairment and no fundamental or marked change in the future can be reasonably expected. 
(See Idaho Code § 72-423). The evaluation of permanent disability is an appraisal of the injured 
worker's present and probable future ability to engage in gainful activity as it is affected by the 
medical factor of permanent impairment and by permanent non-medical factors as set f01ih at 
Idaho Code § 72-430. (See Idabo Code § 72-425). The test for determining whether a claimant 
has suffered a permanent disability greater than permanent impaitment is whether the physical 
impairment, taken in conjunction with non-medical factors, has reduced the claimant's capacity 
for gainful employment. Graybill v. Swift & Co., 115 Idabo 293, 766 P.2d 763 (1988). The 
focus of a determination of permanent disability is on the claimant's ability to engage in gainful 
activity. Sund v. Gambrell, 127 Idaho 3, 896 P.2d 329 (1995). 
93. The labor market to be considered in evaluating Claimant's disability is ordinarily 
the labor market in which Claimant resides as of the date of hearing. Brown v. The Home Depot, 
152 Idaho 605, 272 P.3d 577 (2012). Whether Claimant has a permanent disability is a question 
of fact, and Claimant bears the burden of proving that he has suffered disability in excess of 
impairment. Boley v. State Industrial Special Indemnity Fund, 130 Idabo 278, 989 P.2d 854 
(1997). An odd-lot worker is one who is so injured that he is unable to perform services other 
than those limited in quality, dependability or quantity, such that a reasonably stable market for 
such services does not exist. Boley v. State Idaho Special Indemnity Fund, supra. An odd-lot 
worker need not be physically unable to do anything w01ihy of compensation, but he does need 
to demonstrate that he is so handicapped that he will not be employed regularly in any well-
known branch of the labor market absent the business boom, the sympathy of a paiiicular 
employer or friends, temporary good luck, or superhuman effort on his part. Lyons v. Industrial 
Special Indemnity Fund, 98 Idabo 403,565 P.2d 1360 (1977). 
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94. Claimant bears the burden of adducing proof sufficient to establish, on a prima 
facie basis, his odd-lot status. A claimant may prove odd-lot status by showing that he has 
unsuccessfully attempted other types of employment, that he, or a vocational expert on his 
behalf, has searched for other work but other work is not available, or that any efforts to find 
suitable employment would be futile. Boley v. State Industrial Special Indemnity Fund, supra. 
95. Once a claimant has satisfied his burden of proving a prima facie case of odd-lot 
status by one of the three aforementioned methods, the burden of proof shifts to the employer to 
prove claimant's employability. Hoye v. Daw Forest Products, Inc., 125 Idaho 582, 873 P.2d 
836 (1994). Employer cannot meet this burden merely by showing that claimant is able to 
perform some type of work. Lyons v. State Industrial Special Indemnity Fund, supra. Rather, 
Employer must show that there is an actual job within a reasonable distance from Claimant's 
home which he is able to perform or for which he can be trained that he has a reasonable 
opportunity to be employed at that job. Lyons, supra. 
96. Apportionment of disability, while not at issue in this case if Claimant is adjudged 
totally and permanently disabled, is at issue in the event the Commission determines that 
Claimant is not totally and permanently disabled. Idaho Code § 72-406(1) provides: 
In cases of permanent disability less than total, if the degree or duration of 
disability resulting from an industrial injury or occupational disease is increased 
or prolonged because of a preexisting physical impairment, the employer shall be 
liable only for the additional disability from the industrial injury or occupational 
disease. 
Under this section, and Page v. McCain Foods, Inc., 145 Idaho 302, 179 P.3d 265 (2008), where 
apportionment is at issue in a less-than-total case, a two step process must be employed. First, 
claimant's disability must be evaluated in light of all physical impairments resulting from the 
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industrial accident, and any pre-existing conditions. Thereafter, the amount of permanent 
disability attributable to the industrial accident(s) must be apportioned. 
97. As noted above, evaluation of Claimant's disability depends, in the first instance, 
on making some judgment about the extent and degree to which Claimant has permanent 
limitations/restrictions. Here, Defendants argue that because neither Drs. Reedy, Clawson, 
Hessing, or Harris initially imposed any restrictions on Claimant at medical stability, and, in fact, 
released him to return to a job that they probably knew was fairly onerous, Claimant has no 
disability in excess of impairment. On the other hand, Claimant argues that the 
limitations/restrictions identified in the September 2015 functional capacities evaluation are a 
much more accurate portrayal of Claimant's ability to engage in physical activities, and these 
limitations/restrictions support a conclusion that Claimant is totally and permanently disabled. 
98. There is evidence to suppott a finding that Claimant has no physical 
limitations/restrictions relating to his right knee, neck, left shoulder, and ulnar nerve 
transposition. Drs. Clawson, Hessing, Reedy, Han-is, and Johnson have all rendered opinions 
that suppott this conclusion. Only Dr. Reedy has changed his mind, but his conclusion is subject 
to criticism because he had not seen Claimant for nearly four years prior to his wholesale 
adoption of the FCE findings. However, when last seen by Dr. Reedy on December 5, 2011, 
Claimant was no longer enjoying good relief from cervical spine surgery previously perfo1med 
by Dr. Reedy. In fact, Dr. Reedy recommended a second opinion in an effort to better 
understand Claimant's recurrent cervical spine problems. As well, by December 2011, Dr. 
Reedy was aware that Claimant was having low back problems which would go on to be 
evaluated by Dr. Hajjar. Following December of 2011, Dr. Reedy was updated on Claimant's 
status by Claimant's counsel, especially regarding Claimant's progress with lumbar spine 
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evaluation. Therefore, even though Dr. Reedy had not seen Claimant since December 5, 2011, it 
is possible that he was well enough apprised of Claimant's status to embrace a set of restrictions 
without the need to see Claimant for confirmation. Regardless, Dr. Reedy' s enthusiastic 
embrace of the FCE is the weakest evidence of its legitimacy. 
99. The FCE has also been explicitly endorsed by Dr. Hammond. Dr. Hammond 
testified to his general agreement with the recommendations of the FCE, even though neither did 
he understand PT Wright's reasoning in apportioning low back limitations the way he did. In 
fact, Dr. H~ond testified that probably more of Claimant's limitations relating to sitting and 
walking are related to the lumbar spine condition. (Hammond Depo., pp. 50:19-51:12). Even 
though Claimant had been released by Dr. Reedy for his cervical spine, Dr. Hammond did not 
quarrel with the FCE results which suggested that Claimant continued to have significant neck 
and upper extremity difficulties. (Hammond Depo., pp. 52:10-56:2). In fact, Dr. Hammond 
reported that Claimant still had complaints of cervical spine pain when he evaluated Claimant in 
August of 2016. However, Dr. Hammond's August 1, 2016 office note reflects the following 
about the history he received from Claimant concerning his neck and upper extremity: 
Dr. Reedy did surgery on his neck and he says he has some decreased limitation 
but no other significant pain. His left shoulder feels well and occasionally is stiff 
but he can pretty much do everything he wants with this. There. was also the left 
ulnar nerve difficulty. This was transposed and he has a little bit of numbness 
into his palm of his left hand, but there was no difficulty with grip or using the left 
arm or hand otherwise. 
(Cit. Ex. 24, p. 569A). The record also contains medical records from the GFHC entered 
contemporaneous with the September 2015 FCE. On September I, 2015, Claimant was seen by 
Dr. Ensminger at the GFHC, for complaints ofleft lmee pain which Claimant related to work that 
Claimant was doing during potato harvest which required him to work bent over or kneeling. Dr. 
Ensminger noted that Claimant's artificial knee (on the right) was doing well. Finally, it was 
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noted that Claimant's degenerative disc disease of his neck and low back were "stable." On 
physical exam, no spinal tenderness or misalignment was noted. Spine range of motion was 
normal. Paraspinal muscle strength and tone was within normal limits. Concerning Claimant's 
left upper extremity, no tenderness was noted to palpation. Claimant's shoulder, elbow, and 
wrist joint were stable. He had normal range of motion, without crepitus or pain in the left upper 
extremity. 
100. Dr. Hessing's note from August of 2016, and more particularly, Mark 
Ensminger's, M.D., note from September 2015 are not entirely consistent with Claimant's 
presenting complaints on the occasion of the September 25, 2015 FCE. To PT Wright, Claimant 
made the following pain report: 
Reported discomfort in the lumbar spine, knee, shoulder and cervical spine was 
part of the reason for limitations with lifting, carrying, elevated activity, 
crouching or low level activity, walking, forward bending. Objective signs 
coincided with the Client's reports of discomfort. 
(Cit. Ex. 23, p. 646). On exam, Claimant was noted to have decrease in neck and left shoulder 
range of motion, inconsistent with the September 1, 2015 findings by Dr. Ensminger. 
101. On the other hand, to Defendants' criticism that the FCE must be invalid because 
greater problems are noted with Claimant's unaffected extremities, i.e. the right shoulder and the 
left knee, is nonsensical. Claimant's left shoulder was surgically repaired, as was his right knee. 
Claimant has documented left knee arthritis, and it would be unsurprising if a manual laborer of 
his age also did not have right shoulder arthritis. That Claimant's surgically-addressed 
extremities exhibit less severe findings than his contralateral extremities does not cause the 
Commission to question PT Wright's examination. After all, if the surgeries were not intended 
to improve Claimant's function or reduce his pain, there would be little purpose in doing them. 
Defendants also criticize PT Wright's report because validity testing, measured in what 
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Defendants call the customary manner, is not identified in PT Wright's report. This criticism is 
rejected because PT Wright has clearly expressed his conclusion that in performing Claimant's 
evaluation PT Wright was satisfied that Claimant gave full effort, and that the test results are 
consistent with this conclusion. Nothing in PT Wright's report suggests that it should be 
discounted because Claimant was consciously manipulating the evaluation. 
102. Finally, the Commission is impressed by the fact that Employer is obviously 
aware that Claimant does not retain the same physical ability he had prior to the 2009 accident. 
The Employer is aware that Claimant has physical limitations/restrictions and that he has found a 
way to accommodate his limitations by assigning more tasks to his subordinates. There is 
nothing in the Employer's testimony that would support the conclusion that Claimant is now just 
as physically capable as he was prior to the October 6, 2009 MV A. 
103. Claimant continued to have cervical spine complaints after being released to full 
duty by Dr. Reedy; Dr. Reedy's notes confirm it. Claimant's ulnar nerve transposition does not 
seem to have resulted in any limitations/restrictions. It is less clear whether or not Claimant has 
continued to have left shoulder complaints following Dr. Hessing's surgery, and the dissonance 
between Dr. Ensminger's September 1, 2015 office note and the nearly contemporaneous FCE is 
troubling. Further, by his own statements to Mr. Jordan, Claimant appears to be able to engage 
in physical activities somewhat more onerous than those described in the FCE. 
104. In summary, while it is certainly possible to challenge certain aspects of the FCE, 
it is a better prognosticator of Claimant's limitations than the choice offered by Defendants' 
suggestion that Claimant has no physician-imposed limitations/restrictions, and therefore no 
disability. 
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105. Therefore, the FCE will be used as a guide to evaluating Claimant's disability 
from all causes combined. 
106. Having determined that the September 2015 FCE provides the best snapshot of 
Claimant's functional limitations/restrictions, it is next necessary to evaluate how those 
limitations/restrictions, in conjunction with Claimant's relevant non-medical factors, affect his 
ability to engage in gainful activity. Per the two-step process envisioned by Page v. McCain 
Foods, supra, attention is first directed to understanding Claimant's disability from all causes. 
107. As reflected in his testimony, and in the rep01is and testimony of Dr. Collins and 
Mr. Jordan, Claimant is an older worker of Hispanic extraction who, while bilingual, has limited 
education and limited ability to read and write in either English or Spanish. He has limited 
computer skills, but is able to use a computer to perform some parts of his current job, i.e, 
searching for replacement pmis. He has some transferable vocational skills; he can weld, and 
has some abilities relating to repair and maintenance of farm and other equipment. He also has 
abilities in the area of heavy equipment operation. As foreman at Meyers Farms, he has 
necessarily acquired some skills as a supervisor; he supervises and delegates work to two 
subordinates. Claimant's past relevant work experience has largely been in the agricultural field, 
although he has done some work in the remote past in a manufacturing environment. Based on 
his job at Meyers Farms, Claimant has a demonstrated ability to assume responsibility for the 
day-to-day operation of a relatively large farming operation. His skills are somewhat unique to 
the Meyers Farm's operation; the Bruneau Farm has unique soil characteristics which make 
in-igation challenging. 
108. Mr. Jordan proposed that on a pre-injury basis, Claimant had reasonable access to 
17% of the jobs in his geographic locale. Dr. Collins did not quantify Claimant's pre-injury 
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access to his local labor market, but proposed that based on Claimant's non-medical factors, he 
would have access to agricultural and landscaping-type work absent physical limitations. These 
assessments seem reasonable and not inconsistent. 
109. Mr. Jordan and Dr. Collins part ways, however, when it comes to the impact of 
Claimant's current functional status on his employability, With no explanation other than his 
reliance on OASYS software, Mr. Jordan opined that assuming the FCE recommendations, and 
further assuming that Claimant loses his current employment with Meyers Farms, Claimant has 
suffered 62% loss of access to his pre-injury labor market. Mr. Jordan also calculated a 32% 
wage loss based on his belief that even with the limitations/restrictions derived from the 
September 2015 FCE, Claimant has access to work paying in the range of $8.00 per hour. An 
$8.00 per hour hourly wage in the labor market at large seems reasonable for any job that 
Claimant might obtain in light of his current limitations/restrictions. 
110. The real issue is whether there are in fact suitable jobs for Claimant within his 
limitations/restrictions. In his report, Mr. Jordan did not articulate the types of employment that 
Claimant could compete for, assuming the limitations/restrictions outlined in the FCE and in Dr. 
Hammond's testimony. However, in the course of his deposition, Mr. Jordan did offer some 
comments on the types of employment he believed Claimant could still compete for in his labor 
market should he lose his job with Meyers Farms. Mr. Jordan thought that Claimant's light-duty 
restrictions would enable him to perform the physical requirements of a greeter, car porter at a 
car dealership, security work, shuttle bus driving, school bus driving, sandwich making, job 
coach monitor, pizza deliveryman, and sorter. (Jordan Depo., pp. 53:24-54:6). Mr. Jordan was 
uncertain with what frequency jobs of these types become available in Claimant's labor market. 
On cross examination, Mr. Jordan admitted that some aspects of school driving, sotting, and 
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security jobs might be in excess of what is contemplated by the FCE. (Jordan Depo., pp. 160:20-
168:9). While it is probably true that Claimant can perform some, or even most, of the jobs 
described by Mr. Jordan, there was little evidence about the number of jobs in the labor market 
that remain for Claimant in his geographic area. 
111. Certainly, this was Dr. Collins' concern. She proposed that in view of the 
limitations/restrictions identified in the FCE, and elaborated-on by Dr. Hammond, Claimant is 
essentially unemployable in his geographic area, particularly when one takes into account the 
fact that he is relatively unsophisticated, has minimal reading/writing skills, and was  
 as of the date of hearing. Dr. Collins acknowledged, of course, that Claimant has continued 
to work for Employer since the subject accident, but she contends that he has required a great 
deal of accommodation by his employer, that Claimant must make a "superhuman" effort to 
continue in his current job and that the Employer is a "sympathetic employer." These factors 
lead Dr. Collins to conclude that even though Claimant is currently employed, this fact does not 
denigrate her conclusion that he is nevertheless totally and permanently disabled. However, Dr. 
Collins had a poor understanding of the actual physical requirements of Claimant's cutTent job, 
and an equally poor understanding of to what extent Claimant required the assistance of other 
workers to perform. this work. (Collins Depo., pp. 78:6-80:25; 84:20-92:5). Dr. Collins' 
uncertainty about the specific requirements of Claimant's current position, coupled with her 
uncertainty of whether or how Claimant finds a way to perform this work, denigrates her 
conclusion that Claimant is only able to continue working in his current job because of his 
superhuman effort. Claimant has the ability, endorsed by his Employer, to delegate work to his 
subordinates as necessary. Therefore, Claimant is not required to perform physical tasks which 
are too difficult for him. While it's true that Claimant now takes longer to perform certain work, 
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and now performs some of his work with more difficulty than he once did, the record does not 
suppmi the conclusion that it is only by dint of superhuman effmi that Claimant is able to 
continue in his current job, 
112. Relatedly, the record does not support the conclusion that Meyers Farms is a 
"sympathetic" employer, Morgan Meyers' testimony is that Claimant is a valuable employee 
who has a peculiar knowledge of Employer's operation such that his loss an almost untenable 
proposition for Employer. This sentiment is perfectly expressed in Morgan Meyers' observation 
that "we would be in a panic if he were gone." (Tr., pp. 189:24-190: 1 ). The record supports the 
conclusion that the job Claimant performs is real and that his service is valuable, perhaps 
essential, to Employer's business. However, Claimant's ability to perform his current job and 
his value to his cmTent employer is not necessarily inconsistent with a finding that Claimant is 
totally and permanently disabled under the odd-lot doctrine. In other words, in the presence of 
proof that Claimant is not "regularly employable in any well know branch of the labor market," 
the conclusion that Claimant is totally and permanently disabled under the odd-lot doctrine via 
the route of futility (his only available route) would not be foreclosed by the fact that he is 
demonstrably employable. After all, an odd-lot worker need not be unable to perform any work 
at all. Gooby v, Lake Shore Management Co,, 136 Idaho 74, 29 P.3d 390 (2001). However, 
Claimant's current job is nevertheless relevant, because once Claimant establishes, by prima 
facie evidence, that he is an odd-lot worker, the burden shifts to the Employer to demonstrate 
employability. Employer must show that there is an actual job within a reasonable distance from 
Claimant's home which he is capable of performing, and which he has a reasonable opportunity 
to obtain. Claimant's current job more than satisfies Employer's obligation to rebut a prima 
facie case of total and pennanent disability. There is no reason to believe that Claimant's job 
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will not continue, or that he will be unable to perform the requirements of that job until he 
decides to retire. 
113. Based on the foregoing, even if Claimant had met his burden of proving a prima 
facie case of odd-lot status, Defendants have clearly met their burden of proving that Claimant is 
capable of performing an actual job which is likely to continue. However, the evidence does 
establish that Claimant nevertheless suffered disability as a consequence of his 
limitations/restrictions. Defendants' argument that Claimant's disability must be assessed at zero 
because Claimant continues in his employment with Employer is rejected; this argument ignores 
Claimant's significant limitations/restrictions and the consequences of those restrictions on his 
ability to engage in gainful activity. However, the fact that Claimant has engaged in continuous 
employment since 2009, with significant annual increases in earnings, must be taken into 
account. These facts set up the central conundrum of evaluating Claimant's disability: the fact 
that in the labor market at large he has suffered a significant loss of access must be reconciled 
with the seeming likelihood that Claimant will never suffer the financial impact of his disability. 
114. Claimant's age is, of course, one of the nonmedical factors which must be 
considered when evaluating his disability under Idaho Code § 72-430. In many cases, the fact 
that a claimant is an older worker is a factor which tends to support higher disability; everything 
else being equal, employers are less inclined to hire an older worker, particularly one with some 
functional limitations. In this case, Claimant's status as an older worker has the opposite effect. 
If Claimant was 20 years of age, the Commission would be much less impressed by the fact that 
Claimant has a job for which he is well suited, and an Employer who values his service. A lot 
could happen in the forty or fifty years remaining in such an employee's work life. Here, though, 
Claimant is near the end of his work life and holds employment in which he is likely to remain 
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until he retires. This makes the fact of Claimant's cun-ent job much more significant in 
evaluating his disability. 
115. Based on the foregoing, the Commission concludes that absent Claimant's cun-ent 
employment, his disability, as of the date of hearing, would be profound, and possibly total and 
permanent under the odd-lot doctrine. However, the fact that Claimant's current employment is 
likely to continue at his current or higher wage must be taken into account. Based on these facts, 
Claimant's proven disability is 40% of the whole person, inclusive of impaitment. Even though 
Claimant may never suffer a wage loss, there is no dispute that the accident has left him without 
access to a large swath of his pre-injury labor market, thus constraining his employment options 
now and in the future, should he, for whatever reason, lose his current job. However, it seems 
likely that Claimant's cun-ent employment will continue. Nor does he seem inclined to change 
his cmTent situation. 
Apportionment 
116. Since Claimant is less than totally and pe1manently disabled and since Claimant's 
low back condition is not related to his employment, apportionment of disability between 
Claimant's accident-produced condition and his low back condition under Idaho Code § 72-406 
must be considered. 
117. Where a claim for disability less than total is before the Commission, so is the 
issue of whether Employer bears full responsibility for Claimant's disability. See Page v. 
McCain Foods, Inc., 145 Idaho 302, 179 P.3d 265 (2008). In keeping with Barton v. Seventh 
Heaven Recreation,_ Inc., 2010 IIC 0379 (2010), Claimant bears the burden of persuasion on the 
issue of whether he has suffered disability referable to the subject accident. However, once 
Claimant makes a prima facie showing in this regard, the burden of going forward with evidence 
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that some portion of Claimant's disability is, in fact, referable to a pre-existing condition, shifts 
to Defendants. See Albright v. MGM Construction, Inc., 102 Idaho 269, 629 P.2d 665 (1981); 
Keenan v. Brooks, 100 Idaho 823, 606 P.2d 473 (1980) (Bistline, J., and Donaldson, J. specially 
concun'ing). 
118. In the instant matter, it is asserted that some part of Claimant's disability is 
referable to Claimant's non-work related ,and pre-existing low back condition, because both PT 
Wright and Dr. Hammond have established that some part of Claimant's limitations against 
sitting, walking, and perhaps other functions, are referable to his low back condition. No one, 
including the two vocational expet1s who were quizzed about the matter, could decide how these 
opinions, as couched, could be applied to apportion responsibility for Claimant's disability. Nor 
will the Commission attempt to do so. Defendants have adduced insufficient evidence to allow 
consideration of how or whether Claimant's 40% disability should be appottioned to Claimant's 
pre-existing low back condition. 
Attorney Fees 
119. Claimant argues that because Defendants did not provide certain medical records 
to Dr. Montalbano and Mr. Jordan, the opinions of Dr. Montalbano and Mr. Jordan are faulty, 
and it was therefore unreasonable for Defendants to rely on these opinions to defend the claim, 
such that Defendants are liable for an award of attorney fees under Idaho Code § 72-804. These 
arguments are not persuasive. There may be several reasons Defendants chose to proceed the 
way they did, and these reasons do not even include simple oversight. There is insufficient 
evidence that Defendants had designs on obtaining unsupported opinions on which to rely in 
defending the claim. The Commission.declines to award attorney fees. 5 
5 Moreover, we note that Claimant's counsel, too, chose what records to provide to the recipients of his several 
letters. 
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER 
1. Claimant has failed to establish that his low back condition is causally related to 
the 2009 accident. Claimant is not entitled to benefits for this condition. 
2. Claimant has established that he suffered injuries to his neck, left shoulder, and 
left upper extremity as a consequence of the accident of October 5, 2009. 
3. Claimant has established that he suffered injuries to his right knee as a 
consequence of the accident of August 28, 2013, 
4. As a consequence of the October 5, 2009 accident Claimant has suffered 
permanent impairment as follows: cervical spine - 6% of the whole person; left shoulder - 5% 
of the left upper extremity; ulnar nerve transposition - 0%. 
5. With respect to the accident of August 28, 2013, Claimant has suffered 
impairment as follows: right knee - 21 % lower extremity, 50% attributable to pre-existing 
condition and 50% attributable to the 2013 accident. 
6. Claimant is not totally and permanently disabled under the odd-lot doctrine, or if 
he is, Defendants have met their burden of proving that there is an actual job within a reasonable 
distance from Claimant's home which he is capable of performing. 
7. Defendants have failed to come forward with evidence which would support 
apportionment of disability pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-406. 
8. Claimant has suffered disability of 40% of the whole person, inclusive of 
impairment, referable to the 2009 and 2013 accidents. 
9. Claimant is not entitled to an award of attorney's fees under Idaho Code§ 72-804. 
10. There is no basis for the Commission's retention of jurisdiction over this case, 
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11. Pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-718, this decision is final and conclusive as to all 
matters adjudicated. 
DATED this 1 day of )b:pn' / , 2018. 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
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copy of the foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT, CONLSIONS OF LAW, AND ORDER was 
served by regular United States Mail upon each of the following: 
L. CL YEL BERRY 
POBOX302 
TWIN FALLS ID 83303 
PAUL J. AUGUSTINE 
PO BOX 1521 
BOISE ID 83701 
es! 
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D ORIGn\\L, 
PAUL J. AUGUSTINE ISB 4608 
AUGUSTINE LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
1004 W. Fort Street 
Post Office Box 1521 
Boise, ID 83701 
Telephone: (208) 367-9400 
Facsimile: (208) 947-0014 
Attomeys for Employer/Surety 




ROBERT J. MEYERS FARMS, INC., 
Employer, 
and 
STATE INSURANCE FUND, 
Surety, 
Defendants. 
IC No. 2009-029533 
2013-024075 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR 
CLARIFICATION OF 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND 
ORDER 
Defendants, Robert J Meyers Farms, Inc., and State Insurance Fund, by and through their 
counsel of record, Paul J. Augustine of Augustine Law Offices, PLLC, hereby move the 
Commission pursuant to J.R.P. 3 for an Order clarifying its Conclusions of Law and Order dated 
April 9, 2018, ("Order") specifically paragraph 8 of its Conclusions of Law and Order that 
"Claimant has suffered disability of 40% of the whole person, inclusive of impairment, referable 
to the 2009 and 2013 accidents." 
Defendants request clarification of this Conclusion of Law and Order to enable them to 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR CLARIFICATION OF CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER - I 
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,, 
pay benefits to Claimant. Defendants do not challenge the Commission's Conclusion of Law and 
Order regarding the amount of permanent disability suffered by the Claimant; rather they seek to 
determine what percentage of said permanent disability is owed for each of his accidents. As the 
Commission is aware, pursuant to Idaho Code section 72-435 the rate of benefits payable for 
permanent disability is based upon the date of injury. As a result, the permanent disability rates 
for 2009 and 2013 are different. In order for Defendants to make proper payment to Claimant of 
his 40% permanent disability inclusive of impairment, Defendants seek clarification from the 
Commission as to what percentage of Claimant's permanent disability is attributable to each 
accident. 
In its April 9, 2018 Order the Commission found that as a consequence of Claimant's 
October 5, 2009 accident he suffered permanent impairment of 6% of the whole person due to 
his cervical spine injury and 5% of the left upper extremity due to his left shoulder injury. Order, 
p. 70. This translates into a 9% whole person impairment suffered as result of his 2009 accident 
and injury. With regard to his 2013 industrial accident, the Commission found that Claimant 
suffered impairment of 21 % of the lower extremity of which 50% was attributable to pre-existing 
conditions. Order, p. 70. Thus, the Claimant suffered permanent impairment in the amount of 
10.5% of the lower extremity or 4.2% of the whole person due to his 2013 accident and injury. 
Defendants believe, pursuant to the Commission's Conclusions of Law and Order, that 
permanent disability benefits owed to Claimant should be paid in proportion to the respective 
percentage of impairment suffered by the Claimant for each accident. Under this scenario, 
approximately 68% (9% of 13.2%) of Claimant's permanent disability in excess of his 
impairment is attributable to his 2009 accident while 32% ( 4.2% of I 3.2%) is attributable to his 
2013 accident. Defendants seek clarification from the Commission so that they can make proper 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR CLARIFICATION OF CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER - 2 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the ~day of April, 2018, I caused to be served a true 
copy of the foregoing DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR CLARIFICATION OF CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW AND ORDER, by the method indicated below, and addressed to each of the following: 
L. Clyel BetTy 
PO Box 83 
Twin Falls, ID 83303-0083 
Attorney for Claimant 





i i/1 di I 
// ! / \ ' 
I V 
Paul J. Auf stine 
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STEPHAN, KVANVIG, STONE & TRAINOR 
L. Clyel Berry - ISB #1897 
P. 0. Box 83 





Attorney for Claimant 
'.._
0 ii _, 
BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 




ROBERT J. MEYERS FARMS, INC., 
Employer, 
and 
STATE INSURANCE FUND, 
Surety, 
Defendants. 
I.C. No. 2009-029533 
1.C. No. 2013-024075 
CLAIMANT'S RESPONSE TO 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR 
CLARIFICATION OF 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND 
ORDER 
· COMES NOW Claimant, by and through his counsel of record herein, and 
hereby files response to Defendants' Motion for Clarification; as follows: 
Claimant concurs that the Commission's April 9, 2018, Order, referencing 
paragraph 8 within the Conclusions of Law and Order, requires revisiting, as urged by 
Defendants within Defendants' Motion for Clarification. It is believed that not only does 
Claimant's impairment flowing from the .October 6, 2009, and August 28, 2013, accidents 
CLAIMANT'S RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR CLARIFICATION OF 
r.ONCI l lRIOJ,,f~ 01= I AW ANn ORIJER - 1 
Received Time Apr, 26. 2018 8:48AM No, 6661 
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STEPHAN, KVANVIG, STONE & TRAINOR 
L. Clyel Berry - ISB #1897 
P. 0. Box 83 
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I.C. No. 2009-029533 
I.C. No. 2013-024075 
CLAIMANT'S RESPONSE TO 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR 
CLARIFICATION OF 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW t3ND ROBERT J. MEYERS FARMS, INC., 
Employer, 
ORDER ~ = 
and 













COMES NOW Claimant, by and through his counsel of record herein, and 
hereby files response to Defendants' Motion for Clarification, as follows: 
Claimant concurs that the Commission's April 9, 2018, Order, referencing 
paragraph 8 within the Conclusions of Law and Order, requires revisiting, as urg
ed by 
Defendants within Defendants' Motion for Clarification. It is believed that not only
 does 
Claimant's impairment flowing from the October 6, 2009, and August 28, 2013, acciden
ts 
CLAIMANT'S RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR CLARIFICATION O
F 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER - 1 
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and injuries require separate analysis and discussion, but that Claimant's per
manent 
disability flowing from and resultant of each of those accidents must also be the su
bject of 
separate discussion, analysis and findings. 
However, it would be highly improper for the Commission to determine the 
extent of Claimant's permanent disability related to either the October 6, 2009 or
 August 
28, 2013 accidents by utilizing the "ratio" of Claimant's impairment related to one a
ccident 
to the sum of Claimant's impairment resultant of the two accidents, cumulatively.
 Doing 
so would both ignore and circumvent the mandate of Idaho Code§§ 72-425 and 
72-430. 
I.C. § 72-425 advises that a claimant's permanent disability rating " ... is an 
appraisal of the injured employee's present and probable future ability to engage in
 gainful 
activity as it is affected by the medical factor of permanent impairment and by p
ertinent 
non-medical factors as provided in section 72-430, Idaho Code." Thusly, per
manent 
impairment is but the starting point in the determination of the individual's per
manent 
disability, which requires both the evaluation of the physical disablement (impairm
ent) as 
well as non-medical factors which, where the claim involves multiple accidents se
parated 
by several years, require analysis as outlined in Page v. McCain Foods, 145 Idaho
 302 
(2008). 
Dated this _i,,/J_ day of April, 2018. 
By_~£::1Z..IC::.=l----.1--------
L. Clyel erry 
Attorney for Claimant 
CLAIMANT'S RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR CLARIFICATION 
OF 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I am a resident attorney of the State of Idaho and that on 
the 26th day of April, 2018, I served a copy of the foregoing document by facsimile to the 
following: 
Paul J. Augustine 
AUGUSTINE LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
Fax No. (208) 947-0014 
L. Clyel Berry 
CLAIMANT'S MOTION FOR CLARIFICATION OF ORDER REGARDING HEARING 
EXHIBITS-3 
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L. Clyel Berry - ISB #1897 
P. 0. Box 83 





Attorney for Claimant 
BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION > 
r ·· 




ROBERT J. MEYERS FARMS, INC., 
Employer, 
and 
STATE INSURANCE FUND, 
Surety, 
Defendants. 
LC. No. 2009-029533 
I.C. No. 2013-024075 
CLAIMANT'S MOTION FOR 
RECONSIDERATION; MOTION TO 
REOPEN; FOR MODIFICATION OF 
AWARD UPON CONSIDERATION 
OF A CHANGE IN THE NATURE 
OR EXTENT OF CLAIMANT'S 
DISABLEMENT AND/OR TO 
CORRECT A MANIFEST 
INJUSTICE; AND, FOR 
CONSOLIDATION 
COMES NOW Claimant by and through his counsel of record herein and 
pursuant to Rules JRPP 3F and/or 3G, in conjunction with I.C. §§ 72-718 and 72-719, and 
CLAIMANT'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION; MOTION TO REOPEN; FOR 
MODIFICATION OF AWARD UPON CONSIDERATION OF A CHANGE IN THE 
NATURE OR EXTENT OF CLAIMANT'S DISABLEMENT AND/OR TO CORRECT A 
MANIFEST INJUSTICE; AND, FOR CONSOLIDATION -1 
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hereby petitions the Idaho State Industrial Commission to reconsider its Findings, 
Conclusions and Order dated April 9, 2018; to reopen proceedings herein for the purpose 
of presenting further and additional matters to be considered by the Commission upon the 
grounds that Claimant has suffered a change in the nature and/or extent of his 
disablement; to correct a manifest injustice; and, for consolidation. 
This Motion is made upon the grounds and for the reasons as are stated both 
within Claimant's Affidavit and Memorandum in Support, each filed contemporaneously 
herewith. 
Dated this o?l day of April, 2018. 
STEPHAN,KVA , STONE & TRAINOR 
By_~'::J/,l,~.1.----,/-------
L. Clyel erry 
Attorney for Claimant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
.J,(_ I hereby certify that I am a resident attorney of the State of Idaho and that on 
the ;),Jrrlday of April, 2018, I served a copy of the foregoing document by depositing a 
true copy thereof in the United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to the following: 
Paul J. Augustine 
AUGUSTINE LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
P.O. Box 1521 
Boise, ID 83701 
CLAIMANT'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION; MOTION TO REOPEN; FOR 
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L. Clyel Berry - ISB #1897 
P. 0. Box 83 
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ROBERT J. MEYERS FARMS, INC., 
Employer, 
and 
STATE INSURANCE FUND, 
Surety, 
Defendants. 
STATE OF IDAHO 




1.C. No. 2009-029533 
1.C. No. 2013-024075 
AFFIDAVIT OF CLAIMANT, MARIO 
AYALA, IN SUPPORT OF MOTION 
FOR RECONSIDERATION; 
MOTION TO REOPEN; FOR 
MODIFICATION OF AWARD UPON 
CONSIDERATION OF A CHANGE 
IN THE NATURE OR EXTENT OF 
CLAIMANT'S DISABLEMENT 
AND/OR TO CORRECT A 





COMES NOW Claimant, Mario Ayala and, being first duly sworn on oath, 
deposes and states as follows: 
AFFIDAVIT OF CLAIMANT, MARIO AYALA, IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR 
RECONSIDERATION; MOTION TO REOPEN; FOR MODIFICATION OF AWARD
 UPON 
CONSIDERATION OF A CHANGE IN THE NATURE OR EXTENT OF CLAIMANT
'S 
DISABLEMENT AND/OR TO CORRECT A MANIFEST INJUSTICE; AND, FOR 
CONSOLIDATION - 1 
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1. That affiant is Mario Ayala, Claimant in the above captioned cause an
d 
matter currently pending before the Idaho State Industrial Commission. 
Further, affiant 
makes this Affidavit based upon personal knowledge as to which he would
 be competent 
to testify before the Commission. 
2. That following the October 26, 2016, hearing in this matter, affia
nt 
remained within the employ of Defendant-employer herein, Robert J. Mey
ers Farms, Inc. 
Affiant's wages/earnings by reason of said employment during 2016 were
 $47,690.00, as 
evidenced by the true and correct copy of affiant's 2016 W-2 Wage and 
Tax Statement, 
herewith affixed and attached as Exhibit A hereto. 
3. That, commencing in 2017, affiant's wages and/or earnings wer
e 
reduced by Robert J. Meyers Farms, Inc., such that affiant's earnings for
 and during tax 
year ended December 31, 2017, totaled $27,500.00, as set-forth within aff
iant's 2017 W-2 
Wage and Tax Statement, a true and correct copy of which is herew
ith affixed and 
attached as Exhibit B hereto. 
4. That for and during calendar year 2018, affiant's wages and/o
r 
earnings by reason of his employment with/by Robert J. Meyers Farms, Inc
., remain at the 
reduced rate/level, with affiant's understanding that rather than the month
ly salary which 
he earned during 2016 and prior thereto, he is currently paid upon an hourl
y basis with the 
hourly wage being approximately the same as his two "helpers," also empl
oyed by Robert 
J. Meyers Farms, Inc. 
5. That on or about June 7, 2017, while employed with/by Robert 
J. 
Meyers Farms, Inc., and engaged in the duties of employment therewith, 
affiant fell while 
AFFIDAVIT OF CLAIMANT, MARIO AYALA, IN SUPPORT OF MOTION
 FOR 
RECONSIDERATION; MOTION TO REOPEN; FOR MODIFICATION OF
 AWARD UPON 
CONSIDERATION OF A CHANGE IN THE NATURE OR EXTENT OF CL
AIMANT'S 
DISABLEMENT AND/OR TO CORRECT A MANIFEST INJUSTICE; AND
, FOR 
CONSOLIDATION - 2 
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working upon one of the pivots constituting a part of the Farms' irrigatio
n system, and 
suffered left knee injury. Affiant thereafter presented to Dr. Miers John
son, who was 
affiant's orthopedic surgeon who treated affiant regarding his earlier Augus
t 28, 2013, right 
knee injury, at issue herein. 
6. It is affiant's understanding and belief, from Dr. Johnson, that the Jun
e 
7, 2017, right knee injury consisted of a torn meniscus, for which affiant und
erwent surgery 
by Dr. Johnson. 
7. Affiant last presented to Dr. Johnson on or about April 16, 2018, 
at 
which time Dr. Johnson advised that he was releasing affiant as having achi
eved maximum 
medical improvement absent the surety authorizing left TKA, which Dr. Jo
hnson advised 
affiant he requires. Affiant herewith affixes and attaches as Exhibit C he
reto a true and 
correct copy of Dr. Johnson's Report of Work Status and Restrictions dated
 April 16, 2018, 
confirming the same and which sets-forth the physical restrictions an
d/or limitations 
recommended by Dr. Johnson. Pursuant thereto, said limitations and
/or restrictions 
encompass preclusion from repeated bending and/or stooping; preclusion
 from continual 
standing and/or walking; preclusion from lifting in excess of 20 pounds; an
d, Dr. Johnson 
instructed affiant that he was precluded from climbing onto the pivots/irr
igation system, 
which, if adhered to by affiant, effectively precludes affiant from engaging
 in the integral 
and/or primary function of his employment with/at Robert J. Meyers Farms, In
c. 
8. From the perspective of affiant, he is currently faced with a dilemma
. 
If he adheres to the physical restrictions and/or limitations as set by Dr. 
Johnson, taken 
cumulatively with those residual to/from his earlier October 6, 2009 and A
ugust 28, 2013 
AFFIDAVIT OF CLAIMANT, MARIO AYALA, IN SUPPORT OF MOTION
 FOR 
RECONSIDERATION; MOTION TO REOPEN; FOR MODIFICATION OF
 AWARD UPON 
CONSIDERATION OF A CHANGE IN THE NATURE OR EXTENT OF CL
AIMANT'S 
DISABLEMENT AND/OR TO CORRECT A MANIFEST INJUSTICE; AND
, FOR 
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industrial injuries, it will be impossible for affiant to continue in his employment with the 
farm. Conversely, if he fails to conform to Dr. Johnson's recommended restrictions and/or 
limitations, there is certainty that affiant will suffer significant increased symptomatology 
as well as risk of injury and/or re-injury. 
DATED this JS day of April, 2018. 
MaMo~ (jj£ 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
~ I hereby certify that I am a resident attorney of the State of Idaho and that on 
the day of April, 2018, I served a copy of the foregoing document by depositing a true 
copy thereof in the United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to the following: 
Paul J. Augustine 
AUGUSTINE LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
P.O. Box 1521 
Boise, ID 83701 
AFFIDAVIT OF CLAIMANT, MARIO AYALA, IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR 
RECONSIDERATION; MOTION TO REOPEN; FOR MODIFICATION OF AWARD UPON 
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Attached, please find Claimant's Reply to Defendants' Opposition to Claimant's Post-Decision Motions; and, 
Claimant's Objection to Defendants' Motion to Strike Affidavit of Claimant, dated May 22, 2018, for filing, with 
hard copies having been mailed via U.S. Mail. 
Hard copy to follow: 'g Yes D No 
IMPORTANT: This communication is intended solely for the use of the individual or entity to which it is 
addressed. It may contain information that is confidential and/or privileged. If you are not the intended recipient, 
or if you are not responsible for delivering tllis communication to the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that 
the disclosure of this communication is strictly prohibited. If you have received this communication in error, please 
notify us immediately by telephone and return the original message to us at the above address via regular postal 
service. Thank you. 
Received Time May. 23. 2018 9:44AM No. 7111 
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ROBERT J. MEYERS FARMS, INC., 
Employer, 
and 
STATE INSURANCE FUND, 
Surety, 
Defendants. 
I.C. No. 2009-029533 
I.C. No. 2013-024075 
., 
C.J "· '" 
CLAIMANT'S MEMORANDUM IN 
SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR 
RECONSIDERATION; MOTION TO 
REOPEN; FOR MODIFICATION OF 
AWARD UPON CONSIDERATION 
OF A CHANGE IN THE NATURE 
OR EXTENT OF CLAIMANT'S 
DISABLEMENT AND/OR TO 
CORRECT A MANIFEST 
INJUSTICE; AND, FOR 
CONSOLIDATION 
INTRODUCTION AND PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
Hearing in this matter was held before Referee Michael Powers upon Octobe
r 
26, 2016. Following the submission of the parties' respective post-hear
ing depositions 
and briefing, this matter came under advisement upon November 
3, 2017. By 
CLAIMANT'S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR RECON
SIDERATION; 
MOTION TO REOPEN; FOR MODIFICATION OF AWARD UPON CONS
IDERATION OF A 
CHANGE IN THE NATURE OR EXTENT OF CLAIMANT'S DISABLEME
NT AND/OR TO 
CORRECT A MANIFEST INJUSTICE; AND, FOR CONSOLIDATION -1 
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correspondence to counsel dated January 3, 2018, the Commission advised that Referee 
Powers was experiencing "a backlog of cases," such that, 
... the Commissioners are willing to write this decision on the record adduced 
to expedite moving this along. If you are willing for the Commissioners to do 
so, we will reassign the case and will proceed accordingly. If not, resolution 
of the case will be handled by Referee Powers in due course. 
By correspondence to the Commission dated January 11, 2018, counsel for Claimant 
thanked the Commission for its offer but noted that, 
[h]owever, the decision rendered would then be absent the consideration of 
Mr. Ayala's observational credibility which (was) believed to be an important 
consideration in this case. For that reason, both Mr. Ayala and my office are 
willing to wait for Mr. Powers' Recommendation. 
Page 5 of the Commission's April 9, 2018, Decision noted that, "[w]hile we are sensitive 
to the desires of the parties, our obligation to manage our docket to promote timely 
decisions supports assignment of this matter to the Commission." Thusly, the April 9, 
2018, decision rendered herein was without consideration of Mr. Ayala's observational 
credibility or benefit of Mr. Powers' impressions of Mr. Ayala at hearing within the context 
of his ability to understand the proceedings, generally, and specifically the degree to which 
he understood questions interposed (and thusly the accuracy of his responses given to 
those questions) during the taking of his testimony; impressions made by Mr. Powers 
during the course of the hearing as to whether or to what extent Mr. Ayala exhibited 
indication of symptomatology; and, somewhat interrelated with indicators of manifestation, 
impressions regarding the likelihood that Mr. Ayala would be able to continue in his 
employment with Robert J. Meyers Farms, Inc., and irrespective of the accommodations 
made by the employer as of the date of hearing. It is, to certain extent, within this context 
that certain of the instant Motion is made. 
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The Commission's April 9, 2018, decision noted that Claimant's " ... real value 
to Employer is his specific knowledge of the irrigation system." F/F, ,i 3 at p. 7. The 
Commission further noted that Mr. Ayala's " ... skills are somewhat unique to the Meyers 
Farm's operation." F/F, ,i 107 at p. 63. After discussing and, in fact, determining that the 
Wright FCE results was " ... a better prognosticator of Claimant's limitations than ... 
Defendants' suggestion that Claimant has no physician-imposed limitations/restrictions," 
the Commission noted it was "impressed" by the fact that Employer is obviously aware 
" ... that Claimant does not retain the same physical ability he had prior to the 2009 accident 
(and) ... is aware that Claimant has physical limitations/restrictions and that he has found 
a way to accommodate his limitations .... " F/F, ,i,i 102-104, p. 62. 
While acknowledging that Claimant's ability to perform his current job and his 
value to his current employer is not necessarily inconsistent with the finding that Claimant 
is totally and permanently disabled under the odd-lot doctrine, the Commission reasoned 
that, 
[i]n many cases, the fact that a claimant is an older worker is a factor which 
tends to support higher disability; everything else being equal, employers are 
less inclined to hire an older worker, particularly one with some functional 
limitations. In this case, Claimant's status an older worker has the opposite 
effect. If Claimant was 20 years of age, the Commission would be much less 
impressed by the fact that Claimant has a job for which he is well suited, and 
an employer who values his service. A lot could happen in the 40 or 50 
years remaining in such an employee's work life. Here, though, Claimant is 
near the end of his work life and holds employment in which he is likely to 
remain until he retires. 
F /F, ,i 114, pp. 67-68. The Commission rationalized that there was no reason to believe 
that Mr. Ayala's job would not continue, or that he will be unable to perform the 
requirements of that job until he decides to retire. F/F, ,i 112, pp. 66-67. 
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The Commission then determined that, 
... absent Claimant's current employment, his disability, as of the date of 
hearing, would be profound, and possibly total and permanent under the 
odd-lot doctrine. However, the fact that Claimant's current employment is 
likely to continue at his current or higher wage must be taken into account. 
Based on these facts, Claimant's proven disability is 40 percent of the whole 
person, inclusive of impairment. ... There is no dispute that the accident has 
left him without access to a large swath of his pre-injury labor market, thus 
constraining his employment options now and in the future, should he, for 
whatever reason, lose his current job. However, it seemed likely that 
Claimant's current employment will continue. Nor does he seem inclined to 
change his current situation. 
F/F ,i 16, P. 68. Since Mr. Ayala's industrial accidents of October 6, 2009 and August 28, 
2013, he suffered an industrial injury to his finger, which was somewhat discussed at 
hearing. Tr., p. 138, L. 16-p. 139, L. 10. Within her post-hearing deposition, Dr. Collins 
expressed concern over the possibility of "safety issues," presented by Mr. Ayala's 
continued employment. Collins Depo., p. 29, LL. 18-21. 
Following hearing but prior to the April 9, 2018, Decision herein, the concerns 
of Dr. Collins have come to fruition and the confidence expressed by the Commission that 
there was " ... no reason to believe that Claimant's job will not continue, or that he will be 
unable to perform the requirements of that job until he decides to retire ... (and Claimant) 
holds employment in which he is likely to remain until he retires," is seen to have been 
overly optimistic. Request is made that the Commission take judicial notice of the claim 
file regarding I.C. No. 2017-017451, relating to Mr. Ayala's June 7, 2017, left knee 
industrial injury suffered while continuing in his employment at Meyers Farms. 
Upon June 7, 2017, Mr. Ayala injured his left knee and currently presents 
status-post surgery by Dr. Miers Johnson. Upon April 16, 2018, Dr. Johnson determined 
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that Mr. Ayala requires left TKA. Following that procedure, Mr. Ayala will present status 
post anterior microdiskectomy, C6-7 with arthrodesis, C5-6 arthrodesis, Bengal cage 
lordotic prosthetics X2 and anterior stabilization; left ulnar nerve neurolysis, anterior 
subcutaneous transposition; left subacromial decompression, distal claviculectomy, labral 
and joint debridement and rotator cuff repair; right TKA; and, left TKA, with each of said 
procedures related to injuries suffered during his employment at Meyers Farms. The 
effects and/or cumulative residuals from these injuries and related medical procedures 
most certainly cast considerable doubt upon the validity of the Commission's supposition 
that, "[t)here is no reason to believe that Claimant's job will not continue, or that he will be 
unable to perform the requirements of that job until he decides to retire." 
Mr. Ayala currently presents status post surgical repair of his left torn 
meniscus by Dr. Miers Johnson related to his June 7, 2017, industrial injury. Attached to 
Mr. Ayala's Affidavit in Support is a true and correct copy of Dr. Johnson's Report of Work 
Status and Restrictions dated April 16, 2018, which advises that Mr. Ayala then presented 
at maximum medical improvement absent the surety's authorization to proceed with left 
TKA, which Dr. Johnson advises Mr. Ayala requires. Absent TKA, Mr. Ayala has 
restrictions related to left knee presentment which include preclusion of repeated 
bending/stooping; preclusion from continual standing and/or walking; preclusion from lifting 
greater than 20 pounds; and, preclusion from "climbing into pivots." As noted by Mr. 
Morgan Meyers at hearing, Claimant is the "only one" on the farm qualified to fix/repair the 
pivots, which requires climbing. Tr., p. 180, LL. 1-7. Of note, Claimant's most recent 
industrial injury, being to his left knee, was the result of an accident occurring while 
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Claimant was working upon one of the farm's pivot irrigation systems. In expressi
ng its 
rationale for the April 9, 2018, decision awarding Mr. Ayala but 40 percent perm
anent 
disability, the Commission determined at pages 66-68 that: 
,i 112: "[t]here is no reason to believe that Claimant's job will not 
continue, or that he will be unable to perform the requirements 
of that job until he decides to retire." 
,i 113: " ... the fact that Claimant has engaged in continuous 
employment since 2009, with significant annual increases in 
earnings, must be taken in to account." 
,i 114: "Claimant... holds employment in which he is likely to remain 
until he retires. This makes the fact of Claimant's current job 
much more significant in evaluating his disability." 
,i 115: " ... the Commission concludes that absent Claimant's current 
employment, his disability, as of the date of hearing, would be 
profound, and possibly total and permanent under the odd-lot 
doctrine. However, the fact that Claimant's current 
employment is likely to continue at his current or higher wage 
must be taken into account. ... Even through Claimant may 
never suffer a wage loss, there is no dispute that the accident 
has left him without access to a large swath of his pre-injury 
labor market, thus constraining his employment options now 
and in the future, should he, for whatever reason, lose his 
current job. However, it seems likely that Claimant's current 
employment will continue. Nor does he seem inclined to 
change his current situation." 
Claimant again emphasizes the Commission's assumption that " ... the fact 
that Claimant's current employment is likely to continue at his current or higher wage
 must 
be taken into account." Attached to Claimant's Affidavit in Support, 
filed 
contemporaneously herewith, are true and correct copies of Claimant's W-2s for 201
6 and 
2017. As seen thereby, during 2017 Claimant's earnings from Meyers Farms to
taled 
$27,500.00, being far less than the $47,690.00, Claimant earned the year of the Oc
tober 
26, 2016, hearing herein. Tr., p. 169, LL. 5-15. In fact, Claimant's earnings for/d
uring 
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2017 were actually less than Claimant's 2013 time of injury earnings of $28,652.00. Def. 
Ex. 7, p. 143. 
Thusly, it is certain and clearthatthe April 9, 2018, Decision was based upon 
the Commission's assumptions that, (1) Claimant's time-of-hearing level of earnings would 
continue if not increase; and, (2) that Claimant's time-of-hearing employment with Meyers 
Farms would continue " ... until he decides to retire." Upon the premise that these 
assumptions would, in fact, prove true the Commission discounted Mr. Ayala's disability, 
from being " ... profound, and possibly total and permanent under the odd-lot doctrine," to 
but 40 percent of the whole man, inclusive of impairment. 
The first of these assumptions has now been proven to be ill founded and 
false. Hearing in this matter was held upon October 26, 2016. The very next year Meyers 
Farms reduced Mr. Ayala's earnings/wages from $47,690.00, earned during 2016, to 
$27,500.00, earned during 2017. 
The Commission's second assumption was that Mr. Ayala's time-of-hearing 
employment with Meyers Farms would continue "until he retires." In this regard, Mr. Ayala 
never wanted to "retire." Rather, Mr. Ayala planned upon working "until I can't." Tr., p. 
137, LL. 16-17; also see Tr., p. 163, LL. 20-23. As of current, it appears clear that with Dr. 
Johnson's recommended physical restrictions/limitations it is highly doubtful that Mr. Ayala 
will be able to continue in his employment with Meyers Farms, even considering the 
accommodations made/allowed by Meyers Farms as of the date of hearing herein. It is for 
and upon the above that counsel has made the instant Motions upon behalf of Claimant. 
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MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 
As above-noted and clearly stated by the Commission within its Apri
l 9, 2018, 
decision, by reason of the combination of the facts that Claimant is
 an "older worker"; the 
Commission's assumption that his employment at/with Meyers Fa
rms was secure; and, 
that he would have physical capacity to conform to the requirements
 of that position " ... until 
he decides to retire"; and, " ... that Claimant's current employment is
 likely to continue at his 
current or higher wage ... , "the Commission awarded Mr. Ayala but 
40 percent disability as 
opposed to disability described by the Commission as " ... profound,
 and possibly total and 
permanent under the odd-lot doctrine." 
As above-noted, during the year of the October 26, 2016, hea
ring, Mr. 
Ayala's earnings from Meyers Farms were $47,690.00. The first c
alendar year following 
the hearing Mr. Ayala's earnings were $27,500.00, being $20,190
.00, less than the year 
prior. Further, by reason of yet another industrial injury Claiman
t presents status post 
meniscus repair, with his orthopedic surgeon advising that he "ne
eds" left TKA, without 
which Claimant has significant additional restrictions and/or limitat
ions than were existing 
at the time of hearing herein, which places his continued emplo
yment at/with Meyers 
Farms highly improbable if not impossible. 
Thusly, the factors considered by the Commission which resulte
d in the 
Commission's treatment of Claimant as "an older worker" in the exa
ct opposite matter than 
is typically and customarily done have been shown to be invalid. 
In the instant matter, it is clear that the Commission sig
nificantly 
discounted/reduced Mr. Ayala's permanent disability by reason 
of his being an "older 
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worker," as opposed to supporting a higher disability. The Commission's rationale 
expressed in the instant matter must be compared with and contrasted to prior decisions 
presenting similar facts. 
In Woody v. Seneca Foods, I.C. 2010-012114, decided May 23, 2013, 
claimant was within two months of being 65 at the time of hearing and resided in Buhl, 
Idaho. That claimant had finished the 9
th grade and enjoyed reading. That claimant's 
employment history included being a housekeeper at a hospital; working at Green Giant, 
inspecting corn; working in a position packaging beans; and, ultimately was employed at 
Seneca on a machine which packaged boxes of corn into larger boxes, which required no 
lifting and could be done either seated or standing. In the consideration of relevant non-
medical factors, the Commission noted that claimant was  and, "[a)s an 
older worker, claimant's age reduces her employability," and awarded disability accordingly. 
In fact, excepting the instant matter, counsel was unable to find a singular instance where 
the Commission decreased a claimant's permanent disability from what it otherwise would 
have awarded upon the basis that that claimant was an "older worker." Doing so appears 
to be in direct conflict with the promise set-forth within I.C. § 72-201, which clearly notes 
that Title 72 was promulgated to provide " ... sure and certain relief for injured workman and 
their families." In case after case Idaho's Supreme Court provided instruction that Idaho's 
Workman's Compensation Act is to be construed liberally in favor of claimants. The 
Commission's decision herein represents the exact opposite. 
It is respectfully submitted that the Commission's rationale as specifically set-
forth within its decision herein punishes Mr. Ayala for continuing to work following his 
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October 6, 2009, and August 28, 2013, industrial accidents. Had Mr. Ayala terminated his 
employment after either of those events, he most likely would have been awarded the 
entirety of his permanent disability related to and resultant of injuries suffered therein, 
without reduction. 
I.C. § 72-719 MOTION FOR MODIFICATION OF AWARD 
Claimant hereat petitions the Idaho State Industrial Commission for a 
modification of the April 9, 2018, award upon the basis that Claimant has suffered a 
significant and substantial change in the nature or extent of his disablement; and, the 
reopening and/or review of the April 9, 2018, decision is required to correct a manifest 
injustice. 
Upon the same grounds, basis and references to the record as herein-above 
set-forth and/or made, Claimant argues that the nature of his disablement has significantly 
changed/increased subsequent to the April 9, 2018, decision herein. As therein stated by 
the Commission, the rationale advanced by the Commission to support its 40 percent 
whole person disability award to Claimant was upon the dual-pronged assumptions that 
Mr. Ayala's time-of-hearing employment would continue at the then current or higher 
wages; and, that Mr. Ayala would not become unable to perform the requirements of that 
employment "until he decides to retire." 
First of all, as above set-forth, Mr. Ayala's wages/earnings for the year during 
which his hearing was held, being 2016, were $47,690.00. The very next year, being 2017, 
his earnings were reduced to $27,500.00. Further, during 2017 Mr. Ayala suffered yet 
another serious injury as a result of his employment, related to which he has undergone 
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meniscectomy and currently requires left TKA. Absent left TKA, Mr. Ayala presents at MMI 
and has work restrictions and/or limitations related to his left lower extremity which include 
preclusion from repeated bending and/or stooping; preclusion from continual standing 
and/or walking; preclusion from lifting in excess of 20 pounds; and, preclusion from 
climbing into/onto pivots. 
It should appear obvious that Mr. Ayala is currently faced with the decision 
of either continuing in his employment requiring activities significantly in excess of his 
restrictions and/or limitations, which will expose him to both increased symptomatology as 
well as risk of further injury; or, refusing to engage in physical activities excess to Dr. 
Johnson's recommended restrictions and/or limitations, resulting in probable termination. 
With the invalidity of the Commission's assumptions expressed as support 
for its decision to reduce Mr. Ayala's disability award from " ... profound, and possibly total 
and permanent under the odd-lot doctrine," the 40 percent disability, actually awarded by 
the April 9, 2018, decision most certainly and clearly represents an extreme manifest 
injustice which requires correction. 
As noted by the Commission's April 9, 2018, decision, prior to receipt of 
Referee Powers' recommendations, the Commission determined to reassign the case to 
itself, and proceeded to render its decision absent benefit of observing Mr. Ayala at 
hearing. Thusly, the decision herein is without benefit of observing Mr. Ayala manifesting 
symptomatology upon sitting and/or arising from a seated position; exhibiting instability 
upon walking; or, to weigh the credibility and/or truthfulness of Mr. Ayala's testimony when 
describing his symptomatology and restrictions residual from the 2009 and 2013 industrial 
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injuries. Claimant submits that had the Commission had opportunity to observe Mr. Ayala 
at hearing, it may well not have concluded that Mr. Ayala would be able to continue in his 
time-of-hearing employment until he wished to retire and would have awarded Mr. Ayala 
the " ... profound, and possibly total and permanent (disability) under the odd-lot doctrine" 
then due. 
However, irrespective of the Commission's opportunity to have observed Mr. 
Ayala and thusly to add its impressions thereasto into its consideration of the appropriate 
award of permanent disability, what is most certainly clear is that, even as of the date the 
Commission's decision was released, the rationale expressed by the Commission as 
support for discounting Mr. Ayala's disability from profound, and possibly total and 
permanent, no longer existed. 
MOTION FOR CONSOLIDATION 
Absent the Commission revisiting its April 9, 2018, decision together with its 
stated rationale as therein set-forth, Title 72 Defendants herein will receive a windfall, 
either at the expense of Mr. Ayala or, more likely, the Idaho Special Indemnity Fund within 
proceedings brought before the Commission flowing from the June 7, 2017, industrial 
accident and left knee injury. With the filing of Mr. Ayala's Complaint for Hearing relating 
to the June 7, 2017, industrial accident, that cause should be consolidated with the instant 
action regarding the October 6, 2009, and August 28, 2013, claims. Therein, the 
responsibility of current Title 72 Defendants for Claimant's cumulative permanent disability 
from the combined effects of the three industrial occurrences could be determined. 
However, absent consolidation/joinder of the three claims, if the Commission refuses to 
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revisit its April 9, 2018, decision, upon the likelihood that Mr. Ayala will be determined to 
be totally and permanently disabled within the 2017 claim, the responsibility for Mr. Ayala's 
permanent disability which otherwise would have and should have been borne by current 
Title 72 Defendants will become that of the ISIF. 
Wherefore, it is respectfully submitted that the instant matter compels the 
Commission's reconsideration of its April 9, 2018, decision rendered herein; the 
modification thereof pursuant to I.C. § 72-719(1 )(a) and/or (3); and/or the consolidation of 
the instant matter with I.C. 2017-017451. 
Dated this .:f:J__ day of April, 2018. 
STEPHAN, KVANVIG, STONE & TRAINOR 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
~ I hereby certify that I am a resident attorney of the State of Idaho and that on 
the ,:[l day of April, 2018, I served a copy of the foregoing document by depositing a true 
copy thereof in the United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to the following: 
Paul J. Augustine 
AUGUSTINE LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
P.O. Box 1521 
Boise, ID 83701 
L. Clyel B 
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STEPHAN, KV ANVIG, STONE & TRAINOR 
L. Clyel Berry - ISB #1897 
P. 0. Box 83 
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ROBERT J. MEYERS FARMS, INC, 
Employer, 
and 
STATE INSURANCE FUND, 
Surety, 
Defendants. 
MOTION FOR ORDER OF CONSOLIDATION - 1 
LC. No. 2009-029533 
LC. No. 2013-024075 
MOTION FOR ORDER O!j';: 
CONSOLIDATION CJ c:: 






COMES NOW Claimant, in the above-referenced matters, causes and claims, 
pursuant to Rule 3 (B) of the Judicial Rules of Practice and Procedure, and hereby moves and 
petitions the Idaho State Industrial Commission for its Order of Consolidation, consolidating the 
above-referenced claims and actions for all further purposes herein. 
Claimant advises that, pursuant to that Order to Consolidate, dated March 28, 2014, 
LC. Nos. 2009-029533 and 2013-024075 were consolidated. Thusly, the instant Motion seeks to 
consolidate LC. No. 2017-017451 into those proceedings, such that the three claims/actions are 
consolidated into a single proceeding. In support of the instant Motion, Claimant notes that both the 
employer and surety are "common" as among and between each of the three claims. Further, it is 
believed that Defendants may have "common" defenses thereto, such that there are common issues 
presented by and within each of the above-captioned actions by reason of which the respective 
liability of Defendants together with the entitlement of Claimant to workers' compensation benefits 
cannot be determined except upon consolidation of said claims within a single proceeding. 
Claimant directs the attention of the Commission to the fact that hearing on claims 
numbered 2009-029533 and 2013-040275 was held upon October 26, 2016 and, thereafter, the 
Commission issued its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, dated and filed April 9, 
2018. However, in light of there being post-hearing Motions filed by and upon behalf of both 
Defendants and Claimant herein, it is respectfully submitted that the April 9, 2018, Findings, 
Conclusions and Order, is not final, such that said matter remains pending. Further, by reference to 
Claimant's Motions currently pending therein, consolidation thereof with LC. No. 2017-017451 is 
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mandated. 
DATED This__/_ day of May, 2018. 
, STONE & TRAINOR 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I am a resident attorney of the State of Idaho and that on the 
l day of May, 2018, I served a copy of the foregoing document by depositing a true copy 
thereof in the United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to the following: 
Paul J. Augustine 
AUGUSTINE LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
P.O. Box 1521 
Boise, ID 83701 
Idaho State Insurance Fund 
Post Office Box 990004 
Boise, Idaho 83 799 
Robert J. Meyers Farms, Inc. 
3221 North 3300 East 
Twin Falls, ID 83301-0000 
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PAUL J. AUGUSTINE ISB 4608 
AUGUSTINE LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
1004 W. Fort Street 
Post Office Box 1521 
Boise, ID 83701 
Telephone: (208) 367-9400 
Facsimile: (208) 947-0014 
Attorneys for Employer/Surety 




ROBERT J. MEYERS FARMS, INC., 
Employer, 
and 
STATE INSURANCE FUND, 
Surety, 
Defendants. 
IC No. 2009-029533 
2001-520958 
2013-024075 
DEFENDANTS' OPPOSITION TO 
CLAIMANT'S POST-DECISION 
MOTIONS 
Defendants, by and through their counsel of record, Paul J. Augustine of Augustine Law 
Offices, PLLC, hereby oppose Claimant's Post-Decisions Motions on the grounds that: (1) Claimant 
seeks to introduce new evidence which is not properly in the record to support his Motion for 
Reconsideration; (2) Claimant's Motion for Reconsideration should be denied because there is 
substantial evidence to suppmt the Commission's April 9, 2018 decision and Claimant now alleges 
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that he is totally and permanently disabled by virtue of a new 2017 injmy; (3) Claimant's Motion for 
Modification of Award pursuant to LC.§ 72-719 is not ripe, is barred by the five year statute of 
limitations as it relates to the 2009 accident and is unfounded as there has been no change in the 
nature or extent of Claimant's disablement nor has there been a manifest injustice; (4) Claimant's 
Motion for Consolidation lacks merit and would penalize employer for continuing to gainfully 
employ Claimant; and (5) Claimant's Motion to Reopen is based upon a 2017 accident and injmyto 
a new body part that is unrelated to his injuries suffered in 2009 and 2013. 
Claimant's counsel, through his various contradicto1y and untimely motions, is performing 
the legal equivalent of throwing spaghetti against the wall to see what sticks in an attempt to claim 
that the Commission should find that his client is totally and permanently disabled. On the one hand, 
he alleges that due to his Motion for Reconsideration, the Commission's April 9, 2018 award is not 
final. On the other hand, he moves to reopen and/or for modification of the Commission's April 9, 
2018 award on the grounds that there has been a change in the nature of Claimant's disablement 
and/or to correct a manifest injustice. On the one hand, he alleges that the Commission erred in its 
April 9, 2018 award when it found that Claimant only suffered a 40% disability inclusive of 
impairment as a result of his 2009 and 2013 accidents. Yet, on the other hand, he argues that by 
virtue of a new injury suffered in 2017, the Claimant has suffered a change in his disablement and is 
now totally and permanently disabled. All of Claimant's motions lack merit and should be denied. 
A review of Claimant's testimony and the exhibits ofrecord establish that Claimant's main 
disabling condition at the time of his hearing was his low back which required surgery and which the 
Commission found was not related to either of his industrial accidents. Claimant does not challenge 
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this finding in his Motion for Reconsideration. Claimant testified that he is limited by both sitting 
and standing which causes pain in his low back and numbness down his legs. HT p. 120. His low 
back pain causes him difficulty getting up and walking from a seated position. HT p. 121. As a 
result, he feels like he has trouble with his balance and falls over. Id. His low back affects his ability 
to drive long distances which requires him to stop all the time. Id. His low back limits his walking to 
a quarter of a mile. lfhe walks up and down it causes additional low back pain. HT p.122. His low 
back pain requires him to use a cane occasionally. Id. He was ve1y clear that it was his low back 
condition and not his knee that causes him to use a cane. HT p. 123. Claimant also testified that 
assuming he had no problems with his left shoulder, left elbow or right knee he would still have 
difficulty lifting things off of the floor due to his low back. Id. At the time of his FCE, upon which 
the Commission relied in determining the Claimant suffered disability and access of his impai1ment, 
the Claimant's primary diagnosis was "lumbar spine injury." Ex. 23, p. 646. The therapist who 
perfmmed the FCE determined that the Claimant's low back condition affected the Claimant's 
functional ability to walk, lift from waist to floor, lift and carry, forward bend, stand and sit. Id. at p. 
647. 
In light of this evidence, Claimant now alleges that there is a change in his disablement due to 
his 2017 left knee injury. Claimant claims that he should be allowed to consolidate his previously 
adjudicated 2009 and 2013 accident claims with his new 2017 claim against the employer as the 
recent restrictions he received for his left knee injury render him totally and permanently disabled. 
The fact that the Claimant now alleges that his new restrictions which he claims prohibit him from 
climbing on pivots is totally disabling to him completely undercuts his argument that his prior 2009 
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and 2013 injuries alone render him totally and permanently disabled. Defendants contend that these 
contradict01y positions are sanctionable. 
Claimant's Motion for Reconsideration Should be Denied 
Under Idaho Code§ 72-718 a decision of the Commission, in the absence of fraud, shall be 
final and conclusive as to all matters adjudicated; provided within twenty days for the date of filing 
the decision any party may move for reconsideration or rehearing of the decision. In this case, 
Claimant based, in part, his Motion for Reconsideration on new post- hearing evidence that is not 
properly before the Commission in its record and should not be considered as evidence. This new 
evidence is contained in Claimant's affidavit which, upon inspection, is clearly the declaration of his 
counsel and not a statement of the Claimant who required an interpreter at hearing. This new 
evidence is not properly before the Commission on Claimant's Motion for Reconsideration, as a 
motion for reconsideration should be limited to the evidence that is of record at the time the case was 
submitted to the Commission for a decision and was properly submitted to the Commission pursuant 
to Rule 10. 
The new evidence which the Claimant wishes the Commission to consider on his Motion to 
Reconsider includes a decrease in his total earnings from 2016 to 2017 and his new restrictions 
imposed as a result of a 2017 left knee injury. Defendants have moved to strike Claimant's affidavit 
on the grounds that this new evidence is not properly before the Commission on Claimant's Motion 
for Reconsideration. Regardless, this new evidence does not justify a change in the Commission's 
award of 40% disability inclusive of impairment set forth in the Commission's April 9, 2018 award. 
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Allowing any post-decision change in Claimant's employment should not be a basis for 
reconsidering the Commission's disability dete1mination. 
There is no evidence that the Claimant's reduction in his total earnings from 2016 to 2017 is 
a result of the Claimant's injuries that he suffered in 2009 and 2013 or the impailments resulting 
therefrom. Claimant offered no explanation as to why his total earnings were lowered. Claimant 
testified that he receives an annual bonus from his employer although he does not know how that is 
figmed. HT p. 78. Claimant is forcing the Commission to speculate as to why his total earnings were 
reduced in 201 7 because he offered no evidence that his earnings were reduced by his failure to 
perform his duties or his failure to receive his n01mal wage. One explanation is that the Claimant 
failed to receive a bonus in 2017. At the time of the hearing, Claimant made approximately double 
what he made at the time he was injured. HT p. 169. Therefore, even if the Commission considers 
the Claimant's earnings in 2017, he has not suffered wage loss from the time of his 2009 accident. 
As is readily apparent from the fact that the Claimant suffered a new injury in 2017, the 
Claimant continues to perf01m the essential functions of his job upon which the Commission based 
its decision that the Claimant failed to prove total and permanent disability. By Claimant's counsel's 
admissions in his briefing, the Claimant's new restrictions due to his 2017 left knee injury affect his 
ability to perform the essential functions of his job, i.e., irrigation work, because he allegedly cannot 
climb on pivots to repair them. 
The fact that the Claimant continues to receive his n01mal wages nine years after his initial 
accident establishes that the Claimant is not totally and permanently disabled and proves that the 
Commission's April 2017 decision should not be altered. His continued employment is consistent 
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with the Commission's findings that he would continue to be employed as he performs essential 
functions necessary for the continued operation of the employer's farm. 
While Claimant argues that the Commission erred in finding that the Claimant could continue 
working at the employer's farm until his retirement, the fact that the Claimant testified that he 
contacted Social Security within one year of the hearing to determine how much he would receive in 
retirement benefits proves that the Claimant was considering retirement prior to hearing. HT p. 145, 
I. 9 - p. 146, I. 1. Claimant also testified that he intended to work as long as Mr. Meyers has a job 
available for him. HT p. 163, LI. 19-22. The fact that the Claimant is still working nine years 
following his initial industrial accident establishes that the Claimant's employment is likely to 
continue as long as Claimant is able to work and the employer has work available for him. 
The Commission's decision awarding Claimant 40% disability inclusive ofhis impai1ment is 
consistent with the facts of record regarding the Claimant's physical limitations resulting from his 
2009 and 2013 accidents, his failure to prove that his significantly disabling low back condition was 
related to either accident, and his nine year work history following his industrial accident. 
Therefore, even if the Commission decides to consider the Claimant's attempt to circumvent 
Rule 10 and consider his new evidence, his Motion for Reconsideration should be denied. 
Claimant's Motion for Modification of Award Pursuant to I.C. § 72-719 Must be Denied 
Claimant moved, pursuant to I.C. § 72-719, for modification of the Commission's April 
9, 2018 award on two grounds: (1) that Claimant suffered a "significant and substantial change in 
the nature or extent of his disablement" and (2) the correction of a manifest injustice. As 
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previously noted, since the Commission's April 9, 2018 award is not final by virtue of the 
Claimant's contemporaneously filed Motion for Reconsideration, Claimant's motion pursuant to 
I.C. § 72-719 is not ripe. Regardless, the purported factual basis for the Claimant's allegation that 
he suffered a "significant and substantial change in the nature or extent of his disablement" is 
that his earnings were reduced in 2017 and that he suffered a new injury to his left knee in 2017. 
As is shown in greater detail below, Claimant's counsel misrepresented the Claimant's purported 
basis for his decrease in annual earnings and ignored long-standing Supreme Court precedent that 
clearly sets fmih the grounds for asse1iing a change in condition. Moreover, Claimant's motion 
pursuant to I.C. § 72-719 as it relates to his 2009 motor vehicle accident which caused injuries to 
the Claimant's cervical spine, left arm and left shoulder is time barred by the five year limitations 
period set forth in I.C. § 72-719. 
LC. § 72-719 reads, in relevant part: 
MODIFICATION OF A WARDS AND AGREEMENTS - GROUNDS -
TIME WITHIN WHICH MADE. (1) On application made by a pa1iy in 
interest filed with the Commission at any time within five (5) years of the 
date of the accident causing the injury or date of first manifestation of an 
occupational disease, on the ground of a change in conditions, the 
Commission may, but not oftener than once in six (6) months, review any 
order, agreement or award upon any of the following grounds: 
(a) Change in the nature or extent of the employee's injury or 
disablement ... ( emphasis added) 
This statute allows the Commission to modify an award only if there is a" [c]hange in the 
nature or extent of the employee's injmy or disablement." LC.§ 72-719(1)(a). The Idaho 
Supreme Comi has made the Claimant's burden of establishing a change in condition under LC. 
§ 72-719(1)(a) clear: 
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When a Claimant applies for modification of an award due to a change in 
condition under LC.§ 72-719(a), the Claimant bears the burden of showing 
a change in condition. Matthews v. Dep't of Corr., 121 Idaho 680,681,827 
P.2d 693,694 (1992) (citing Boshers v. Payne, 58 Idaho 109, 70 P.2d 391 
(1937)). The Claimant is "required to make a showing before the 
Commission that he had an increased level of impairment, and to establish 
with reasonable medical probability the existence of a causal relationship 
between the change in condition and the initial accident and injury." 
Matthews, 121 Idaho at 681-82, 827 P.2d at 694-95 (internal citations 
omitted). 
Magee v. Thompson Creek Min. Co., 152 Idaho 196,268 P.3d 464, (2012) (emphasis added). 
Therefore, it is clear that Claimant must establish with reasonable medical probability the 
existence of a causal relationship between the change of condition/disablement and the 2013 
accident and injmy to his right knee, which is the only accident that occmTed within the five year 
window applicable to LC. § 72-719 motions. 
In support of his argument, Claimant's counsel alleges that the Claimant suffered a 
decrease in earnings between 2016 and 2017. However, Claimant failed to produce any facts 
demonstrating that this decrease in earnings had anything to do with the impairment caused by 
his 2013 right knee injmy or other alleged impairments. In fact, as shown by the Declaration of 
Morgan J. Meyers, the Claimant continued to earn his normal wage in 2017 (which was higher 
than his wage at the time of his accident). The Claimant did not receive a bonus in 2017, which 
explained his decrease in total earnings. The decision by management not to issue a bonus to the 
workers on the Bruneau Farm was um-elated to the Claimant's accident, injuries, alleged 
impairment or his production. Therefore, the Claimant's decreased earnings was not affected by 
his 2013 right knee injmy or any other alleged impairments. 
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More problematic, however, is Claimant's counsel's ignorance of Supreme Comi 
precedent set fotih in Magee because he based his change in condition argument upon a new 
injury to his left knee that occuned in 2017. Claimant offered no evidence or facts that his 2017 
left knee injury was related to his 2013 right knee injury ( or any other alleged impairments for 
that matter). Claimant now argues that the restrictions attributable to his 2017 left knee injury 
support his claim that he is totally and pennanently disabled. However, in order to prevail under 
LC. § 72-719, Claimant must establish with reasonable medical proQability the existence of a 
causal relationship between the change of condition/disablement and the 2013 accident and 
injury to his right knee. Claimant offered no proof, facts or other argument as required by the 
Idaho Supreme Comi in Magee. Thus, Claimant's Motion pursuant to LC. § 72-719 alleging a 
change in condition is meritless, frivolous and should be denied by the Commission. 
Claimant also alleges that the Commission's decision to reassign the case to itself thus 
depriving itself of the opportunity to observe Claimant's symptomatology at hearing, constitutes 
a manifest injustice under LC. § 72-719(3). This provision allows the Commission within five 
years of the date of the accident causing the injury to review a case in order to conect a manifest 
injustice. Since the Claimant's 2009 accident occuned well over nine years ago, the Commission 
may only consider the Claimant's 2013 right knee injury in determining whether a manifest 
injustice exists. Regardless, Claimant's argument lacks merit because the Claimant testified 
extensively to his perceived limitations due to the injuries he suffered in his motor vehicle 
accident and his 2013 right knee injury. See, Hearing Transcript, pp. 99 - 101; 111 - 119. Thus, 
Claimant and his counsel had adequate opportunity to present his alleged physical limitations and 
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issues at hearing. He also relied upon an FCE that further detailed his limitations. Thus, no 
manifest injustice exists pursuant to LC. § 72-719. 
Claimant's argument is also meritless and frivolous because the primmy condition that 
affected Claimant's symptomatology at the hearing was his low back which the Commission 
properly determined, based upon the medical testimony and evidence, was not causally related to 
his 2009 or 2013 industrial accidents. For example, the Claimant testified upon examination by 
his own counsel that his low back negatively impacts his balance while walking, ability to sit, 
stand, walk, drive, and lift. See, Hearing Transcript, pp. 120 - 123. Therefore, the Claimant's 
purported difficulty sitting in a rising from a seated position, instability upon walking, etc. is 
immaterial to the Commission's determination that he suffered 40% disability inclusive of his 
impairment. Again, no manifest injustice exists pursuant to LC. § 72-719. 
Claimant's Motion for Consolidation is Frivolous and Must be Denied 
The Claimant, after a long hearing and extensive, exhaustive post-hearing depositions, failed 
to establish that his considerable low back problems were related to either of his 2009 or 2013 
industrial accidents and also failed to establish that he was totally and permanently disabled due to 
the injuries he suffered in 2009 and 2013. Claimant now seeks to reopen his 2009 and 2013 cases 
and consolidate them with a more recent 2017 injury to his left knee in order to establish that he is 
totally and permanently disabled. In other words, Claimant is admitting that the evidence he 
produced related to his 2009 and 2013 injuries that he fully litigated was insufficient to establish he 
was totally and permanently disabled. Otherwise, there would be no reason for him to attempt to 
reopen the case and consolidate it with a new injury which he now claims total and permanent 
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disability. Defendants contend that this establishes the frivolous nature of his Motion for 
Reconsideration filed contemporaneously with his Motion for Consolidation. 
Claimant's counsel's gamesmanship in this regard should be rejected by the Commission as it 
is similar to what he attempted to do in a another case, Hartgrave v. City of Twin Falls, where he 
attempted to reopen the case after it had been decided by the Commission (in which Defendants also 
prevailed) during a stay of his appeal because he wanted to submit additional evidence that he failed 
to produce prior to the Commission's original decision. Although in this case Claimant presented all 
of the evidence that he felt was necessary to establish that his 2009 and 2013 injuries resulted in his 
total and permanent disability, he now seeks to reopen the case following the Commission's decision 
that he failed to meet his burden and awarding Claimant disability inclusive ofimpaitment of 40%. If 
Claimant reasonably believes that he is now totally and permanently disabled by virtue of his most 
recent injury combined with his prior impairments Idaho law provides that the liability for such 
disability is to be apportioned between the employer and the ISIF. As a result, Claimant's Motion for 
Consolidation must be denied. 
DATED this / \l\tday of May, 2018. 
AUGUSTINE LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
B ,j 
Y----1'----+--+-------
Paul , Augu\tinf Of the Firm 
Attorneys for\Errlployer/Surety 
\J 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the /yf"' day of May, 2018, I caused to be served a true copy 
of the foregoing DEFENDANTS' OPPOSITON TO CLAIMANT'S POST-DECISION MOTIONS, 
by the method indicated below, and addressed to each of the following: 
L. Clyel Beny 
PO Box 302 
Twin Falls, ID 83303-0302 
Attorney for Claimant 
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PAUL J. AUGUSTJNE ISB 4 08 
AUGUSTiNE LAW OFFICES, LLC 
1004 W. Fort Street 
Post Office Box 1521 
Boise, ID 83701 
Telephone: (208) 367-9 00 
Facsimile: (208) 947-0 14 
Attorneys for Employer/ urety 
BEFORE TH INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
MARIO AYALA, 




ROBERT J. MEYERS ARMS, INC., 
DECLARATlON OF MORGAN J. 




STATE INSURANCE D, 
, urety, 
STATE OF IDAHO 





MORGAN J. M YERS, under penalty of perjury her,:,by declares as follows: 
1. lama ager employed by the defendant employer. I have knowledge of all the 
ed herein. 
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I 
2. In 2017, laiwant Mario Ayala, was ewployed by the defe
ndant employer. Mr. 
Ayala 
was paid his normal wa es in 2017. However, Mr. Ayala did not rece
ive a bonus. This explains 
why his total compensa1·on in 2017 was less than his total compensatio
n he received in 2016. 
· 3. The reas n Mr. Ayala di.d not receive a bonUJl in 2017 
had nothing to do with his 
inability to perform. the lO!'!mll duties of his job, his production or 
the number of hours that he 
worked. The decision n t to pay bonuses to the workers at the fat
m in Bruneau was made by 
management, including 
4. Mr. Aya\ continues to be employed by the defendant emp
loyer and receive his 
normal wages. 
FlIBTHER YO DECLARANT SAYETHNAUGHT. 
, L f: 
DATED this day o{May, 2018. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CE TJJ1Y that on the I~ Y' day of 5/11/2018, I caused to be served a true 
copy of the foregoing ECLARATION OF MORGAN J. MEYERS IN RESP
ONSE TO CLAIM.ANT'S POST-
AW AJ?JJ MOTIONS, by t e method indicated below, and addressed to 
each of the following: 
L. Clyel Berry 
POBox302 
Twin Falls, ID 8330 -03 02 
Attorney for C!aima t 
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P u~ J. Augustine 
\ \ 
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O'.' 1 n.•~1AL ,,.) 11 ) ', 1\u1.1U~,1 t . 
PAUL J. AUGUSTINE ISB 4608 
AUGUSTINE LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
1004 W. Fort Street 
Post Office Box 1521 
Boise, ID 83701 
Telephone: (208) 367-9400 
Facsimile: (208) 947-0014 
Attorneys for Employer/Surety 




ROBERT J. MEYERS FARMS, INC., 
Employer, 
and 
STATE INSURANCE FUND, 
Surety, 
Defendants. 
IC No. 2009-029533 
2001-520958 
2013-024075 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO 
STRIKE AFFIDAVIT OF CLAIMANT 
DATED APRIL 23, 2018 
Defendants, by and through their counsel of record, Paul J. Augustine of Augustine Law 
Offices, PLLC, hereby move the Commission for an Order striking the Affidavit of Claimant, 
Mario Ayala dated April 23, 2018 submitted in support of Claimant's Motion for 
Reconsideration and other post-decision motions. The basis of this motion is that Claimant's 
affidavit contains the averment of facts and exhibits pertaining to events that occurred after the 
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October 2016 hearing and constitutes an attempt by Claimant and his counsel to present 
additional testimony following the close of evidence and the record in violation of Rule 10 of the 
Judicial Rules of Practice and Procedure. As such, allegations made by Claimant's counsel in 
Claimant's affidavit and the exhibits thereto are not evidence, should be stricken from the record 
and not considered by the Commission on Claimant's various post-decision motions. 
The sole purpose of Claimant's affidavit is Claimant's counsel's attempt to have the 
Commission consider new evidence which he alleges contradicts the factual basis for the 
Commission's April 9, 2018 Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order. This is Claimant's 
second attempt in this case to circumvent Rule 10 of the Judicial Rules of Practice and 
Procedure. The first occmTed when Claimant sought to reopen Dr. Hammond's post-hearing 
deposition testimony by presenting additional opinion testimony in Dr. Hammond's affidavit. 
Since the evidence in Claimant's affidavit was presented after the close of the record it 
cannot be considered by the Commission in ruling upon Claimant's Motion for Reconsideration 
pursuant to LC. § 72-718 or his Motion for Modification pursuant to LC. § 72-719. Claimant's 
motions must be decided based upon the evidence ofrecord at the time the record closed 
following the post-hearing depositions of the parties' experts. As a result, for purposes of the 
record relating to the Claimant's 2009 and 2013 accident claims, it should be stricken. 
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DATED this \cj¾' day of May, 2018. 





Paul J. Augu ne- Of the Firm 
Attorneys forlJ;!mployer/Surety 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the \~\'--day of May, 2018, I caused to be served a true copy 
of the foregoing DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO STRIKE AFFIDAVIT OF CLAIMANT DATED 
APRIL 23, 2018, by the method indicated below, and addressed to each of the following: 
L. Clyel Berry 
PO Box 302 
Twin Falls, ID 83303-0302 
Attorney for Claimant 




Paul J. Augµ\itine 
\ l 
\} 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO STRIKE AFFIDAVIT OF CLAIMANT DATED APRIL 23, 2018 -4 
252
05/23/2018 9:44AM FAX 2087333619 SKS&T l.il0002/0019 
,':!' 
STEPHAN, KVANVIG, STONE & TRAINOR 
L, Clyel Berry - ISB #1897 
P. 0. Box83 





Attorney for Claimant 
''(:1n, 
/_1_//i_) ii I•".,, :,· ::J 
!G: 0 I 
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ROBERT J. MEYERS FA~S, INC,, 
Employer, 
and 
STATE INSURANCE FUND, 
Surety, 
Defendants. 
I.C. No. 2009-029533 
LC. No. 2013-024075 
CLAIMANT'S REPLY TO 
DEFENDANTS' OPPOSITION TO 
CLAIMANT'S POST-DECISION 
MOTIONS 
COMES NOW Claimant, by and through counsel of record herein, and hereby replies to 
Defendants' Opposition to Claimant's Post-Decision Motions as follows: 
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STEPHAN, KV ANVIG, STONE & TRAINOR 
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P. 0. Box 83 
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ROBERT J. MEYERS FARMS, INC., 
Employer, 
and 
STATE INSURANCE FUND, 
Surety, 
Defendants. 
LC. No. 2009-029533 
LC. No. 2013-024075 
CLAIMANT'S REPLY TO 
DEFENDANTS' OPPOSITION TO 
CLAIMANT'S POST-DECISION 
MOTIONS 
COMES NOW Claimant, by and through counsel of rec
ord herein, and hereby replies to 
Defendants' Opposition to Claimant's Post-Decision Mot
ions as follows: 
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Claimant's Reply to Defendants' Argument upon Claim
ant's Motion for Reconsideration: 
It appears that the thrust of Defendants' argument in oppo
sition to Claimant's Motion for 
Reconsideration is that Claimant's Motion is" ... based, in par
t, ... on new post-hearing evidence is that 
not properly before the Commission in its record and sh
ould not be considered as evidence." 
Defendants continue to assert that" ... a motion for reconside
ration should be limited to the evidence 
that is of record at the time the case was submitted.to the C
ommission for decision and is properly 
submitted to the Commission pursuant to Rule 10." Defe
ndants' Opposition p. 4. Although it is 
tempting to "borrow" language within Defendants' Oppos
ition, at page 9, regarding "Claimant's 
counsel's ignorance of Supreme Court precedent...," the tem
ptation to disparage counsel is resisted 
in favor of opting for the high road. Rather, counsel refer
ences the Idaho Supreme Court case of 
Curtis v. MH King and State Insurance Fund, 142 Idaho 
383, 128 P.3d 920 (2005). There, in 
addressing the Commission's denial of that claimant/appe
llant's Motion for Reconsideration, the 
Court reaffirmed that, 
[i]t is axiomatic that a claimant must present to the Co
mmission new reasons 
factually and legally to support a hearing o
n her Motion for 
Rehearing/Reconsideration rather than rehashing evidenc
e previously presented. 
Although Curtis presented a very detailed brief in support o
f her motion she did not 
produce new law or evidence to necessitate a rehearing or 
reconsideration. 
Thusly, it is perfectly clear that a Motion for Reconsiderati
on/Rehearing is to be based upon "new 
law or evidence." 
Counsel finds it interesting that Defendants, who argu
ed through the testimony of 
Defendants' vocational expert, Mr. Jordan, as well as with
in Defendants' Post-Hearing Brief, that 
Claimant actually spoke English quite well, knowing that th
e Commission did not have opportunity 
for observational credibility of Claimant at hearing and, t
husly, was unaware as to the extent of 
Claimant's proficiency to speak English, or lack thereof, 
now assert that "Claimant required an 
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interpreter at hearing," in commenting upon who prepared Claiman
t's Affidavit in Support of 
Motions as between Claimant and his counsel. In that regard, Defendan
ts are correct. The Affidavit 
was prepared by counsel, but was from information and/or data receive
d from Claimant following 
which Claimant and his counsel met to personally review the content 
thereof and representations 
made therein. 
However, on a more meaningful point referencing the basis of Cla
imant's Motion for 
Reconsideration, Defendants' argument is not on point. Defendants asse
rt that,"[ a] !lowing any post-
decision change in Claimant's employment should not be a basis for reco
nsidering the Commission's 
disability determination." Defendants argue that there is " ... no ev
idence that the Claimant's 
reduction in his total earnings from 2016 to 2017 is a result of the 
Claimant's injuries that he 
suffered in 2009 and 2013 or the impairments resulting therefrom." T
hen, "[w]ithout referencing 
evidence of record," Defendants assert that, 
[ a]s is readily apparent from the fact that the Claimant suffered a new in
jury in 2017, 
the Claimant continues to perform the essential functions of his job up
on which the 
Commission based its decision that the Claimant failed to prove total an
d permanent 
disability. 
Again, Defendants miss the point. 
There most certainly is no evidence establishing that Claimant's reduc
tion of wages from 
2016, the year of his hearing before this Commission, and the very next
 year following, being 2017, 
was volitional on Claimant's part. The Declaration of Morgan Meyers
 in Response to Claimant's 
Post-Award Motions attempts to explain that the decrease in wages as 
between 2016 and 2017was 
that, in 2017 " ... Mr. Ayala did not receive a bonus. This explains wh
y his total compensation in 
2017 was less than his total compensation he received in 2016." 
At hearing and thereafter 
Defendants argued that the bonuses paid to Claimant by reason of h
is employment constituted 
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"wages." Most certainly, they were taxable and utilized by Defendants in arg
uing that Claimant's 
wages were not static but were actually increasing through the date of the Octob
er 26, 2016, hearing 
herein. When considering Mr. Morgan's explanation for the decreased wage
s in 2017, being that 
Claimant was not paid a bonus by the employer, whereas he had received bon
uses through 2016. 
Records reflect that during 2016 Mr. Ayala received wages and bonuses tota
ling $47,690.00, but 
during 2017, his earnings totaled $27,500.00, being a reduction of $20,190.0
0. This reduction is 
approximately twice the level of Mr. Ayala's bonuses prior to 2017, which fa
ct casts significant 
doubt upon Mr. Morgan's explanation of the decrease in wages. Tr., p. 169, LL
. 18-22. 
Mr. Morgan's Declaration further asserted that Mr. Ayala continues to be e
mployed and 
"receives his normal wages." This statement flies in the face of and is inconsi
stent with the record 
herein. First, prior to year-end 2016, Mr. Ayala's employment was upon a sala
ry plus annual bonus 
basis, as opposed to wages. As noted by Defendants' vocational expert, Mr. Jord
an, Claimant earned 
$2,200.00 per month plus housing and bonuses. Def Ex. 9, p. 207. From
 Morgan Meyers' 
Declaration, one would believe that Claimant continues to receive a salary 
with expectation of 
annual year-end bonuses. Such conflicts with paragraphs 3 and 4 of Claimant's
 Affidavit in Support 
of Motions dated April 23, 2018 and bearing a Certificate of Service of April 2
7, 2018. There, it is 
clearly stated that commencing in 2017 Claimant's wages and/or earnings we
re reduced and that, 
continuing for and during calendar year 2018, Claimant receives earnings on
 a per hour basis as 
opposed to a salary. Attached hereto is a true and accurate copy of the March
 20, 2018, Employee 
Notice "posted" by Mr. Robert Meyers, owner/principal ofDefendant-employer
 herein, which clearly 
states that, " ... so for the two workers and Mario, the maximum that you are to 
work is 48 hours per 
week. No more. You will not be paid for additional time." Further,just as th
e two helpers, Mario 
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is now required to submit time cards. In short, Mr. Ayala does not continue to receive
 his "normal" 
wages, at least not following the year of his hearing hereof before the Comm
ission, being 2016. 
Further taking excerpts from the record out of context, Defendants' Oppositio
n asserts that, 
" ... the fact that the Claimant testified that he contacted Social Security within o
ne year of the hearing 
to determine how much he would receive in retirement benefits proves th
at the Claimant was 
considering retirement prior to hearing." In a continuing pattern of attem
pting to mislead the 
Commission, Defendants' counsel omitted the fact that Claimant contacting So
cial Security was not 
out of any desire to "retire," but was responsive to Robert Meyers' conduct tow
ard Claimant related 
to him proceeding with the required right TKA as ordered by Dr. Miers John
son, with the surgery 
falling within the farm's irrigation season, thusly angering Mr. Meyers. Tr., p. 
191, L. 22-p. 193, 
L. 4. 
Defendants' Opposition failed to mention or discuss the fact that the Commiss
ion's decision 
awarding Claimant but 40% permanent partial disability inclusive ofimpairme
nt was premised upon 
the Commission's rationale that, "[t]here is no reason to believe that Cla
imant's job will not 
continue, or that he will be unable to perform the requirements of that job until
 he decides to retire," 
and, " ... the fact that Claimant has engaged in continuous employment since 2
009, with significant 
armual increases in earnings, must be taken into account." In summary,
 " ... the Commission 
concludes that absent Claimant's current employment, his disability, as of the d
ate ofhearing, would 
be profound, and possibly total and permanent under the odd-lot doctrine." 
Following hearing herein but even prior to the release of the Commissio
n's decision, 
Defendant-employer reduced Claimant's time-of-hearing earnings by an a
mount in excess of 
$20,000.00, thusly proving false the Commission's assumption that " 
... Claimant's current 
employment is likely to continue at his current or higher wage .... " 
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Defendants further misconstrue the basis upon which Claimant's M
otions were made, by 
asserting that the pending motions were arguing that Claimant is tota
lly and permanently disabled 
by virtue of the new 2017 left knee injury. With respect to Claimant's
 Motion for Reconsideration, 
the importance of the 2017 left knee injury is not within the context o
f Claimant's disability related 
to the 2017 left knee injury. Rather, the significance of the 2017 left k
nee injury within the context 
of the Motion for Reconsideration is that the occurrence of the same
 together with Dr. Johnson's 
significant recommended restrictions and/or limitations casts signif
icant doubt upon the second 
assumption upon which the Commission's decision to award Claimant
 but 40% pe1manent disability 
was premised, being that, "[t]here is no reason to believe that Claim
ant's job will not continue, or 
that he will be unable to perform the requirements of that job until h
e decides to retire." 
Clearly, the left knee injury creates substantial doubt as to Claimant's
 ability to continue in 
his employment at Meyers Farms and irrespective of his desire to d
o so. In this regard, counsel 
represents to the Commission that Defendants in the 2017 left k
nee injury, being the same 
Defendants as in the instant matter, had Claimant undergo IME review
 by orthopedic surgeon Kyle 
Palmer upon May 2, 2018. Attached hereto is a true and correct c
opy of correspondence from 
counsel to Defendant-surety, State Insurance Fund, dated May 3, 2
018, requesting copies of all 
reproducible communications by and between the Fund and Dr. Palmer
/Dr. Palmer's office regarding 
Claimant; and, requesting a copy of all reproducible opinion gener
ated by reason of Claimant's 
examination by Dr. Palmer, as quickly as the same is available. As o
f current date, counsel has not 
received response to those requests but asserts that the Commission
's decision regarding pending 
motions should be held in abeyance until the Commission is afford
ed opportunity to review the 
opinions, conclusions and recommendations of Dr. Palmer flowing f
rom the May 3, 2018, IME of 
Claimant herein. It is believed that the same will shed considerably g
reater light upon the validity 
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of the assumption of the Commission that, "[t]here is no reason to believe tha
t Claimant... will be 
unable to perform the requirements of that job until he decides to retire." Obvio
usly, being disabled 
from employment is a far different cry than deciding to retire. 
Upon this basis, it is respectfully urged that Claimant's Motion for Recon
sideration is 
appropriate, well-based and should be granted by the Commission. 
Claimant's Reply to Defendants' Argument Upon Claimant's Motion for
 Modification of 
Award Pursuant to I.e.§ 72-719. 
Counsel initially concedes that Defendants may be technically correct that Cl
aimant's LC. 
§ 72-719 Motion for Modification may not be ripe, upon the basis that the Co
mmission's April 9, 
2018, award is not final, by reason of Defendants' Motion for Clarification dat
ed April 13, 2018, as 
joined in by Claimant's Response to Defendants' Motion for Clarification, d
ated April 26, 2018. 
However, while being perhaps technically premature, it seemed that LC.§ 72
-719 motions should 
be considered in conjunction with the basis for Claimant's Motion for Recons
ideration. 
Speaking as to the "thrust" of Defendants' Opposition, Defendants cite Magee v. T
hompson 
Creek Mine. Co., 152 Idaho 196,268 P.3d 464 (2012) as precedent that an LC. §
 72-719(a) movant 
bears the burden of establishing " ... an increased level of impairment." Claim
ant's LC.§ 72-719 
Motions are not premised upon any argument that Claimant's impairment has
 increased since the 
date ofhearing herein, related to the 2009 and/or 2013 injuries. Rather, counse
l notes that LC. § 72-
719(1 )(a) sets forth as alternative grounds either a change in the nature or exte
nt of the employee's 
injury, meaning impairment, or, in the disjunctive, disablement. Claimant's
 LC. § 72-719(l)(a) 
Motion is upon the ground of a change in Claimant's disablement following
 the date of hearing 
herein. Conversely, Magee concerned the Claimant's LC. § 72-719(1 )( a) Motion
 upon the argument 
of the Claimant's change in the nature or extent of injury/impairment. 
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What is important about Magee is the fact that, there, the Commission 
held a hearing upon 
that Claimant's Motion. In the instant proceedings, the Commission i
s respectfully urged to hold 
a hearing regarding this Claimant's allegation of a change in his disa
blement following hearing 
herein which invalidates the premises upon which the Commission a
warded Claimant but 40% 
permanent disability as opposed to disability which the Commissio
n determined " ... would be 
profound, and possibly total and permanent under the odd-lot doctrine
." 
Counsel reiterates and emphasizes that the instant Motion does not al
lege a change in his 
impairment but, rather, a change in his disablement by reason of the con
duct of Defendant-employer 
in reducing Claimant's earnings from the date of hearing and the effe
ct of Claimant's "new" left 
knee injury upon the Commission's rationale in reducing Claimant's d
isability from that which it 
stated it would have awarded mandates LC.§ 72-719(1) review, pursu
ant to both sub-sections (a), 
being a change in the nature or extent of Claimant's disablement; and,
 (3), Commission review to 
correct a manifest injustice. 
Defendants' Opposition asserts that, "Claimant now argues that the res
trictions attributable 
to his 2017 left knee injury support his claim that he is totally and perm
anently disabled." Again, 
Defendants totally miss the point and basis of Claimant's Motion. Str
ictly limited to the claims at 
issue in LC. Nos. 2009-029533 and 2013-024075, the restrictions attri
butable to Claimant's 2017 
left knee injury should not be considered in the determination of Claim
ant's permanent disability, 
inclusive of potential odd-lot status. Rather, the pending Motion was ma
de upon the basis that where 
the two assumptions referenced by the Commission as justifying th
e reduction of Claimant's 
permanent disability from " ... profound, and possibly total and permanen
t ... ," have been shown to be 
invalid, Claimant should be entitled to the profound and possibly tota
l and permanent disability 
which the Commission determined to be related to the 2009 and 2013 
injuries at issue herein. 
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Defendants further argue that Claimant's pending motions are w
ithout merit " ... because of 
the primary condition that affected Claimant's symptomatology
 at the hearing was his low back 
which the Commission properly determined " ... was not caus
ally related to his 2009 or 2013 
industrial accidents." This argument made by or upon behalf of D
efendants is the product of smoke 
and/or mirrors in attempting to create an illusion. No where with
in Claimant's pending Motions is 
there a single reference to Claimant's low back presentments or an
y symptomatology related thereto. 
Rather, again, all that Claimant seeks is that which this Commissi
on clearly expressed it would have 
granted to Claimant, being profound and possibly total and
 permanent disability related to 
Claimant's injuries which the Commission determined were rela
ted to and resultant of the at-issue 
accidents and injuries occurring in 2009 and 2013. 
Upon this basis, it is respectfully urged that allowing the Com
mission's April 9, 2018, 
decision to stand ignores Claimant's profound increase in disable
ment and results in an extreme and 
manifest injustice. 
Claimant's Reply to Defendants' Argument Upon Claimant's
 Motion for Consolidation: 
Defendants' Opposition to this Motion again referenced Claiman
t's "considerable low back 
problems" which were not advanced by or within Claimant's pen
ding Motions, or even referenced 
therein. Clearly, Defendants attempt to muddy the water and c
onfuse the Commission as to the 
purpose, basis and grounds upon and by which Claimant's pendi
ng Motions were filed. Similarly, 
commencing at page 10 of Defendant's Opposition, Defendants
 allege that, 
... Claimant is admitting that the evidence he produced related to 
his 2009 and 2013 
injuries that he fully litigated was insufficient to establish h
e was totally and 
permanently disabled. Otherwise, there would be no reason fo
r him to attempt to 
reopen the case and consolidate it with the new injury. 
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Defendants misconstrue or, perhaps more accurately, misrepresent that which Claimant's 
Motion for Consolidation clearly intends to accomplish. Again, the report upon Dr. Palmer's May 
2, 2018, IME of Claimant has not yet been produced to Claimant/Claimant's counsel. Claimant 
respectfully petitions the Commission for leave to produce the same in conjunction with and support 
of his Motion for Consolidation for the consideration of the Commission immediately upon receipt. 
Simply stated, the effect of the Commission's April 9, 2018, Decision will result in 
Defendants' receipt of an undeserved windfall if the 2017 claim, identified as I.C. No. 2017-017 451, 
is not consolidated with the instant proceedings in I.C. Nos. 2009-029533 and 2013-024075, most 
likely at the expense of the Idaho Special Indemnity Fund. Defendants' Opposition Brief 
inadvertently concedes and admits the same within the last paragraph upon page 11 thereof by 
stating, 
[i]f Claimant reasonably believes that he now is totally and permanently disabled by 
virtue of his most recent injury combined with his prior impairments Idaho law 
provides that the liability for such disability is to be apportioned between the 
employer and the ISIP. 
This windfall comes about soley by reason of the Commission "discounting" Claimant's 
disability from " ... profound, and possibly total and permanent under the odd-lot doctrine" to 40% 
by giving Claimant's status as an "older worker" the opposite effect than is typical and customary, 
upon the assumptions that his current employment is likely to continue at his current or higher wage; 
and, that " ... there is no reason to believe that Claimant's job would not continue, or that he will be 
unable to perform the requirements of that job until he decides to retire." By this rationale and 
premised upon these assumptions, which have shown to have been invalid even as of the date of the 
Commission's April 9, 2018, decision herein, significant of Claimant's permanent disability directly 
related to the 2009 and 2013 injuries at issue herein was not awarded. 
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If Claimant establishes entitlement to total and permanent disability in proceedings pending 
in LC. No. 2017-017451, absent consolidation Defendants will only be liable for Claimant's 
impairment and permanent disability directly flowing from the June 7, 2017, accident with the ISIF 
becoming responsible for Claimant's disablement related to impairment preceding the June 7, 2017, 
injury and, thusly, Claimant's disability not awarded by the Commission by and within its April 9, 
2018, decision herein, which rightfully, logically and ethically should be borne by Defendants herein. 
It is respectfully submitted that such was not the result anticipated by the creation of the ISIP. 
It is respectfully submitted that consolidation of the instant proceedings with LC. No. 2017-
017 451 is both necessary and just. 
CONCLUSION 
First, a few comments regarding Defendants' representations and/or positions as set-forth 
within the Opposition Brief. 
1. At page 2, Defendants assert that Claimant's Motion for Consolidation " ... would 
penalize employer for continuing to gainfully employ Claimant." This position is a 
far cry from if not the exact opposite of Defendants' position throughout these 
proceedings and repeatedly set-forth within Defendants' Post-Hearing Brief, that the 
continued employment by Defendant-employer of Claimant was not as a sympathetic 
employer but was in recognition ofDefendants' reliance upon Claimant's experience, 
skills and expertise relating to the Farm's irrigation system. 
Since hearing, Defendant-employer's position appears to have radically 
changed. Rather than a salary, Claimant is now required to keep meticulous time 
cards and is paid upon an hourly basis. Claimant's annual earnings decreased by an 
amount in excess of $20,000.00, the year following hearing and now, with the 
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occurrence of Claimant's 2017 left knee injury, it appears to be the position of 
Defendant-employer that it is being "penalized" for continuing Claimant's 
employment through his succession of injuries requiring extensive cervical surgery 
involving multi-level fusion; left shoulder and elbow surgeries; a right TKA; and, 
most recently, a significant left knee injury which Claimant's orthopedic surgeon 
advises requires TKA. Rhetorically speaking, any "penalty" perceived by Defendants 
related to the continued employment of Claimant pales in comparison to the 
"penalty" clearly suffered by Claimant in continuing to exhaust his body beyond 
anatomical limits for the benefit of Meyers Farms. 
Defendant's position in this regard appears to be closely akin by analogy to 
an 18th century farmer working his plow horse well beyond endurances, to then 
abandon it without remorse, conscience or compassion. 
2. Again, at page 2 of Defendants' Opposition, Defendants assert that it is Claimant's 
position " ... that by virtue of a new injury suffered in 2017, the Claimant has suffered 
a change in his disablement and is now totally and permanently disabled." As 
counsel attempted to set-forth and clarify above, it is not Claimant's position that the 
2017 injury and related disablement should add to Claimant's disability award related 
to the 2009 and 2013 injuries, at issue herein. Rather, the significance of2017 injury 
is to provide clear and certain example that the Commission's assumption that 
Claimant's employment with Defendant-employer herein would continue; and, that 
Claimant would be physically able to continue in that employment until he decides 
to retire, were without basis and, in fact, proved to be invalid even prior to the release 
of the Commission's April 9, 2018, decision rendered herein. 
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The second significance of the 2017 injury is that, absent the Commission revisiting 
its decision herein and/or ordering consolidation of the instant claims with the 2017 
proceedings, Defendants will receive a windfall at the expense of the ISIF within the 2017 
litigation. 
3. Throughout Defendants' Opposition, Defendants made multiple and continued 
references to Claimant's low back presentment in an obvious effort to bias the 
Commission against Claimant's pending Motions when, in reality, Claimant was 
careful so as to exclude any reference to his low back within the pending Motions; 
Claimant's Affidavit in Support; and, Claimant's briefing. Simply stated, Claimant's 
low back, both prior to and subsequent from the hearing herein and/or the 
Commission's April 9, 2018, decision is a non-issue for purposes of Claimant's 
pending Motions. 
It is respectfully submitted that Claimant's pending Motions are, each, well-based of record, 
applicable statutes, and controlling case· precedent and should, in the interests of equity, justice and 
the spirit of LC.§ 72-201, be granted. 




L. Clyel Be 
Attorney for Claimant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I am a resident attorney of the State ofldaho and that on the 1' 2... day 
of May, 2018, I served a copy of the foregoing document by depositing a true copy thereof in the 
United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to the following: 
Paul J. Augustine 
AUGUSTINE LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
P.O. Box 1521 
Boise, ID 83701 
L. 
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Robert J. Meyers Farms 
3921 North 3300 East4'Twin Falls, Idaho 83301 
Employee Notice: March 20, 2018 
To the workers on the Bruneau Farm (River Ranch West): 
As an employer I am to guarantee 8 hours a day for 6 days or 48 hours a week. 
I am to comply with this. 
So for the two workers and Mario, the maximum that you are to work is.48. 
hours per week. No more. You will not be paid for additional time. 
Split your day up, some morning hours and some night hours, so that it will fit 
the irrigation schedule. 
Also, I will not accept time cards UNLESS you list the specific jobs th.at you 
have done for the day, i.e. operation, field job done. Every single day. 
For the workers catching rock chucks and ground pests, I only want you to 
work for 4 hours per day. This applies to everyone catching ground pests, no 
exceptions. 




RUSSELL G. KVANVIG 
LAIRD B. STONE 
STEPHAN, 
JEREMY C. VAUGHN - ASSOCIATE 
L. CLYEL BERRY -OF COUNSEL 
TELEPHONE 208-733-2721 
KV ANVIG, STONE & 
ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
102 MAIN AVENUE SOUTH, STE#J 
POST OFFICE BOX 83 
TWIN FALLS, IDAHO 83303-0083 
TRAINOR 
FRANK L. STEPHAN 1886-1952 
DANIELA. SLAVIN 1938-1987 
ROBERT W. STEPHAN 1917-2003 
KEVIN F. TRAINOR - RETIRED 
Ove1· 100 Years of Legal Services to the Magic Valley 
E-MAIL sks&t@idaho-law.com 
FACSIMILE 208-733-3619 
Via Facsimile: (208) 332-2171 
Claims Adjuster 
Idaho State Insurance Fund 
P.O. Box 990004 
Boise, ID 83799 
May 3, 2018 
Re: My Client/Claimant - Mario G. Ayala 
Date oflnjury- June 7, 2017 
I.C. No. -2017-017451 
Dear Sir/Madam: 
I am writing this letter to you upon my understanding that Mr. Ayala presented for IME 
with/by Dr. Palmer upon Wednesday, May 2, 2018. The purpose of this correspondence is to request 
your courtesy in providing me with a copy of all reproducible communications by and between the 
State Insurance Fund, inclusive of any agent, employee and/or representative thereof, and Dr. 
Palmer/Dr. Palmer's office regarding Mr. Ayala. 
Secondly, request is made that I be provided with a copy of all reproducible opinion 
generated by reason of and/or as related to Dr. Palmer's examination of Mr. Ayala, as quickly as the 
same, is/are available. 
Should you have questions or concerns, I would be more than happy to be responsive. 
LCB:mek 
Very truly yours, 
STEPHAN, KV ANVIG, STONE & TRAINOR 
Dictated by the attorney and faxed without 
Signature in his absence to avoid delay 
L. Clyel Berry 
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. __ , 
STEPHAN, KVANVIG, STONE & TRAINOR 
L. Clyel Berry • ISB #1897 
P. 0. Box 83 
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ROBERT J. MEYERS FARMS, INC., 
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and 
STATE INSURANCE FUND, 
Surety, 
Defendants. 
J.C. No. 2009-029533 
r.c. No. 2013-024075 
CLAIMANT'S OBJECTION TO 
DEFENOANTS' MOTION TO 
STRIKE AFFIDAVIT OF 
CLAlMANT 
COMES NOW Claimant, by and through counsel ofrecord herein, and hereby responds and 
objects to Defendants' Motion to Strike Affidavit of Claimant, dated April 23, 2018. As noted by 
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Employer, 
and 
STATE INSURANCE FUND, 
Surety, 
Defendants. 
I.C. No. 2009-029533 
I.C. No. 2013-024075 
CLAIMANT'S OBJECTION TO 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO 
STRIKE AFFIDAVIT OF 
CLAIMANT 
COMES NOW Claimant, by and through counsel
 of record herein, and hereby responds and 
objects to Defendants' Motion to Strike Affidavit
 of Claimant, dated April 23, 2018. As noted by
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Defendants' Motion, Claimant's subject Affidavit w
as submitted in support of Claimant's post-
decision motions, generally, and specifically Claiman
t's Motion for Reconsideration. 
It is respectfully submitted that Defendants overlooked
 the fact that, both respect to a Motion 
for Reconsideration as well as LC. § 72-719 motions, 
the movant is not precluded from submitting 
new/additional facts, data and/or evidence to the Co
mmission for review in the consideration of 
those motions. In fact, it is this submission upon wh
ich those motions are premised. The Idaho 
Supreme Court's Opinion in Curtis v. MH King Co., 14
2 Idaho 3 83, 128 P .3d 920 (2005), is decisive 
and controlling regarding Defendants' Motion to Strik
e. There, in determining whether or not the 
Commission abused its discretion in denying Curtis' M
otion for Reconsideration, the Supreme Court 
noted that, 
[i]t is axiomatic that a claimant must present to th
e Commission new reasons 
factually and legally to support a hearing on her motion
 for rehearing/reconsideration 
rather than rehashing evidence previously submitted. 
Although Curtis presented a 
very detailed brief in support of her motion she did not
 produce new law or evidence 
to necessitate a rehearing or reconsideration. 
128 P .3d 920, at 926. In a more recent decision regar
ding which counsel is somewhat familiar, in 
Page v. McCain Foods, 145 Idaho 302, 179 P.3d 265
 (2008), the Affidavit of Dr. Joseph Peterson 
was submitted in Support of Claimant's Motion for 
Reconsideration, which effectively reversed 
certain of Dr. Peterson's post-hearing deposition testim
ony. Dr. Peterson's revised opinions, as set-
forth within his Affidavit, was a significant factor in th
e Court reversing the Commission's decision 
in that matter. 
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In sunnnary, Defendants' Motion to Strike is wit
hout basis in law and, in fact, seeks that 
which is in contravention to established law and c
ontrolling precedent, and must be, in all respects, 
denied. 
Dated this JJ,..__ day of May, 2018. 
STONE & TRAINOR 
By _ _._.~WC..::0.-\--,/------1-----
L. Clyel erry 
Attorney for Claimant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I am a resident attorney of t
he State of Idaho and that on the 
J1 day of May, 2018, I served a copy of the foregoing document by depositing a true copy 
thereof in the United States mail, postage prepaid
, addressed to the following: 
Paul J. Augustine 
AUGUSTINE LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
P.O. Box 1521 
Boise, ID 83701 
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On April 9, 2018, the Commission entered its Findings of Fact, C
onclusions of Law, and 
Order addressing, inter alia, the issue of the extent and degree
 of Claimant's disability and 
whether that disability should be apportioned between the Claim
ant's work-related injuries and 
his pre-existing low back condition. The Commission determ
ined that Claimant's disability 
from all causes combined is 40%, inclusive of impairment. 
On the question of whether 
Claimant's disability should be apportioned between the work-
related injuries and Claimant's 
pre-existing low back condition pursuant to the provisions 
of Idaho Code § 72-406, the 
Commission ruled that the evidence was insufficient to support
 apportionment pursuant to that 
section and charged Defendants with responsibility to pay th
e entirety of Claimant's 40% 
disability. 
Defendant's Motion for Clarification is prompted by the fact
 that Claimant's work-
related injuries derive from separate accidents of October 6
, 2009 and August 28, 2013. 
Pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-428 and Idaho Code § 72-429, dis
ability less-than-total is payable 
at 55% of the average weekly state wage for the year of
 injury. Defendants seek the 
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Commission's guidance as to how the 40% disability for which Defendants ar
e held responsible 
should be paid. They contend that since Claimant's disability is the product 
of Claimant's pre-
existing low back condition, the 2009 accident, and the 2013 accident, t
hat some part of 
Claimant's disability should be paid at 2009 rates and some po1iion should be 
paid at 2013 rates. 
Defendants propose that disability over and above impaiiment be prorated betw
een the 2009 and 
2013 accidents in the same ratio that the 2009 and 2013 accidents contrib
ute to Claimant's 
permanent physical impairment. 
In response, Claimant contends that the mechanistic approach to apportionmen
t advanced 
by Defendants is disfavored, and that apportionment of responsibility for
 Claimant's 40% 
disability must be based on an evaluation and assessment of the impact of
 each accident on 
Claimant's ability to engage in gainful activity as anticipated by the provision
s of Idaho Code § 
72-425 and Idaho Code § 72-430. 
We believe it appropriate to treat Defendant's Motion for "Clarification" as a 
motion for 
reconsideration pursuant to Idaho Code§ 72-718. A decision of the Commissio
n, in the absence 
of fraud, shall be final and conclusive as to all matters adjudicated, provided th
at within 20 days 
from the date of the filing of the decision, any party may move for reconsidera
tion. Idaho Code 
§ 72-718. However, "it is axiomatic that a claimant must present to the C
ommission new 
reasons factually and legally to suppmi a hearing on her Motion for Rehearing
/Reconsideration 
rather than rehashing evidence previously presented." Cu1iis v. M.H. King Co
., 142 Idaho 383, 
388, 128 P.3d 920 (2005). 
On reconsideration, the Commission will examine the evidence in the 
case, and 
determine whether the evidence presented supports the legal conclusions. Th
e Commission is 
not compelled to make findings on the facts of the case during reconsideration.
 Davison v. H.H. 
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Keim Co., Ltd., 110 Idaho 758, 718 P.2d 1196. The Commission may 
reverse its decision upon 
a motion for reconsideration, or rehearing of the decision in question,
 based on the arguments 
presented, or upon its own motion, provided that it acts within the t
ime frame established in 
Idaho Code§ 72-718. See, Dennis v. School District No. 91, 135 Idah
o 94, 15 P.3d 329 (2000) 
(citing Kindred v. Amalgamated Sugar Co., 114 Idaho 284, 756 P.2d 41
0 (1988)). 
In the underlying decision, the Commission found that Claimant has su
ffered disability of 
40%, inclusive of impairment referable to the 2009 and 2013 accidents
. The Commission found 
that Defendants failed to come forward with such evidence as would s
upport a ruling that some 
portion of Claimant's disability should be apportioned to his pre-exi
sting low back condition 
pursuant to the provisions of Idaho Code § 72-406(1 ). That determ
ination is not challenged. 
However, the Connnission's Order assigning responsibility for the paym
ent of the 40% disability 
is complicated by the fact that two industrial accidents are implicat
ed in contributing to that 
disability, leaving Defendants unable to understand whether the award
 should be paid at 2009 or 
2013 rates. They urge the Commission to prorate the disability awa
rd between the 2009 and 
2013 accidents in the same ratio that each accident contributed to Claim
ant's permanent physical 
impairment. In other words, they suggest that the apportiomnen
t problem be solved by 
application of the Carey formula, the rule applied in total and pe1m
anent disability cases to 
apportion total and permanent disability between the Industrial Spe
cial Indemnity Fund and 
Employer. (See Carey v. Clearwater County Road Dept., 107 Idah
o 109, 118 686 P.2d 54 
(1984)). However, the Court has made it clear that the Carey form
ula has no application in 
apportioning responsibility in less than total cases under the provisi
ons of Idaho Code § 72-
406(1 ). (See Reiher v. American Fine Foods, 126 Idaho 58, 878 P.2d 
757 (1994); Henderson v. 
McCain Foods, Inc., 142 Idaho 559, 130 P.3d 1097 (2006)). Rather, 
in appo1tioning less-than-
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total disability under Idaho Code § 72-406(1 ), the Commission is presumed, by its experience, to 
be able to judge the causative factors in a particular case, and should be allowed a degree of 
latitude in making an apportionment under Idaho Code § 72-406. (See Brooks v. Standard Fire 
Ins., Co., 117 Idaho 1066, 793 P.2d 1238 (1990)). Still, any decision on apportionment must be 
' supported by substantial and competent evidence. Consideration of the factors outlined in Idaho 
Code § 72-425 and Idaho Code § 72-430 is the most appropriate way to determine whether, 
under Idaho Code § 72-406, Claimant's disability is increased or prolonged by virtue of a pre-
existing condition. As we noted in the underlying decision, once Claimant has made a prima 
facie showing of Claimant's disability from all causes, the burden of coming forward with 
evidence that Defendants should not bear responsibility for that disability shifts to Defendants. 
Defendants did not adduce proof adequate to persuade the Commission that Claimant's 40% 
disability should be apportioned between the subject accidents and Claimant's pre-existing low 
back condition. 
With respect to whether or how the 40% disability should be apportioned between the 
2009 and 2013 accidents, it is worth noting that Claimant was found to be medically stable from 
the 2009 injuries prior to the 2013 accident. Vis-a-vis the 2013 accident, the impairments 
relating to the 2009 accident are certainly pre-existing, and there seems to be no reason why the 
rules relating to appmtionment between a work accident and a non-work related pre-existing 
condition should not also apply to appmtion responsibility between two work-related accidents 
separated by a period of years, but consolidated for the purposes of hearing. 
As was the case with Claimant's low back condition, upon a prima facie showing that 
Claimant had suffered disability of 40%, inclusive of impairment, the burden of coming forward 
with evidence that disability should be shared as between the 2009 and 2013 accidents falls to 
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Defendants. Review of the record reveals no evidence that would allow the Commission to do 
anything but guess how the 2009 and 2013 accidents individually contribute to Claimant's 40% 
disability except to say that each accident is responsible for ce1iain disability payable as 
impairment, as set forth in Paragraph 87 of the April 9, 2018 decision. As noted in Page v. 
McCain Foods, Inc., 145 Idaho 302, 179 P.3d 265 (2008), where a claim for disability less-than-
total is before the Commission, so is the issue of whether Employer bears full responsibility for 
Claimant's disability. Accordingly, appotiionment of disability as between the 2009 and 2013 
accidents is an issue before the Commission. Unfotiunately, there is neither medical nor 
vocational evidence before the Commission, and no argument made to the Commission in 
briefing or the underlying matter, that would suppo1i appotiionment of disability between the 
2009 and 2013 accidents. Defendants' having failed to establish that some part of Claimant's 
disability should be paid at the lower 2009 rate, the Commission concludes that the balance of 
Claimant's 40% disability over and above the impairments referable to the 2009 and 2013 
accidents must be paid at the higher 2013 rate. 
Based on the foregoing, the Commission orders that the impairments identified at 
Paragraph 87 of the April 9, 2018 decision shall be paid at the appropriate percentage of the 
average weekly state wage based on the year of injury. The balance of Claimant's 40% 
impairment shall be paid at 2013 rates. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
DATED this d)f'..til day of ~ , 2018. 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
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~c~C~-=> 
Thomas P. Baskin, Commissioner-···-
A~~ 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the J.hd.,day of ~ ,u • , 2018, a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing ORDER ON MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION was served by 
regular United States Mail upon each of the following: 
L. CL YEL BERRY 
POBOX302 
TWIN FALLS ID 83303 
PAUL J. AUGUSTINE 
PO BOX 1521 
BOISE ID 83701 
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BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE ST




ROBERT J. MEYERS FARMS, INC., 
Employer, 
and 












In its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order da
ted April 9, 2018, the 
Commission determined, inter alia, that Claimant has proven d
isability of 40% of the whole 
person, inclusive of disability referable to the accidents of 2009,
 2013, and Claimant's non-work 
related low back condition. Defendants failed to adduce ev
idence sufficient to allow the 
Commission to apportion disability pursuant to Idaho Cod
e § 72-406 and, accordingly, 
Defendants were found responsible for the entirety of Claiman
t's 40% disability. In a separate 
Order issued contemporaneously herewith, the Commission has 
determined that Claimant's 40% 
disability is payable at 2013 rates. 
On or about April 30, 2018, Claimant filed his Motion
s for Reconsideration, 
Modification, and Consolidation, supported by the April 30, 20
18 Affidavit of Claimant. That 
affidavit reflects that Claimant earned $47,690 in income for 2
016, but only $27,500 in 2017. 
Claimant also avers that while he was paid a monthly salary
 at the time of hearing, he is 
currently paid on an hourly basis, with his hourly wage being ap
proximately the same as his two 
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subordinates. The affidavit further reflects that on or 
about June 7, 2017, Claimant suffered a 
work-related injmy to his left knee for which he ha
s received arthroscopic surgery by Dr. 
Johnson, the same physician who performed the right
 knee arthroplasty arising from the 2013 
right knee injury. From Claimant's affidavit, it 
further appears that Dr. Johnson has 
recommended that Claimant requires left knee replace
ment. That surgery has not taken place 
and the affidavit suggests that Surety has declined to
 authorize this treatment. Exhibit C to 
Claimant's affidavit is a brief report from Dr. Johns
on. It reflects that Claimant carries a 
diagnosis of degenerative joint disease and a torn me
niscus. It further reflects Dr. Johnson's 
opinion that Claimant requires a left total knee replacem
ent, suggesting that Dr. Johnson is of the 
view that Claimant is not yet at a point of medical sta
bility. Somewhat paradoxically, he then 
suggests that if worker's compensation will not cover t
he recommended total knee replacement, 
Claimant may be considered to be at maximum medic
al improvement, with certain delineated 
impairment and permanent restrictions, restrictions wh
ich may be more onerous than those at 
issue in this proceeding. 
In opposition to Claimant's motions, Defendants have
 offered the Affidavit of Morgan 
Meyers of Robert J. Meyers Farms, Inc. That affidav
it reflects that in the 2017 calendar year, 
Claimant was paid his "normal wages." However, Cla
imant did not receive an annual bonus in 
2017, and according to Mr. Meyers, this explains w
hy his total compensation in 2017 was 
significantly less than his 2016 income. The affidavi
t further reflects that the decision not to 
offer a bonus in 2017 applied to all employees and 
that insofar as this decision applied to 
Claimant, it had nothing to do with Claimant's job per
formance. Mr. Meyers' affidavit implies 
that Claimant's compensation scheme, except for the pa
yment of the 2017 bonus, was unchanged 
from prior years. This contradicts Claimant's affidavit 
which reflects that in 2017 Claimant went 
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from a monthly salary to an hourly wage. However
, Claimant's affidavit does not reflect that 
this change in the method of compensation resulted in
 a pay reduction. Claimant argues that the 
approximate $20,000 reduction in income he suffer
ed in 2017 cannot be explained solely by 
Employer's decision not to award a bonus for 2017
, the implication being that some pmt of 
Claimant's decrease in compensation must be attribu
table to a decrease in his monthly income. 
However, Claimant, who should know, does not make
 this averment in his affidavit. 
Morgan Meyers' affidavit does not explain why M
eyers Farms employees, including 
Claimant, were not paid an annual bonus for 2017. C
laimant's affidavit does not explain why he 
was switched from a monthly salary to an hourly wa
ge in 2017. Nor does Claimant's affidavit 
explain why Claimant's income was reduced signifi
cantly in 2017; it may be that Claimant's 
income loss is related to new injuries he sustained 
in 2017. The affidavits are potentially in 
conflict depending on what is meant by Morgan Mey
ers' use of the te1m "normal wages" at ~ 2 
of this affidavit. However, both affidavits seem to su
pport the proposition that Claimant's 2017 
income is approximately $20,000 lower than his 2016
 annual income. 
In support of his motions, Claimant argues that 
the accident of June 7, 2017 and 
Claimant's demonstrated income reduction for 2017
 constitute new evidence which warrants 
review of the Commission's April 9, 2018 Order pur
suant to Idaho Code§ 72-718 and/or Idaho 
Code § 72-719. As a fallback position, Claimant urg
es the Commission to consolidate the 2009 
and 2013 claims with the new 2017 claim. 
Claimant first takes issue with the Commission's de
cision to issue its own Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order without the bene
fit of having observed Claimant at hem·ing. 
As we have explained, the Commission's election to
 write the April 9, 2018 decision was not 
lightly made. However, our obligation to manage ou
r docket to issue timely decisions informed 
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our judgment. We are, of course, sensitive to the 
fact that not having observed Claimant at 
hearing, we are unable to make any finding as to Cla
imant's observational credibility. However, 
we are just as competent as the Referee who heard t
he matter to compare Claimant's testimony 
to other testimony and evidence of record to make 
substantive credibility determinations. For 
example, as explained in the April 9, 2018 decision, 
we found Claimant's testimony that he has 
experienced significant and unremitting low back pai
n ever since the October 6, 2009 accident to 
be incredible as compared to other testimony and evid
ence of record. This finding was important 
to the Commission's determination that Claimant's l
ow back condition is not causally related to 
the subject accident. 
Claimant also testified at hearing to his subjective 
pain and functional loss stemming 
from his various injuries/conditions. The Commiss
ion considered this testimony in evaluating 
Claimant's disability. However, it is urged by Claim
ant that had we had the ability to observe 
Claimant at hearing, e.g., had we watched him walk 
to and from the witness stand, grimace with 
certain movements, or squirm in his seat, we migh
t have been more inclined to give greater 
weight to his recitation of his functional limitations. 
Identifying Claimant's residual functional capacity w
as one of the principle issues with 
which the Commission struggled in connection with
 evaluating Claimant's disability. Based on 
the opinions of a number of Claimant's treaters, 
Defendants argued that Claimant has no 
limitations/restrictions referable to the 2009 and 2
013 injuries. In further support of this 
asse1tion, they pointed out that Claimant has continu
ed to work for this time-of-injury employer 
in his time-of-injury position since the 2009 accident.
 
Claimant relied on the September 25, 2015 FCE in s
uppmt of his assettion that the 2009 
and 2013 accidents, along with Claimant's low back
 condition, have significantly degraded his 
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functional capacity. We rejected Defendants' argument 
that Claimant is not limited by the 
residual effects of the subject accidents. While the FCE fi
ndings are not unchallenged by other 
evidence of record (see Findings of Fact, ,r,r 98-105), the Commission determined 
that the FCE is 
the least objectionable measure of Claimant's functional 
abilities and relied on it to evaluate 
Claimant's disability. Therefore, the Commission did exac
tly as Claimant asked. If Claimant's 
presentation at hearing was demonstrative of his discomf
ort and loss of functional ability, it 
seems that this additional information only reiterates the
 evidence the Commission accepted 
concerning Claimant's functional ability, and is therefor
e cumulative. Medical evidence is 
prefened as a guide to evaluating limitations/restrictions. 
Next, Claimant takes issue with the Commission's treatmen
t of Claimant's age, 65, as of 
the date of hearing. Claimant argues that the Commiss
ion's decision subverts conventional 
wisdom about the impact of age on disability. We disagree
. Idaho Code § 72-4 30 specifies that 
among the non-medical factors to be considered by the C
ommission in evaluating disability is 
Claimant's age. The statute does not direct us to award
 higher disability to older workers, 
although that is frequently the result. As directed by
 statute, the Commission did take 
Claimant's age into account and found, under the peculia
r facts of this case, that Claimant's 
status as an older worker, coupled with the likelihood of con
tinued employment with his time-of-
injury employer, supported lower disability than would be
 the case for a similarly situated 20-
year-old. We find no reason to revise our treatment of Clai
mant's age. Woody v. Seneca Foods, 
LC. 2010-012114 (2013) is inapposite. That case involv
ed an older injured worker who was 
unemployed at the time of hearing and without prospects. 
Next, Claimant charges that it was improper for the
 Commission to attach the 
significance it did to Claimant's current employment an
d annual income in evaluating his 
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disability. Claimant argues that the Commissio
n's consideration of Claimant's cu1Tent 
employment "punishes" Claimant for continuing to w
ork following the 2009 accident: 
It is respectfully submitted that the Commission's r
ationale as specifically set-
forth within its decision punishes Mr. Ayala for continuin
g to work following his 
October 6, 2009, and August 28, 2013, industrial 
accidents. Had Mr. Ayala 
terminated his employment after either of those event
s, he most likely would have 
been awarded the entirety of his permanent disability
 related to and resultant of 
injuries suffered therein, without reduction. 
Clt's Memorandum, p. 9-10. Therefore, the a
rgument goes, Claimant's post-accident 
employment denies him disability that he would other
wise have been entitled to, had he not gone 
back to work.
1 We reject this cynical argument as entirely inconsiste
nt with the purpose of our 
worker's compensation system. In this case, Clai
mant suffered two work-related accidents. 
Income and medical benefits were paid to Claima
nt, all for the purpose of supporting his 
recovery and return to gainful employment. This he d
id, and in his case, the system did what it is 
supposed to do. Claimant has hardly been punish
ed. We can think of no justification for 
ignoring Claimant's current ability to work at his 
time-of-injury job, since return to gainful 
activity is the aim of worker's compensation. 
The main argument offered by Claimant in suppmt of
 his Idaho Code§ 72-718 and Idaho 
Code§ 72-719 motions is his assertion that events oc
cutTing subsequent to the October 26, 2016 
hearing have invalidated one of the significant assum
ptions made by the Commission in an·iving 
at the determination that Claimant has 40% disability 
referable to the pre-existing back condition 
and the 2009 and 2013 accidents. As the underlying 
decision reflects, it was, indeed, significant 
to the Commission's decision that Claimant has pe
rformed his time-of-injury job, albeit with 
some modification, since the 2009 accident, exceptin
g those times when he has been in a period 
of recovery following his various surgeries. Claima
nt was so employed at the time of hearing, 
1 By dint of similar reasoning, any person who is empl
oyed is unfairly deprived of the unemployment insura
nce 
benefits he would get were he laid off. 
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and since 2009, he has enjoyed steady annual increase
s in compensation, such that by 2016 his 
annual income slightly exceeded $47,000. It was als
o significant to the Commission that 
Claimant's prospects for ongoing employment seem
ed reasonably secure; Morgan Meyers 
testified that Claimant was important, if not critical, 
to Employer's business. Based on past 
history, the Commission also entertained the possibil
ity that Claimant's annual income would 
increase, and that he would eventually retire from
 this job. Claimant argues that the 
Commission's assumption that Claimant's employmen
t would continue at the same or greater 
wage was central to the Commission's decision on disa
bility. However, the fact that Claimant is 
currently employed is far from the sole factor upon w
hich the Commission relied in evaluating 
Claimant's disability. Had it been the sole factor, we m
ight have adopted Defendant's argument 
on disability: Claimant's continuing employment, cou
pled with a significant increase in annual 
income since 2009, and the prospect for continued f
uture employment, augers in favor of a 
conclusion that Claimant has suffered no disability ov
er and above impairment. However, we 
did not adopt this argument, recognizing that we mus
t reconcile Claimant's seeming prospects 
for continued employment with the fact that he has s
uffered a significant disability should he 
ever lose his job. (See Findings of Fact, Conclusions o
f Law and Order at ,i,i 113-115). 
Pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-425, disability is a me
asure of Claimant's "present and 
probable future" ability to engage in gainful activit
y. Our finding that Claimant's current 
employment is likely to continue is assuredly impmian
t to our decision, but our award of a 40% 
disability necessarily reflects our recognition that cont
inuation of Claimant's employment is not 
assured. The Commission cannot predict the future, y
et the statute requires us to consider the 
impact of the 2009 and 2013 accidents on Claimant's p
robable future ability to engage in gainful 
activity. Our synthesis of Claimant's disability reco
gnizes that the future holds uncertainties 
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which we cannot know, including the circumstance
s of Claimant's future employment. The 40% 
disability figure we arrived at recognizes Claim
ant's significant loss of access to the labor 
market, and the fact that he has successfully cont
inued to work for Employer. Nothing in our 
decision signals that a different result would obtain
 should Claimant lose his current job. While 
the 40% rating is based on our perception that 
Claimant will continue in his time-of-injury 
employment, it also reflects our acknowledgemen
t that he may not. Otherwise, we might have 
awarded Claimant no disability above impailment
. That one of the possibilities we necessarily 
entertained has now come to pass does not pers
uade us to revisit our gestalt of Claimant's 
disability since that possibility is merged into the C
ommission's evaluation. 
Further, the affidavits provided by the parties 
leave us unable to understand why 
Claimant's income declined so precipitously in 20
17. Claimant specifically denies any increase 
in disability or limitation referable to the 2009 and
 2013 accidents. (See Claimant's Reply at pp. 
7 and 8). He does, however, argue that the June 7
, 2017 accident is responsible for a significant 
increase in Claimant's limitations/restrictions an
d may make it impossible for Claimant to 
continue in his employment. It is argued that this
 likelihood adds further support to Claimant's 
argument that the Commission erred when it based
 its evaluation of Claimant's disability on the 
likelihood that Claimant's employment would con
tinue. This argument seems nonsensical. If 
Claimant suffers income loss or loses his job becau
se of a new injury associated with an accident 
of June 7, 2017, this loss is part-and-parcel of a cla
im for disability referable to the new accident, 
not the 2009 and 2013 claims. While Claiman
t might lose his job because of additional 
limitations related to the June 7, 2017 accident, this
 does not prove that the Commission made an 
invalid assumption concerning the likelihood fo
r Claimant's continued employment. All it 
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proves ( or may prove) is that Claimant has an actionable c
laim for disability arising from a new 
accident/injury. 
Having addressed the broad arguments made by Claimant
 in suppo1t of his motions, we 
turn now to the specific arguments made by Claimant i
n connection with his motions made 
pursuant to Idaho Code§ 72-718, Idaho Code§ 72-719, and
 for consolidation. 
Motion for Reconsideration Under Idaho Code§ 72-71
8 
Claimant has filed a timely Motion for Reconsideration pur
suant to Idaho Code § 72-718. 
That section provides: 
A decision of the comm1ss10n, in the absence of frau
d, shall be final and 
conclusive as to all matters adjudicated by the commi
ssion upon filing the 
decision in the office of the commission; provided, within 
twenty (20) days from 
the date of filing the decision any party may move 
for reconsideration or 
rehearing of the decision, or the commission may rehear or
 reconsider its decision 
on its own initiative, and in any such events the decision sh
all be final upon denial 
of a motion for rehearing or reconsideration or the filin
g of the decision on 
rehearing or reconsideration. Final decisions may be app
ealed to the Supreme 
Comt as provided by section 72-724, Idaho Code. 
On reconsideration, the Commission will examine the evid
ence in the case and dete1mine 
whether the evidence presented supports the legal co
nclusions. The Commission is not 
compelled to make findings on the facts of the case dur
ing reconsideration. Davison v. Ii Ii 
Keim Co., Ltd., 110 Idaho 758, 718 P.2d 1196 (1986). The 
Commission may reverse its decision 
upon a motion for reconsideration, or rehearing of the
 decision in question, based on the 
arguments presented, or upon its own motion, provided
 that it acts within the time frame 
established in Idaho Code§ 72-718. See, Dennis v. School 
District No. 91, 135 Idaho 94, 15 P.3d 
329 (2000) (citing Kindred v. Amalgamated Sugar Co., 11
4 Idaho 284, 756 P.2d 410 (1988)). A 
motion for reconsideration must be properly supp01ted b
y a recitation of the factual findings 
and/or legal conclusions with which the moving party take
s issue. However, the Commission is 
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not inclined to re-weigh evidence and argum
ents during reconsideration simply because 
the case 
was not resolved in a party's favor. 
In this case, Claimant argues that facts arisi
ng subsequent to the date of hearing underc
ut 
the assumptions supporting the Commission
's decision and constitute new evidence of w
hich the 
Commission must consider on reconsiderat
ion. Defendants argue that in evaluating th
e Motion 
for Reconsideration, the Commission is lim
ited to consideration of evidence of record,
 not new 
evidence. Consistent with this position, D
efendants filed a Motion to Strike the Aff
idavit of 
Claimant, but against the chance that th
e Commission will entertain Claimant's 
affidavit, 
Defendants filed the Affidavit of Morgan M
eyers, which also makes factual ave1ments 
not in the 
cunent record. The statute is silent on the
 question of whether the Commission may
 consider 
new evidence, i.e., evidence that was not b
efore the Commission in connection with t
he earlier 
proceeding, in evaluating a motion for reco
nsideration. However, as Claimant has obs
erved, the 
Idaho Supreme Court does appear to have a
ddressed this issue. In Curtis v. MH. King
 Co., 142 
Idaho 383, 128 P.3d 920 (2005), claimant
 asserted that her avascular necrosis of the
 hip was 
attributable to a fall at work. Relying on the
 testimony of Dr. Rudd, the Commission de
termined 
that this condition was not causally related
 to claimant's accident. Claimant filed a m
otion for 
reconsideration pursuant to Idaho Code § 
72-718, which was denied by the Commis
sion. On 
appeal, the Court noted that although med
ical evidence was in conflict, Dr. Rudd's 
testimony 
constituted substantial and competent evide
nce supporting the Commission's decision. 
Claimant 
also argued that the Commission erred in 
denying her motion for reconsideration. T
he Court 
noted that Idaho Code § 72-718 authorize
s the party to request reconsideration, but
 does not 
require the Commission to grant such reque
st. The Court then stated: 
It is axiomatic that a claimant must pres
ent to the Commission new reasons 
factually and legally to support a
 hearing on her Motion for 
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Rehearing/Reconsideration rather than rehashi
ng evidence previously presented. 
Although Curtis presented a very detailed brie
f in support of her motion she did 
not produce new law or evidence to necessitate 
a rehearing or reconsideration. 
Id. at 388, 925. As noted by Claimant, this lang
uage suggests that to properly support a motio
n 
for reconsideration the moving party must p
resent to the Commission new facts or lega
l 
argument rather than ask the Commission to thi
nk some more about the facts and argument upo
n 
which the Commission originally relied in 
reaching its decision. Indeed, review of th
e 
Commission's Order denying reconsideration in
 Curtis reflects that Claimant did not rely on an
y 
new facts to support her motion for reconsid
eration. (See Order Denying Reconsideration
 at 
2004-IIC0735.l) (2004). 
The evidence that Claimant would have us cons
ider is not evidence that could reasonably 
have been adduced at hearing. The facts that
 Claimant would have us consider are new fa
cts 
which came into existence following the h
earing, and therefore could not and were n
ot 
considered by the Commission. In other rec
ent cases we have considered such evidence 
in 
connection with a motion for reconsideration. 
(See Strope v. Kootenai Medical Ctr, Inc., 201
6 
IIC0046.1 ). In Strope, one of claimant's argum
ents at hearing was that claimant was entitled to
 a 
new MRI which it was thought might reveal t
hat she was entitled to further medical treatme
nt. 
The Commission ruled in defendants' favor, fin
ding that claimant had not proven her entitleme
nt 
to such a study. Following the Commission's 
decision, claimant obtained the study at her ow
n 
expense, and urged the Commission to reconsi
der its decision, arguing that the study did reve
al 
that she suffered from a work-related conditi
on requiring additional care. The Commissi
on 
found this argument persuasive and granted cla
imant's motion for reconsideration upon the ba
sis 
of new evidence. Accordingly, we agree tha
t it is not inappropriate for the Commission 
to 
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consider the affidavits of Claimant and Mr. Meyers in co
nnection with Claimant's Motion for 
Reconsideration and we deny Defendants' Motion to Strike
 Claimant's Affidavit. 
However, as explained above, we do not find Claimant's
 arguments, in particular, his 
arguments involving events occutTing subsequent to the d
ate of hearing, to be persuasive. We 
continue to be satisfied with our analysis of Claimant's dis
ability based on the evidence that was 
before us. Our deliberations on the issue of disability in
cluded consideration of a number of 
"what-ifs," including the fact that Claimant might not rema
in in his time-of-injuty job to the date 
of his eventual retirement. Therefore, we deny Claiman
t's Motion for Reconsideration under 
Idaho Code§ 72-718. 
Motion to Correct a Manifest Injustice under Idaho Cod
e§ 72-719 
Idaho Code § 72-719(3) provides: 
The commission, on its own motion at any time within fiv
e (5) years of the date 
of the accident causing the injuty or date of first manifesta
tion of an occupational 
disease, may review a case in order to correct a manifest inj
ustice. 
While the plain language of the statute specifies that it com
es on the Commission's own motion, 
' this fact does not preclude the Commission from exercisin
g its powers when notice of a 
purported manifest injustice is brought to its attention by a 
party. Banzhaf v. Carnation Co., l 04 
Idaho 700, 662 P.2d 1144 (1983). As grounds for reop
ening and review of an order of the 
Commission the term "manifest injustice," must be give
n broad construction to advance the 
humane purposes of the Act. Sines v. Appel, 103 Idaho
 9, 644 P.2d 331 (1982). As to the 
meaning of the term, the Sines Court stated: 
"Manifest" has been defined to mean: capable of being
 easily understood or 
recognized at once by the mind; not obscure; obvious. 
Webster's Third New 
International Dictionary, 1967. "Injustice" has been define
d to mean: absence of 
justice; violation of right or of the rights of another; iniquit
y, unfairness; an unjust 
act or deed; wrong. Webster's Third New International Dic
tionary, 1967. 
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In Page v. McCain Foods, Inc., 145 Idaho 302, 179 P .3d 265 
(2008), the Commission 
determined that Claimant reached a point o_f medical stability from
 the effects of a knee injury on 
November 26, 2001. This decision was based on a note from C
laimant's physician. Claimant 
was scheduled to see her physician on November 26, 2001
, but was a no-show for the 
appointment. The physician concluded that claimant must hav
e been getting along well and 
pronounced her medically stable. This was the only evidence 
the Commission relied upon to 
define Claimant's date of medical stability. 
Subsequent to the issuance of the Commission's decision, c
laimant filed a motion 
pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-719(3), urging the Commission 
to reopen the case to correct a 
manifest injustice. Claimant suppotied her motion with a letter
 written by Dr. Peterson stating 
that he had not examined claimant on November 26, 2001, but 
that he had since examined her 
and determined that she was not medically stable and was 
in need of further care. The 
Commission denied the motion to reopen the case, ruling that D
r. Peterson's letter presented an 
insufficient factual basis upon which to reopen and review the 
case. On appeal, the Supreme 
Cami noted that the only evidence upon which the Commission r
elied in defining claimant's date 
of medical stability was Dr. Peterson's November 26, 2001 chai
i note. The Cami further noted 
that the unrebutted evidence established that Dr. Peterson did no
t actually examine claimant on 
that date. Dr. Peterson's subsequent letter entirely underm
ined his eai·lier statement and 
established that claimant was not medically stable and was in n
eed of further care. Therefore, 
the only evidence upon which the Commission relied in establis
hing claimant's date of medical 
stability was demonstrated to be invalid. Clearly, the Cami reas
oned, this is an adequate factual 
basis upon which to reopen the case to revisit the finding of me
dical stability. To do otherwise 
would be unjust. 




In this case, Claimant appears to state three bases for reopening of th
e case in order to 
correct a manifest injustice. First, as above noted, the Commissio
n considered Claimant's 
testimony concerning his subjective limitations and discomfort. It is
 argued by Claimant that 
had the Commission actually observed Claimant at hearing, we might h
ave been more inclined to 
give greater weight to his recitation of his residual functional abilities
. However, as explained 
above, we have accepted the FCE findings, which Claimant urged 
us to adopt, as the best 
analysis of Claimant's residual functional capacity. Whatever addit
ional insights might have 
been obtained by watching the Claimant as he sat or walked about the
 hearing room are largely 
reiterative and cumulative. We decline to entertain Claimant's invitat
ion to reopen the case for 
further review on this basis. 
Next, Claimant appears to suggest that because he suffered a n
ew June 7, 2017 
accident/injury which implicates further and more onerous restrictions 
on his ability to engage in 
gainful activity, the Commission's decision must be reopened to allo
w consideration of these 
new facts in assessing Claimant's disability. We reject this, too, as a 
reason to reopen the April 
9, 2018 decision to conect a manifest injustice. Simply, the June 7, 
2017 accident/injury, if it 
did occur, is not pati of this proceeding. It is separately actionable an
d, as explained below, we 
decline to consolidate it with the 2009 and 2013 claims. 
Finally, Claimant argues that to avoid a manifest injustice the record m
ust be reopened to 
allow consideration of Claimant's changed circumstances, i.e., his 201
7 earnings, which reflects 
a significant decrease, as compared to his 2016 earnings. Setting asi
de the possibility that this 
decrease is attributable to a separately actionable 2017 accident/injury,
 we conclude that it is not 
unjust to decline to consider this change in circumstance in evaluating
 Claimant's disability. As 
explained above, our evaluation of disability is a synthesis of Clai
mant's significant loss of 




access to the labor market and the fact of his co
ntinued employment. Bill Jordan speculated th
at 
if Claimant ever lost his job, his disability wou
ld be in the range of 4 7%. Claimant has not lo
st 
his job, yet the Commission nevertheless made 
an award of 40% disability to balance Claiman
t's 
labor market access loss against the fact of h
is continuing employment. Simply, our analys
is 
contemplates the possibility that Claimant's cir
cumstances might change in the future. That th
ey 
did does not undermine our analysis. This case
 is not like Page. Claimant's current job and h
is 
2016 income were far from the sole factors
 we relied on in making our determination 
of 
Claimant's disability. 
Based on the foregoing, we deny Claimant's Ida
ho Code § 72-719(3) motion. 
Motion for Modification Pursuant to Chang
e in Condition 
Claimant's motion for modification made pur
suant to Idaho Code § 72-719(l)(a) was 
made contemporaneous with his motion for rec
onsideration. Idaho Code § 72-718 specifies th
at 
the Commission's decision of April 9, 2018 i
s final and conclusive as to matters adjudicat
ed 
therein unless a timely motion for reconsiderat
ion is filed, as it was in this case. Idaho Code
 § 
72-719(1) authorizes the reopening of a "final 
and conclusive" award in certain circumstance
s. 
Fowler v. City of Rexburg, 116 Idaho 1, 773 
P.2d 269 (1988). At the time Claimant filed h
is 
Idaho Code § 72-719 motion, the April 9, 2018
 decision was not final and conclusive, owing 
to 
Claimant's contemporaneous motion for reco
nsideration pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-71
8. 
However, having denied Claimant's Motion 
for Reconsideration and Motion to Con-ect 
a 
Manifest Injustice, the April 9, 2017 decision o
f the Commission is now final and conclusive a
s 
anticipated by Idaho Code § 72-718. Therefo
re, we accept Claimant's invitation to conside
r 
whether the case should be reopened to addres
s a change in condition. Idaho Code§ 72-719
(1) 
provides: 
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72-719. Modification of awards and agreements - Grounds - Tim
e within 
which made. - (1) On application made by a party in interest filed 
with the 
commission at any time within five ( 5) years of the date of the accid
ent causing 
the injury or date of first manifestation of an occupational disease, on
 the ground 
of a change in conditions, the commission may, but not oftener than
 once in six 
(6) months, review any order, agreement or award upon any of th
e following 
grounds: 
(a) Change in the nature or extent of the employee's injury or disablem
ent; and 
(b) Fraud. 
Therefore, a case may be reopened to review an award on the ground
s of a change in the nature 
of the employee's injury or disablement. Claimant concedes that there
 has been no change in the 
extent or degree or Claimant's impairment since date of hearing: 
Claimant's Idaho Code § 72-719 motions are not premised upon any
 argument 
that claimant's impairment has increased since the date of hearing he
rein, related 
to the 2009 and/or 2013 injuries ..... 
(Claimant's Reply to Defendants' Opposition to Claimant's Post-Decis
ion Motions at p.7) 
Rather, Claimant argues that his condition has changed because of a c
hange in the circumstances 
of his employment, and that Idaho Code § 72-719 provides that
 such a change warrants 
reopening of the case because it may reflect a change in Claimant's "d
isablement": 
Rather, counsel notes that Idaho Code § 72-719(l)(a) sets forth as
 alternative 
grounds, either a change in the nature or extent of employee's injur
y, meaning 
impairment, or, in the disjunctive, disablement. ... 
(Claimant's Reply to Defendants' Opposition to Claimant's Post-Decis
ions Motions at p.7) 
Therefore, the argument is that because the ground for reopening fo
r change in condition are 
stated in the disjunctive, a petition for change in condition may be jus
tified where there is either 
a change in the nature and extent of Claimant's impairment, or a chan
ge in the nature and extent 
of his disability, owing to some non-medical circumstance, in this c
ase, Claimant's significant 
2017 decrease in earnings. For the reasons set fmth below, we con
clude that Claimant must 
demonstrate a change in the nature and extent of his physical injur
y in order to successfully 
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pursue a petition for change in condition under Idaho Co
de § 72-719(1)(a), and that such a 
petition cannot be pursued upon a showing of some cha
nge in a non-medical factor, alone. 
Essentially, Claimant's argument is that because a petition
 for change in condition may 
be pursued when there has been a change in Claimant'
s "disablement," the statute clearly 
anticipates that such a petition may be pursued where there 
has been a change in one of the non-
medical factors relied on by the Commission to assess "di
sability." Necessarily, this argument 
pre-supposes that "disablement" as used in the statute is the
 equivalent of "disability" as defined 
and evaluated at Idaho Code § 72-423, § 72-425, and § 72-4
30. Had the legislature intended that 
a petition for change in condition could be supported by a sh
owing of a change in one of the non-
medical factors central to the determination of "disabil
ity," it could have unambiguously 
signaled this intent by using that term in Idaho Code § 72
-719( 1 )(a). Instead, the legislature 
chose to use another term: "disablement." Disablement is a 
concept central to the compensability 
of occupational disease claims. Idaho Code § 72-102(22)( c)
 defines disablement as follows: 
"Disablement," except in the case of silicosis, means the ev
ent of an employee's 
becoming actually and totally incapacitated because of an
 occupational disease 
from performing his work in the last occupation in which i
njuriously exposed to 
the hazards of such disease; and "disability" means th
e state of being so 
incapacitated. 
A claim for occupational disease anses when a worker 
is incapacitated, i.e. disabled, from 
perfo1ming his work in the last occupation in which he was 
injuriously exposed to the hazards of 
his disease. See Idaho Code § 72-437. "Disablement," 
in this sense, represents a physical 
inability to work at the time of injury job, caused by the h
azards of that job. It does not have 
anything to do with the nonmedical factors enumerated at Id
aho Code§ 72-430. The nonmedical 
factors implicated in evaluating "disability" are not 
at issue when assessing whether 
"disablement" has occurred, i.e. whether a claimant is phy
sically incapable of performing the 
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time of injury job. The legislature's choice of "disable
ment" versus "disability" in Idaho Code § 
72-719(1)(a) lends no support to Claimant's argument
 that a change in one of the non-medical 
factors relevant to the original evaluation of claimant's 
disability watTants reopening of the claim 
for a change in condition. It seems just as likely tha
t the disjunctive language of the statute 
simply reflects the fact that petitions for change 
in condition can be brought in both 
accident/injury and occupational disease claims, but o
nly where there has been a change in the 
nature of the physical condition of the injured worker. 
Case law also supports the conclusion that it is only fo
r changes in the extent and degree 
of an injured worker's physical condition that a petition
 for change in condition may be pursued. 
In Magee v. Thompson Creek Mining Co., 152 Ida
ho 196, 268 P.3d 464 (2011), claimant 
suffered a work-related injury to his low back in 20
02. His injuries resulted in permanent 
complaints of chronic pain. In a 2004 decision, th
e Commission found that Claimant had 
suffered permanent impairment and disability as a con
sequence of the accident. Claimant later 
filed a Petition for Change in Condition, arguing th
at the Commission's decision should be 
modified because of a change in Claimant's conditio
n. A second hearing was held and the 
Commission ruled that Claimant had failed to prove th
at a change in his condition had occutTed 
since the original hearing. Further, the Commission rn
led that Claimant had failed to prove that 
it would be manifestly unjust for the Commission to c
ontinue to abide by its original decision. 
The evidence established that at the time of the or
iginal 2000 injury, Claimant resided in 
Cascade, Montana, a town with a population of about 2
000 people. As of the date of hearing on 
the Petition for Change in Condition, Claimant reside
d in Radersburg, Montana, a town with a 
population of around 150 people. In co1111ection wi
th the Petition for Change in Condition 
Claimant acknowledged that his physical condition was
 about the same as it had been at the time 
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of the original hearing. However, there was also ev
idence that Claimant had been diagnosed 
with a major depressive disorder since the original hea
ring, which had been attributed to the May 
2000 industrial injmy. Fmther, since the origina
l hearing, Claimant had undergone the 
implantation of a dorsal column stimulator in an effo1t
 to diminish Claimant's chronic pain. This 
evidently offered Claimant some relief. At hearing 
on the Petition for Change of Condition, 
Claimant also put on the testimony of a vocational
 rehabilitation specialist who opined that 
Claimant was totally and permanently disabled, but
 it was also noted that this opinion was 
delivered in the context of his very small labor marke
t in Radersburg, Montana. The vocational 
expe1t acknowledged that a larger labor market migh
t provide better employment opportunities 
for Claimant. 
The Commission denied the Petition for Change of C
ondition, concluding that Claimant 
had failed to adduce evidence showing that a ch
ange in condition had occurred. The 
Commission also denied Claimant's Motion to Co1Tec
t a Manifest Injustice. Claimant appealed, 
arguing that the Commission erred in determining tha
t Claimant had failed to establish a change 
in condition. 
Concerning Idaho Code § 72-719(1), the Comt ackn
owledged the disjunctive nature of 
Idaho Code § 72-719(1)(a), yet concluded that in o
rder to pursue a Petition for Change of 
Condition under this section, Claimant must neve1the
less demonstrate a change in the nature or 
extent of his impairment: 
Magee asse1ts that he sustained a change in conditi
on pursuant to Idaho Code 
section 72-719(a). The statute allows the Commission
 to modify an award if there 
is a "[c]hange in the nature or extent of the employ
ee's injury or disablement." 
I. C. § 72-719(1 )(a). When a claimant applies for modificat
ion of an award due to 
a change in condition under I.C. § 72-719(a), the cl
aimant bears the burden of 
showing a change in condition. Matthews v. Dep't of
 Corr., 121 Idaho 680, 681, 
827 P.2d 693, 694 (1992) (citing Boshers v. Payne, 
58 Idaho 109, 70 P.2d 391 
(1937)). The claimant is "required to make a showing 
before the Commission that 
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he had an increased level of impairment, and to establ
ish with reasonable medical 
probability the existence of a causal relationship betw
een the change in condition 
and the initial accident and injury." Matthews, 121 
Idaho at 681-82, 827 P.2d 
694-95 (internal citations omitted). 
Id Arguably, Magee did experience a significant cha
nge in the non-medical factors considered 
by the Commission in reaching its original decision on
 disability. By the time of the Petition for 
Rehearing, Claimant had moved from a town of2000 
to a town of 150, a move which, according 
to Claimant's vocational expert, dramatically increa
sed his disability. Yet the Court did not 
consider this fact in evaluating the Petition for Change
 of Condition pursuant to the provisions of 
Idaho Code§ 72-719(l)(a), concluding that since Cl
aimant had failed to adduce evidence of a 
change in the nature or extent of his impai1ment, there
 the inquiry stops. 
Cited with approval by the Magee Court is the case o
f Matthews v. Dept. of Corrections, 
121 Idaho 680, 827 P.2d 693 (1992). Matthews s
uffered a low back injury in 1985. He 
underwent surgery and was eventually given a 20% im
pairment rating. Thereafter, claimant and 
surety executed a compensation agreement pursuant to
 the terms of which the claim for disability 
was resolved by the payment of $15,895, the amoun
t of his impairment rating. Some months 
later, claimant alleged a change in his condition and r
equested that the Commission increase his 
disability award. He also filed an Idaho Code§ 72-71
9(3) motion to con-ect a manifest injustice. 
His argument was based on his assertion that his low
 back injury made it impossible for him to 
re-enter the Army National Guard, and that this resul
ted in significant additional loss of wages 
and future retirement benefits. 
In connection with the petition for change of conditio
n under Idaho Code§ 72-719(1)(a) 
the Court stated that to support such a petition, the cla
imant must prove an increase in the extent 
or degree of impairment: 
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As the Commission noted, when a claimant applies 
for a modification of an award 
under LC. Section 72-719, he or she bears the bu
rden of showing a change in 
condition. Boshors v. Payne, 58 Idaho 109, 70 P.2
d 391 (1937). Matthews was 
required to make a showing before the Commission
 that he had an increased level 
of impairment, Urry v. Walker & Fox Masomy Co
ntractors, 115 Idaho 750, 769 
P.2d 1122 (1989), and to establish with reason
able medical probability the 
existence of a causal relationship between the chan
ge in condition and the initial 
accident and injury. Carter v. Garrett Freightlines,
 105 Idaho 59, 665 P.2d 1069 
(1983). 
As in Magee, the Court had before it, facts which
 arguably supported a change in the 
level of claimant's disability; new facts before the 
Commission suggested that claimant's 1985 
injury was more limiting than initially found owing
 to its effect on claimant's designs upon re-
entering the National Guard. Even so, the Idaho C
ode§ 72-719(1)(a) issue was resolved by the 
Court's affirmation of the Commission's conclusion
 that claimant had failed to adduce evidence 
of a change in the nature or extent of his physical i
njury. See also Ivie v. Daw Forest Products, 
1998 IIC 1253 (1998). 
The Court's construction of Idaho Code§ 72-719(l
)(a) makes perfect sense. Otherwise, 
any time someone lost a job, got a job, got his GED
, flunked out of school, got a raise, refused to 
cross a picket line, moved to another labor marke
t, lost access to daycare, got older, etc., the 
Commission might be faced with a petition to c
hange a previous disability award because 
somebody's circumstances had changed. In other w
ords, anytime claimant's earnings increased 
or decreased for reasons unconnected with the exte
nt and degree of the work-related injury, the 
Commission could be faced with a petition to re
open the case. This is clearly not what is 
intended, particularly in view of the charge of 
Idaho Code § 72-423 which obligates the 
Commission to evaluate Claimant's present and p
robable future ability to engage in gainful 
activity as of the date of hearing. This necessarily
 requires the Commission to consider how 
Claimant's future disability may be impacted by t
hings that may or may not happen. We are 
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obligated to make this judgment once, and it would place an und
ue burden on the administration 
of the worker's compensation system to continually revise d
isability assessments based on 
Claimant's changing circumstances. 
Since Claimant concedes that his Idaho Code§ 72-719(l)(a) m
otion is not premised on 
any change in the nature or extent of his physical injuries related
 to the 2009 and 2013 accidents, 
we deny his Petition for Change in Condition under that section. 
Motion for Consolidation 
In the alternative, Claimant urges the Commission to withd
raw the April 9, 2018 
decision, consolidate the 2009, 2013, and 2017 complaints for 
hearing, and rehear the case so 
that Defendants may be held responsible for the entirety of the d
isability referable to Claimant's 
employment, and so that Defendants will be prevented from 
shifting responsibility for some 
po1tion of Claimant's disability to the Industrial Special Indemn
ity Fund. We decline to do this 
for several reasons. 
First, it is unclear to us why consolidation will assure that Emplo
yer/Surety will pay what 
it should, but that a refusal to consolidate will not. Employer's
 liability for the 2009 and 2013 
accidents has been decided by the Commission. If Claimant beli
eves that he is entitled to further 
benefits by reason of the 2017 accident, he may pursue his claim
. Consolidation or no, Employer 
will be held responsible for the payment of worker's comp
ensation benefits owed as a 
consequence of the subject accidents. 
In a case of total and permanent disability, the ISIF may be 
held responsible for that 
pmtion of an injured worker's total and permanent disability
 caused by impainnents which 
predate the last accident. Sometimes these pre-existing impairme
nts are work related, sometimes 
they are not. The distinction is unimpo1tant in evaluating the ISI
F's liability. 
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Finally, there is the matter of timing. Claimant's third accident 
allegedly occurred on or 
about June 7, 2017. It appears that Claimant's left knee conditio
n following that accident was of 
sufficient seriousness to require surgical treatment, although
 we have no way of knowing 
whether the accident is responsible for that need for treatment. 
Had Claimant been sufficiently 
concerned that the June 7, 2017 accident changed the lay of the
 land, he had ample time within 
which to alert the Commission to his concerns, and to request 
action of some type prior to the 
issuance of the April 9, 2018 decision. Instead, the parties
 and the Commission devoted 
considerable effort to hearing and deciding the claims as present
ed. That Claimant may not have 
expected the decision to go the way it did is no defense to sitting
 on his hands. 
We DENY the Motion to Consolidate. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER 
Having reviewed the affidavits and arguments of the parties on
 Claimant's motions, we 
hereby enter the following Order. 
1. Claimant's Motion for Reconsideration is denied. 
2. Claimant's Motion to Conect a Manifest Injustice Pursu
ant to Idaho Code § 72-
719(3) is denied. 
3. Claimant's Motion for Change in Condition Pursuant to
 the Provisions of Idaho 
Code§ 72-719(1)(a) is denied. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
DATED this ,;;J2rd,,day of~ IJ <? ✓ , 2018. 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the ?Jf\.lNl!ay of ~llil , , 2018
, a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing ORDER ON MOTION FOR 
RECONSIDERATION, 
MODIFICATION, AND CONSOLIDATION was served by regular 
United States Mail upon 
each of the following: 
L, CL YEL BERRY 
PO BOX 302 
TWIN FALLS ID 83303 
PAUL J, AUGUSTINE 
PO BOX 1521 
BOISE ID 83701 
esl 
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STEPHAN, KV ANVIG, STONE & TRAINOR 
L. Clyel Berry - ISB # 1897 
P. 0. Box 83 
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ROBERT J. MEYERS FARMS, INC., 
Employer, 
and 
STATE INSURANCE FUND, 
Surety, 
Defendants/Respondents. 
LC. No. 2001-520958 
LC. No. 2009-029533 
LC. No. 2013-024075 





TO: The above-named Respondents, Robert J. Meyers Farms, Inc. and State
 Insurance Fund, and 
their counsel, Paul J. Augustine, Augustine Law Offices, PLLC, P.O. Box 
1521, Boise, 
Idaho, 83701, and the Clerk of the above-entitled Industrial Commissio
n of the State of 
Idaho. 
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NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
1. The above-named Appellant, Mario Ayala, appeals against the above
-named 
Respondents to the Idaho Supreme Court from that Order on Motion f
or 
Reconsideration, Modification, and Consolidation, dated and filed June 22, 201
8, 
together with that Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order, dated a
nd 
filed April 9, 2018, each entered ofrecord in the above-entitled proceeding, Thom
as 
E. Limbaugh, Chairman, presiding. A copy of said Orders being appealed a
re 
attached to the Notice. 
2. That the party has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and 
the orders 
described in paragraph 1 above are appealable orders pursuant to Rule l l(d)I.A.
R. 
3. Preliminary statement of issues on appeal: 
(a) Did the conduct of the Idaho State Industrial Commission in reassigning t
he 
claim from the Referee, Mr. Michael Powers, to the Commission following 
hearing involving testimony presided over by Mr. Powers; the taking of post-
hearing depositions by the respective parties; the filing of the parties' 
respective post-hearing briefs; and, the submission of the claim for 
determination but prior to Mr. Powers having opportunity to issue his 
proposed Findings ofFact, Conclusions ofLaw, and Recommendation and/or 
submit the same to the Commission over the written objection of 
Claimant/ Appellant, constitute error herein? 
(1) Was said conduct by the Commission in excess of the Commission's 
jurisdiction, power and/or authority? 
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(2) Was said conduct by the Commission arbitrary and capricious so as 
to constitute an abuse of its discretion? 
(3) Whether said conduct by the Commission without properly enacted 
regulations and/or guidelines in violation of the Due Process Clauses 
of the United States and Idaho Constitutions? 
(b) Whether it was error for the Commission to consider matters ( certain of 
Claimant's medical records) which were not admitted of record, but which 
had been, in fact, specifically excluded by the January 10, 2017, Order on 
Claimant's Motion to Strike; Amended Order Regarding Hearing Exhibits, 
ofrecord herein? 
( c) Did the Commission err in its determination that Claimant's low back 
presentment from and following the October 6, 2009, industrial motor vehicle 
accident was not compensable as a result and/or consequence thereof? 
( d) Whether Claimant's I. C. § § 72-718 and 72-719 Motions for Reconsideration; 
to Reopen; for Modification of Award Upon Consideration of a Change in the 
Nature or Extent of Claimant's Disablement and/or to Correct a Manifest 
Injustice; and, for Consolidation, together with the Supporting Affidavit of 
Claimant, Mario Ayala, inclusive of the attachments thereto, each dated April 
27, 2018, in conjunction with the record then before the Commission, present 
a sufficient factual basis to warrant review by the Commission such that the 
Commission's denial thereof was an abuse of discretion? 
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(1) Whether the Commission erred in concluding tha
t an LC. § 72-
719(1)(a) Motion required demonstration ofa change in th
e nature 
and extent of Claimant's physical injury as a condition p
recedent 
thereof? 
( e) Whether the Commission's findings, rationale and/o
r determinations within 
the Orders appealed from, to the extent adverse to Appell
ant herein, were 
erroneous as a matter of law; supported by substantial 
and competent 
evidence of record; set-forth specific findings necessary a
nd required for 
meaningful appellate review; were arbitrary, capricious, an
d/or the product 
of abuse of discretion; or, whether relevant thereto, the Comm
ission failed to 
make proper application oflawto the evidence and/or facts 
ofrecord herein, 
in reaching the same? 
(f) Whether, pursuant to Idaho Code§ 72-804 and/or Ru
le 41, I.AR., Claimant 
is entitled to reasonable attorney fees on appeal herein. 
4. No order has been entered sealing any portion of the
 record. 
5. The reporter's transcript is requested of the October
 26, 2016, hearing, inclusive of 
the pre-hearing colloquially between counsel and Referee P
owers; the testimony of 
Claimant, Mario Ayala; the testimony of Mr. Morgan Meyer
s; and, the post-hearing 
colloquially between Referee Powers and counsel. Appellan
t hereby requests a hard 
copy of said transcript. 
6. Appellant requests the following documents to be in
cluded in the agency's record in 
addition to those automatically included under Rule 28, LA
.R.: 
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(a) Claimant's Rule 10 Submission of Exhibits. 
(1) Claimant's Motion for Clarification of Order Regarding
 Exhibits, 
dated November 22, 2016. 
(2) Defendants' Response to Claimant's Motion for Clarificatio
n of Order 
Regarding Hearing Exhibits, dated December 3, 2016. 
(3) Claimant's Objection; Motion to Strike; and, Reply to D
efendants' 
Response to Claimant's Motion for Clarification of Order Regardi
ng 
Hearing Exhibits, dated January 3, 2017. 
(4) Order on Claimant's Motion to Strike; Amended Order 
Regarding 
Hearing Exhibits, dated and filed January 10, 2017. 
(b) Transcript of pre-hearing deposition of Claimant, Ma
rio Ayala, taken 
November 10, 2015, together with Change Sheet and any exhibit
s thereto. 
(c) Transcript of post-hearing deposition of Richard John H
ammond, M.D., 
taken December 16, 2016, inclusive of exhibits. 
(d) Transcript of post-hearing deposition of Paul J. Montalb
ano, M.D., taken 
April 26, 2017, inclusive of exhibits. 
( e) Transcript of post-hearing deposition of Nancy J. Collins, 
Ph.D., taken June 
20, 2017, inclusive of exhibits. 
(f) Transcript of post-hearing deposition of William C. Jorda
n, taken June 20, 
2017, together with Change Sheet thereto and any exhibits. 
(g) The parties' respective post-hearing briefs, being: 
(1) Claimant's Post-Hearing Opening Brief, dated September
 28, 2017; 
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(2) Defendants' Post-Hearing Brief, dated October 23, 2017; 
(3) Claimant's Post-Hearing Reply Brief, dated November 1, 2017. 
(h) That January 3, 2018, correspondence from the Commission to counsel, 
inquiring whether the parties were willing for the Commissioners to issue a 
decision on the record adduced, to expedite the same in light of Referee 
Powers having a backlog of cases. 
(1) Correspondence to the Commission from Clyel Berry, as counsel for 
Claimant herein, dated January 11, 2018, advising the Commission 
that in light of the importance of Claimant's observational credibility 
as consideration in the matter, that Claimant and his counsel were 
willing to wait for Mr. Powers' Recommendation. 
(2) Any correspondence from counsel for Defendants, Mr. Augustine, 
responsive to the Commission's January 3, 2018, correspondence to 
counsel. 
7. I certify: 
(a) That a copy of this Notice of Appeal has been served on each reporter of 
whom a transcript has been requested as named below at the address set out 
below: 
M. Dean Willis 
c/o M.D. Willis, Inc. 
Certified Shorthand Reporters 
P.O. Box 1241 
Eagle, ID 83616 
(b) That the estimated fee for preparation of the Agency's Record has been paid. 
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( c) That the Appellant filing fee has been paid. 
(d) That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant 
to Rule 20. 




L. Clyel Be 
Attorney for Claimant/ Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
,.. ,/ I hereby certify that I am a resident attorney of the State of Idaho and that on the 
.oCJ__ day of July, 2018, I served a copy of the foregoing document by depositing a true copy 
thereof in the United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to the following: 
Paul J. Augustine 
AUGUSTINE LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
P.O. Box 1521 
Boise, ID 83701 








ROBERT J. MEYERS FARMS, INC., 
Employer, 
and 











JUN 2 2 2018 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
In its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order. dated April 9, 2018, the 
Commission detennined, inter alia, that Claimant has proven disability of .40% of the whole 
person, inclusive of disability referable to the accidents of 2009, 2013, and Claimant's non-work 
related low back condition. Defendants failed to adduce evidence sufficient to allow the 
Commission to apportion disability pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-406 and, accordingly, 
Defendants were found responsible for the entirety of Claimant's 40% disability. In a separate 
Order issued contemporaneously herewith, the Commission has determined that Claimant's 40% 
disability is payable at 2013 rates. 
On or about April 30, 2018, Claimant filed his Motions for Reconsideration, 
Modification, and Consolidation, supported by the April 30, 2018 Affidavit of Claimant. That 
affidavit reflects that Claimant earned $47,690 in income for 2016, but only $27,500 in 2017. 
Claimant also avers that while. he was paid a monthly salary at the time of hearing, he is 
currently paid on an hourly basis, with his hourly wage being approximately the same as his two 
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subordinates. The affidavit further reflects that on or about June 7, 2017, Claimant suffered a 
work-related injury to his left knee for which he has received arthroscopic surgery by Dr. 
Johnson, the same physician who perfo1med the right knee arthroplasty arising from the 2013 
right lmee injury. From Claimant's affidavit, it further appears that Dr. Johnson has 
recommended that Claimant requires left knee replacement. That surgery has not taken place 
and the affidavit suggests that Surety has declined to authorize this treatment. Exhibit C to 
Claimant's affidavit is a brief report from Dr. Johnson. It reflects that Claimant carries a 
diagnosis of degenerative joint disease and a torn meniscus. It further reflects Dr. Johnson's 
opinion that Claimant requires a left total knee replacement, suggesting that Dr. Johnson is of the 
view that Claimant is not yet at a point of n:i,edical stability. Somewhat paradoxically, he then 
suggests that if worker's compensation will not cover the recommended total lmee replacement, 
Claimant may be considered to be at maximnm medical improvement, with ce1iain delineated 
impairment and permanent restrictions, restrictions which may be m?re onerons than those at 
issue in this proceeding. 
In opposition to Claimant's motions, Defendants have offered the Affidavit of Morgan 
Meyers of Robe1i J. Meyers Farms, Inc. That affidavit reflects that in the 2017 calendar year, 
Claimant was paid his "normal wages." However, Claimant did not receive an annual bonus in 
2017, and according to Mr. Meyers, thi~ explains why his total compensation in 2017 was 
significantly less than his 2016 income. ,The affidavit further reflects that the decision not to 
offer a bonus in 2017 applied to all employees and that insofar as this decision applied to 
Claimant, it had nothing to do with Claimant's job performance. Mr. Meyers' affidavit implies 
that Claimant's compensation scheme, except for the payment of the 2017 bonus, was unchanged 
from prior years. This contradicts Claimant's affidavit which reflects that in 2017 Claimant went 
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from a monthly salary to an hourly wage. However, Claimant's affidavit does not reflect that 
this change in the method of compensation resulted in a pay reduction. Claimant argues that the 
approximate $20,000 reduction in income he suffered in 2017 cannot be explained solely by 
Employer's decision not to award a bonus for 2017, the implication being that some part of 
Claimant's decrease in compensation must be attributable to a decrease in his monthly income. 
However, Claimant, who should know, does not make this averment in his affidavit. 
Morgan Meyers' affidavit does not explain why Meyers Farms employees, including 
Claimant, were not paid an annual bonus for 2017. Claimant's affidavit does not explain why he 
was switched from a monthly salary to an hourly wage in 2017. Nor does Claimant's affidavit 
explain why Claimant's income was reduced significantly in 2017; it may be that Claimant's 
income Joss is related to new injuries he sustained in 2017. The affidavits are potentially in 
conflict depending on what is meant by Morgan Meyers' use of the term "normal wages" at~ 2 
of this affidavit. However, both affidavits seem to support the proposition that Claimant's 2017 
income is approximately $20,000 lower than his 2016 annual income. 
In support of his motions, Claimant argues that the accident of June 7, 2017 and 
Claimant's demonstrated income reduction for 2017 constitute new evidence which warrants 
review of the Commission's April 9, 2018 Order pursuant to Idaho Code§ 72-718 and/or Idaho 
Code§ 72-719. As a fallback position, Claimant urges the Commission to consolidate the 2009 
and 2013 claims with the new 2017 claim. 
Claimant first takes issue with the Commission's decision to issue its own Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order without the benefit of having observed Claimant at hearing. 
As we have explained, the Commission's election to write the April 9, 2018 decision was not 
lightly made. However, our obligation to manage our docket to issue timely decisions informed 
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our judgment. We are, of course, sensitive to the fact that not having observed Claimant at 
hearing, we are unable to make any finding as to Claimant's observational credibility. However, 
we are just as competent as the Referee who heard the matter to compare Claimant's testimony 
to other testimony and evidence of record to make substantive credibility determinations. For 
example, as explained in the April 9, 2018 decision, we found Claimant's testimony that he has 
experienced significant and unremitting low back pain ever since the October 6, 2009 accident to 
be incredible as compared to other testimony and evidence of record. This finding was important 
to the Commission's detennination that Claimant's low back condition is not causally related to 
the subject accident. 
Claimant also testified at hearing to his subjective pain and functional loss stemming 
from his various injuries/conditions. The Commission considered this testimony in evaluating 
Claimant's disability. However, it is urged by Claimant that had we had the ability to observe 
Claimant at hearing, e.g., had we watched him walk to and from the witness stand, grimace with 
certain movements, or squhm in his seat, we might have been more inclined to give greater 
weight to his recitation of his functional limitations. 
Identifying Claimant's residual fun_ctional capacity was one of the principle issues with 
which the Commission struggled in c01mection with evaluating Claimant's disability. Based on 
the opinions of a number of Claimant's treaters, Defendants argued that Claimant has no 
limitations/restrictions referable to the 2009 and 2013 injuries. In further support of this 
assertion, they pointed out that Claimant has continued to work for this time-of-injury employer 
in his time-of-injury position since the 2009 accident. 
Claimant relied on the September 25, 2015 FCE in support of his asse1iion that the 2009 
and 2013 accidents, along with Claimant's low back condition, have significantly degraded his 
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functional capacity. We rejected Defendants' argument that Claimant is not limited by the 
residual effects of the subject accidents. While the FCE findings are not unchallenged by other 
evidence of record (see Findings of Fact, ,r,r 98-105), the Commission determined that the FCE is 
the least objectionable measure of Claimant's functional abilities and relied on it to evaluate 
Claimant's disability. Therefore, the Commission did exactly as Claimant asked. If Claimant's 
presentation at hearing was demonstrative of his discomfort and loss of functional ability, it 
seems that this additional information only reiterates the evidence the Commission accepted 
concerning Claimant's functional ability, and is therefore cumulative. Medical evidence is 
preferred as a guide to evaluating limitations/restrictions. 
. ' . 
Next, Claimant takes issue with the Commission's treatment of Claimant's age, 65, as of 
the date of hearing. Claimant argues that the Commission's decision subverts conventional 
. . ' ' . . . ' 
wisdom about the impact of age on disabHity. We disagree. Idaho Code § 72-430 specifies that 
' ,, ' . ' !' ' ' ' ' 
among the. non-medical factors to be considered by the Commission in evaluating disability is 
' " . . 
Claimant's age. The statute does not direct us to awmd higher disability to older workers, 
although that is frequently the re~ult. As directed by statute, the Commission did take 
' ' . . 
Claimant's age into account and found, un.der the pecuEar facts of this case, that Claimant's 
status as an aide~ worker, coupled with the likelihood of continued employment with his time-of-
injury employer, supported lower disability than would be the case for a similarly situated 20-
year-old. We.find no reason to .revise, our treatment of Claimant's age. Woody v. Seneca Foods, 
LC. 2010-012114 (2013) is inapposite. That case involved an older injured worker who was 
unemployed at the time of hearing and with.out prospects. 
Next, Claimant charges that it was improper for the Commission to attach the 
significance it did to Claimant's current employment and annual income in evaluating his 
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disability. Claimant argues that the Commission's consideration of Claimant's cutTent 
employment "punishes" Claimant for continuing to work following the 2009 accident: 
It is respectfully submitted that the Commission's rationale as specifically set-
f01ih within its decision punishes Mr. Ayala for continuing to work following his 
October 6, 2009, and August 28, 2013, industrial accidents. Had Mr. Ayala 
terminated his employment after either of those events, he most likely would have 
been awarded the entirety of his permanent disability related to and resultant of 
injuries suffered therein, without reduction. 
Clt's Memorandum, p. 9-10. Therefore, the argument goes, Claimant's post-accident 
employment denies him disability that he would otherwise have been entitled to, had he not gone 
back to work. 1 We reject this cynical argument as entirely inconsistent with the purpose of our 
worker's compensation system. In this case, Claimant suffered two work-related accidents. 
Income and medical benefits were paid to Claimant, all for the purpose of supporting his 
recovery and return to gainful employment. This he did, and in his case, the system did what it is 
supposed to do. Claimant has hardly been punished. We can think of no justification for 
ignoring Claimant's current ability to work at his time-of-injury job, since return to gainful 
activity is the aim of worker's compensation. 
The main argument offered by Claimant in support of his Idaho Code § 72-718 and Idaho 
Code§ 72-719 motions is his assertion that events occun-ing subsequent to the October 26, 2016 
hearing have invalidated one of the significant assumptions made by the Commission in arriving 
at the determination that Claimant has 40% disability referable to the pre-existing back condition 
and the 2009 and 2013 accidents. As the underlying decision reflects, it was, indeed, significant 
to the Commission's decision that Claimant has performed his time-of-injury job, albeit with 
some modification, since the 2009 accident, excepting those times when he has been in a period 
of recovery following his various surgerie~. Claimant was so employed at the time of hearing, 
1 By dint of similar reasoning, any person who is employed is unfairly deprived of the unemployment insurance 
benefits he would get were he laid off. · 
ORDER ON MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION, MODIFICATION, AND 
CONSOLIDATION - 6 
317
and since 2009, he has eajoyed steady annual increases in compensation, such that by 2016 his 
annual income slightly exceeded $47,000. It was also significant to the Commission that 
Claimant's prospects for ongoing employment seemed reasonably secure; Morgan Meyers 
testified that Claimant was impo1iant, if not critical, to Employer's business. Based on past 
history, the Commission also ente1iained the possibility that Claimant's annual income would 
increase, and that he would eventually retire from this job. Claimant argues that the 
Commission's assumption that Claimant's employment would continue at the same or greater 
wage was central to the Commission's decision on disability. However, the fact that Claimant is 
currently employed is far from the sole factor upon which the Commission relied in evaluating 
Claimant's disability. Had it been the sole factor, we might have adopted Defendant's argument 
on disability: Claimant's continuing employment, coupled with a significant increase in annual 
income since 2009, and the prospect for continued future employment, augers in favor of a 
conclusion that Claimant has suffered no disability over and above impahment. However, we 
did not adopt this argument, recognizing that we must reconcile Claimant's seeming prospects 
for continued employment with the fact that he has suffered a significant disability should he 
ever lose his job. (See Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order at 11113-115). 
Pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-425, disability is a measure of Claimant's "present and 
probable future" ability to engage in gainful activity. Our finding that Claimant's current 
employment is likely to continue is assuredly important to our decision, but our award of a 40% 
disability necessarily reflects our recognition that continuation of Claimant's employment is not 
assured. The Commission cannot predict the future, yet the statute requires us to consider the 
impact of the 2009 and 2013 accidents on Claimant's probable future ability to engage in gainful 
activity. Our synthesis of Claimant's disability recognizes that the future holds uncertainties 
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which we cannot know, including the circumstances of Claimant's future employment. The 40% 
disability figure we arrived at recognizes Claimant's significant loss of access to the labor 
market, and the fact that he has successfully continued to work for Employer. Nothing in our 
decision signals that a different result would obtain should Claimant lose his cmTent job. While 
the 40% rating is based on our perception that Claimant will continue in his time-of-injury 
employment, it also reflects our acknowledgement that he may not. Otherwise, we might have 
awarded Claimant no disability above impaitment. That one of the possibilities we necessarily 
entertained has now come to pass does not persuade us to revisit our gestalt of Claimant's 
disability since that possibility is merged into the Commission's evaluation. 
Further, the affidavits provided by the parties leave us unable to understand why 
Claimant's income declined so precipitously in 2017. Claimant specifically denies any increase 
in disability or limitation referable to the 2009 and 2013 accidents. (See Claimant's Reply at pp. 
7 and 8). He does, however, argue that the June 7, 2017 accident is responsible for a significant 
increase in Claimant's limitations/restrictions and may make it impossible for Claimant to 
' ' 
continue in his employment. It is argued that this likelihood adds futiher support to Claimant's 
argument that the Commission erred when it based its evaluation of Claimant's disability on the 
likelihood that Claimant's employment would continue. This argument seems nonsensical. If 
Claimant suffers income loss or loses his job because of a new injury associated with an accident 
of June 7, 2017, this loss is part-and-parcel of a claim for disability referable to the new accident, 
not the 2009 and 2013 claims. While Claimant might lose his job because of additional 
limitations related to the June 7, 2017 accident, this does not prove that the Commission made an 
invalid assumption concerning the likelihood for Claimant's continued employment. All it 
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proves ( or may prove) is that Claimant has an actionable claim for disability arising from a new 
accident/injury. 
Having addressed the broad arguments made by Claimant in support of his motions, we 
turn now to the specific arguments made by Claimant in connection with his motions made 
pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-718, Idaho Code § 72-719, and for consolidation. 
Motion for Reconsideration Under Idaho Code§ 72-718 
Claimant has filed a timely Motion for Reconsideration pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-718. 
That section provides: 
A decision of the comm1ss10n, in the absence of fraud, shall be final and 
conclusive as to all matters adjudicated by the commission upon filing the 
decision in the office of the commission; provided, within twenty (20) days from 
the date of filing the decision any party may move for reconsideration or 
rehearing of the decision, or the commission may rehear or reconsider its decision 
on its own initiative, and in any such events the decision shall be final upon denial 
of a motion for rehearing or reconsideration or the filing of the decision on 
rehearing or reconsideration. Final decisions may be appealed to the Supreme 
Court as provided by section 72-724, Idaho Code. 
On reconsideration, the Commission will examine the evidence in the case and determine 
whether the evidence presented supports the legal conclusions. The Commission is not 
compelled to make findings on the facts of the case during reconsideration. Davison v. HH 
Keim Co., Ltd., 110 Idaho 758, 718 P.2d 1196 (1986). The Commission may reverse its decision 
upon a motion for reconsideration, or rehearing of the decision in question, based on the 
arguments presented, or upon its own motion, provided that it acts within the time frame 
established in Idaho Code§ 72-718. See, Dennis v. School District No. 91, 135 Idaho 94, 15 P.3d 
329 (2000) (citing Kindred v. Amalgamated Sugar Co., 114 Idaho 284, 756 P.2d 410 (1988)). A 
motion for reconsideration must be properly supported by a recitation of the factual findings 
and/or legal conclusions with which the moving party takes issue. However, the Commission is 
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not inclined to re-weigh evidence and arguments during reconsideration simply
 because the case 
was not resolved in a party's favor. 
In this case, Claimant argues that facts arising subsequent to the date of hearin
g undercut 
the assumptions supporting the Commission's decision and constitute new evid
ence of which the 
Commission must consider on reconsideration. Defendants argue that in eval
uating the Motion 
for Reconsideration, the Commission is limited to consideration of evidence o
f record, not new 
evidence. Consistent with this position, Defendants filed a Motion to Strik
e the Affidavit of 
Claimant, but against the chance that the Commission will entertain Cla
imant's affidavit, 
Defendants filed the Affidavit of Morgan Meyers, which also makes factual av
erments not in the 
current record. The statute is silent on the question of whether the Commiss
ion may consider 
new evidence, i.e., evidence that was not before the Commission in connectio
n with the earlier 
proceeding, in evaluating a motion for reponsideration .. However, as Claimant
 has observed, the 
Idaho Supreme Court does appear to have addressed this issue. In Curtis v. M
H. King Co., 142 
Idaho 383, 128 P.3d 920 (2005), ~laimant asserted that her avascular necros
is of the hip was 
attributable to a fall at work. Relying on the testimony Clf Dr. Rudd, the Comm
ission dete1mined 
that this condition was not causally related to claimant's accide11t. Claimant 
filed a motion for 
reconsideration pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-718, which was denied by the 
Commission. On 
appeal, the Court noted that although medical evidence was in conflict, Dr. 
Rudd's testimony 
. ' 
constituted substantial and competent eyidence supporting the Commission's d
ecision. Claimant 
also argued that the Commissi9n erred in denying her motion for reconsider
ation. The Court 
noted that Idaho Code § 72-718 authorizes the party to request reconsideration
, but does not 
require the Commission to grant such request. The Court then stated: 
It is axiomatic that a claimant must present to the Commission new reasons
 
factually and legally to support a hearing on her Motion 
for 
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Rehearing/Reconsideration rather than rehashing evidence previously presented .. 
Although Curtis presented a very detailed brief in support of her motion she did 
not produce new law or evidence to necessitate a rehearing or reconsideration. 
Id. at 388, 925. As noted by Claimant, this language suggests that to properly support a motion 
for reconsideration the moving party must present to the Commission new facts or legal 
argument rather than ask the Commission to think some.more about the facts and argument upon 
which the Commission originally relied in reaching its decision. Indeed, review of the 
Commission's Order denying reconsideration in Curtis reflects that Claimant did not rely on any 
new facts to support her motion for reconsideration. (See Order Denying Reconsideration at 
2004-IIC0735.l) (2004). 
The evidence that Claimant would have us consider is not evidence that could reasonably 
have been adduced at hearing. The facts that Claimant would have us consider are new facts 
which came into existence following the· hearing, and therefore conld not and were not 
considered by the Commission. In other recent cases we have considered such evidence in 
connection with a motion for reconsideration. (See Strope v. Kootenai Medical Ctr, Inc., 2016 
IIC0046.1). In Strope, one of claimant's arguments at hearing was that claimant was entitled to a 
new MRI which it was thought might reveal that she was entitled to further medical treatment. 
The Commission ruled in defendants' favor, finding that claimant had not proven her entitlement 
to such a study. Following the Commission's decision, claimant obtained the study at her own 
expense, and urged the Commission to reconsider its decision, arguing that the study did reveal 
that she suffered from a work-related c9ndition requiring additional care. The Commission 
found this argument persuasive and granted claimant's motion for reconsideration upon the basis 
of new evidence. Accordingly, we agree that it is not inappropriate for the Commission to 
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consider the affidavits of Claimant and Mr. Meyers in connection with Claimant's Motion for 
Reconsideration and we deny Defendants' Motion to Strike Claimant's Affidavit. 
However, as explained above, we do not find Claimant's arguments, in particular, his 
arguments involving events occurring subsequent to the date of hearing, to be persuasive. We 
continue to be satisfied with our analysis of Claimant's disability based on the evidence that was 
before us. Our deliberations on the issue of disability included consideration of a number of 
"what-ifs," including the fact that Claimant might not remain in his time-of-injury job to the date 
of his eventual retirement. Therefore, we deny Claimant's Motion for Reconsideration under 
Idaho Code § 72-718. 
Motion to Correct a Manifest Injustice under Idaho Code§ 72-719 
Idaho Code§ 72-719(3) provides: 
The commission, on its own motion at any time within five (5) years of the date 
of the accident causing the injury or date of first manifestation of an occupational 
disease, may review a case in order to c01Tect a manifest injustice. 
While the plain language of the statute specifies that it comes on the Commission's own motion, 
, 
this fact does not preclude the Commission from exercising its powers when notice of a 
purported manifest injustice is brought to its attention by a party. Banzhafv. Carnation Co., 104 
Idaho 700, 662 P.2d 1144 (1983). As grounds for reopening and review of an order of the 
Commission the term "manifest injustice," must be given broad construction to advance the 
humane purposes of the Act. Sines v. Appel, 103 Idaho 9, 644 P.2d 331 (1982). As to the 
meaning of the te1m, the Sines Court stated: 
"Manifest" has been defined to mean: capable of being easily understood or 
recognized at once by the mind; not obscure; obvious. Webster's Third New 
International Dictionary, 1967. "Injustice" has been defined to mean: absence of 
justice; violation of right or of the rights of another; iniquity, unfairness; an unjust 
act or deed; wrong. Webster's Third New International Dictionary, 1967. 
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In Page v. McCain Foods, Inc., 145 Idaho 302, 179 P.3d 265 (
2008), the Commission 
determined that Claimant reached a point o.f medical stability from
 the effects of a knee injury on 
November 26, 2001. This decision was based on a note from C
laimant's physician. Claimant 
was scheduled to see her physician on November 26, 2001,
 but was a no-show for the 
appointment. The physician concluded that claimant must hav
e been getting along well and 
pronounced her medically stable. This was the only evidence t
he Commission relied upon to 
defin~ Claimant's date of medical stability. 
Subsequent to the issuance of the Commission's decision, cl
aimant filed a motion 
pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-719(3), urging the Commission t
o reopen the case to correct a 
manifest injustice. Claimant supported her motion with a letter 
written by Dr. Peterson stating 
that he had not examined claimant on November 26, 2001, but t
hat he had since examined her 
and determined that she · was not medically stable and was i
n need of further care. The 
Commission denied the motion to reopen the case, ruling that Dr
. Peterson's letter presented an 
insufficient factual basis upon which to reopen and review the 
case. On appeal, the Supreme 
Court noted that the only evidence upon which the Commission re
lied in defining claimant's date 
of medical stability was Dr. Peterson's November 26, 2001 chart
 note. The Court further noted 
that the unrebutted evidence established that Dr. Peterson did no
t actually examine claimant on 
that date. Dr. Peterson's subsequent letter entirely undermi
ned his earlier statement and 
established that claimant was not medically stable and was in ne
ed of further care. Therefore, 
the only evidence upon which the Commission relied in establish
ing claimant's date of medical 
stability was demonstrated to be invalid. Clearly, the Court reaso
ned, this is an adequate factual 
basis upon which to reopen the case to revisit the finding of me
dical stability. To do otherwise 
would be unjust. 




In this case, Claimant appears to state three bases for reopening of the case in order to 
correct a manifest injustice. First, as above noted, the Commission considered Claimant's 
testimony concerning his subjective limitations and discomfort. It is argued by Claimant that 
had the Commission actually observed Claimant at hearing, we might have been more inclined to 
give greater weight to his recitation of his residual functional abilities. However, as explained 
above, we have accepted the FCE findings, which Claimant urged us to adopt, as the best 
analysis of Claimant's residual functional capacity. Whatever additional insights might have 
been obtained by watching the Claimant as he sat or walked about the hearing room are largely 
reiterative and cumulative. We decline to ente1iain Claimant's invitation to reopen the case for 
further review on this basis. 
Next, Claimant appears to suggest that because he suffered a new June 7, 2017 
accident/injury which implicates further and more onerous restrictions on his ability to engage in 
gainful activity, the Commission's decision must be reopened to allow consideration of these 
new facts in assessing Claimant's disability. We reject this, too, as a reason to reopen the April 
9, 2018 decision to correct a manifest injustice. Simply, the June 7, 2017 accident/injmy, if it 
did occur, is not part of this proceeding. It is separately actionable and, as explained below, we 
decline to consolidate it with the 2009 and 2013 claims. 
Finally, Claimant argues that to avoid a manifest injustice the record must be reopened to 
allow consideration of Claimant's changed circumstances, i.e., his 2017 earnings, which reflects 
a significant decrease, as compared to his 2016 earnings. Setting aside the possibility that this 
decrease is attributable to a separately actionable 2017 accident/injury, we conclude that it is not 
unjust to decline to consider this change in circumstance in evaluating Claimant's disability. As 
explained above, our evaluation of disability is a synthesis of Claimant's significant loss of 
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access to the labor market and the fact of his continued employment. Bill Jordan speculated that 
if Claimant ever lost his job, his disability would be in the range of 47%. Claimant has not lost 
his job, yet the Commission nevertheless made an award of 40% disability to balance Claimant's 
labor market access loss against the fact of his continuing employment. Simply, our analysis 
contemplates the possibility that Claimant's circumstances might change in the future. That they 
did does not undermine our analysis. This case is not like Page. Claimant's current job and his 
2016 income were far from the sole factors we relied on in making our determination of 
Claimant's disability. 
Based on the foregoing, we deny Claimant's Idaho Code§ 72-719(3) motion. 
Motion for Modificatiol\ Pursuant to Change in Condition 
Claimant's motion for modification made pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-719(l)(a) was 
made contemporaneous with his motion for reconsideration. Idaho Code § 72-718 specifies that 
the Commission's decision of April 9, 2018 is final and conclusive as to matters adjudicated 
therein unless a timely motion for reconsideration is filed, as it was in this case. Idaho Code § 
72-719(1) authorizes the reopening_ of a "final and conclusive" award in certain circumstances. 
Fowler v. City of Rexburg, 116 Idaho 1, 773 P.2d 269 (1988). At the time Claimant filed his 
Idaho Code§ 72-719 motion, the April 9, 2018 decision was not final and conclusive, owing to 
Claimant's contemporaneous motion for reconsideration pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-718. 
However, having denied Claimant's Motion for Reconsideration and Motion to Correct a 
Manifest Injustice, the April 9, 2017 decision of the Commission is now final and conclusive as 
anticipated by Idaho Code § 72-718. Therefore, we accept Claimant's invitation to consider 
whether the case should be reopened to address a change in condition. Idaho Code § 72-719(1) 
provides: 
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72-719. Modification of awards and agreements - Grounds - Time within 
which made. - (1) On application made by a party in interest filed with the 
commission at any time within five (5) years of the date of the accident causing 
the injury or date of first manifestation of an occupational disease, on the ground 
of a change in conditions, the commission may, but not oftener than once in six 
(6) months, review any order, agreement or award upon any of the following 
grounds: 
(a) Change in the nature or extent of the employee's injury or disablement; and 
(b) Fraud. 
Therefore, a case may be reopened to review an award on the grounds of a change in the nature 
of the employee's injury or disablement. Claimant concedes that there has been no change in the 
extent or degree or Claimant's impairment since date of hearing: 
Claimant's Idaho Code § 72-719 motions are not premised upon any argument 
that claimant's impairment has increased since the date of hearing herein, related 
to the 2009 and/or 2013 injuries ..... 
(Claimant's Reply to Defendants' Opposition to Claimant's Post-Decision Motions at p.7) 
Rather, Claimant argues that his condition has changed because of a change in the circumstances 
of his employment, and that Idaho Code § 72-719 provides that such a change warrants 
reopening of the case because it may reflect a change in Claimant's "disablement": 
Rather, counsel notes that Idaho Code § 72-719(1)(a) sets fo1ih as alternative 
grounds, either a change in the nature or extent of employee's injury, meaning 
impairment, or, in the disjunctive, disablement .... 
(Claimant's Reply to Defendants' Opposition to Claimant's Post-Decisions Motions at p. 7) 
Therefore, the argument is that because the ground for reopening for change in condition are 
stated in the disjunctive, a petition for change in condition may be justified where there is either 
a change in the nature and extent of Claimant's impairment, or a change in the nature and extent 
of his disability, owing to some non-medical circumstance, in this case, Claimant's significant 
2017 decrease in earnings. For the reasons set forth below, we conclude that Claimant must 
demonstrate a change in the nature and extent of his physical injury in order to successfully 
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pursue a petition for change in condition under Idaho Code § 72-719(1)(a), and that such a 
petition cannot be pursued upon a showing of some change in a non-medical factor, alone. 
Essentially, Claimant's argument is that because a petition for change in condition may 
be pursued when there has been a change in Claimant's "disablement," the statute clearly 
anticipates that such a petition may be pursued where there has been a change in one of the non-
medical factors relied on by the Commission to assess "disability." Necessarily, this argument 
pre-supposes that "disablement" as used in the statute is the equivalent of "disability" as defined 
and evaluated at Idaho Code § 72-423, § 72-425, and § 72-430. Had the legislature intended that 
a petition for change in condition could be supported by a showing of a change in one of the non-
medical factors central to the determination of "disability," it could have unambiguously 
signaled this intent by using that term in Idaho Code § 72-719(l)(a). Instead, the legislature 
chose to use another term: "disablement." Disablement is a concept central to the compensability 
of occupational disease claims. Idaho Code§ 72-102(22)(c) defines disablement as follows: 
"Disablement," except in the case of silicosis, means the event of an employee's 
becoming actually and totally incapacitated because of an occupational disease 
from performing his work in the last occupation in which injuriously exposed to 
the hazards of such disease; and "disability" means the state of being so 
incapacitated. 
A claim for occupational disease arises when a worker is incapacitated, i.e. disabled, from 
performing his work in the last occupation in which he was injuriously exposed to the hazards of 
his disease. See Idaho Code § 72-437. "Disablement," in this sense, represents a physical 
inability to work at the time of injury job, caused by the hazards of that job. It does not have 
anything to do with the nonmedical factors enumerated at Idaho Code § 72-430. The nonmedical 
factors implicated in evaluating "disability" are not at issue when assessing whether 
"disablement" has occurred, i.e. whether a claimant is physically incapable of performing the 
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time of injury job. The legislatme's choice of "disablement" versus "disability" in Idaho Code § 
72-719(1)(a) lends no support to Claimant's argument that a change in one of the non-medical 
factors relevant to the original evaluation of claimant's disability warrants reopening of the claim 
for a change in condition. It seems just as likely that the disjunctive language of the statute 
simply reflects the fact that petitions for change in condition can be brought in both 
accident/injury and occupational disease claims, but only where there has been a change in the 
nature of the physical condition of the injured worker. 
Case law also supports the conclusion that it is only for changes in the extent and degree 
of an injured worker's physical condition that a petition for change in condition may be pursued. 
In Magee v. Thompson Creek Mining Co., 152 Idaho 196, 268 P.3d 464 (2011), claimant 
suffered a work-related injury to his low back in 2002. His injuries resulted in permanent 
complaints of chronic pain. In a 2004 decision, the Commission found that Claimant had 
suffered permanent impairment and disability as a consequence of the accident. Claimant later 
filed a Petition for Change in Condition, arguing that the Commission's decision should be 
modified because of a change in Claimant's condition. A second hearing was held and the 
Commission ruled that Claimant had failed to prove that a change in his condition had occurred 
since the original hearing. Further, the Commission ruled that Claimant had failed to prove that 
it would be manifestly unjust for the Commission to continue to abide by its original decision. 
The evidence established that at the time of the original 2000 injury, Claimant resided in 
Cascade, Montana, a town with a population of about 2000 people. As of the date of hearing on 
the Petition for Change in Condition, Claimant resided in Radersburg, Montana, a town with a 
population of around 150 people. In connection with the Petition for Change in Condition 
Claimant acknowledged that his physical condition was about the same as it had been at the time 
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of the original hearing. However, there was also evidence that Claim
ant had been diagnosed 
with a major depressive disorder since the original hearing, which had b
een attributed to the May 
2000 industrial injmy. Further, since the original hearing, Claim
ant had undergone the 
implantation of a dorsal column stimulator in an effmt to diminish Claim
ant's chronic pain. This 
evidently offered Claimant some relief. At hearing on the Petition f
or Change of Condition, 
Claimant also put on the testimony of a vocational rehabilitation sp
ecialist who opined that 
Claimant was totally and pe1manently disabled, but it was also not
ed that this opinion was 
delivered in the context of his very small labor market in Radersburg, M
ontana. The vocational 
expert acknowledged that a larger labor market might provide better e
mployment opportunities 
for Claimant. 
The Commission denied the Petition for Change of Condition, conclud
ing that Claimant 
had failed to adduce evidence showing that a change in conditi
on had occurred. The 
Conunission also denied Claimant's Motion to Correct a Manifest Injus
tice. Claimant appealed, 
arguing that the Commission erred in determining that Claimant had fa
iled to establish a change 
in condition. 
Concerning Idaho Code§ 72-719(1), the Court aclmowledged the dis
junctive nature of 
Idaho Code § 72-719(l)(a), yet concluded that in order to pursue a
 Petition for Change of 
Condition under this section, Claimant must nevertheless demonstrate 
a change in the nature or 
extent of his impairment: 
Magee asserts that he sustained a change in condition pursuant to Id
aho Code 
section 72-719(a). The statute allows the Commission to modify an awa
rd if there 
is a "[c]hange in the nature or extent of the employee's injury or dis
ablement." 
LC. § 72-719(l)(a). When a claimant applies for modification of an aw
ard due to 
a change in condition under LC. § 72-719(a), the claimant bears the
 burden of 
showing a change in condition. Matthews v. Dep't a/Corr., 121 Idaho
 680,681, 
827 P.2d 693, 694 (1992) (citing Boshers v. Payne, 58 Idaho 109, 70
 P.2d 391 
(193 7)). The claimant is "required to make a showing before the Comm
ission that 
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he had an increased level of impairment, and to establish with reasonable medical 
probability the existence of a causal relationship between the change in condition 
and the initial accident and injury." Matthews, 121 Idaho at 681-82, 827 P.2d 
694-95 (internal citations omitted). 
Id Arguably, Magee did experience a significant change in the non-medical factors considered 
by the Commission in reaching its original decision on disability. By the time of the Petition for 
Rehearing, Claimant had moved from a town of 2000 to a town of 150, a move which, according 
to Claimant's vocational expert, dramatically increased his disability. Yet the Court did not 
consider this fact in evaluating the Petition for Change of Condition pursuant to the provisions of 
Idaho Code§ 72-719(l)(a), concluding that since Claimant had failed to adduce evidence of a 
change in the nature or extent of his impairment, there the inquiry stops. 
Cited with approval by the Magee Court is the case of Matthews v. Dept. a/Corrections, 
121 Idaho 680, 827 P.2d 693 (1992). Matthews suffered a low back injury in 1985. He 
underwent surgery and was eventually given a 20% impairment rating. Thereafter, claimant and 
surety executed a compensation agreement pursuant to the terms of which the claim for disability 
was resolved by the payment of $15,895, the amount of his impaitment rating. Some months 
later, claimant alleged a change in his condition and requested that the Commission increase his 
disability award. He also filed an Idaho Code § 72-719(3) motion to correct a manifest injustice. 
His argument was based on his assertion that his low back injury made it impossible for him to 
re-enter the Army National Guard, and that this resulted in significant additional loss of wages 
and future retirement benefits. 
In connection with the petition for change of condition under Idaho Code§ 72-719(l)(a) 
the Court stated that to support such a petition, the claimant must prove an increase in the extent 
or degree of impairment: 
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As the Commission noted, when a claimant applies for a modification of an award 
under LC. Section 72-719, he or she bears the burden of showing a change in 
condition. Boshors v. Payne, 58 Idaho 109, 70 P.2d 391 (1937). Matthews was 
required to make a showing before the Commission that he had an increased level 
of impairment, Urry v. Walker & Fox Masonry Contractors, 115 Idaho 750, 769 
P.2d 1122 (1989), and to establish with reasonable medical probability the 
existence of a causal relationship between the change in condition and the initial 
accident and injury. Carter v. Garrett Freightlines, l 05 Idaho 59, 665 P.2d 1069 
(1983). 
As in Magee, the Court had before it, facts which arguably supported a change in the 
level of claimant's disability; new facts before the Commission suggested that claimant's 1985 
injury was more limiting than initially found owing to its effect on claimant's designs upon re-
entering the National Guard. Even so, the Idaho Code§ 72-719(1)(a) issue was resolved by the 
Court's affirmation of the Commission's conclusion that claimant had failed to adduce evidence 
of a change in the nature or extent of his physical injury. See also Ivie v. Daw Forest Products, 
1998 IIC 1253 (1998). 
The Court's construction of Idaho Code § 72-719(1 )(a) makes perfect sense. Otherwise, 
any time someone lost a job, got a job, got his GED, flunked out of school, got a raise, refused to 
cross a picket line, moved to another labor market, lost access to daycare, got older, etc., the 
Commission might be faced with a petition to change a previous disability award because 
somebody's circumstances had changed. In other words, anytime claimant's earnings increased 
or decreased for reasons unconnected with the extent and degree of the work-related injury, the 
Commission could be faced with a petition to reopen the case. This is clearly not what is 
intended, particularly in view of the charge of Idaho Code § 72-423 which obligates the 
Commission to evaluate Claimant's present and probable future ability to engage in gainful 
activity as of the date of hearing. This necessarily requires the Commission to consider how 
Claimant's future disability may be impacted by things that may or may not happen. We are 
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obligated to make this judgment once, and it would place an undue burden on t
he administration 
of the worker's compensation system to continually revise disability asses
sments based on 
Claimant's changing circumstances. 
Since Claimant concedes that his Idaho Code§ 72-719(1)(a) motion is not pre
mised on 
any change in the nature or extent of his physical injuries related to the 2009 an
d 2013 accidents, 
we deny his Petition for Change in Condition under that section. 
Motion for Consolidation 
In the alternative, Claimant urges the Commission to withdraw the April
 9, 2018 
decision, consolidate the 2009, 2013, and 2017 complaints for hearing, and r
ehear the case so 
that Defendants may be held· responsible for the entirety of the disability refera
ble to Claimant's 
employment, and so that Defendants will be prevented from shifting respon
sibility for some 
portion of Claimant's disability to the Industrial Special Indemnity Fund. We 
decline to do this 
for several reasons. 
First, it is unclear to us why consolidation will assure that Employer/Surety will
 pay what 
it should, but that a refusal to consolidate will not. Employer's liability for th
e 2009 and 2013 
accidents has been decided by the Commission. If Claimant believes that he is 
entitled to further 
benefits by reason of the 2017 accident, he may pursue his claim. Consolidation
 or no, Employer 
will be held responsible for the payment of worker's compensation ben
efits owed as a 
consequence of the subject accidents. 
In a case of total and permanent disability, the ISIF may be held responsible fo
r that 
portion of an injured worker's total and permanent disability caused by im
pairments which 
predate the last accident. Sometimes these pre-existing impairments are work re
lated, sometimes 
they are not. The distinction is unimp01iant in evaluating the ISIF's liability. 
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Finally, there is the matter of timing. Claimant's third accident allege
dly occun-ed on or 
about June 7, 2017. It appears that Claimant's left knee condition followin
g that accident was of 
sufficient seriousness to require surgical treatment, although we h
ave no way of !mowing 
whether the accident is responsible for that need for treatment. Had C
laimant been sufficiently 
concerned that the June 7, 2017 accident changed the lay of the land, 
he had ample time within 
which to alert the Commission to his concerns, and to request action 
of some type prior to the 
issuance of the April 9, 2018 decision. Instead, the parties and 
the Commission devoted 
considerable effort to hearing and deciding the claims as presented. Th
at Claimant may not have 
expected the decision to go the way it did is no defense to sitting on his 
hands. 
We DENY the Motion to Consolidate. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER 
Having reviewed the affidavits and arguments of tl;ie parties on Claim
ant's motions, we 
hereby enter the following Order. 
1. Claimant's Motion for Reconsideration is denied. 
2. Claimant's Motion to Correct a Manifest Injustice Pursuant to 
Idaho Code § 72-
719(3) is denied. 
3. Claimant's Motion for Change in Condition Pursuant to the P
rovisions of Idaho 
Code§ 72-719(l)(a) is denied. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
DA TED this ;;)JJAd,, day of ~-fl t7 ~ , 2018. 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
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~:£~ 
Thomas P. Baskin, Commissioner 
~
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INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
This matter came before the Industrial Commission for hearing on October 26, 2016. 
Appearing for Mario Ayala (Claimant) was L. Clyel Be1Ty, Esq. Appearing for Defendants 
Robert J. Meyers Fmms, Inc. (Employer) and its worker's compensation surety, the State 
Insurance Fund (Surety), was Paul Augustine, Esq. The testimony of Claimant and Morgan 
Meyers was adduced at hearing. The testimony of William Jordan, Nancy Collins, PhD, Paul 
Montalbano, M.D., and Richard Hammond, M.D., was taken by way of post-hearing deposition. 
At hearing, Defendants' Exhibits 1 through 10 were admitted into evidence. Claimant identified 
propq~ed Exhibits 1 through 33, but withdrew Exhibit 1, and pages 46 through 115 (inclusive) of 
Exhibit 3, Exhibit 25(a), and Exhibit 28(a). 1 Pursuant to Commission Orders of November 18, 
1 Pages 46-115 of Exhibit 3 consists ofrecords from GFHC, and cover visits from 2004-2007. These records contain 
certain references to pre-injury low back/SJ joint pain, and were reviewed by William Jordan and relied upon by 
Mark Harris, M.D., (See Cit. Ex. 20, p. 601,629). Claimant's counsel referenced some of these records in his 
November 5, 2015 letter to Vernon Mccready, PA-C. (Cit E_x. 6, p. 349).These records are also implicit in 
Claimant's acknowledgement that he suffered from episodic bouts oflow back pain in the years preceding the 2009 
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2016 and January 10, 2017, the balance of Claimant's proposed exhibits are admitted into 
evidence. 
Per the Commission's Orders of July 19, 2016 and September 14, 2016, the following 
matters are at issue: 
I. Whether Claimant's condition is due in whole or in part to a pre-existing injury or 
disease or cause not work-related; 
2. Whether Claimant is entitled to reasonable and necessary medical care as 
provided for by Idaho Code § 72-432, and the extent thereof; 
3. Whether Claimant is entitled to temporary partial and/or temporary total disability 
(TPD/TTD) benefits, and the extent thereof; 
4. Whether Claimant is entitled to permanent partial impairment (PPI) benefits, and 
the extent thereof; 
5. Whether Claimant is entitled to permanent partial disability (PPD) in excess of 
permanent impairment, and the extent thereof; 
6. Whether Claimant is entitled to permanent total disability pursuant to the odd-lot 
doctrine, or otherwise; 
7. Whether apportiomnent for a pre-existing condition pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-
406 is appropriate; and, 
8. Whether Claimant is entitled to attorney fees due to Employer/Surety's 
unreasonable denial of compensation as provided for by Idaho Code § 72-804. 
accident (See Cit. Ex. 20, p. 635). It seems preferable to consider the original of these notes rather than rely on 
second hand synopses. Therefore, and notwithstanding the Commission's previous accession to Claimant's nropos~l 
to withdraw these Exhihits, these portions ofExhihit 2 are sonsidered in this necis10n: However, exclus10n ofthese 
records wvuld not change any asp·ect of the Commission's decision; as noted., rnei-e is other evidence of record 
which establishes that Claimant did have some pre-injury low back symptoms. 
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9. Whether, if it is determined that Claimant's low back injury, condition and/or 
presentment is casually related to or resultant of the industrial accidents/occurrences forming the 
basis of the instant consolidated proceeding; that Claimant does not yet present at maximum 
medical improvement related to said low back presentment; and that additional medical care, 
treatment and/or services are reasonably required by reason of said low back presentment, that 
the Commission reserve jurisdiction herein upon the issues of Claimant's entitlement to 
permanent impairment and permanent disability, inclusive of odd-lot states, with said issues to 
be considered/determined at the conclusion of Claimant's reasonably required medical care and 
achieving maximum medical improvement. 
This matter was calendared for hearing following the consolidation of three claims; an 
accident of October 14, 2001 involving an injury to Claimant's back, an accident of October 6, 
2009 involving multiple injuries to Claimant, and an accident of August 28, 2013 involving 
injuries to Claimant's right knee. At hearing, Claimant signified his intention to withdraw from 
consideration in the current proceeding, the October 14, 2001 claim. Accordingly, this matter is 
before the Industrial Commission for consideration of the October 6, 2009 and August 28, 2013 
accidents only. 
At hearing, the parties expressed their agreement that Claimant suffered a compensable 
injury to his right knee as a consequence of the August 28, 2013 accident, which injury 
eventually resulted in the need for a total knee arthroplasty. Similarly, the parties agreed that as 
a consequence of the October 6, 2009 motor vehicle accident, Claimant suffered injuries to his 
neck, left shoulder, and left elbow. Claimant has undergone surgical treatment for each of these 
injuries. Defendants have accepted responsibility for related medical care, income benefits owed 
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to Claimant during his period of recovery, and impairment attributable to the neck, shoulder, 
elbow, and knee. 
Claimant contends that the evidence demonstrates that his low back condition is cansally 
related to the 2009 motor vehicle accident, and that he is entitled to medical and income benefits 
related to that injury. Claimant asserts that should the Commission dete1mine that Claimant's 
low back condition is causally related to the 2009 accident, it is inappropriate to consider 
Claimant's claim for disability at this juncture; Claimant requires further medical treatment for 
his low back and the Commission should retain jurisdiction over this case pending such 
treatment. In the alternative, Claimant contends that if the Commission dete1mines that 
Claimant's low back condition is not a compensable consequence of the 2009 motor vehicle 
accident, Claimant is nevertheless totally and permanently disabled as a result of those injuries 
' 
which the parties acknowledge to be causally related to the accidents of 2009 and 2013. In this 
regard, Claimant contends that the FCE performed by PT Wright best delineates the 
limitations/restrictions referable to Claimant's injuries, and as demonstrated by the testimony of 
Dr. Collins, these limitations/restrictions leave Claimant totally and permanently disabled. 
Defendants dispute that the October 9, 2009 industrial accident caused anything more 
than a temporary aggravation of Claimant's documented pre-existing degenerative aithritis of the 
lumbar spine, and that to the extent Claimant may require further medical treatment for his low 
back, those consequences of Claimant's low back c9ndition are entirely referable to Claimant's 
pre-existing low back condition and/or the natural progression of that condition unrelated to the 
October 9, 2009 motor vehicle accident. Defendants contend that PT Wright's FCE is flawed, 
and that the assertion of total and permanent disability is denigrated by the fact that Claimant has 
been continuously employed in his time-of-injury job since the 2009 accident. Defendants 
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contend that the evidence demonstrates that Claimant has a fund of essential skills which 
continue to make him a valuable employee and that he does not enjoy continued employment by 
virtue of his own superhuman effort or the Employer's sympathy. In view of Claimant's ongoing 
successful employment at his time-of-injury job, and the fact that no physician has authored 
limitations/restrictions for Claimant, Defendants contend that Claimant has failed to prove 
entitlement to disability in excess of impairment paid to date. 
This matter was originally heard by Referee Powers. At the time this matter came under 
advisement, on November 3, 2017, the assigned Referee faced a significant case backlog that 
would result in a delay of this decision. In an effort to minimize the anticipated delay, the 
Commission contacted the parties to suggest that the case be decided on the record by the 
Commission. The parties responded, stating that due to observational credibility issues relating to 
Claimant's presentation .at hearing, they preferred to have the case decided by the Referee who 
observed Claimant at hearing. However, as developed infra, the outcome in this case does not 
depend on an assessment of whether Claimant appeared to testify credibly at hearing. It does, to 
some extent, depend on a comparison of Claimant,' s testimony, with other evidence of record. 
While we are sensitive to the desires of the parties, our obligation to manage our docket to 
promote timely decisions supports assignment of this matter to the Commission. 
FINDINGS OF F'ACT 
I. Claimant was . At the time of hearing, he was  
 Claimant was born in Mexico and attended school there for three years. He moved to the 
United States in 1974 and became a U.S. Citizen in 1992. He spoke no English when he moved 
to the United States. Claimant has pursued no formal education in the United States. He learned 
English on his own, and has good conversational English language skills. (Tr., p, 34: 12-22). He 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND ORDER - 5 
341
also testified that as time has passed, his English language abilities h
ave improved. (Tr., pp. 
53: 15-2; 132:7-16). He has poor Spanish and English reading/writing sk
ills. 
2. Claimant did not admit to having any paiticular problem commu
nicating with his 
physicians in connection with the treatment/evaluation he received foll
owing the accident. He 
testified that if he initially does not understand a question posed by a p
hysician, he will ask for 
clarification. (Tr., p. 151:14-25). Nor do the medical records in evidenc
e suggest that Claimant's 
providers/evaluators had any paiticular difficulty communicating with h
im. For example, in his 
August 2, 2010 repo1t, Dr. Harris reported that Claimant provided th
e history recorded. Dr. 
Harris noted that Claimant was a "good histori.an." (Cit. Ex. 20, p. 602)
. In connection with his 
evaluation of September 10, 2010, Dr. H~mmond noted that Claimant 
"can give a lucid history 
and has no language dysfunction." (Cit. Ex. 9, p. 458). In a follow-up 
visit of October 1, 2013, 
at1 employee of Dr. Hammond's office updated histmy taken from Claim
ant. She also noted that 
Claimant did not require an interpreter, and that his language preferenc
e was English. (Cit. Ex. 
9, p. 466). Finally, Claimant's counsel aclmowledged in his June
 22, 2016 letter to Dr. 
Hammond, that Claimant speaks English well enough that Claima
nt does not require an 
interpreter to converse with English speakers. (Cit. Ex. 24, p. 659i). 
3. Between 1974 and 1995, Claimant was employed primarily as a
 laborer on farms 
and ranches in the vicinity of Bruneau, Idaho. . He was briefly 
employed by a trailer 
manufacturer in Boise where his job involved installing electrical wir
ing in trailers. He was 
employed as a laborer, not as an electrician. In 1995, he commence
d his employment with 
Meyers Farms, Employer herein. Claimant was initially employed as th
e farm foreman, and still 
works in that capacity. Even though Claimant has always directed one
 or two employees since 
1995, he was, before 2009, more of a working foreman. He testified
 that between 1995 and 
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2009, he did "everything" on the farm, including some heavy physical labor. (Tr., pp. 61:3-
62: 12). Claimant knows how to weld, and has some skills as a mechanic. However, his real 
value to Employer is his specific knowledge of the inigation system, and how to maximize that 
system for the benefit of crops grown by Employer. Since the 2009 accident, Claimant does less 
heavy lifting, and gives more direction to his subordinates to perfo1m this work. He intends to 
continue working for Employer as long as he can. Claimant's tax records reflect that for 2015, 
he earned approximately $43,000 in his job for Employer, approximately twice as much as he 
earned in 2009. (Tr., p. 169:3-13). 
4. Morgan Meyers, one of the principals of Meyers Farms, testified to the business 
of Meyers Faims. Employer controls approximately 12,000 acres of fa1mland, at three different 
locations. Employer's Bruneau operation is managed by Claimant, whose expertise regarding 
the Bruneau farm inigation system is impo1tant to that operation's success; the Brnneau tract is 
somewhat "gravelly" and does not hold water well, making inigation management that much 
more important. According to Mr. Meyers, Claimant possesses the peculiar skills needed to 
make that operation successful. (Tr., pp. 173:14-185:19). Claimant does not require much in the 
way of supervision, and Meyers relies on Claimant to delegate work as Claimant sees fit. In 
addition to his expertise with the faim's inigation system, Meyers depends on Claimant a great 
deal to oversee and supervise the annual harvest at Bruneau. Meyers testified that he would hire 
Claimant today, and that his knowledge and expe1tise is so important that Meyers "would be in a 
panic" if Claimant decided to leave or retire. (Tr., pp. 189:13-190:1). 
Pre-Injury Medical Condition 
5. Claimant testified that immediately prior to the October 6, 2009 motor vehicle 
accident, he had no limitations on his ability to perform his work. Specifically, Claimant denied 
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any problems with his neck, left shoulder, left elbow, or low back immediately prior to October 
6, 2009. (Tr., pp. 82:15-85:12). However, the record reflects that Claimant did have periodic 
problems with low back pain/discomfort in the years prior to the October 6, 2009 motor vehicle 
accident. On November 6, 2001, Claimant was referred to chiropractor Jeffery Kieffer, D.C., by 
John Booth, PA-C for care of low back pain. PA Booth noted that Claimant had received no 
relief from conventional medical intervention. Evidently it was thought that chiropractic 
treatment might offer some relief. (Cit. Ex. 2, p. 31). However, Dr. Kieffer's records appear to 
reflect that he treated Claimant following November 6, 2001 for a principal complaint of cervical 
spine and upper extremity complaints. Nevertheless, Dr. Kieffer's January 3, 2002 report to the ' 
State Insurance Fund reflects that among his diagnoses of Claimant was a diagnosis of lumbar 
segmental joint dysfunction. (Cit. Ex. 2, p. 37). 
6. On March I, 2004, Claimant saw. Dr. Kieffer with complaints of low back 
soreness. On March 8, 2004, he was again seen with complaints of low back pain and bilateral 
leg numbness. (Cit. Ex. 2, pp. 38-39). In a statement dated October 11, 2012, Dr. Kieffer, 
referring to the 2004 notes, stated: 
This is to verify that I evaluated and treated Mr. Ayala on two occasions for lower back and lower extremity "numb foeling" as secondary complaints to a cervical and mid-scapular injury. These treatment dates were March 1 and March 8, 2004. There were no significant objectives finding regarding his lower back complaints at that time. . ... 
(Cit. Ex. 2, p. 45). It is unclear at whose instance the October 11, 2012 statement was prepared, 
or what information/representations accompanied that request. 
7. On June 23, 2004 Claimant was seen at the Glenns Ferry Health Center (GFHC) 
with a principal complaint of low back pain/soreness in the SI area. No neuroradicular 
symptoms were noted. The note reflects that Claimant expressed "multiple past experience[ s ]" 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND ORDER - 8 
344
of similar discomfort. (Cit. Ex. 3, p. 65), Right SI soreness was noted on July 15, 2004 at the 
GFHC. On May 21, 2007, Claimant was again seen at the GFHC with complaints of right hip 
and SI joint pain "for over two years, with no recent trauma," although he did admit to an itzjury 
to this part of his back in 1974.2 He admitted to discomfort associated with sitting in a tractor 
and walking in the fields. He did not complain of any neuroradicular symptoms. (Cit. Ex. 3, p. 
115), 
8. On Febrnary 25, 2009, Claimant underwent a musculoskeletal exam as part of his 
encounter of that date. Findings were as follows: 
On examination, the patient- walks with a normal gait. There is no visible 
scoliosis. The shoulders and pelvis are well-balanced. There is no tenderness over 
the spine or SI joints. There is no inguinal adenopathy. There is full spine range of 
motion without pain, and the patient can touch their toes. There is full hip range 
of motion bilaterally. There is a negative Patrick's test, and a negative straight leg 
raising test on both sides. Motor strength is 5/5 in both lower extremities, and 
sensation is intact to light touch in both legs. Knee jerk and ankle jerk reflexes are 
2+ bilaterally, and toes are downgoing. There is no clonus. 
(Cit. Ex. 3, p. 129). 
9. The GFHC notes of September 9, 2009 and October 5, 2009 figure prominently in 
the parties' arguments concerning whether or not Claimant's current low back complaints are 
causally related to the October 6, 2009 motor vehicle accident. Those notes deserve particular 
attention. On September 9, 2009, Claimant presented with the following history: 
Established patient for evaluation of 
1. back pain. 
Location of symptoms: the upper back, mid back, and low back, 
Symptom(s) are described as persistant (sic] and achey [sic], Severity: mild and 
stable. 
Onset is/was abrnpt. Symptoms have persisted for about one week. 
Context: Pt/ felt like he had an "internal fever" and felt restless and achey [sic]. 
His back along the paraspineous [sic] muscle straps, bilaterally have ached. He 
denies any vomiting but had some nausea. No change in bowel or bladder 
2 
Per Dr. Hammond, hip pain is an indicator of nerve root impingement. (Hammond Depa., p. 39:1-8). 
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function. Modifying factors include: OTC drugs, which does not alleviate or 
worse the problem. 
Denies drowsiness; trouble falling asleep; 
Repmis appetite loss; which is/are mild; fatigue, restlessness, which is/are mild; 
restless sleep, muscle cramps, which is mild; 
(Cit. Ex. 3, p. 136). Claimant denied fever. Examination of his back revealed mild vertebral 
muscle spasm. Claimant's diagnosis was obesity and back pain. Lab work was ordered and 
weight loss was recommended. Prescriptions for Cyclobenzaprine and Naprosyn were written. 
(See Cit. Ex. 3, pp. 136-140). 
10. Claima~t again presented to the GFHC on October 5, 2009, the day before the 
subject October 6, 2009 motor vehicle accident. He presented with complaints of a cough, which 
he described as a longstanding condition related to exposure to cold air and other initants. 
Claimant was also noted to be obese. He reported mild joint pain, muscle aches, and back pain. 
Claimant's musculoskeletal exam was positive for grinding at the lateral aspect of the lateral 
joint line of the right knee. Diagnoses at this visit included obesity, asthma, and back pain. 
Claimant's prescription for Naprosyn was refilled, as were other prescriptions related to obesity 
and diabetes. 
11. To other providers, Claimant also gave some history of low back problems 
predating the October 6, 2009 motor vehicle accident. When seen by D. Peter Reedy, M.D., on 
January 8, 2010, Claimant reported a past history of chiropractic visits for low back problems. 
(Cit. Ex. 5, p. 150). In his letter of January 7, 2016, Dr. Reedy proposed that the treatment notes 
from the GFHC reflect that Claimant was treated for complaints of low back pain immediately 
preceding the subject accident. Dr. Reedy also acknowledges that prior to the subject accident, 
Claimant suffered from a degenerative condition of the lumbar spine. He likened the subject 
accident to "the straw that broke the camel's back." (Cit. Ex. 5, p. 186). In a follow-up letter to 
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Claimant's counsel of January 19, 2016, Dr. Reedy acknowledged that Claimant had periodic 
episodes of low back pain which predated the 2009 motor vehicle accident, which was 
unsurprising to Dr. Reedy based on Claimant's vocation. (Cit. Ex. 5, p. 187). 
12. Vernon McCready, PA-C, too, was asked by Claimant's counsel to comment on 
the nature of the complaints with which Claimant presented at the time of his evaluation by PA 
McCready and/or his staff on September 9, 2009 and October 5, 2009. 
13. On November 5, 2015, December 14, 2015, and again on January 5, 2016, 
Claimant's counsel queried PA McCready about the nature of the problems with which Claimant 
presented on September 9, 2009 and October 5, 2009, suggesting a narrative that Claimant's 
problems were more-or-less systemic in nature and not reflective of a mechanical low back 
injury. (Cit. Ex. 6., p. 358). Also important in Claimant counsel's November 5, 2015 letter to PA 
Mccready is the representation, which appears with some regularity in letters to Claimant's 
treating/evaluating physicians, that Claimant is the type of person who, on presenting for medical 
care, will only reference a primary complaint, declining to reference complaints of secondary 
importance: 
From my perspective, Mario presents as a straight-forward but rather 
unsophisticated individual. Following the industrial motor vehicle accident, Mario 
focused his complaints upon what was then causing him the greatest difficulty and 
produced the greatest symptomatology. Although logical, this approach results in 
an absence of medical records for other than primary or more obvious 
presentments, and oft-times in confusion or medical disagreement upon the issue 
of causal relation of the medical presentment to the injury at question. 
(Cit. Ex. 6, p. 351 ). This asse1iion finds little, if any, support in the record, and must be 
distinguished from a related assertion, discussed infi'a, that Claimant did not discuss his post-
ittjury low back complaints with Dr. Reedy because Dr. Reedy instructed Claimant to hold off 
discussing his low back until Dr. Reedy had completed his treatment of Claimant's cervical spine 
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condition. PA McCready failed to respond to the November 5, 2015 letter, the December 14, 
2015 letter, but finally did respond to the January 5, 2016 letter. Rather than provide a narrative 
response, PA Mccready simply acceded to the prepared statements offered by Claimant's 
counsel. (Cit. Ex. 6, p. 348). 
Accident of October 6, 2009 and Subsequent Low Back Complaints 
14. The accident giving rise to the first of the two claims in this consolidated 
proceeding occuned on October 6, 2009. On that date, Cla.imant was operating a Meyers Faims' 
vehicle heading north on Highway 51, intending to pick up a paii for a piece of farm machinery 
when his left front tire blew out, causing his vehicle to pull to the left. Claimant over-c01rncted, 
and struck the guard rail on the right side of the road. The vehicle then came back across the 
roadway, hitting the west guard rail. (Cit. Ex. 26, p. 679). Claimant was not wearing a seatbelt 
at the time of the accident. He testified he was thrown about the interior of the cab in the course 
of the accident. Afterwards, he was driven to his home by a passerby and transp01ied later that 
day to the Elmore Medical Center (EMC) in Mountain Home. 
15. The EMC records of October 6, 2009 reflect that Claimant presented with .a 
laceration to his left hand and with a history of striking his left chest wall as his vehicle swerved 
back and forth. Claimant denied any injury to his head, neck, abdomen, or other irtjuries. He 
admitted only to the hand laceration and chest contusion. Claimant was examined, and other 
than the aforementioned injuries to his left hand and chest wall, no abnormalities were noted. 
Diagnosis on discharge was left chest wall contusion and left hand contusion, with puncture 
wounds. Claimant was seen again in follow-up on October 13, 2009 at EMC complaining of left-
sided rib pain and left anterior shoulder pain that radiated into the left arm. He stated that these 
symptoms began shortly after the accident of October 6, 2009. Claimant denied neck pain. 
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Neurological exam of the upper and lower extremities was nonnal. Gait was intact. The 
discharge diagnosis was expanded to include left rib fracture and left shoulder contusion. (Cit. 
Ex. 3, p. 148). 
16. On October 16, 2009, PA McCready evaluated Claimant at GFHC. Claimant's 
primary complaint was diminished urinary stream, a complaint for which he had been seen in the 
past. Secondarily, Claimant presented for removal of sutures from his left hand and an 
authorization to return to work. 
17. The November 4, 2009 chart note from the GFHC reflects that while Claimant did 
complain of left shoulder and left arm pain, he specifically denied low back pain or difficulty 
walking. Next, the GFHC records contain two separate chart notes, both signed by PA 
McCready, and both dated November 12, 2009. The first note from ll :41 a.m. reflects that 
Claimant was seen in follow-up for his neck and left upper extremity discomfo1t. The second 
note from 12:01 p.m. reflects that Claimant was seen for treatment of a chronic urinary problem. 
Neither of the November 12, 2009 notes reference the low back. 
18. The GFHC record from November 16, 2009 reflects continued complaints of neck 
and left upper extremity symptoms. PA McCready recommended MRI evaluation of the cervical 
spine: PA McCready's note reflects that Claimant specifically denied low back pain or difficulty 
walking. (Cit. Ex. 6, p. 205). In treatment notes dated November 30, 2009 and December 11, 
2009, PA Mccready also specifically noted that Claimant denied complaints of low back 
discomfort or difficulty with walking. (Cit. Ex. 6, pp. 206-211 ). 
19. While none of the aforementioned post-accident medical records reference 
complaints of low back or lower extremity difficulty, ( even when Claimant appears to have been 
asked whether he had problems in these areas) the record does contain other references to post-
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accident back pain. The Notice oflnjury and Claim for Benefits prepared on or about November 
17, 2009 reflects that as a result of the October 6, 2009 accident Claimant suffered injuries as 
follows: "Cut and bruised hand when hit driver's side window and hmi back." (Cit. Ex. 25, p. 
673). On November 20, 2009, a State Insurance Fund investigator contacted Claimant to discuss 
the occmTence of the 2009 accident. In a claimant contact report, Claimant described the 
following problems which he evidently related to the subject accident: 
How are you doing? left ann is numb, neck, back entire back. No strength in my 
left arm, both hands went numb, left hand worse. Cut on left hand. 
Please give a brief description of your job: farming 
Please give a description of what you were doing when the accident occmTed. I 
was going to get some pati in town and on hwy 51. I was coming up on the pati of 
the road where the guard rails were on both sides of the road and my left front tire 
blew out on the pickup, it all happened so fast. I pulled to [ o] hard on the steering 
wheel and over conected too far and hit the other guard rail. Both of my hands 
went numb. After hit the first guard rail on the right side and I went to grab the 
steering wheel I could not feel my left hand at all, shook my right hand it had 
some feeling. Accident happened about 2:30-3:00pm i0-04-09 
Describe the nature of your injury. Injuries from cart accident, left hand, back, 
neck (Emphasis in original). 
(Cit. Ex. 25, p. 674a). 
20. The Industrial Commission Rehabilitation Division opened its file on Claimant in 
March of 2010. While the Rehabilitation Division's initial April 18, 2010 interview of Claimant 
does not reflect that Claimant described complaints of low back pain, a subsequent note of May 
12, 2010 does reflect that Claimantdescribed complaints of numbness in his legs when standing 
at physical therapy for over 30 minutes. 
21. The first post-accident medical record making reference to Claimant's low back 
or lower extremities is Dr. Reedy's letter of Januat-y 8, 2010 to PA Mccready, who had refened 
Claimant to Dr. Reedy for evaluation .. Per.Dr. Reedy's letter, Claimant presented on January 8, 
2010 with the following complaints: 
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As you !mow, he is a pleasant  faim foreman out at Robert J. Meyers 
farms in Twin Falls who comes in complaining of pain "everywhere." He has 
neck pain and left arm pain primarily that arose from a work related motor vehicle 
accident in October 2009. He tells me that if he stands for 20-25 minutes his legs 
go numb. He has seen a chiropractor in the past for low back problems but he has 
never had a neck problem before this. He tried oral steroids without much relief. 
(Clt. Ex. 5, p. 150). Therefore, per the history recorded by Dr. Reedy, Claimant did relate his 
neck and left arm pain to the 2009 motor vehicle accident. However, Dr. Reedy's note does not 
explicitly reflect that Claimant also related his complaints of bilateral leg numbness to the motor 
vehicle accident. On exam, Claimant had findings suggestive of a cervical spine injury. Also, it 
was noted that lumbar range of motion was mildly decreased, although station and gait were 
normal. Deep tendon reflexes were 2+, and both ankle jerks were missing. Dr. Reedy went on 
to treat Claimant for his cervical spine condition, eventually performing surgery on Claimant's 
cervical spine on February 19, 2010, to include microdiscectomies at CS thru C6 followed by 
instrumented fusions at the same levels. Claimant was seen in follow-up by Dr. Reedy on 
multiple occasions, but it was not until Dr. Reedy's December 5, 2011 office visit with Claimant 
that Claimant's low back and lower extremities are again referenced. On December 5, 2011, Dr. 
Reedy' s office notes reflect that in addition to ongoing complaints with his cervical spine, 
Claimant presented with complaints of leg numbness and low back pain "ever since 10/09 
accident," which had never been investigated. Claimant also described more low back pain in the 
3-4 weeks prior to December 5, 2011. (Cit. Ex. 5, p. 168). 
22. The December 5, 2011 office visit is further memorialized in Dr. Reedy's 
December 10, 2011 letter to PA McCready. This letter contains further infotmation concerning 
the history of Claimant's low back and lower extremity complaints that was not captured in the 
December 5, 2011 chart note: 
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He also complains about low back pain that he has had since the accident but that 
was never investigated. He said that when I first saw him I said lets work on the 
neck first and then we will deal with the lumbar issue but it never came up again. 
He describes what sounds like neurogenic claudication in that he can go into a 
store and walk around for 15-20 minutes but then he has bilateral leg pain, 
especially in the thighs when he is walking and he needs to sit down to get some 
relief. I think he certainly should have gotten an MRI of the lumbar spine and I 
will ask his attorney to get his case reopened so that we may pursue the lumbar 
end of things. I will also suggest to his attorney that he get a second opinion about 
his neck. 
(Cit. Ex. 5, p. 166). This letter does not reflect that Dr. Reedy has a recollection of instructing 
Claimant, in December of 2009, that Claimant's back and lower extremity complaints would be 
sorted out after Dr. Reedy dealt with Claimant's cervical spine. (Indeed, Dr. Reedy's January 8, 
2010 note does not reflect that he told Claimant to _hold his low back complaints in abeyance). 
The letter only reflects that in December of 2011 Claimant came to Dr. Reedy stating that Dr. ' . . . 
Reedy had previously told Claimant that investigation of Claimant's lumbar spine would be 
deferred pending treatment of the cervical sp'ine. 
23. However, in his December 10, 2011 letter to Claimant's counsel, Dr. Reedy 
reported the following history of Claimant's low back complaints following the 2009 motor 
vehicle accident: "In addition, his lumbar spine, which he has complained about since the 
accident, has never been investigated and I would request authorization to perform an MRI if you 
get his case file reopened." (Cit. Ex. 5, p. 176). If Claimant persistently claimed about low back 
and lower extremity complaints following the 2009 motor vehicle accident, he either did not 
share these complaints with Dr. Reedy, or Dr. Reedy failed to make note of these symptoms. 
24. Nor does Claimant appear to have shared his persistent low back complaints with 
his attorney prior to December of 2011. Counsel's June 17, 2010 letter to Dr. Reedy describes 
Claimant's cervical spine and left upper extremity complaints and poses a number of questions to 
Dr. Reedy about Claimant's residual functional capacity, and whether Claimant is at risk for 
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accelerated degeneration of cervical spme segments above and below the C5-C7 fusion. 
However, that letter does nothing to suggest that counsel was aware of an as yet untreated low 
back complaints. 
25. Between January of 20 IO and December of 2011, Claimant also continued to be 
seen at the GFHC. (See Cit. Ex. 6). The GFHC note of March 15, 2010 makes no reference to 
Claimant's low back or lower extremities. The April 2, 2010 note reflects that Claimant was 
able to walk with a normal gait with no visible signs of scoliosis. He had full spinal range of 
motion without pain and was able to touch his toes. Hip motion was full bilaterally. Patrick's 
test was negative and Claimant had negative straight-leg raising on both sides. Motor strength 
was 5/5 in both lower extremities and sensation was intact to light touch in both legs. Knee jerk 
and ankle jerk reflexes were 2+ bilaterally. Identical findings were noted in an April 7, 2010 
chart note and Claimant reported that the back pain associated with his cough was gone. The 
June 4, 2010 office visit note makes no reference to Claimant's low back or lower extremities 
and Claimant specifically denied that there were additional symptoms to report. On June 21, 
20 IO Claimant presented to the GFHC with complaints of back pain which Claimant described 
as "new." Claimant's discomfo1t was located in the right mid-back. He described a sudden 
onset of symptoms for three days. Claimant was seen in follow-up for these complaints of mid-
back pain on July 21, 2010. On the occasion of that visit, PA McCready noted the same mid-
back pain with symptoms persisting for a)Jout a month. On exam, Claimant had tightness in the 
paraspinous musculature of the lumbar spine with spasm from Tl2 to S1. By August 17,. 2010, 
Claimant's complaints persisted in the right mid-to-lower back. PA Mccready noted the 
persistence of symptoms over the past three months with insidious onset. However, on exam, no 
back abnormalities were noted. GFHC chart notes from August 30, 2010 reflect a past medical 
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history of chronic back pain and a 1975 right leg fracture. However, on the occasion of the 
August 3 0 exam, Claimant denied back pain or difficulty walking. On October 1, 20 IO Claimant 
reported back pain, among his other complaints. GFHC notes from October 22, 2010, November 
1, 2010, January 6, 2011, January 11, 2011 and February 11, 2011 make no reference to low 
back or lower extremity symptoms. A chart note from June 3, 2011 does reflect arthritic 
complaints in Claimant's wrists, ankles, and feet. However, no complaints of low back 
pain/discomfort are referenced. Gait and station were n01mal. Claimant's hips were normal, 
bilaterally. A chart note from August 3, 2011 does not reflect low back complaints, but does 
note that Claimant presented with normal gait and an ability to stand without difficulty. The note 
referencing the office visit of August 23, 2011 reflects that Claimant denied muscular weakness, 
tingling, or numbness. The August 23, 2011 chait note does not reflect any back complaints. 
Claimant had normal gait and station. Similar findings were noted in the October 14, 2011 office 
visit. 
26. Then, in the chart note memorializing a December 1, 2011 visit, Claimant 
presented to PA McCready with the following complaints: 
The patient is a  other race, Hispanic or Latino male who presents a 
history of lumbar region pain which began two weeks ago. He describes the pain 
as moderate in severity and radiating into the right leg and left leg. The onset of 
the back pain was gradual and began without a clear precipitating event. 
The pain is aggravated by prolonged standing and sitting. The pain is alleviated 
by change of position and rest. He states that the pain does not wake him from 
sleep and the pain is improved in the morning. He also complains of left leg 
paresis, right leg paresis and cough, right lw1g discomfort, rhinorrhea ... 
(Cit. Ex. 6, p. 288). Neurologic exam of Claimant's lower extremities was normal. PA 
McCready diagnosed Claimant as suffering from sciatica. Five days later, Claimant was seen by 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND ORDER - 18 
354
Dr. Reedy, who noted Claimant's low back and lower extremity complaints which had no
t been 
referenced in Dr. Reedy's records since January of 2010. 
27. Following Claimant's cervical spine surgery, Dr. Reedy refened Claimant to 
Gregory Schweiger, M.D., for evaluation of persistent left upper extremity complain
ts. Dr. 
Schweiger first saw Claimant on April 28, 20 I 0. His note does not reflect that Cl
aimant 
described any lumbar spine or lower extremity problems. MRI evaluation of Clai
mant's 
shoulder demonstrated a rotator cuff tear. 
28. Dr. Schweiger arranged for Claimant to be seen by Dr. Hessing, who first 
examined Claimant on November 2, 2010. (Cit. Ex. 8, p. 409). Dr. Hessing report
ed that 
Claimant injured his shoulder in the 2009 motor vehicle accident as well as his cervical
 spine. 
Dr. Hessing noted that Claimant had suffered from left shoulder pain since the motor 
vehicle 
accident. Per Dr. Hessing, Claimant's August 23, 2010 left shoulder MRI was read as sho
wing a 
large intrasubstance tear of the supraspinatus tendon. EMG evaluation of Claimant's left
 upper 
extremity was also thought to show an ulnar neuropathy at the elbow. Dr. H
essing 
recommended shoulder surgery to include probable rotator cuff repair and decompression
 of the 
shoulder joint. (Cit. Ex. 8, p. 409). Dr. Hessing's initial evaluation of Claimant does not 
reflect 
that Claimant presented with complaints of low back or lower extremity problems. 
29. On November 2, 2010 Claimant was also evaluated by Mark Clawson, M.D., for 
suspected left cubital tunnel syndrome. Dr. Clawson's initial evaluation does not refle
ct any 
complaints oflow back or lower extremity problems. 
30. On December 9, 2010, Claimant underwent left ulnar nerve neurolysis and 
anterior subcutaneous nerve transposition performed by Dr. Clawson, along with a left sh
oulder 
decompression, labral debridement, and rotator cuff repair performed by Dr. Hessing. 
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31. Claimant was rated and released by Dr. Hessing for his shoulder injm-y on April 
20, 2011. Dr. Hessing reported that Claimant was working at his regular job, and felt that his 
residual left shoulder symptoms were tolerable. Claimant did note some residual neck difficulty, 
but Dr. Hessing noted that Claimant would be seen by Dr. Reedy for care/evaluation of these 
complaints. Dr. Hessing gave Claimant an impainnent rating of 5% of the upper extremity and 
released him to retm-n to his pre-injury job without restriction. 
32. On November 8, 2011, Claimant was seen for a closing evaluation by Dr. 
Clawson. D
0
r. Clawson noted that recent electrodiagnostic testing demonstrated nmmal nerve 
function in the left upper extremity. Claimant described symptoms that were more compatible 
with cervical spine pathology. Dr. Clawson also noted, for the first time, that Claimant presented 
with complaints of lower back pain. Dr. Clawson recommended that Claimant visit with Dr. 
Reedy regarding his neck and low back complaints. (Cit. Ex. 8, p. 456). 
33. As Claimant neared medical stability following his cervical spine surgery, Surety 
atrnnged for Claimant to be evaluated by Mark J. Harris, M.D. In his July 26, 2010 introductory 
letter, TJ Matiin, Claims Examiner for Surety, introduced Claimant to Dr. Harris. He provided 
Dr. Harris with all medical records in possession of the Fund relating to Claimant's claim and 
provided a very brief history of Claimant's treatment. Importantly, Mr. Matiin indicated that in 
his last conversation with Mr. Ayala, Claimant indicated that he was having some lower 
extremity pain and numbness. Mr. Martin's letter coincides with the GFHC treatment notes from 
June 21, July 21, and August 7, 2010 reflecting new onset of back pain. Mr. Martin posed a 
number of questions to Dr. Harris relating to Claimant's current status, need for medical 
treatment, impairment, and restrictions. Dr. Harris saw Claimant for evaluation on August 2, 
2010. He took history from Claimant concerning the occurrence of the accident, his post-
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accident symptoms, and his treatment to date. Dr. Harris also elicited from Claimant a 
description of Claimant's then-current complaints. Dr. Harris reported these complaints as 
follows: 
CURRENT STATUS: The examinee's chief complaint is decreased range of 
motion and pain in the neck and left arm pain. I asked him several times in several 
different ways if he has any other areas of concern and he stated no. It was not 
until later that I asked him about the left leg symptoms and he stated those have 
now resolved and he has no fmther concerns about that area. He reports difficulty 
with pain, primarily located in the neck and left arm. Pain is described as stabbing 
in the left shoulder anteriorly, laterally, and down the arm into the fingers, 
specifically the small, ring, and long fingers. He states he always has numbness in 
the thumb and index fingers as well. The pain is worsened by resting his arm after 
work and improved by taking pain medications. The pain is reported as constant. 
On a scale of 0/10 which is no pain and 10/10 which is excruciating pain he 
reports the pain is a 6-7/10. During the past month he has averaged 2/10-3/10 with 
a high of 10/10 and a low of2/10-3/10. The examinee also reports difficulty with 
activity using the left hand carrying over 20 pounds and difficulty with grip. He 
denies any symptoms prior to the motor vehicle collision on 10/06/09. 
(Cit. Ex. 20, p. 603). Therefore, Claimant was provided with a number of opportunities to 
describe all symptoms from which he was then suffeting. Claimant was specifically asked about 
lower extremity complaints. Claimant said that his lower extremity complaints had resolved and 
were no longer an issue. Claimant did not describe any low back complaints. Dr. Harris did 
relate Claimant's cervical spine and left upper extremity complaints to the subject accidents and 
proposed that Claimant was in need of fmther medical care for treatment/evaluation of these 
conditions. Nevertheless, he felt that Mr. Ayala was capable of working at his time-of-injury job 
since he was evidently doing so at the time of Dr. Harris' evaluation. However, pending MRl 
evaluation of the shoulder, Dr. Harris felt it appropriate to limit Claimant's lifting to 50 pounds. 
34. By letter dated June 27, 2011, Mr. Martin again asked for Dr. Harris to evaluate 
Claimant as he neared medical stability following the surgeries performed by Drs. Hessing and 
Clawson. Mr. Martin asked Dr. Harris to asce1tain whether Claimant was at a point of medical 
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stability, and if so, whether he had pe1manent impairment referable to his work injuries, as well 
as work-related limitations/restrictions. 
35. Claimant was seen by Dr. Harris for the second time on August 15, 2011. Dr. 
HatTis again asked Claimant to describe his cunent complaints. Those complaints included left 
hand pain with some residual pain in the shoulder and neck. Claimant described his discomfort 
as cramping pain. He described the pairl as constant. Dr. Harris did not record any low back or 
lower extremity difficulties as described by Claimant. Dr. Hanis felt that Claimant had reached 
medical stability following his neck, shoulder, and elbow surgeries. Dr. Hanis felt that Claimant 
was entitled to a 6% whole person impairment for his neck condition, a 5% upper extremity 
impairment for his shoulder condition, and no impairment for his ulnar nerve condition. 
36. Dr. Harris noted that as of August 15, 2011, none of Claimant's treating 
physicians had imposed restrictions on Claimant's functional activities. However, Dr. Harris felt 
that Claimant should use caution in overhead activities and heavy lifting even though his treaters 
had not issned such restrictions. (Clt. Ex. 20, p. 618). 
37. As developed infra, after Claimant presented to Dr. Reedy in December of 2011 
with complaints of low back pain, Dr. Reedy refened Claimant to Michael Hajjar, M.D., for 
evaluation of the low back complaints. Dr. Hajjar eventually requested authorization to perform 
an 14-S1 decompression and fusion. By letter dated August 30, 2012, Claims Examiner Martin 
asked Dr. Hanis to review additional records generated since August 15, 2011, and to provide 
his analysis of whether Claimant's low back condition is causally related to the subject 2009 
motor vehicle accident. By letter dated September 21, 2012, Dr. Hanis noted that at the time of 
his initial evaluation of Claimant, Claimant had been asked to describe his problems and only 
reported neck and left arm injuries. The pain diagram filled out by Claimant only denoted 
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burning and stabbing pain in the left upper shoulder area. Dr. Hanis also noted the September 9, 
2009 chart note from the GFHC and the May 21, 2007 chart note from the same facility, both of 
which, as discussed above, reference low back pain. Concerning the May 2 I, 2007 chart note, 
Dr. Hanis noted: 
In reviewing the records from John Booth on 05/21 /07 it shows hip pain under the 
subjective main complaint: "This is a  farmer complaining of right hip 
and SI area pain for over two years with no recent trauma. He did have injury to 
the area in 1974; no fracture. He has more pain after Inactive [sic] sitting in 
tractor and then tries to walk. He also has progressive pain in the lateral hip when 
walking in the fields. He expresses no new radicular or neuritic pain." 
(Cit. Ex. 20, p. 629). Dr. Harris also had the opportunity to review records generated by Drs. 
Clawson, Schweiger, and Hessing at Orthopedic Associates. Dr. Harris enoneously described 
Dr. Clawson's note of November 8, 201°1 as having been authored on October 6, 2009. As 
developed above, Dr. Clawson's note of November 8, 2011 contains the first reference in the 
Orthopedic Associates notes of "lower back pain." At any rate, following his review of the 
records supplied by the State Insurance Fund, Dr. HaiTis opined that Claimant's complaints of 
low back pain are not causally related to the industrial accident. This conclusion is based on Dr. 
Harris' observations that there is evidence of low back pain which predates the subject accident 
and no medical evidence supporting the proposition that Claimant presented with complaints of 
low back pain following the subject aycident. (Cit. Ex. 20, p. 630). Based on Dr. Harris' letter of 
September 21, 2012, Surety denied responsibility for Claimant's low back condition. 
38. Following Dr .. Reedy's letter to PA McCready of December 10, 2011, 
authorization for MRI evaluation of Claimant's lumbar spine was requested. That study was 
perfo1med on January 16, 2012 and was read as-follows: 
LUMBAR DISK LEVELS: 
Ll-2: Normal for age. 
L2-3: Normal for age. 
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13-4: Disc desiccation with mild bulging. Mild bilateral facet arthrop
athy. Mild 
canal and mild bilateral foraminal stenosis. 
14-5: Disc desiccation with mild bulging. Moderate bilateral facet de
generation. 
There is mild canal and moderate bilateral foraminal stenosis. 
15-S I: Disc desiccation with mild bulging. Moderate bilateral facet de
generation. 
There is mild canal and moderate bilateral foraminal stenosis. 
CONCLUSION: Old Tl2 compression fracture with mild height los
s. No acute 
fracture. No Iisthesis. 
Lumbar spondylosis with moderate bilateral 14/5 and LS/S 1 foramin
al stenosis. 
There is mild canal and foraminal stenosis elsewhere, as detailed above
. 
Cit. Ex. 11, p. 488. Thereafter, Dr. Reedy ordered a CT myelogram o
f Claimant's lumbar spine 
which was performed on April 3, 2012. That study was read as follows
: 
Stable mild vertebral spurring throughout the lumbar spine. Mild defo
rmity of the 
ventral thecal sac contour particularly at the L4-5 level to a lesser ext
ent through 
out the lumbar spine without significant lateralizing mass effect. In
 particular 
there is no significant displacement of lumbar nerve roots or underfi
lling of the 
nerve root sleeves at Ll-15 levels. There is underfilling of the theca
l sac at the 
lumbosacral junction and for opacification of the S 1 nerve root sleeve
s. There is 
facet arthropathy at 14-5 and 15-S I levels. There is no new significa
nt vertebral 
malalignment. 
Cit. Ex. 11, p. 489 
39. In April of 2012, Dr. Reedy referred Claimant to Dr. Hajjar for
 further evaluation 
of Claimant's lumbar spine. 
40. Dr. Hajjar first saw Claimant on June 23, 2012. At that time
, Claimant gave a 
history to Dr. Hajjar that he suffered from back and lower extremity pa
in which Claimant related 
to the motor vehicle accident of October 6, 2009. Dr. Hajjar reviewed
 prior radiological studies, 
concluding that they demonstrated anterolisthesis at 14-5 "likely deg
enerative in nature." Dr. 
Hajjar also noted findings of bilateral recess stenosis and foraminal st
enosis at 14-5 and LS-S l. 
Per Dr. Hajjar, the studies demonstrated impingement of both the L4
 and LS nerve roots. Dr. 
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Hajjar counseled Claimant that his back condition might be amenable to surgical treatment. He 
recommended a bone scan to further evaluate Claimant's low back. When seen again by Dr. 
Hajjar on August 7, 2012, Claimant expressed continuing back and lower extremity pain, as well 
as difficulties with standing, walking, and other activities. Dr. Hajjar reiterated Claimant's 
radiographic findings, apparently consisting largely of degenerative pathology. Dr. Hajjar 
recommended L4 through SI decompression and fusion. 
41. By letter dated November 14, 2012 to Claims Examiner Martin, Dr. Hajjar 
responded to the several reports generated by Dr. Hall'is by this date. Dr. Hajjar erroneously 
noted that Dr. HatTis had not, by this time, expressed an opinion on the etiology of Claimant's 
low back complaints.3 Regardless, Dr. Hajjar stated that like Dr. Reedy, he believed Claimant's 
low back complaints are causally related to the subject accident, although his November 14, 
2012 letter to Claims Examiner Martin does not elaborate on what persuaded him to this point of 
view. Time passed, and Dr. Hajjat· was not again quizzed about the causation issue until the date 
of hearing approached. 
42. By letter dated January 6, 2016, Defense counsel provided Dr. Hajjar with the 
pre-injury treatment records from the GFHC generated in the fall of 2009, and invited Dr. Hajjar 
to revisit the question of the cause of Claimant's low back and lower extremity complaints. In 
his response of January 27, 2016, Dr. Hajjar acknowledged receipt of the GFHC records from 
September 9, 2009 and October 5, 2009. His review of those records led him to agree with Paul 
Montalbano's, M.D., view that, at most, Claimant suffered a temporai·y and self-limiting 
exacerbation of his lumbar spine condition as a consequence of the October 6, 2009 accident. 
(Cit. Ex. 10, p. 472A). However, there the matter did not rest because, on February 4, 2016, 
3 In his September 21, 2012 report, Dr. Harris explained that certain pre-injury medical records, including GFHC 
records from May 21, 2007 and September 9, 2009 supported his conclusion that Claimant's low back complaints 
are not causally related to the subject accident. · 
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Claimant's counsel authored an extensive letter to Dr. Hajjar i
n which Dr. Hajjar was again. 
invited to visit the issue of the cause of Claimant's current low
 back complaints and need for 
surgery. Counsel's February 4, 2016 letter is worthy of futiher
 comment. As he did in other 
letters to providers/evaluators, Claimant's counsel introduced hi
s questions with the following 
narrative: 
From my perspective, Mr. Ayala presents as a rather straight-for
ward but rather 
unsophisticated individual. Mr. Ayala's principal language is Sp
anish, although 
he can and does communicate in English at a base level. Followi
ng his industrial 
motor vehicle accident, Mr. Ayala focused his complaints upon
 what was then 
causing him the greatest difficulty and produced the greatest s
ymptomatology. 
Although logical, this approach results in an absence of medical r
ecords for other 
than primary or more obvious presentments and oft-times in confu
sion or medical 
disagreement upon the issue of casual relation of the 'medical pre
sentment to the 
injury in question, following a delay in appropriate diagnosis and 
treatment of that 
condition. · 
(Cit. Ex. 10, p. 472G-472H). Concerning Claimant's past med
ical history, while Claimant's 
counsel did synopsize for Dr. Hajjar the GFHC records from Sept
ember 14, 2007 forward, he did 
not advise Dr. Hajjar of earlier records from GFHC which do 
reflect a history of low back 
symptomatology. (Clt. Ex. 10, p. 472i). For example, Dr. Hajjar
 does not appear to have been 
. . ' ' . ' 
. 
made aware of the May 21, 2007 notes which reflect compla
ints of right hip and SI joint 
discomfort for two years without recent trauma. (Cit. Ex. 3, p. 
115). Fmiher, as he did in his 
letter to PA Mccready of January 5, 2016, Claimaiit's'counsel p
roposed to Dr. Hajjar that the 
complaints with which Claimant presented to PA McCready on
 September 9 and October 5, 
2009 were not of the type that warranted further workup for injmy
 to the low back. (Cit. Ex. 10, 
p. 4721). Claimant's counsel further represented that Dr. Reedy c
onfirmed that he told Claimant 
to hold his low back complaints in abeyance until Dr. Reedy .ha
d finished treating Claimant's 
cervical spine. (Cit. Ex. 10, p. 472J). (Dr. Reedy has never confit
med that he recalls having this 
conversation with Claimant.) Finally, in his February 4, 2016 l
etter to Dr. Hajjar, Claimant's 
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counsel represented that Claimant's low back and lower extremity symptomatology has persisted 
ever since the October 6, 2009 motor vehicle accident. This is, assuredly, an assertion which 
Claimant now makes, but to say that it is a fact is ,not completely accurate; the record just as 
easily supports the proposition that Claimant's low back complaints have waxed and waned 
following the October 6, 2009 motor vehicle accident. 
43. With that background, Claimant's counsel then asked Dr. Hajjar whether it would 
be appropriate to revisit the opinion he gave to Defense counsel on January 27, 2016. 
44. In his Febrnary 19, 2016 letter to Claimant's counsel, Dr. Hajjar did, indeed, 
revise his opinion. Informing Dr. Hajjar'.s change of hemi is his conclusion that the GFHC 
records do not demonstrate any history of low back complaints prior to the subject accident. 
I 
Concerning the notes of September 9, 2009 and October 5, 2009, Dr. Hajjar concluded that these 
notes suggest a condition that "sounds more like a flu" versus any type of mechanical low back 
issue. He also noted that PA McCready did not order any follow-up radiological testing which 
would have been a logical next step had PA McCready entertained the possibility of mechanical 
low back problems in September 2009. These records and reasoning caused Dr. Hajjar to change 
his opinion and rejoin Dr. Reedy in supp01iing a causal relationship between the motor vehicle 
accident and Claimant's low back complaints. (See Cit. Ex. 10, p. 472E-F). 
45. On August 28, 2013, Claimant suffered the second of the two accidents which are 
the subject of this proceeding. On that date, Claimant fell from an 8 foot ladder, landing on his 
feet, but, in the process, flexing his right knee. He experienced the immediate onset of right lmee 
pain. He was initially evaluated at the Nampa Medical Center on the day of accident. He was 
seen for futiher treatment of his right lmee by Miers Johnson, M.D., on September 11, 2013. Dr. 
Johnson noted Claimant's history of prior right knee surgeries, but also noted that Claimant had 
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had no significant problems with the right knee since the last surgery in 1987. He noted that as 
of the 2013 right knee injury, Claimant had been working full time, without restrictions, even 
though he had some pain/discomfort in his low back and lower extremities.' Claimant admitted 
to being able to drive farm equipment, but to having trouble with any climbing or prolonged 
standing or pivoting. Claimant did not believe that the 2013 accident aggravated his low back 
condition and, indeed, no such assertion is made in these proceedings. MRI evaluation of the 
right knee revealed severe tri-compartmental degenerative changes and a chronic fracture of the 
posterior tibial plateau and the posterior lateral tibia. Also noted was a chronic avulsion of the 
posterior crnciate ligament tibial. insertion. Within all three compartments of the knee, areas of 
full thickness cartilage loss were identified. Dr. Johnson noted that while Claimant assuredly 
had pre-existing osteoarthritis of the knee, some of the findings were likely referable to the 
subject accident. Dr. Johnson recommended a right total knee arthroplasty, and this procedure 
was performed on or about May 6, 2014. (Cit. Ex. 13, p. 514). Dr. Johnson released Claimant 
from care on or about September 24, 2014. At that time, Claimant denied any pain in the right 
knee, noting that he was driving tractor and otherwise performing his job. He denied any trouble 
walking on uneven surfaces, although he did admit to some difficulty after long periods of time 
on his feet. However, Dr. Johnson noted that Claimant related this discomfo1t to his back. 
Claimant indicated that long periods of standing and walking produced pain radiating into both 
anterior thighs and legs, and that he had pem1anent numbness in his left anterior thigh. 
46. On September 22, 2014, Dr. Johnson released Claimant to full duty work. He did 
not give Claimant any restrictions regarding walking related to Claimant's right lmee 
arthroplasty. However, he did believe that Claimant should be followed for his low back and 
lower extremity complaints. (Cit. Ex. 13, p. 525). 
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47. Dr. Johnson referred Claimant to Fred Shoemaker, M.D
., for the purposes of 
rating Claimant's right knee injury. That rating was perfotmed 
on October 6, 2014. Claimant 
told Dr. Shoemaker that he felt he had had a good result from 
the knee replacement surgery. 
Based on Claimant's good outcome, confirmed by clinical 
exam, Dr. Shoemaker felt it 
appropriate to give Claimant a 21 % impairment rating of the lo
wer extremity referable to his 
right knee, one-half of which Dr. Shoemaker related to Clai
mant's pre-existing right knee 
condition. Dr. Shoemaker was aware that Dr. Johnson ha
d released Claimant without 
restrictions, but Dr. Shoemaker did not speak to limitations/restri
ctions as part of his evaluation. 
(Cit. Ex. 14, pp. 53 8-540). 
48. From the record it appears that·. Dr. Johnson refer
red Claimant to Paul 
Montalbano, M.D., for further care/evaluation of Claimant's low b
ack condition. Dr. Montalbano 
saw Claimant for the first time on October 15, 2014. Claimant ga
ve Dr. Montalbano a history of 
the October 6, 2009 accident, and that he had suffered from low 
back pain ever since that event. 
Shortly after the motor vehicle accident, Claimant described not
ing bilateral and anterior thigh 
discomfort as well as numbness and tingling into his extremiti
es going down into the lateral 
aspect of his leg to his foot. He denied having any lower extremi
ty symptomatology prior to the 
motor vehicle accident. He described his back pain as constant bu
rning pain at level 7 on a scale 
0/10. Dr. Montalbano recommenqed new imaging of Claimant's
 lumbat spine to include x-rays 
and MRI evaluation. Instead, it appe\lrs that a myelogram 
and post-myelogram CT were 
perfmmed on October 31, 2014. The post-myelogram CT w
as read as follows by Jeffrey 
Pugsley, M.D.,: 
T12-Ll: 2 mm of grade 1 retrolisthesis of T12 on LI with mild 
disc height loss. 
Mild central canal narrowing secondary to the retrolisthesis. M
ild right neural 
foraminal narrowing secondary to the retrolisthesis. 
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Ll-L2: 2 mm of grade 1 retrolisthesis of LI on L2 with mild disc height loss. 
Mild central canal narrowing secondary to the retrolisthesis, small disc bulge, and 
mild facet arthropathy. Moderate right and mild left neural foraminal narrowing 
secondary to the retrolisthesis and facet arthropathy. 
L2-L3: Mild central canal narrowing secondary to a small disc bulge and mild 
facet arthropathy. Mild bilateral neural foraminal narrowing secondary to facet 
arthropathy and disc bulge. 
L3-L4: Mild central canal narrowing secondary to a small disc bulge and mild 
facet arthropathy. Mild bilateral neural foraminal narrowing secondary to facet 
arthropathy and disc bulge. 
L4-L5: Mild central canal narrowing secondary to a small disc bulge and 
moderate facet arthropathy. Moderate to severe bilateral neural foraminal 
narrowing secondary to endplate osteophytes and facet arthropathy. 
L5-S 1: Mild central canal narrowing secondary to severe facet arthropathy. 
Severe right and moderate left neural foraminal nerve secondary to facet 
arthropathy and endplate osteophytes. 
(Cit. Ex. 19, pp. 591-592). Flexion/extension films of the lumbar spine demonstrated multi-level 
degenerative disc disease, most pronounced at Tl2-LI, multi-level facet degeneration, most 
prominent at 13-4 thru LS-SI, and a Grade I retrolisthesis of Ll on L2, unchanged on 
flexion/extension. 
49. In his letter to Dr. Johnson of November 7, 2014, Dr. Montalbano expressed his 
agreement with Dr. Pugsley's interpretation of the post-myelogram CT. On exam, Claimant's 
muscle strength was 5/5 in both upper and lower extremities. Claimant did exhibit antalgic gait 
and station. Deep tendon reflexes were normal, and Claimant's sensory exam was intact. 
50. Claimant was again seen by Dr. Montalbano on February 25, 2015, following a 
course of physical therapy. He presented with continued complaints of low back pain and lower 
extremity symptomatology. Dr. Montalbano ordered a bone scan in an effort to further sort out 
Claimant's problems. That study, performed on March 20, 2015, showed uptake at the right L4-5 
facet joint, and bilaterally at LS-SJ. (See Clt. Ex. 19, p. 595). In his note of April 8, 2013, Dr. 
Montalbano described the bone scan results as "quite mild." Dr. Montalbano recommended a 
facet joint injection from which Claimant enjoyed only limited improvement. Subsequent 
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neurological exam was nmmal. Dr. Montalbano recommended continuation of conservative 
modalities, including physical therapy and weight loss. 
51. By June 3, 2015, Dr. Montalbano reported that Claimant was much improved 
with conservative modalities. Based on Claimant's improvement, and his limited findings on the 
post-myelogram CT, Dr. Montalbano did not believe that Claimant was a surgical candidate. 
52. By letter dated June 22, 2015, Claimant's counsel queried Dr. Montalbano as to 
whether or not Claimant's lumbar spine condition is causally related to the subject MV A. Again, 
Claimant's counsel made the representation that Claimant's practice, when meeting with treaters, 
is to withhold history of secondary complaints and reference to treaters/evaluators only those 
problems that are of greater significance. (Cit. Ex. 17, p. 577) 
53. Claimant's counsel's letter of June 22, 2015 does reflect that he provided Dr. 
Montalbano with selected medical records, includi1:1g records from Dr. Reedy and Mountain 
Home Physical Therapy. Counsel's letter does not reflect that he provided Dr. Montalbano with 
copies of the September 9 and October 5, 2009 chart notes from the GFHC, but Counsel did 
offer the following comments concerning Claimant's pre-injury low back complaints: 
Upon Dr .. Hajj er recommending lumbar surgery, the State Insurance Fund 
required that Mr. Ayala undergo an IME by Dr. Mark Harris, with Idaho Physical 
Medicine & Rehabilitation. Dr. Harris' opinions were not upon actual 
examination of Mr. Ayala,· but were based upon a review of medical records 
provided by the State Insurance Fund. Following the records review, Dr. Harris 
noted that Mr. Ayala did present prior to the October 6, 2009, motor vehicle 
accident with sporadic complaints of low back symptomatology. When 
questioned about this, Mr. Ayala responded that he is a "farm-worker," and that 
all farm-workers experience low back pain upon occasion. 
(Cit. Ex. 17, p. 579). Therefore, while Dr. Montalbano was generally apprised of Claimant's 
sporadic pre-injury back complaints, he was not specifically apprised of the September 9 and 
October 5, 2009 GFHC visits, nor was he provided with copies of those notes. He was, however, 
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provided with a synopsis of some of Claimant's medical contacts between October 5, 2009 and 
December 2011 chronicling Claimant's complaints of low back and lower extremity discomfort. 
Dr. Montalbano was asked whether, against this background, he would agree that the medical 
evidence establishes a causal connection between the motor vehicle accident and Claimant's 
current low back condition. Dr. Montalbano's reply of July 8, 2015 reveals something about the 
assumptions he made in forming a response to Counsel's question. Dr. Montalbano premised his 
conclusions on the observation that it was "clear" that Claimant suffered from symptomatic low 
back complaints "since that motor vehicle accident," but that he had been "asymptomatic" prior 
to the motor vehicle accident. Therefore, Dr. Montalbano concluded that Claimant's 
symptomatology is directly related to the October 6, 2009 MV A. 
54. By letter dated September 30, 2015, Defense counsel provided Dr. Montalbano 
with the GFHC records from September 9, 2009 and October 5, 2009 and inquired of Dr. 
Montalbano how or whether those records would cause him to revisit his opinion that Claimant's 
low back complaints are causally related to the subject motor vehicle accident. In his reply of 
October 8, 2015 Dr. Montalbano explained that the opinions contained in his July 8, 2015 letter 
to Claimant's counsel were based on limited medical records. After reviewing the pre-injury 
GFHC records, Dr. Montalbano stated: 
After reviewing the additional medical records provided to me via your office, it 
is quite clear that Mr. Mario G. Ayala was symptomatic in terms of low back pain 
on at least two separate occasions. He was evaluated for low back pain on 
September 9, 2009 and once again on October 5, 2009. The latter was one day 
prior to his motor vehicle accident of October 6, 2009, in which Mr. Ayala 
attributes all of his symptomatology to be related to. Within these two visits of 
September 9, 2009, as well as October 5, 2009, Mr. Ayala started on treatment on 
two separate occasions for low back pain and even received a prescription for a 
nonsteroidal anti-inflammatory agent in order to manage such pain. 
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(Clt. Ex. 21, p. 639). Dr. Montalbano concluded that, at most, the October 6, 2009 motor vehicle 
accident caused but a temporary sprain/strain which he would have expected to be of relatively 
short duration. Dr. Montalbano's October 8, 2015 letter suggests that any care required later than 
4-6 weeks after the motor vehicle accident would be related to Claimant's underlying 
degenerative condition. In his letter of October 3, 2016, Dr. Montalbano stated that none of the 
records/materials generated by Dr. Hammond would cause him to revise any of his previously-
stated opinions. 
55. Dr. Montalbano's testimony was taken by way of post-hearing deposition. Dr. 
Montalbano testified that he had the opportunity to review both the 2012 and 2014 post-
myelogram CT studies. Those studies did not reveal any progression of Claimant's condition 
between 2012 and 2014. Dr. Montalbano also testified that none of the post-accident lumbar 
spine studies provide any support for the proposition that Claimant suffered an acute iajury to his 
lumbar spine as a consequence of the motor vehicle accident. (Montalbano Depo., pp. 29:24-
30:22; 37:8-38:9; 92:21-93:12; 116:12-22). While Claimant's lumbar spine studies do 
demonstrate severe multi-level degenerative arthritis, facet disease, and anterolisthesis, neither 
the studies, nor Dr. Montalbano's clinical examination demonstrated that Claimant has 
impingement of existing nerve roots. (Montalbano Depo., pp. 12: 19-13:15; 16:23-17:6; 65:3-
66: 17). On exam, Claimant's lower extremity symptoms did not follow a de1matomal pattern 
suggestive of nerve root compromise. (Moptalbano Depo., pp. 13:7-15; 16:23-6). Because of the 
lack of findings suggestive of nerve root compromise/radiculopathy, Dr. Montalbano does not 
believe that Claimant is a surgical candidate, especially after Claimant experienced improvement 
in symptoms following the course of physical therapy ordered by Dr. Montalbano. 
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56. Dr. Montalbano originally opined that based on Claimant's lack of pre-injury low 
back symptoms, and the development of symptoms following the accident, it followed that 
Claimant's low back condition must be, in some respect, referable to the subject accident. Dr. 
Montalbano changed his mind after reviewing the September 9 and October 6, 2009 GFHC 
notes. Contrary to the narrative proposed by Claimant's counsel, Dr. Montalbano saw nothing in 
those notes which suggested that Claimant's low back complaints were mediated by some type 
of systemic ailment such as the flu, or other illness. Medications prescribed for Claimant on 
September 9, 2009, Naprosyn and Flexeril, are medications typically prescribed for 
musculoskeletal pain. (Montalbano Depa., pp. 26:24-28:23; 79:25-92:7). Therefore, from his 
review of the medical records, Dr. Montalbano concluded that in the years preceding the October 
6, 2009 motor vehicle a~cident, Claimant had periodic problems with low back pain and that 
immediately prior to the motor vehicle accident, he had one of these episodes. 
57. Dr. Montalbano recognized that Claimant's course following the subject accident 
is equally important. For example, he appears to concede that if Dr. Reedy is c01Tect in 
supposing that Claimant had "unrelenting" low back/lower extremity discomfort since the 
subject accident, this fact would auger in favor of a conclusion that the subject accident did 
something to aggravate or accelerate Claimant's low back problems on a permanent basis. 
However, the medical records do not support the proposition that Claimant suffered from 
persistent/unrelenting low back pain ever since the subject accident. (Montalbano Depo., pp. 
30:23-31:19; 32:11-37:3). Based on the failure of the record to document persistent and 
unrelenting low back pain following the October 6, 2009 MV A, the existence of medical records 
which document a lade of low back symptoms/findings at various times after the October 6, 2009 
accident, arid other medical records which document new occurrences of low back pain 
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following periods of no low back symptomatology, Dr. Montalbano believed
 that the subject 
accident caused, at most, a temporary exacerbation of Claimant's documented 
pre-existing low 
back condition. 
58. Richard Hammond, M.D., first saw Claimant on September 10, 2010, o
n referral 
from PA McCready. Dr. Hammond took a history from Claimant concerning 
the accident and 
the cervical spine surgery previously performed by Dr. Reedy. Dr. Hammond
 noted that since 
the accident Claimant suffered from continued pain across the top of his left s
houlder and had 
difficulty using his left mm. Dr. Hammond did not report that Claimant pre
sented with any 
complaints of low back or lower extremity pain. Nor did Dr. Hammond's clini
cal exam suggest 
any findings indicative of low back problems. Dr. Hammond believed th
at Claimant had 
possible ulnar nerve and left shoulder problems and recommended further evalu
ation. (See Clt. 
Ex. 9, pp. 458-459). Dr. Hainmond next saw Claimant on October !, 2013 f
or complaints of 
blacking out. On the occasion of that visit, Dr. Hammond noted that Claiman
t did have some 
low back complaints for which he had been
1 
evaluated by Dr. Hajjar. Also noted was the 2013 
industrial injury to Claimant's right knee. Claimant was next seen by Dr. Ham
mond on August 
1, 2016, at the instance of Claimant's counsel. Counsel re-introduced Claimant t
o Dr. Hammond 
by way ofa letter dated June 22, 2016.
4 Among other things, Claimant's counsel inquired of Dr. 
Hmnmond whether Claimant's low back condition is causally related to the 
October 6, 2009 
motor vehicle accident. To Dr. Hammond, Claimant gave a history of having
 significant low 
back pain commencing immediately after the subject motor vehicle accident. 
Concerning the 
September 9, 2009 and October 5, 2009 GFHC notes, Claimant told Dr. Hammo
nd that the back 
4 As he did with Dr. Hajjar, Counsel synopsized Claimant's pre-injury medica
l history, noting that Claimant had not 
presented to tJ,e GFHC with any low back complaints between September 14
, 2007 and September 9, 2009, 
Claimant's Counsel did not include a synopsis ofGFHC and Kieffer Chiropr
actic records generated between 
November 2001 and September of 2007. As noted infi'a, these records do reference e
pisodes of low back, SI joint, or 
hip pain during this time frame. 
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complaints he had prior to the motor vehicle accident were of an entirely different nature than the 
low back complaints he developed thereafter. He reiterated that his low back complaints have 
been persistent since the motor vehicle accident. Based on Claimant's history, the records 
provided by Claimant's counsel, and his examination of Claimant, Dr. Hammond concluded that 
Claimant's low back condition is causally related to the subject accident. 
59. Dr. Hammond's deposition was taken on December 16, 2016. He testified that 
Claimant had radiographic evidence of L4-5 anterolisthesis with significant bilateral stenosis at 
L5-Sl. Dr. Hammond testified that Claimant's anterolisthesis closed-off Claimant's 
neuroforamina, bilaterally, causing exiting nerve root impingement. Con_ceming the GFHC 
records from September 9, 2009 and Oct_ober 5, 2009, Dr. Hammond agreed with Claimant's 
counsel that these notes are consistent with Claimant's treatment for some type of systemic 
complaint, as opposed to a musculoskeletal low back complaint. (Hammond Depo., pp. 17:18-
20:19). At most, Dr. Hammond believed that the Sep_tember 9 and October 5, 2009 chart notes 
reflected muscular pain, while Claimant's current complaints are referable to a structural 
abnormality. (Hammond Depo., pp. 20:20-21: 17). 
60. Concerning his September 10, 2010 evaluation of Claimant, Dr. Hammond 
testified that unless Claimant had presented with significant low back or lower extremity 
problems, he probably would not have made note of these, since he was seeing Claimant for left 
upper extremity problems. (Hammond Depo., p. 59:3-19). However, review of Dr. Hammond's 
September 10, 2010 chart note demonstrates that he did talce a complete history from Claimant 
that involved inquiries well beyond the apibit of the nature and extent of Claimant's left upper 
extremity complaints. His history and exam of Claimant included Claimant's eyes, ears, nose and 
throat, cardiovascular, respiratory, gastrointestinal, genital/urinary, musculoskeletal, neurologic 
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and neurogenic systems. Claimant was invited to admit to any problems in these areas. Dr. 
Hammond also conducted a limited exam of Claimant's lower extremities. Knee jerk and ankle 
jerk were 1 +. Claimant's gait and station were normal. Per Dr. Hammond, the knee and ankle 
jerk findings, though not normal, were not significant enough to warrant follow-up at that time. 
(Hammond Depo., p. 61 :6-24). 1n summary, in September of 2010, Dr. Hammond noted nothing 
regarding Claimant's low back which would have caused him to refer Claimant for further 
evaluation or treatment. 
61. Dr. Hammond testified that trauma can be one cause of anterolisthesis of the type 
seen in Claimant's lumbar spine. (Hammond Depo., pp. 15:21-16:19). However, he also 
acknowledged that wear and tear in populations that perfo1m heavy labor "can ce1iainly cause" 
anterolisthesis. (Hammond Depo., p. 85:15-21). Dr. Hammond believes that the subject accident 
caused injury to Claimant's Iumbosacral spine and is responsible for Claimant's need for 
surgery. His reasons for coming to this conclusion are several. Dr. Hammond was willing to 
acknowledge that Claimant did have disease of the lumbar spine which predated the subject 
accident. However, he believed that the pre-injury and post-injury medical records he reviewed 
support the conclusion that the subject accident aggravated the pre-existing condition. Dr. 
Hammond believed that Claimant's pre-iajury complaints consisted of a one or two-time visit to 
PA McCready for complaints of low back pain on September 9, 2009 and October 5, 2009, while 
his post-injury complaints have been persistent and unrelenting. (Hammond Depo., pp. 42: 11-
43:7; 79:1-13; 92:15-93:23; 107:18-108:14; 109:23-110:12; 111:14-24; 123:6-124:1). Dr. 
Hammond did not believe that the GFHC notes of September 9, 2009 and October 5, 2009 were 
significant. 
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62. Dr. Hammond was not provided with medical records generated by Dr. Kieffer 
and the GFMC, and discussed at~ 5-7, inji"a. Those records cover a period from a 2001 through 
May, 2007 and do reflect i_nore longstanding complaints of hip/low back discomfort. It is 
unknown whether, or how, the additional notes which he did not see would cause him to amend 
any of the opinions he expressed concerning the significance of the subject accident to the 
development of Claimant's current low back condition. 
63. As noted, Dr. Hammond's opinion is also supported by his belief that Claimant's 
complaints were different in character following the motor vehicle accident and have been 
persistent and umelenting since that time. In this belief he joins with Dr. Reedy: 
Q: [By Mr. Berry]: Basically, Dr. · Reedy advised Mr. Augustine that just 
because Mr. Ayala may have had a backache once in a while prior to the motor-
vehicle accident that - - and here I'm quoting " ... does not preclude the fact that 
the exacerbation of the accident led to the persistent, umelenting pain in the back 
and leg with neurogenic claudication-like symptoms, and he clearly has pathology 
to demonstrate the validity of those claims." Do you agree with that? 
A: I couldn't have said it better. 
(Hammond Depo., p. 111: 14-24). However, as developed irifi·a, the medical records do not 
support the conclusion that Claimant's low back/lower extremity complaints have been persistent 
and umelenting since the subject accident, at least until the late fall of 2011. 
64. Dr. Hammond was in general agreement with the FCE performed by Brian 
Wright, DPT. However, he believed that it might be appropriate to assign more of Claimant's 
sitting, standing, and walking restrictions to the low back condition as opposed to Claimant's 
knee injury. 
65. As noted, Dr. Reedy treated Claimant through December 201 I, but thereafter, 
engaged in some back-and-forth with Claimant's counsel concerning the etiology cif Claimant's 
low back complaints. In a letter dated November 20, 2012, Claimant's counsel introduced a 
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number of questions to Dr. Reedy by first synopsizing medical records tending to support the 
proposition that while Claimant may have had some periodic flares of low back pain prior to the 
subject accident, his complaints have been persistent and unrelenting since the subject accident. 
Claimant's counsel asked Dr. Reedy to confirm that Claimant's low back complaints were, in 
some respect, referable to the subject accident. In his response of December 12, 2012, Dr. Reedy 
stated: 
I clearly think Mr. Ayala's lumbar presentment and need for snrgery that both I 
and Dr. Hajjar issued is causally related to the October 6, 2009 motor vehicle 
accident. Obviously, he did have pre-existing spine (he had worked hard for a 
living fol' his entire life)! However, he was asymptomatic until the time of the 
MV A which precipitated the need for intervention. Please contact me if I can be 
of any further assistance. 
(Cit. Ex. 5, p. 177). Counsel's November 20, 2012 letter did not specifically refetence the much-
discussed GFHC records of September 9, 2009 and October 5, 2009. 
66. By letter dated December 17, 2015, Defense counsel advised Dr. Reedy that Dr. 
Montalbano had ultimately concluded that Claimant's low back condition is not referable to the 
subject accident. He also provided Dr. Reedy with copies of the chart notes from September 9, 
2009 and October 5, 2009, which Dr. Montalbano had found to be significant. He asked for Dr. 
Reedy's comment. By letter dated January 7, 2016, Dr. Reedy acknowledged that Claimant had a 
pre-existing degenerative condition of the lumbar spine, but proposed that the subject accident 
was a "straw that broke the camel's back," causing Claimant to suffer "persistent unrelenting" 
pain in the back and leg since the motor vehicle accident. (Cit. Ex. 5, p. 186). He minimized the 
GFHC notes from September 9, 2009 and October 5, 2009, explaining that just because Claimant 
had a back ache prior to his industrial accident did not mean that the industrial accident did not 
cause additional injury to Claimant's lumbar spine. (Cit. Ex. 5, p. 186). In a January 19, 2016 
follow-up letter to C_laimant' s counsel, Dr. Reedy again elaborated on his view of what is and is 
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not significant in this case in terms of Claimant's clinical presentation. He stated Claimant may 
well have suffered from periodic bouts of low back pain prior to the motor vehicle accident, and 
he clearly did have degenerative disease of the lumbar spine prior to the industrial accident; 
however, it was only following the industrial accident that Claimant suffered from persistent and 
intractable low back pain, and therefore, the motor vehicle accident is directly related to 
Claimant's cutTent lumbar spine condition. (Cit. Ex. 5, p. 187). 
Further Discussion Concerning Claimant's Lumbar Spine 
67. It is well established by a long line of authorities that in any proceeding before the 
Industrial Commission, a claimant has the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the 
evidence, all facts essential to his recovery. See Ball v. Daw Forest Products Co., 136 Idaho 
155, 30 P.3d 933 (2001); Evans v. Hara's, Inc., 123 Idaho 473, 849 P.2d 932 (1993). Where 
medical causation is at issue, a claimant must provide medical evidence that supports the claim 
for compensation to a reasonable degree of medical probability. Langley v. State Industrial 
Special Indemnity Fund, 126 Idaho 781, 890 P.2d 732 (1995). Probable is defined as having 
more evidence for than against. Fisher v. Bunker Hill Co., 96 Idaho 341, 528 P.2d 903 (1974). 
Magic words are not necessary to convey that a doctor's opinion is given with the requisite 
degree of medical probability; all that is needed is testimony demonstrating the physician's plain 
and unequivocal conviction that a causal connection exists between an accident and an injury. 
See Jensen v. City of Pocatello, 135 Idaho 406, 18 PJd 211 (2001). 
68. In the instant matter, the pmties have devoted reams of exhibits, testimony, and 
m·gument for and against the proposition that Claimant's lumbar spine condition is, in some 
respect, causally related to the subject accident. The opinions are numerous, and vacillating, but 
the'y generally acknowledge that Claimant has degenerative disease of the lumbar spine which 
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predated the subject accident. All physicians who have reviewed the films taken in connection 
with evaluation of Claimant's lumbar spine aclmowledge that there is no finding in any of those 
studies which, standing alone, constitutes evidence of acute injury of Claimant's lumbar spine. 
The studies alone do not provide evidence sufficient to demonstrate that the subject accident 
contributed something to Claimant's pre-existing low back condition. However, while the 
radiographic evidence demonstrates longstanding disease of the lumbar spine, the studies are not 
inconsistent with the proposition that these processes may have been aggravated by the subject 
accident. As is not uncommonly the case, the objective medical evidence must be con-elated with 
Claimant's history and clinical examination to inform an opinion on whether or not the subject 
accident did cause some permanent injury to Claimant's lumbar spine. 
69. It is clear from review of the causation opinions in this case that the 
treating/evaluating physicians are cognizant of the importance of con-elating the objective 
medical evidence with Claimant's history, clinical presentation, and exam. The parties, too, 
recognize the importance of this correlation, and have pulled out the stops to posit questions to 
treating/evaluating physicians premised on the facts they deem most important to their case. 
70. Having reviewed the record in its entirety, and having considered the writings and 
testimony of all the physicians who have rendered an opinion on the cause of Claimant's low 
back condition, the Commission concludes that Claimant has failed to demonstrate, to a 
reasonable degree of medical probability, that his cun-ent low back complaints are causally 
related to the subject accident. 
71. First, the radiological studies unambiguously establi.sh that Claimant has multi-
level degenerative disease of the lumbar spine which predated the subject accident. The record 
also establishes that Claimant presented, in the years preceding the October 6, 2009 accident 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND ORDER - 41 
377
with periodic complaints of low back pain. Claimant endorses this, as does Dr. Reedy. (Cit. Ex. 
5, pp. 179, 180, 187; Cit Ex. 20, p. 635). However, Dr. Hammond was not aware of the Kieffer 
Chiropractic and GFHC records which reflect some complaints of low back/hip pain between 
2001-2007. On September 9, 2009, Claimant was seen at the GFHC for a number of complaints, 
inclnding, inter a/ia, low back pain. He was seen again on October 5, 2009, the day before the 
subject accident, with complaints of a cough, which he described as longstanding and mild joint 
pain, muscle aches, and back pain. Having reviewed the testimony and records of the numerous 
providers who have commented on the September 9 and October 5, 2009 notes, the evidence 
does not establish that the back pain or low back pain with which Claimant presented on those 
occasions was simply a manifestation of a systemic illness such as the flu. PA McCready's 
January 19, 2016 reply to counsel's check-the-box questi01maire is not_particularly persuasive, 
I 
and it is given little weight. Such evidence is always regarded with some skepticism. Rather 
than the physician's unalloyed opinion, what is received is an opinion fonnulated by the paity 
offering it, to which the physician is asked to give his assent. It is unclear whether PA 
McCready' s reply represents his actual opinion, or was simply his way to buy some peace; 
Claimant's counsel contacted him on three occasions seeking a response to certain questions, and 
only obtained it after advising PA McCready that failing a written response, it would be 
necessary to notice McCready's deposition. Further, PA McCready's response does not 
discount the possibility that the complaints with which Claimant presented on September 9, 2009 
included musculoskeletal low back complaints. All that PA McCready admitted to is that as of 
September 9, 2009 and October 5, 2009, Claimant's low back complaints did not indicate 
"serious or significant" injury to the low back. How serious or how significant an injury 
Claimant's symptoms might have indicated, is left to speculation. PA Mccready next signified 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND ORDER - 42 
378
his agreement with the assertion that absent the October 5, 2009 accident, he wou
ld not have 
expected Claimant to "thereafter" present with a significant low back injury as later 
documented 
by Drs. Hajjar and Reedy in 2012. The te1m "thereafter" admits a lot of leeway, and
 it is unclear 
how or whether PA McCready's opinion might change if Claimant did not develop
 significant 
low back symptoms until several months following the accident or, if, he had waxing
 and waning 
symptoms between the date of the subject accident and Dr. Reedy' s chart note in D
ecember of 
2011. Accordingly, PA McCready's January 19, 2016 response to Claimant's co
unsel is not 
especially probative of the question of whether Claimant's low back condition is re
lated to his 
MVA. 
72. Both Dr. Hammond and Dr. Montalbano have speculated on the significanc
e of 
the complaints with which Claimant presented on September 9 and October 5, 2009.
 In general, 
Dr. Montalbano's reasoning is more persuasive. He has pointed out that Naprosyn 
and Flexeril 
are typically prescribed for musculoskeletal complaints, thus denigrating the sug
gestion that 
Claimant merely had the flu. He also noted that [f PA McCready had suspected the f
lu, he would 
undoubtedly have' ordered a quick flu test in addition to the other labs he or
dered. Dr. 
Montalbano also noted other of PA McCready's findings that ran counter to a system
ic condition 
or infection as the explanation for Claimant's presenting complaints. Dr. Hammond
 was far less 
persuasive in this regard. 
73. The most problematic, and hardest fought, aspect of this case lies in making s
ome 
determination as to whether or not, or to what extent, Claimant suffered from
 low back 
complaints following the October 5, 2009 accident. Based on the medical opinion
s that have 
been adduced, if Claimant's low back complaints following the 2009 accident wer
e persistent 
and unrelenting, it would be rather easy to conclude that the subject accident
 must have 
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aggravated Claimant's pre-existing low back disease; objective findings consistent with an 
accident caused aggravation of a pre-existing condition could be conelated with a medical 
history of new and unrelenting back and lower extremity symptoms since the accident to supp01i 
the conclusion that the accident caused permanent injury to Claimant's low back. On the other 
hand, if the evidence is more susceptible of a conclusion that Claimant did not present with 
persistent low back complaints following the subject accident until the late fall of 2011, then.it 
becomes much more difficult to conclude that the subject accident is implicated in the cause of 
Claimant's low back condition. The evidence on this issue is conflicting but, as developed 
below, the record offers less suppo1i to the proposition that Claimant suffered from persistent 
and unrelenting low back pain since the October 5, 2009 MV A, and more support to the 
proposition that his low back complaints began, in earnest, in late 2011. 
74. Claimant testified that he has suffered from low back and lower extremity 
numbness unremittingly since the accident of October 6, 2009. (Claimant Depo., p. 33:11-22; 
Tr., p. 95: 13-17). However, there are multiple post-accident medical records which are silent on 
the issue of whether Claimant complained of low back and lower extremity pain; these records 
admit the possibility that Claimant had, low back symptomatology which he simply did not 
describe to his providers. However, the post-accident medical records generated between the date 
of accident and the late fall of 2011 contain an equal number of records in which Claimant 
specifically denied low back/lower extremity symptoms, or which reference an exam of the low 
back and lower extremities which turned up nothing untoward. These records are much harder to 
reconcile with Claimant's current insistence that he has suffered from unrelenting low back/ 
lower extremity symptomatology ever since the subject accident. Moreover, the post-injury 
medical records generated between the date of accident and the late fa[l of 2011 also reflect that 
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on several occasions when Claimant did complain of back or low back discomfort the onset of 
these problems was not related to the subject accident, but was described as being of more recent 
origin. It is clear that Claimant did describe suffering from back pain immediately after the 
accident to Employer and the SIF. It is also clear that he complained of back pain in the spring 
of 2010, and again, in the late fall of 2011. However, these records are not sufficient to suppoti a 
finding that Claimant's symptomatolog_y following the motor vehicle accident was persistent and 
umelenting in light of the other medical records which show that Claimant's history of low back 
symptomatology following the motor vehicle accident was, at most, intermittent. Dr. Reedy was 
prepared to acknowledge that on a precinjury basis Claimant suffered from intermittent low back 
and/or lower extremity problems. Claimant's post-accident history does not persuasively 
demonstrate more significant or persistent low back symptoms, at least not until the fall of 2011. 
Of paiiicular interest, are medical records from a number of sources generated in the late fall of 
2011. These records reflect a new onset of low back and lower extremity discomfort in 
November of 2011. 
75. Claimant has explained the failure of the medical records to uniformly reflect 
persistent and umelenting low back pain since the subject accident by his practice to only 
reference to the many providers he saw following the subject accident his most predominant 
complaint, leaving unstated any secondary complaint such as low back and lower extremity 
discomfort. Having reviewed Claimant's testimony, both at heai·ing, and at the time of his 
prehearing deposition, there is little-if-any support · for this proposition in the record, For 
example, following cervical s.pine surgery Claimant was referred to Mountain Home Physical 
Therapy, He was first evaluated at that facility on March 25, 2010, and was last seen on June 9, 
2010. Claimant was again referred to Mountain Home Physical Therapy by Dr, Hessing 
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following Claimant's shoulder and elbow surgery. During the first session of physical therapy 
(March 25, 2010 - June 9, 2010) Claimant was seen for treatment on 31 occasions. Claimant 
contends that the physical therapy chart notes from March 25, April 7, April 19, April 27, and 
May 25 reflect that Claimant presented on those occasions to the physical therapist with 
complaints of hip/lower extremity pain. The notes reflect that throughout the course of physical 
therapy, Claimant's primary complaints related to his neck and left upper extremity. However, 
on Masch 25, 2010 the therapist noted that Claimant had complaints of pain in the left foot. (Cit. 
Ex. 7, p. 361). The note from April 7, 2010 reflects that Claimant complained about hip soreness 
after riding the bike. The chart note from April 19, 2010 reflects that Claimant presented with 
complaints that his hip had been bothering him more and was waking him at night. The chart 
note from April 27, 2010 reflects that Claimant's hip did better with a different type of exercise 
bicycle. The note from May 25, 2010 reflects that Claimant told his doctor about his hip pain but 
the doctor did not have an answer. Therefore, for the period March 25, 2010 tlu·ough June 11, 
2010 there is reference to hip discomfort in four of the 31 chart notes. They do not reveal 
1· ,' 
complaints of low back pain or lower e4tremity ~umbness. Between Januaiy 18, 20 I I and April 
7, 2011 Claimant was seen at Moun1ain Home Physical Therapy on 21 occasions. These notes 
make no reference to .complaints of hip or lower extremity discomfort. In all, the Mountain 
Home Physical Therapy records lend little support to the proposition that Claimant complained 
of persistent and unrelenting back and lower extremity discomfo1i at all times following the 
industrial accident of October 5, 2009. However, these records do denigrate _Claimant's other 
insistence that the medical records do not contain reference to low back complaints either 
because (I) he only told physicians about his mo~t significant complaint; or (2) Dr. Reedy 
counseled Claimant to withhold discussion of the low back until Claimant's neck/upper 
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extremity complaints were dealt with. Nor do the PT notes suppmi the proposition that if 
Claimant was seeing a particular provider for his neck or upper extremity complaints, he would 
not discuss any other complaints he was having with such provider. 
76. As noted, Dr. Reedy has reported that Claimant told Dr. Reedy in December of 
2011 that he (Dr. Reedy) had advised Claimant back in January of 20 IO that Dr. Reedy would 
concentrate first on Claimant's neck problem, and after resolution of the same, attention would 
be turned to the low back. Dr. Reedy has never endorsed this; he has only reported that this is 
what Claimant has said. That the nanative proposed by Claimant to Dr. Reedy in December of 
2011 does not accurately represent a discussion had between Dr. Reedy and Claimant in Januaty 
of 2010 is perhaps best demonstrated by Dr. Reedy's letter of November 18, 2010 to PA 
McCready. By that time, Claimant was thought to be medically stable following his cervical 
spine fusion performed by Dr. Reedy. However, rather than take-up the next of Claimant's 
complaints, i.e. his low back, which had been held in reserve pending resolution of Claimant's 
cervical spine condition, Dr. Reedy released Claimant from his care. (Cit. Ex.'5, p. 164) 
77. Claimant saw Dr. Harris for the purposes of an IME. Dr. HatTis was not 
designated to treat Claimant for his back, shoulder, or any other condition. Claimant was invited 
to describe the nature and extent of the complaints he related to the work accident and low back 
complaints were not among those described. Claimant treated with Dr. Clawson for his left 
upper extremity, yet in November of 2011 shared with Dr. Clawson the low back complaints he 
was having. In short, Claimant's explanation for the failure of the medical record to document 
persistent and unrelenting complaints in the low back is not persuasive. The record better 
' 
supports the proposition that Claimant suffered from periodic, but not unrelenting, low back and 
lower extremity discomfort betw:een October 6, 2009. and the late fall of 2011, just as he had 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND ORDER- 47 
383
suffered from periodic bouts of low back pain in the years prior to October 6. 2009. The opinions 
of Dr. Reedy, Dr. Hammond, and Dr. Hajjar are all premised on the assumption that Claimant's 
low back symptomatology increased precipitously following the industrial accident. This 
assumption is important because it provides support for the proposition that Claimant's objective 
degenerative changes were more likely-than-not aggravated by the subject accident. Otherwise, 
how is one to explain the sudden and precipitous worsening described by Claimant? Absent this 
underlying assumption there is little-to-no support for the proposition that the objective changes 
noted on radiology studies are, in some respect, referable to the subject accident. As described 
by Drs. Hammond, Montalbano, and Reedy, Claimanfs lumbar spine films demonstrate 
degenerative findings with no clear evidence of an acute injury which could be related to the 
subject accident. For these reasons, Claimant has failed to establish that his low back condition 
is causally related to the subject accident. 
Futther Findings and Discussion Relating to Neck, Left Upper Extremity, and Right Knee 
78. As initially explained, the parties are in agreement that Claimant's cervical spine, 
left shoulder, left ulnar nerve, and right knee injuries are causally related to the accidents of 2009 
and 2013. There remains the issue of Claimant's disability referable to these compensable 
conditions. 
79. Dr. Reedy released Claimant to return to work without restriction on May 20, 
2010. (Cit. Ex. 5, p. 161). He continued to follow Claimant during Claimant's treatment with 
Dr. Clawson and Dr. Hessing. By June of 2011, Claimant presented with complaints of 
experiencing acute cervical discomf01t after he tilted his head and felt a "pop" in his neck. 
Follow-up MRI evaluation did not reveal anything untoward although Dr. Reedy did comment 
on persistent foraminal encroachment at the C6-7 level. On December 10, 2011, Claimant 
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presented to Dr. Reedy with continuing complaints of having difficulty turning
 his neck, more so 
on the left than the right. Dr. Reedy did not believe that Claimant's situation c
ould be improved 
by further surgery, but recommended that Claimant obtain a second opinion. (C
lt. Ex. 5, p. 166). 
Dr. Reedy has not seen Claimant since December 5, 2011, and, despite Cl
aimant's recurrent 
cervical spine complaints, did not ever revise his release to return to work with
out restrictions, at 
least not until he received a copy of the September 25, 2015 FCE performed 
by PT Wright. On 
November 2, 2015, nearly four years after he last saw Claimant, Dr. Reedy 
expressed his full 
agreement with the restrictions proposed by PT Wright and the appmii
onment of those 
restrictions between Claimant's ce_rvical spine/upper extremity complaints 
and his low back 
condition. (Cit. Ex. 5, p. 182). Concerning the impairment referable to Claima
nt's cervical spine 
condition, Dr. Reedy deferred to the rating proposed by Dr. Harris. (Cit. Ex. 5,
 p. 173). 
80. Dr. Hessing, who perfmmed Claimant's left shoulder surgery, was
 aware of 
Claimant's work as a farm laborer. (Cit. Ex. 8, p. 415). Following surgery, h
e gave Claimant a 
5% upper extremity rating and released Claimant to return to work at his pre
injury job without 
restrictions. (Cit. Ex. 8, p. 445). 
81. Dr. Clawson, who performed Claimant's ulnar nerve surgery, released
 Claimant 
to return to work without restrictions, and without reference to residual impai
rment, on January 
11, 2011. 
82. Claimant was first seen by Miers Johnson, M.D., for treatment of his 
right lmee, 
on September 11, 2013. Dr. Johnson's note of that date reflects that Claimant d
escribed working 
as a farm laborer, without restrictions, although he did complain of some low
er extremity and 
low back difficulties. Following the right knee atihroplasty performed by Dr. J
ohnson, he noted, 
on July 14, 2014, that Claimant was doing quite well vis-a-vis the right knee: 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND ORDER- 49 
385
He seldom has trouble with the knee except maybe the next day after physical 
therapy and if he tries to kneel on his kneecap. He is driving a tractor and 
otherwise doing his job. He has trouble walking on uneven ground. He is able to 
walk, but has trouble when he is on his feet for very long periods of time. Most of 
this seems secondary to his back. .. 
(Clt. Ex. 13, p. 522). On September 22, 2014 Claimant was released from care by Dr. Johnson 
with these comments: 
Patient can work full duty. I have no restrictions regarding his walking with his 
total lmee. His biggest problem seems to be sciatica and should be re-evaluated 
by the spine surgeon. 
(Cit. Ex. 13, p. 524). Dr. Johnson did not offer impairment rating for Claimant's right knee 
arthroplasty. In this regard, he defe1rnd to Dr. Shoemaker. 
83. Dr. Shoemaker saw Claimant for the purposes of evaluation on October 6, 2014. 
Dr. Shoemaker noted Claimant's pre-existing right lmee surgeries, as well as the surgery 
performed by Dr. Johnson. He gave Claimant a 21 % impairment rating of the lower extremity 
based on Claimant's good surgical outcome and the fact that Dr. Johnson did not deem it 
necessary to provide Claimant with any permanent restrictions. Dr. Shoemaker apportioned one-
half of the 21 % lower extremity rating to Claimant's documented pre-existing right lmee 
problems. (See Cit. Ex. 14, pp. 539-540). In his report, Dr. Shoemaker referenced a separate 
"activity status report" which he prepared, and which discussed work restrictions/precautions 
applicable to Claimant. However, that document is not contained in the record. 
84. At the instance of Defendants, Claimant was evaluated by Dr. Han-is following 
Claimant's release by Drs. Hessing, Clawson, and Reedy. To Dr. Han-is, Claimant described the 
requirements of his job and indicated that as of August 15, 2011 he was performing this work 
without physician-imposed restrictions. (Cit. Ex. 20, p. 614). Claimant complained of neck and 
upper extremity discomfort, but no low back/lower extremity difficulties. Dr. HaiTis gave 
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Claimant a 6% whole person rating for his cervical spine, concuned with Dr. Hessing' s 5% 
upper extremity rating for the left shoulder and awarded no impairment for the left ulnar nerve 
transposition surgery performed by Dr. Clawson. (Clt. Ex. 20, pp. 617-618). Concerning 
permanent limitations/restrictions, Dr. Hanis offered the following: 
At this point, Mr. Ayala has no work restrictions as noted by the treating 
physicians in this case and I would agree that he shbuld use caution in overhead 
activities and heavy lifting, although no permanent restrictions are given or 
suggested. 
(Cit. Ex. 20, p. 618). 
85. Claimant's counsel referred Claimant to Brian Wright, DPT, for the purpose of a 
\ 
functional capacities evaluation. In his cover letter, Counsel cautioned PT Wright that because 
Claimant's low back condition might ultimately be determined to be unrelated to the 2009 
accident, it would be important for PT Wright to distinguish between limitations/restrictions 
referable to Claimant's right knee/neck/left upper extremity injuries and his low back condition. 
(See Cit. Ex. 23, pp. 656-659). PT Wright performed this functional capacity evaluation on 
September 25, 2015. PT Wright noted that Claimant participated in the evaluation with "full 
objective signs of maximum effort and cooperation." He also noted that "between similar 
functional tests, client consistently performed as expected and these findings correlated well with 
each other." PT Wright did not have access to the job site evaluation prepared by the ICRD. He 
relied on Claimant to describe the functional components of his job, and this informed his 
ultimate conclusion that the physical abilities demonstrated on exam constituted a significant 
bmTier to Claimant's performance of his job. Per PT Wright, the limitations referable to 
Claimant's specific areas of injury are as follows: 
1. Cervical spine/neck, status-post microdiskectomy and fusion by Dr. Reedy -
This pmiicular presentment is responsible for the limitations in the following 
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functional categories: Waist to floor lifting, waist to crown lifting, lift-can·y, 
elevated activity and forward bend - stand activities. 
2. Left upper extremity, status -post left ulnar nerve neurolysis, anterior 
subcutaneoustransposition by Dr. Clawson. This particular presentment is 
responsible for the limitations in the following functional categories: Waist to 
floor lifting, waist to crown lifting, lift-ca1Ty and elevated activity. 
3. Left shoulder, status-post arthroscopic subacromial decompression, distal 
claviculectomy, labral and joint debridement with rotator cuff repair by Dr. 
Hessing. This particular presentment is responsible for the limitations in the 
following functional categories: Waist to floor lifting, waist to crown lifting, lift-
carry and elevated activity. 
4. Right knee, status-post right TKA by Dr. Johnson. This particular presentment 
is responsible for the limitations in the following functional categories: Walking 
(low back is contributing 20-40% of this in my opinion), Waist to floor lift (low 
back is contributing 20-40% to this), lift-carry (10-20% contribution from low 
back), forward bend - stand (20-40% contribution) and sitting (60-80% 
contribution from the low back). 
5. Low back/ lumbar spine, cmTently presenting as non-surgical. This particular 
presentment is responsible for the limitations in the following functional 
categories: Walking (low back is contributing 20-40% of this in my opinion), 
Waist to floor lift (low back is contributing 20-40% to this) lift-cany (10-20% 
contribution from low back), forward bend - stand (20-40% contribution) and 
sitting (60-80% contribution from the low back). 
(Cit. Ex. 23, p. 647). 
86. Concerning his findings relating to Claimant's low back, PT Wright did n
ot 
explain his conclusion that 20-40% of Claimant's waist-to-floor lifting limitation s
hould be 
attributed to Claimant's low back condition. For example, does this mean that since 
Claimant 
was found to be capable of occasional waist-to-flool' lifting in the range of 15
 pounds, 
subtracting out the low back condition's contribution to this limitation would result in i
ncreasing 
Claimant's waist-to-floor lifting by 20-40%? Neither Mr. Jordan nor Dr. Collins wer
e able to 
offer any insights on this question, and PT Wright was not deposed. 
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87: In summary, there is general agreement that Claimant has the following 
impairments referable to his industrial injuries: cervical spine - 6% of the whole person; left 
shoulder - 5%; upper extremity; ulnar nerve transposition - 0%; right knee - 21 %; lower 
extremity -- 50% attributable to pre-existing condition, 50% referable to 2013 accident. 
Claimant's low back condition is not deemed stable and ratable. 
Vocational Testimony 
88. William Jordan conducted a forensic vocational evaluation of Claimant at the 
instance of Defendants. His report reflects that Claimant has been employed primarily as a farm 
laborer/foreman since approximately 1990. Since 1999, Claimant has been employed by Meyers 
Farms. Social Security earnings records reflect a steady annual increase in earnings since 1999, 
the only exception being the years 2009, 2010, and 2013, when Claimant lost time from work 
referable to his work-related injuries. In 2008, for example, the year preceding the 2009 
accident, Claimant earned $24,170. In 2015, Claimant's earnings are reported at $42,911. Mr. 
Jordan had the opportunity to interview both Claimant and Robert Meyers, the principal of 
Meyers Farms. Per Mr. Meyers, Claimant is a good worker who Meyers expects to retain as an 
employee, notwithstanding that Claimant has been forced to modify how he performs his work 
as farm foreman. From Mr. Meyers, Mr. Jordan recorded the following: 
Mr. Meyers indicated that he was aware that the Claimant has modified his work 
activities so that he does less lifting: he estimated that the Claimant probably lifts 
a maximum of 50 pounds. He uses equipment for lifting, can get help with lifting 
or he can del~gate heavier lifting to the other two employees. The Employer 
stated that the Claimant still does about all of the same job tasks that he has 
always done - he just goes about it a little differently. 
Mr. Meyers indicated that the Claimant possesses knowledge that is helpful on the 
farm. He gave the example of how they draw water out of the river using pumps. 
The 14 pivots that they use for irrigating have to be balanced to manage the use of 
the water. The Claimant is in charge of this task. 
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relationship with the Claimant as he continues to be productive, although he noted 
that he has heard through some of the chemical distributors that the Claimant has 
been considering quitting. Mr. Meyers is aware that the Claimant is getting older, 
and is approaching full Social Security Retirement age (approximately within the 
next year). 
(Def. Ex. 9, pp. 207-208). Mr. Jordan also elicited from Claimant, Claimant's sense of his 
functional abilities. Per Mr. Jordan, Claimant's sense of what he can do from a functional 
standpoint is somewhat more generous than the maximum functional capabilities outlined by PT 
Wright. Mr. Jordan noted that Claimant has a fund of agricultural skills valuable to his current 
employer, and to other similarly-situated employers. Mr. Jordan's repmi illustrates the 
importance of understanding the extent and degree of Claimant's limitations/restrictions: absent 
limitations/restrictions, as might be suggested by the work releases of Drs. Hessing, Clawson, 
Harris, and Johnson, Claimant has suffered no disability as a consequence of the work injuries 
since he has no functional limitations that would impede his ability to engage in gainful activity. 
On the other hand, Mr. Jordan acknowledged that if one accepts the limitations/restrictions 
identified in the September 2015 FCE, Claimant has suffered significant loss of his ability to 
engage in gainful activity as compared to the labor market access he enjoyed prior to the 2009 
accident. Based on Claimant's status as an able-bodied individual, and taking into account his 
relevant non-medical factors, Mr. Jordan proposed that Claimant had access to approximately 
17% of his labor market prior the 2009 accident. However, assuming the limitations/restrictions 
identified in the September 2015 FCE, Claimant has lost 62% of his pre-injury labor market with 
an anticipated wage loss of 32%. Employing a convention frequently utilized by vocational 
rehabilitation experts, Mr. Jordan proposed that the limitations/restrictions outlined in the FCE, 
coupled with Claimant's non-medical factors, yield disability in the range of 47%, inclusive of 
PPL (62 + 32 = 94 + 2 = 47). 
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89. Nancy Collins, Ph.D., was engaged by Claimant's counsel to perform a forensic 
vocational assessment of Claimant's residual employability following the subject accidents. Her 
report appears at Claimant's. Exhibit 32. She reviewed medical records, interviewed Claimant, 
and undertook an assessment of Claimant's employability. Her report reflects that the subjective 
complaints described by Claimant have been consistent. Over time she noted that none of 
Claimant's treating physicians, with the exception of Dr. Reedy, felt that Claimant required any 
physician-imposed limitations/restrictions following his dates of medical stability. Even Dr. 
Reedy initially proposed no limitations/restrictions. Dr. Collins did note that the FCE imposed 
significant restrictions, and these were generally adopted by Dr. Reedy and Claimant's expert, 
Dr. Hammond. Dr. Collins also took a detailed history from Claimant concerning his subjective 
sense of what he can and cannot do. Claimant's subjective sense of his functional abilities is 
much more consistent with the FCE than it is with the opinions of his treating physicians. 
Generally speaking, Dr. Collins found that the FCE results are consistent with the ability of 
Claimant to perform limited light-duty work. Per Dr, Collins, Claimant's skills are as a farm 
laborer and foreman. He also has supervisory skills and some skills in operating/repairing fann 
and irrigation equipment. Although Dr. Collins did not perform an analysis of Claimant's 
percentage access to his labor market on a pre-injury basis, she did conclude that based on 
Claimant's age, education, work experience, and other non-medical factors, he was best suited to 
working as a farming supervisor, agricultural equipment operator, farm worker/laborer, or 
landscaped grounds keeper. 
90. As did Mr. Jordan, Dr. Collins acknowledged that absent functional 
limitations/restrictions, Claimant has suffered no loss of earning capacity as a consequence of the 
subject accidents. However, considering the limitations/restrictions suggested by the FCE, led 
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Dr. Collins to propose that Claimant is totally and pe1manently disabled at prese
nt. Although Dr. 
CoJlins acknowledged that she did not understand how to apply PT Wright's a
ttempt to subtract 
low back limitations from the totality of Claimant's limitations, she belie
ves that even if 
Claimant's low back restrictions are not considered, Claimant is totally and perm
anently disabled 
by virtue of his knee, neck, and left upper extremity limitations. Dr. Collins is o
f the opinion that 
were it not for Claimant's "superhuman" effort, and the accommodatio
n offered by a 
"sympathetic employer," Claimant would not be employed at this time, and a
bsent his current 
job, he is, essentially, totally and permanently disabled. On the matter of the ef
fort Claimant has 
gone to in order to retain employment, Dr. Collins noted that he has been forced
 to delegate work 
he can no longer perform to his subordin~tes, and to work longer hours in ord
er to accomplish 
the things he can still do. At the time of her post-hearing deposition Dr. Colli
ns acknowledged 
that if Claimant has no limitations/restrictions, he has no disability. However
, Dr. Collins did 
not consider this assumption in formulating her opinion. Her concluding rema
rks make it clear 
that it is her opinion that Claimant is 100% disabled but for the one job
 he is currently 
performing for an accommodating and sympathetic employer. 
Discussion and Further Findings Relating to Claim of Disability 
91. Claimant contends that he is totally and permanently disabled under th
e odd-lot 
doctrine. Defendants contend that Claimant has suffered no disability, but if he 
has, it is less than 
total and permanent. Moreover, Defendants contend that Claimant's less-tha
n-permanent and 
total disability must be apportioned between the subject accident and a pre-e
xisting condition 
pursuant to the provisions ofidaho Code § 72-406. 
92. "Permanent Disability" or "under a pe1manent disability" results when. 
the actual 
or presumed ability to engage in gainful activity is reduced or absent becau
se of pennanent 
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impahment and no fundamental or marked change in the future can be reasonably expected. 
(See Idaho Code§ 72-423). The evaluation of permanent disability is an appraisal of the injured 
worker's present and probable future ability to engage in gainful activity as it is affected by the 
medical factor of permanent impairment and by pe1manent non-medical factors as set fo1ih at 
Idah.o Code § 72-430. (See Idaho Code § 72-425). The test for determining whether a claimant 
has suffered a permanent disability greater than permanent impairment is whether the physical 
impairment, taken in conjunction with non-medical factors, has reduced the claimant's capacity 
for gainful employment. Graybill v. Swift & Co., 115 Idaho 293, 766 P.2d 763 (1988). The 
focus of a determination of permanent disability is on the claimant's ability to engage in gainful 
activity. Sund v. Gambrell, 127 Idaho 3, 896 P.2d 329 (1995). 
93. The labor market to be considered in evaluating Claimant's disability is ordinarily 
the labor market in which Claimant resides as of the date of hearing. Brown v. The Home Depot, 
152 Idaho 605, 272 P.3d 577 (2012). Whether Claimant has a pe1manent disability is a question 
of fact, and Claimant bears the burden of proving that he has suffered disability in excess of 
impairment. Boley v. State Industrial Special Indemnity Fund, 130 Idaho 278, 989 P .2d 854 
(1997). An odd-lot worker is one who is so injured that he is unable to perform services other 
than those limited in quality, dependability or quantity, such that a reasonably stable market for 
such services does not exist. Boley v. State Idaho Special Indemnity Fund, supra. An odd-lot 
worker need not be physically unable to do anything worthy of compensation, but he does need 
to demonstrate that he is so handicapped that he will not be employed regularly in any well-
known branch of the labor market absent the business boom, the sympathy of a particular 
employer or friends, temporary good luck, or superhuman effort on his paii. Lyons v. Industrial 
Special Indemnity Fund, 98 Idaho 403, 565 P.2d 1360 (1977). 
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94. Claimant bears the burden of adducing proof sufficient to establish, on a prima 
facie basis, his odd-lot status. A claimant may prove odd-lot status by showing that he has 
unsuccessfully attempted other types of employment, that he, or a vocational expe1i on his 
behalf, has searched for other work but other work is not available, or that any efforts to find 
suitable employment would be futile. Boley v. State Industrial Special Indemnity Fund, supra. 
95. Once a claimant has satisfied his burden of proving aprimafacie case of odd-lot 
status by one of the three aforementioned methods, the burden of proof shifts to the employer to 
prove claimant's employability. Hoye v. Daw Forest Products, Inc., 125 Idaho 582, 873 P.2d 
836 (1994). Employer cannot meet this burden merely by showing that claimant is able to 
perform some type of work. Lyons v. State Industrial Special Indemnity Fund, supra. Rather, 
Employer must show that there is an actual job within a reasonable distance from Claimant's 
home which he is able to perform or for which he can be trained that he has a reasonable 
oppotiunity to be employed at that job. Lyons, supra. 
96. Apportionment of disability, while not at issue in this case if Claimant is adjudged 
totally and permanently disabled, is at issue in the event the Commission dete1mines that 
Claimant is not totally and pennanently disabled. Idaho Code § 72-406(1) provides: 
1n cases of permanent disability less than total, if the degree or duration of 
disability resulting from an industrial injury or occupational disease is increased 
or prolonged because of a preexisting physical impai1ment, the employer shall be 
liable only for the additional disability from the industrial injury or occupational 
disease. 
Under this section, and Page v. McCain Foods, Inc., 145 Idaho 302, 179 P .3d 265 (2008), where 
apportionment is at issue in a less-than-total case, a two step process must be employed. First, 
claimant's disability must be evaluated in light of all physical impairments resulting from the 
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industrial accident, and any pre-existing conditions. Thereaf
ter, the amount of permanent 
disability attributable to the industrial accident(s) must be apportio
ned. 
97. As noted above, evaluation of Claimant's disability depen
ds, in the first instance, 
on making some judgment about the extent and degree to w
hich Claimant has permanent 
limitations/restrictions. Here, Defendants argue that because 
neither Drs. Reedy, Clawson, 
Hessing, or Harris initially imposed any restrictions on Claimant a
t medical stability, and, in fact, 
' 
released him to return to a job that they probably knew was fa
irly onerous, Claimant has no 
disability in excess of impairment. On the other hand, C
laimant argues that the 
limitations/restrictions identified in the September 2015 functio
nal capacities evaluation are a 
much more accurate portrayal of Claimant's ability to engage i
n physical activities, and these 
limitations/restrictions support a conclusion that Claimant is totall
y and permanently disabled. 
98. There is evidence to support a finding that Claim
ant has no physical 
limitations/restrictions relating to his right knee, neck, lef
t shoulder, and ulnar nerve 
transposition. Drs. Clawson, Hessing, Reedy, Hanis, and John
son have all rendered opinions 
that support this conclusion. Only Dr. Reedy has changed his min
d, but his conclusion is subject 
to criticism because he had not seen Claimant for nearly fou
r years prior to his wholesale 
adoption of the FCE findings. However, when last seen by Dr.
 Reedy on December 5, 2011, 
Claimant was no longer enjoying good relief from cervical spine
 surgery previously performed 
by Dr. Reedy. In fact, Dr. Reedy recommended a second 
opinion in an effort to better 
understand Claimant's recunent cervical spine problems. As 
well, by December 2011, Dr. 
Reedy was aware that Claimant was having low back proble
ms which would go on to be 
evaluated by Dr. Hajjar. Following December of 2011, Dr. Ree
dy was updated on Claimant's 
status by Claimant's counsel, especially regarding Claimant's
 progress with lumbar spine 
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evaluation. Therefore, even though Dr. Reedy had not seen Claimant since De
cember 5, 2011, it 
is possible that he was well enough apprised of Claimant's status to embrace a
 set of restrictions 
without the need to see Claimant for confomation. Regardless, Dr. Re
edy' s enthusiastic 
embrace of the FCE is the weakest evidence of its legitimacy. 
99. The FCE has also been explicitly endorsed by Dr. Hammond. Dr. 
Hammond 
testified to his general agreement with the recommendations of the FCE, even 
though neither did 
he understand PT Wright's reasoning in apportioning low back limitations th
e way he did. In 
fact, Dr. Hammond testified that probably more of Claimant's limitations rela
ting to sitting and 
' 
walking are related to the lumbar spine condition. (Hammond Depo., pp. 50
:19-51:12). Even 
though Claimant had been released by Dr. Reedy for his cervical spine, Dr.. 
Hammond did not 
quarrel with the FCE results which sugg,ested that Claimant continued to hav
e significant neck 
and upper extremity difficulties. (Hammond Depo., pp. 52:10-56:2). In fac
t, Dr. Hammond 
reported that Claimant still had complaints of cervical spine pain when he eval
uated Claimant in 
August of 2016. However, Dr. Hammond's August 1, 2016 office note refl
ects the following 
about the history he received from Claimant concerning his neck and upper ext
remity: . 
Dr. Reedy did surgery on his neck and he says he has some decreased limitat
ion 
but no other significant pain. His left shoulder feels well and occasionally is s
tiff 
but he can pretty much do everything he wants with this. There. was also the 
left 
ulnar nerve difficulty. This was transposed and he has a little bit of numbn
ess 
into his palm of his left hand, but there was no difficulty with grip or using the 
left 
arm or hand othe1wise. 
(Cit. Ex. 24, p. 569A). The record also contains medical records from th
e GFHC entered 
contemporaneous with the September 2015 FCE. On September 1, 2015, Clai
mant was seen by 
Dr. Ensminger at the GFHC, for complaints of left knee pain which Claimant re
lated to work that 
Claimant was doing during potato harvest which required him to work bent ove
r or kneeling. Dr. 
Ensminger noted that Claimant's artificial knee (on the right) was doing wel
l. Finally, it was 
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noted that Claimant's degenerative disc disease of his neck and lo
w back were "stable." On 
physical exam, no spinal tender~ess or misalignment was noted. 
Spine range of motion was 
normal. Paraspinal muscle strength and tone was within nmmal lim
its. Concerning Claimant's 
left upper extremity, no tenderness was noted to palpation. Claim
ant's shoulder, elbow, and 
wrist joint were stable. He had normal range of motion, without crep
itus or pain in the left upper 
extremity. 
100. Dr. Hessing's note from August of 2016, and more 
particularly, Mark 
Ensminger's, M.D., note from September 2015 are not entirely 
consistent with Claimant's 
presenting complaints on the occasion of the September 25, 2015 FC
E. To PT Wright, Claimant 
made the following pain report: 
Repo1ted discomfo1t in the lumbar spine, knee, shoulder and cervic
al spine was 
part of the reason . for limitations with lifting, carrying, eleva
ted activity, 
crouching or low level activity, walking, forward bending. Ob
jective signs 
coincided with the Client's reports of discomfo1i. 
(Cit. Ex. 23, p. 646). On exam, Claimant was noted to have decrea
se in neck and left shoulder 
range of motion, inconsistent with the September 1, 2015 findings by
 Dr. Ensminger. 
101. On the other hand, to Defendants' criticism that the FCE mus
t be invalid because 
greater problems are noted with Claimant's unaffected extremities, i.
e. the right shoulder and the 
left knee, is nonsensical. Claimant's left shoulder was surgically rep
aired, as was his right knee. 
Claimant has documented left knee arthritis, and it would be unsurp
rising if a manual laborer of 
his age also did not have right shoulder arthritis. That Clai
mant's surgically-addressed 
extremities exhibit less severe findings than his contralateral extr
emities does not cause the 
Commission to question PT Wright's examination. After all, if the 
surgeries were not intended 
to improve Claimant's function or reduc,e his pain, there would be l
ittle purpose in doing them. 
Defendants also criticize PT Wright's report because validity 
testing, measured in what 
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Defendants call the customary manner, is not identified in PT Wrigh
t's report. This criticism is 
rejected because PT Wright has clearly expressed his conclusion tha
t in performing Claimant's 
evaluation PT Wright was satisfied that Claimant gave full effort, 
and that the test results are 
consistent with this conclusion. Nothing in PT Wright's report 
suggests that it should be 
discounted because Claimant was consciously manipulating the evalu
ation. 
102. Finally, the Commission is impressed by the fact that Em
ployer is obviously 
aware that Claimant does not retain the same physical ability he had
 prior to the 2009 accident. 
The Employer is aware that Claimant has physical limitations/restrict
ions and that he has found a 
way to accommodate his limitations by assigning more tasks to h
is subordinates. There is 
nothing in the Employer's testimony that y.,ould support the conclusi
on that Claimant is now just 
as physically capable as he was prior to the October 6, 2009 MV A. 
103. Claimant continued to have cervical spine complaints after b
eing released to full 
duty by Dr. Reedy; Dr. Reedy's notes confirm it. C_laimant's ulnar n
erve transposition does not 
seem to have resulted in any limitations/restrictions. It is less clear w
hether or not Claimant has 
continued to have left shoulder complaints following Dr. Hessing's 
surgery, and the dissonance 
between Dr. Ensminger's September 1, 2015 office note and the near
ly contemporaneous FCE is 
troubling. Further, by his owµ statements to Mr. Jordan, Claimant a
ppears to be able to engage 
in physical activities somewhat more onerous than those described in
 the FCE. 
104. In summary, while it is certainly possible to challenge certain
 aspects of the FCE, 
it is a better prognosticator of Claimant's limitations than the cho
ice offered by Defendants' 
suggestion that Claimant has no physician-imposed limitations/res
trictions, and therefore no 
disability. 
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I 05. Therefore, the FCE will be used as a guide to evaluating Claimant's disability 
from all causes combined. 
106. Having determined that the September 2015 FCE provides the best snapshot of
 
Claimant's functional limitations/restrictions, it is next necessary to evaluate how
 those 
limitations/restrictions, in conjunction with Claimant's relevant non-medical factors, aff
ect his 
ability to engage in gainful activity. Per the two-step process envisioned by Page v. M
cCain 
Foods, supra, attention is first directed to understanding Claimant's disability from all cau
ses. 
I 07. As reflected in his testimony, and in the repotis and testimony of Dr. Collins and 
Mr. Jordan, Claimant is an older worker of Hispanic extraction who, while bilingual, has 
limited 
education and limited ability to read and write in either English or Spanish. He has 
limited 
computer skills, but is able to use a computer to perfonn some paiis of his current jo
b, i.e, 
searching for replacement parts. He has some transferable vocational skills; he can we
ld, and 
has some abilities relating to repair and maintenance of farm and other equipment. He a
lso has 
abilities in the ai·ea of heavy equipment operation. As foreman at Meyers Faims, 
he has 
necessarily acquired some skills as a supervisor; he supervises and delegates work 
to two 
subordinates. Claimant's past relevant work experience has lai·gely been in the agricultura
l field, 
although he has done some work in the remote past in a manufacturing environment. Ba
sed on 
' . 
his job at Meyers Farms, Claimant has a demonstrated ability to assume responsibility 
for the 
day-to-day operation of a relatively large farming operation. His skills are somewhat un
ique to 
the Meyers Farm's operation; the Bruneau Farm has unique soil characteristics which
 make 
irrigation challenging. 
I 08. Mr. Jordan proposed that on a pre-injury basis, Claimant had reasonable access to 
17% of the jobs in his geographic locale. Dr. Collins did not quantify Claimant's pre
-injury 
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access to his local labor market, but proposed that based on Claimant's non-medical factors, he 
would have access to agricultural and landscaping-type work absent physical limitations. These 
assessments seem reasonable and not inconsistent. 
109. Mr. Jordan and Dr. Collins part ways, however, when it comes to the impact of 
Claimant's cunent functional status on his employability. With no explanation other than his 
reliance on OASYS software, Mr. Jordan opined that assuming the FCE recommendations, and 
further assuming that Claimant loses his cutTent employment with Meyers Farms, Claimant has 
suffered 62% loss of access to his pre-injury labor market. Mr. Jordan also calculated a 32% 
wage loss based on his belief that even with the limitations/restrictions derived from the 
September 2015 FCE, Claimant has access to work paying in the range of $8.00 per hour. An 
$8.00 per hour hourly wage in the labor market at large seems reasonable for any job that 
Claimant might obtain in light of his current limitations/restrictions. 
110. The real issue is whether there are in fact suitable jobs for Claimant within his 
limitations/restrictions. In his report, Mr. Jordan did not articulate the types of employment that 
Claimant could compete for, assuming the limitations/restrictions outlined in the FCE and in Dr. 
Hammond's testimony. However, in the course of his deposition, Mr. Jordan did offer some 
comments on the types of employment he believed Claimant could still compete for in his labor 
market should he lose his job with Meyers Farms. Mr. Jordan thought that Claimant's light-duty 
restrictions would enable him to perform the physical requirements of a greeter, car porter at a 
car dealership, security work, shuttle bus driving, school bus driving, sandwich making, job 
coach monitor, pizza deliveryman, and sorter. (Jordan Depa., pp. 53:24-54:6). Mr. Jordan was 
uncertain with what frequency jobs of these types become available in Claimant's labor market. 
On cross examination, Mr. Jordan admitted that some aspects of school driving, sorting, and 
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security jobs might be in excess of what is contemplated by the FCE. (Jordan Depo., pp. 160:20-
168 :9). While it is probably true that Claimant can perform some, or even most, of the jobs 
described by Mr. Jordan, there was little evidence about the number of jobs in the labor market 
that remain for Claimant in his geographic area. 
111. Certainly, this was Dr. Collins' concern. She proposed that in view of the 
limitations/restrictions identified in the FCE, and elaborated-on by Dr. Hammond, Claimant is 
essentially unemployable in his geographic area, particularly when one takes into account the 
fact that he is relatively unsophisticated, has minimal reading/writing sldlls, and was  
 as of the date of hearing. Dr. Collins acknowledged, of course, that Claimant has continued 
to work for Employer since the subject accident, but she contends that he has required a great 
deal of accommodation by his employer, that Claimant must make a "superhuman" effmi to 
continue in his current job and that the Employer is a "sympathetic employer." These factors 
lead Dr. Collins to conclude that even though Claimant is currently employed, this fact does not 
denigrate her conclusion that he is nevertheless totally and permanently disabled. However, Dr. 
Collins had a poor understanding of the actual physical requirements of Claimant's current job, 
and an equally poor understanding of to what extent Claimant required the assistance of other 
workers to perform. this work. (Collins Depo., pp. 78:6-80:25; 84:20-92:5). Dr. Collins' 
uncertainty about the specific requirements of Claimant's current position, coupled with her 
uncertainty of whether or how Claimant finds a way to perform this work, denigrates her 
conclusion that Claimant is only able to continue working in his current job because of his 
superhuman effort. Claimant has the ability, endorsed by his Employer, to delegate work to his 
subordinates as necessary. Therefore, Claimant is not required to perform physical tasks which 
are too difficult for him. While it's true that Claimant now takes longer to perform ce1iain work, 
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and now performs some of his work with more difficulty than he once did, the record does not 
support the conclusion that it is only by dint of superhuman effort that Claimant is able to 
continue in his cunentjob. 
112. Relatedly, the record does not support the conclusion that Meyers Farms is a 
"sympathetic" employer. Morgan Meyers' testimony is that Claimant is a valuable employee 
who has a peculiar knowledge of Employer's operation such that his loss an almost untenable 
proposition for Employer. This sentiment is perfectly expressed in Morgan Meyers' observation 
that "we would be in a panic ifhe were gone." (Tr., pp. 189:24-190:1). The record supports the 
conclusion that the job Claimant performs is real and that his service is valuable, perhaps 
essential, to Employer's business. However, Claimant's ability to perform his current job and 
his value to his cmTent employer is not necessarily inconsistent with a finding that Claimant is 
totally and permanently disabled under the odd-lot doctrine. In other words, in the presence of 
proof that Claimant is not "regularly employable in any well know branch of the labor market," 
' I 
the conclusion that Claimant is totally and pe1manently disabled under the odd-lot doctrine via 
. . ' 
the route of futility (his only available route) _would not be foreclosed by the fact that he is 
demonstrably employable. After all, an odd-lot worker need not be unable to perfotm any work 
at all. Gooby v. Lake Shore Management Co., 136 Idaho 74, 29 P.3d 390 (2001). However, 
Claimant's current job is nevertheless relevant, because once Claimant establishes, by prima 
facie evidence, that he is an odd-lot worker, the burden shifts to the Employer to demonstrate 
employability. Employer must show that there is_ an .actual job within a reasonable distance from 
Claimant's home which he is capable of perfo1ming, and which he has a reasonable opportunity 
' 
to obtain. Claimant's cmTent job more than satisfies .Employer's obligation to rebut a prima 
facie case of total and permanent disability. There is no reason to believe that Claimant's job 
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will not continue, or that he will be unable to perfmm the requirements of that job until he 
decides to retire. 
113. Based on the foregoing, even if Claimant had met his burden of proving a prima 
facie case of odd-lot status, Defendants have clearly met their burden of proving that Claimant is 
capable of performing an actual job which is likely to continue. However, the evidence does 
establish that Claimant neve1theless suffered disability as a consequence of his 
limitations/restrictions. Defendants' argument that Claimant's disability must be assessed at zero 
because Claimant continues in his employment with Employer is rejected; this argument ignores 
Claimant's significant limitations/restrictions and the consequences of those restrictions on his 
ability to engage in gainful activity. However, the fact that Claimant has engaged in continuous 
employment since 2009, with significant annual increases in earnings, must be taken into 
acconnt. These facts set up the central conundrum of evaluating Claimant's disability: the fact 
that in the labor market at large he has suffered a significant loss of access must be reconciled 
with the seeming likelihood that Claimant will never suffer the financial impact of his disability. 
I 14. Claimant's age is, of course, one of the nonmedical factors which must be 
considered when evaluating his disability under Idaho, Code § 72-430. In many cases, the fact 
that a claimant is an older worker is a factor which tends to support higher disability; everything 
else being equal, employers are less inclined to hire an older worker, particularly one with some 
functional limitations. In this case, Claimant's status as an older worker has the opposite effect. 
If Claimant was 20 years of age, the Commission would be much less impressed by the fact that 
Claimant has a job for which he is well suited, and an Employer who values his service. A lot 
could happen in the forty or fifty years remaining in such an employee's work life. Here, though, 
Claimant is near the end of his work life and holds employment in which he is likely to remain 
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until he retires. This makes the fact of Claimant's CutTent job much more significant in 
evaluating his disability. 
115. Based on the foregoing, the Commission concludes that absent Claimant's current 
employment, his disability, as of the date of hearing, would be profound, and possibly total and 
permanent under the odd-lot doctrine. However, the fact that Claimant's current employment is 
likely to continue at his current or higher wage must be taken into account. Based on these facts, 
Claimant's proven disability is 40% of the whole person, inclusive of impairment. Even though 
Claimant may never suffer a wage loss, there is no dispute that the accident has left him without 
access to a large swath of his pre-injury labor market, thus constraining his employment options 
now and in the future, should he, for whatever reason, lose his current job. However, it seems 
likely that Claimant's current employment will continue. Nor does he seem inclined to change 
his current situation. 
Apportionment 
116. Since Claimant is less than totally and permanently disabled and since Claimant's 
low back condition is not related to his employment, apportionment of disability between 
Claimant's accident-produced condition and his low back condition under Idaho Code § 72-406 
must be considered. 
I I 7. Where a claim for disability less than total is before the Commission, so is the 
issue of whether Employer bears full responsibility for Claimant's disability. See Page v. 
McCain Foods, Inc., 145 Idaho 302, 179 P.3d 265 (2008). In keeping with Barton v. Seventh 
Heaven Recreation,_ Inc., 2010 IIC 0379 (2010), Claimant bears the burden of persuasion on the 
issue of whether he has suffered disability referable to the subject accident. However, once 
Claimant makes a prima facie showing in this regard, the burden of going forward with evidence 
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that some pmtion of Claimant's disability is, in fact, referable to a pre-existing condition, shifts 
to Defendants. See Albright v. MGM Construction, Inc., 102 Idaho 269, 629 P.2d 665 (1981); 
Keenan v. Brooks, 100 Idaho 823, 606 P.2d 473 (1980) (Bistline, J., and Donaldson, J. specially 
concurring). 
118. In the instant matter, it is asserted that some part of Claimant's disability is 
referable to Claimant's non-work related and pre-existing low back condition, because both PT 
Wright and Dr. Hammond have established that some part of Claimant's limitations against 
sitting, walking, and perhaps other functions, are referable to his low back condition. No one, 
including the two vocational experts who were quizzed about the matter, could decide how these 
opinions, as couched, could be applied to apportion responsibility for Claimant's disability. Nor 
will the Commission attempt to do so. Defendants have adduced insufficient evidence to allow 
consideration of how or whether Claimant's 40% disability should be appmtioned to Claimant's 
pre-existing low back condition. 
Attorney Fees 
119. Claimant argues that because Defendants did not provide certain medical records 
to Dr. Montalbano and Mr. Jordan, the opinions of Dr. Montalbano and Mr. Jordan are faulty, 
and it was therefore umeasonable for Defendants to rely on these opinions to defend the claim, 
such that Defendants are liable for an award of attorney fees under Idaho Code § 72-804. These 
arguments are not persuasive. There may be several reasons Defendants chose to proceed the 
way they did, and these reasons do not even include simple oversight. There is insufficient 
evidence that Defendants had designs on obtaining unsuppmted opinions on which to rely in 
defending the claim. The Commission declines to award attorney fees. 5 
5 Moreover, we note that Claimant's counsel, too, chose what records to provide to the recipients of his several 
letters. 
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CONCLUSIONS OF LA ,v AND ORDER 
1. Claimant has failed to establish that his low back condition is causally related to 
the 2009 accident. Claimant is not entitled to benefits for this condition. 
2. Claimant has established that he suffered injuries to his neck, left shoulder, and 
left upper extremity as a consequence of the accident of October 5, 2009. 
3. Claimant has established that he suffered injuries to his right lmee as a 
consequenee of the aceident of August 28, 2013. 
4. As a eonsequenee of the October 5, 2009 accident Claimant has suffered 
pennanent impairment as follows: cervical spine - 6% of the whole person; left shoulder - 5% 
of the left upper extremity; ulnar nerve transposition - 0%. 
5. With respect to the accident of August 28, 2013, Claimant has suffered 
impainnent as follows: right knee - 21% lower extremity, 50% attributable to pre-existing 
condition and 50% attributable to the 2013 accident. 
6. Claimant is not totally and permanently disabled under the odd-lot doctiine, or if 
he is, Defendauts have met their burden of proving that there is an actual job within a reasonable 
distance from Claimant's home which he is capable of performing. 
7. Defendants have failed to come forward with evidence which would support 
apportiomnent of disability pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-406. 
8. Claimant has suffered disability of 40% of the whole person, inclusive of 
impairment, referable to the 2009 and 2013 accidents. 
9. Claimant is not entitled to an award of attorney's fees under Idaho Code§ 72-804. 
10. There is no basis for the Commission's retention of jurisdiction over this case. 
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11. Pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-718, this decision is final and conclusive as to all 
matters adjudicated. 
DATEDthis1dayof /J<pri' f , 2018. 
INDUSTRJAL COMMISSION 
Commiss~9n Se 
"••····· ,'.' !Dr-11\\ 
'lfu111•'' 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby ce1iify that on the ----2:!Jay of ~, / , 2018, a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT, CONLSIONS OF LAW, AND ORDER was 
served by regular United States Mail upon each of the following: 
L. CL YEL BERRY 
PO BOX 302 
TWIN FALLS ID 83303 
PAUL J. AUGUSTINE 
PO BOX 1521 
BOISE ID 83701 
es! 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND ORDER- 71 
407
Claimant's Name & Address 
Mario Ayala 
47456 St. Hwy 78 
Mountain Home, ID 83647 
WORKERS' COMPENSATION 
COMPLAINT 
Claimant's Attorney's Name & Address 
L. Clyel Berry 
Attorney at Law 
P.O.Box302 
Twin Falls, ID 83303-0302 
Employer's Name & Address 
Robert J. Meyers Farms, Inc. 
3221 North 3300 East 
Workers' Compensation Insurance Carrier's 
(Not Adjustor's) Name & Address 
Idaho State Insurance Fund 
Twin Falls, ID 83301-0000 P.O. Box 990004 





Date oflnjury/Manifestation of Occupational Disease 
10/14/01 
State & County in Which Injury Occurred 
State ofidaho. Countv of Elmore 
When Injured, Claimant was Earning an Average 
Weeklv Wa<>e of$ oursuant to LC. 672-419. 
Describe How Injury/Occupational Disease Occurred (What Happened) 
Claimant fell from a ladder while installing insulation. 
Nature of Medical Problems Alleged As a Result of Accident or Occupational Disease 
Injury to neck together with thoracic and lumbar regions of the spine. 
What Workers' Compensation Benefits are You Claiming at This Time? 
1. Reinstatement/continuation of medical benefits; and, 
2. Fees, pursuant to LC. §72-804 
--· ( ) 
Date on Which Notice oflnjury was Given to Employer 
10/14/01 
To Whom You Gave Not\& 
Robert Meyers 
How Notice Was Given: (X) Oral (X) Subsequent Written ( ) Other, Please Specify 
Issue or Issues Involved: 
:] 
I. Whether Claimant's cut1'ent need for medical care, generally, and specifically involving Claimant's low 
back, as recommended by Drs. Reedy and/or Hajjar, is causally related to or resultant of the October 14, 
2001, accident and injury at issue herein, to any extent, such that responsibility for the same rests with or 
upon Defendants herein. 
2. Whether Defendants have unreasonably withheld authorization or otherwise denied responsibility for 
medical benefits, such that Claimant is entitled to an award for fees, pursuant to I.C. § 72-804. 
Do You Believe This Claim Presents a New Question of Law Or a Complicated Set of Facts? ( )Yes (X) No 
If so Please state why. 
Notice: Complaints against the Industrial Special Indemnity Fund must be in accordance with Idaho Code § 72-334 and 
filed on form LC. I 002 
Complaint - Page 1 
lNDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
P.O. BOX 83720 
BOISE, ID 83720-0041 






(Provider Use Only) 
Medical Record Number:----­
( ) Pick Up Copies ( ) Fax Copies
( ) Mail Copies 
ID Confirmed by; -------
AUTHORIZATION FOR DISCLOSURE OF HEALTH INFORMATION 
I hereby authorize--=:----c:-----c--------------,-----to disclose health information as specified: 
Provider Name - must be specific for each provider 
To: .,,.----.,,.----,---,-------------------:------------------
Jnsurance Company/Third Party Administrator/Self Insured Emplayer!ISJF, their attorneys or patient's attorney 
Street Address 
City State Zip (:ode 
Purpose or need for data: :---::=c--:----------,--------------------------
(e.g. Workers' Compensation Claim) 
Information to be disclosed: Date(s) of Hospitalization/Care: -------------
( ) Discharge Summary 
( ) History & Physical Exam 
{ ) Consultation Reports 
( ) Operative Reports 
() Lab 
( ) Pathology 
( ) Radiology Reports 
( ) Entire Record 
( ) Other: Specify -----------------=----==-------------
1 understand that the disclosure may include information relating to ( check if applicable): 
( ) AIDS or HIV 
( ) Psychiatric or Mental Health Information 
( ) Drug/Alcohol Abuse Information 
I understand that the information to be released may include material that is protected by Federal Law (45 CFR Part 164) and that the 
information maTbe subject to redisclosure by the recipient and no longer be protected by the federal regulations. I understand that 
this authorization may be revoked in writing at any time by notifying the privacy officer, except that revoking the authorization won't 
apply to information already released in response to this authorization. I understand that the provider will not condition treatment, 
payment, enrollment, or eligibility for benefits on my signing this authorization. Unless otherwise revoked, this authorization will 
expire upon resolution of worker's compensation claim. Provider, its employees, officers, copy service contractor, and physicians
are hereby released from any legal responsibility or liability for disclosure of the above information to the extent indicated and 
authorized by me on this form and as outlined in the Notice of Privacy. My signature below authorizes release of all information 
specified in this authorization. Any questions that I have regarding disclosure may be directed to the privacy officer of the Provider 
specified above. 
Sig,qf� Date 
Signal e if Legal Representative & Relationship to Patient/Authority to Act Date 
Title Date 






Send Original To: lndw,trlal Commls!,lon, Jud!clal Division, 700 S. Clearwater Lane, Boise, Idaho 8:3112 I0100~ (llov, w0, 
ANSWER TO COMPLAINT 
LC. NO .. _-=20:.::.01.:...;•5=2=09=58::..-_ INJURY DATE._~10"'""/1~4=/2~00~1-~-
_lL The above-named (;Lmployer or employer/surety responds to Claimant's Complaint by 
stating: 
_ The Industrial Special Indemnity Fund responds to the Complaint against the ISIF by stating: 
CLAIMANT'S NAME AND ADDRESS CLAIMANT'S ATTORNEY'S NAME AND ADDRESS 
Marlo Ayalla L, Clyel Berry 
47456 State Hwy 78 Attorney at Law 
Mountain Home, ID 83647 Po Box 302 
Twin F1:1lls. IP 83303•0302 
EMPLOYER' S NAME AND ADDR!cSS WORKERS' COMPENSATION INSURANCE CARRIER'S (NOT ADJUSTOR'S) NAME 
Robert J, Meyers Farms, Inc, AND ADDRESS 
3221 North 3300 East State Insurance Fund 
Twin Falls, ID 83301-0000 P, 0, Box 83720 
Boise, ID 83720-0044 
ATTORNEY !\!;PRESENTING EMPLOYER OR EMPLOYER/SURETY (NAME ATTORNEY REPRE;SENTING INDUSTRIAL SPECIAL INDEMNITY FUND (NAME AND 
ANO ADDRESS) ADDRESS) 
Paul J, Augustine 
Augustine Law Offices, PLLC 
1~., 
,,-_:::.> 
P.O. Box 1521 ,---.l 
Boise, ID 83701 
· "I " 
' 
-







X 1, That the accident alleged In the Complaint actually oc6¥rred 011nr about th<, time claimed. 
X 2, That the employer/employee relationship i,xisted, 
X 3. That the parties were subject to the provisions of the Idaho Workers' Compensation Act. 
X 4. That the condition for which benefits are claimed was caused by an accident arising out of 
and in the course of Claimant' s employment. 
NA NA 5. That, if an occupational disease Is alleged, manifestation of such disease Is or was due to 
the nature of the employment in which the hazards of such disease actually exist, are 
characteristic of and peculiar to the trade, occupation, process, or employment. 
X 6, That notice of the accident causing the injury, or notice of the occupational disease, was 
given to the employer as soon as practical but not later than 60 days after such accident or 60 
days of the manifestation of such occupational disease, 
X 7, That the rate of wages claimed Is correct. If denied, state the average weekly wage 
pursuant to Idaho Code,§ 72-419: under investigation, 
X 8, That the alleged employer was Insured or permissibly self-insured under the Idaho Workers' 
Compensation Act. 
12, What benefits, if any, do you concede are due Claimant? 
None, 
Answer? Pngc 1 of 2 
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,-11-. -S-ta-to_w_ll_h_s-pe_c_lfl-cl-ly_w_h_at_m_a_tt_er_s_a-re-ln_d_ls-p-ut_e_a-nd_y_o_u_r r-•-as_o_n-fo-r -d.-n-yi-ng-lls1=b-lilt_y_, 1-og_e_lh_e_r w-1-lh-a-ny-· -aff-ir-m-at-lv_e_d-ef-e-ns-•-•·•----~.
 ~ 
1. Defendants deny each and every allegation of the Complaint not specially admitted herein. 
2. Defendants deny that claimant's lumbar symptoms or any Injury lo his lumbar spine was catrsed by his 10/04109 industrial accident. 
3. Defendants deny that claimant Is anlllled to further me(llcal benefits. 
4. Claimant Is not entitled to additional Impairment other than what has already been paid, 
Under the Commission rules, you have 21 days from the date of service of the Complaint to answer the Complaint. A 
copy of your Answer must be malled to the Commission and a copy must be served on all parties or their attorneys by 
regular U.S. mall or by personal service of process. Unless you deny liability, you should pay Immediately the 
compensation required by law, and not cause the claimant, as well as yourself, the expense of a hearing. All 
compensation which Is concededly due anc;l accrued should be paid. Payments due should not be withheld because a 
Complaint has been flied. Rule 3.D,, Judicial Rules of Practice and Procedure under the Idaho Workers' Compensallon 
Law, applies. Complaints against the Industrial Special Indemnity Fund must be flied on Form I.C. 1002. 
I AM INTERESTED IN MEDIATING THIS CLAIM, IF THE OTHER PARTIES AGREE. x YES --.-NO 
DO YOU BELIEVE THIS CLAIM PRESENTS A NEW QUESTION OF LAW OR A COMPLICATED SET OF FACTS? IF SO, PLEASE STATE. 
NO. 
Amount of Compensation Paid to Date Datod Signature of Defendant or Attqrney 
l {/'. 
PPD TTD Medical DecemboV, 2012 
$00.00 $00.00 $398.00 
PLEASE COMPLETE 
CERTIFICATE OP SERVICE 
J ,-. I hereby cartlfy that on th (}f day of Dec.ember, 2012 I caused to be S81V(:ld a trut;1 and correct copy of the foregoing ANSWER upon: 
CLAIMANT'S NAME AND ADDRESS 
Marlo Ayala 
o/o L. Clyel Berry 
Po Sox 302 
Twin Falls, ID 83303-0302 
Via: _ personal se1vlce of proo0ss 
y) 
r regular U.S. Mall 
Answer-Page 2 of2 
EMPLOYER AND SURETY'S 
NAME AND ADDRESS 
State Insurance Fund 
1215 W. State Street 
Boise, ID 8372\) 
Via: 
INDUSTRIAL SPECIAL INDEMNITY FUND 
(If appllc~ble) 
---------------
Via: ___ personal servk:e of proeoss 




Claimant's Name & Address 
Mario Ayala 
47456 St. Hwy 78 
Mountain Home, ID 83647 
. · .. 
Employer's Name & Address 
Robert J. Meyers Farms, Inc. 
3221 North 3300 East 





Claimant's Attorney's Name & Address 
L. Clyel Berry 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 302 
Twin.Falls, ID 83303-0302 
Workers' Compensation Insurance Carrier's 
(Not Adjustor's) Name & Address 
Idaho State Insurance Fund 
P.O. Box 990004 
Boise, ID 83799 
Date of Injury/Manifestation of Occupational Disease 
8/28/13 
State & County in Which Injury Occurred When Injured, Claimant was Earning an Average 
State of Tdaho Countv of Elmore Weeklv War,e of i507.70 nursuant to LC. 672-419
. 
Describe How Injury/Occupational Disease Occurred (What Happened) 
Claimant was involved in a fall, suffering injury/re-injury to his right knee, during the course of his 
employment. 
Nature of Medical Problems Alleged As a Result of Accident or Occupational Disease 
1. Right knee injury/re-injury, 
What Workers' Compensation Benefits are You Claiming at This Time? 
I. Continuation/reinst~tement of medical benefits; and, 
2. Temporary disability benefits 
Date on Which Notice of Injmy was Given to Employer 
8/28/13 
To Whom You Gave Notice 
How Notice Was Given: (X) Oral (X) Subsequent Written ( ) Other, Please Specify 
Issue or Issues Involved: . , '· l ,. 
I. Whether Claimant's current need for medical care involving right lower ex1:r~wity/knie is causally related to 
or resultant of the August 28, 2013, accident and injury at issue herein such that responsibility for the same 
continues to rest with or upon Defendants; , : ;;! .· · 
2. Entitlement to temporary disability benefits during period of medical recovery;·,'; 
3. Upon date Claimant achieves medical stability/maximum medical improvement,,whether and to what extent 
Claimant presents with permanent impairment; · · ·: 
4, Whether, at time of maximum medical improvement/clinical stability, Claft\:lant presents with permanent 
disability in excess of impairment, specifically to encompass whether Claimanf _presents as totally 
and 
permanently disabled pursuant to theories of odd-lot, or otherwise; 
5. Whether any of Claimant's permanent impairment and/or permanent disability in excess of impairment is by 
reason of causes or conditions pre-existing the August 28, 2013, injury at issue herein; and, 
6. Whether, as of date of any hearing herein, Defendants have responsibility pursuant to LC. § 72-804. 
Do You Believe This Claim Presents a New Question of Law Or a Complicated Set of Facts? ( )Yes (X) No 
If so Please state why. 
Notice: Complaints against the Industrial Special Indemnity Fund must be ii] accordance wi.th Idaho Code§ 72-334 and 
filed on form J.C. 1002 
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Physicians Who Treated Claimant (Name & Address) 
Physicians associated with Terry Reilly Health Services, Nampa, Idaho; 
Physicians associated with and/or at Nampa Medical, Nampa, Idaho; 
Physicians associated with St. Alphonsus Medical Group, specifically being Dr. Miers C. Johnson, Ill, Nampa, Idaho; 
What Medical Costs Have You Incurred To Date? 
What Medical Costs Has Your Employer Paid? If any?$ ___ What Medical Costs Have You Paid, If any? $ __ _ 
I AM INTERESTED IN MEDIA TING THIS CLAIM, IF THE OTHER PAR'Ii ) Yes ( ) No 
Date 
f.;. f}_ 3-/i 
Please answer the set of questions immediately below only if claim 
Name and Social Security Number Date of Death Relation to deceased Claimant 
of party filing Complaint 
Was filing patty dependent on deceased? 
( ) Yes ( ) No 
Did filing patty live with deceased at time of accident? 
{ \ Yes { ) No 
CLAIMANT MUST COMPLETE. SIGN AND DATE THE ATTACHED MEDICAL RELEASE FORM 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the$ day <lt,.,,\ , 2014, I caused to be served a true and 
conect copy of the foregoing Complaint upon: 
Employer's Name & Address 
Robe1t J. Meyers Farms, Inc. 
3221 North 3300 East 
Twin Falls, ID 83301 
Surety's Name & Address 
Idaho State Insurance Fund 
P.O. Box 990004 
Boise, ID 83 799 
Via: ( ) Personal Service of Process Via: ( ) Personal Service of Process 
(X) Regular U.S. Mail (X) Regular U.S. Mail 
( ) I have not served a copy of the Complaint °"'"'MLv 
Signature 
NOTICE! An employer or Insurance Company served with a Complaint must file an Answer on Form LC. 1003 with the 
Industrial Commission within 21 days of the date of service as specified on the cettificate of mailing to avoid default. If 
no answer is filed, a Default Award may be entered! 
Further information may be obtained from: Industrial Commission, Judicial Division, 317 Main Street, 
Boise, Idaho 83720-6000 (208) 334-6000. 
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INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
P.O. BOX 83720 
BOISE, ID 83720-0041 
Patient Name: ~M=a,.,r"'io"-"A'-'y'-'a'-'la"---------
________ _ 
Address: ______________ _ 
Phone Number: 
  
(Provider Use Only) 
Medical Record Number: ____ _ 
( ) Pick Up Copies ( ) Fax Copies 
( ) Mail Copies 
ID Confirmed by: 
AUTHORIZATION FOR DISCLOSURE OF HEALTH INFORMATION 
I hereby authorize _______________________ to disclose health information as specified: 
Provider Name - must be specific for each provider 
To: 
Insurance Company/Third Party Administrator!Se/f-Jnsured Emp/oyer!JSJF, their attorneys or patient's attorney 
Street Address 
City State Zip Code 
Purpose or need for data: ---------------------------------------
(e.g. Workers' Compensation Claim) 
Information to be disclosed: Date(s) of Hospitalization/Care: 
( ) Discharge Summary 
( ) History & Physical Exam 
( ) Consultation Reports 
( ) Operative Reports 
( ) Lab 
( ) Pathology 
( ) Radiology Reports 
( ) Entire Record 
( ) Other: Specify 
I understand that the disclosure may include information relating to (check if applicable): 
( ) AIDS or HIV 
( ) 
( ) 
Psychiatric or Mental Health Information 
Drng/ Alcohol Abuse Information 
I understand that the information to be released may include material that is protected by Federal Law ( 45 CFR Part 164) and that the 
information may be subject to redisclosure by the recipient and no longer be protected by the federal regulations. I understand that 
this authorization may be revoked in writing at any time by notifying the privacy officer, except that revoking the authorization won't 
apply to information already released in response to this authorization. I understand that the provider will not condition treatment, 
payment, enrollment, or eligibility for benefits on my signing this authorization. Unless otherwise revoked, this authoriwtion will 
expire upon reso/11tio11 of wol'ker's compe11satio11 claim. Provider, its employees, officers, copy service contractor, and physicians 
are hereby released from any legal responsibility or liability for disclosure of the above information to the extent indicated and 
authorized by me on this form and as outlined in the Notice of Privacy. My signature below authorizes release of all information 
specified in this authorization. Any questions that I have regarding disclosure may be directed to the privacy officer of the Provider 
specified. above. . . , /. 
4(/4;;;;:;J lf<:1w~ , , i,+'-,/i s_,___~ 
Signature of Patient i;J" ---D"t;-1-1-IJ 1 
Signature of Legal Representative & Rel"tio11ship to P"tie11t/A11thol'ity to Act Date 
R)zg1:<2e0J?Jr ru~="£e=/tfN/"'-=-_· --------~i l+f=B.,___/1=· .~~---~ 
Sig1wt11re of Witness Title D{lte 





Send Original To: Industrial Commission, Judicial Division, 700 S. Clearwater Lane, Boise, Idaho 83712 IC1003 (Rev. 11/91) 
ANSWER TO COMPLAINT 
I.C. NO .. _--=20._.1-=-3·-=02"-'4=07--=-5 __ INJURY DATE._~oa=,2=a=,2-=-01=3 
_L The above-named employer or employer/surety responds to Claimant's Complaint by 
stating: 
_ The Industrial Special Indemnity Fund responds to the Complaint against the ISIF by stating: 
CLAIMANT'S NAME AND ADDRESS CLAIMANT'S ATTORNEY'S NAME AND ADDRESS 
Mario Ayala L. Clyel Berry 
4 7 456 State Hwy 78 Attorney at Law 
Mountain Home, ID 83647 PO Box 302 
Twin Falls, ID 83303-0302 
EMPLOYER'S NAME ANO ADDRESS WORKERS' COMPENSATION INSURANCE CARRIER'S (NOT ADJUSTOR'S) NAME 
Robert J. Meyers Farms, Inc. AND ADDRESS 
3221 North 3300 East State Insurance Fund 
Twin Falls, ID 83301-0000 P. 0. Box 83720 
Boise, ID 83720-0044 
ATTORNEY REPRESENTING EMPLOYER OR EMPLOYER/SURETY (NAME ATTORNEY REPRESENTING INDUSTRIAL SPECIAL INDEMNITY FUND (NAME AND 
AND ADDRESS) ADDRESS) 
Paul J. Augustine 
Augustine Law Offices, PLLC r--•. , 
P.O. Box 1521 c-.;::,, 
Boise, ID 83701 
_,:;· 
•·,·1 
_·_-,. ''' ' 







X 1. That the accident alleged in the Complaint actually occurf~d on pr-about the time claimed. ',_) .,, . ...} 
X 2. That the employer/employee relationship existed. C 
X 3. That the parties were subject to the provisions of the Idaho Workers' Compensation Act. 
X 4. That the condition for which benefits are claimed was caused by an accident arising out of 
and in the course of Claimant's employment. 
NA NA 5. That, if an occupational disease is alleged, manifestation of such disease is or was due to 
the nature of the employment in which the hazards of such disease actually exist, are 
characteristic of and peculiar to the trade, occupation, process, or employment. 
X 6. That notice of the accident causing the injury, or notice of the occupational disease, was 
given to the employer as soon as practical but not later than 60 days after such accident or 60 
days of the manifestation of such occupational disease. 
X 7. That the rate of wages claimed is correct. If denied, state the average weekly wage 
pursuant to Idaho Code, § 72-419: unknown. 
X 8. That the alleged employer was insured or permissibly self-insured under the Idaho Workers' 
Compensation Act. 
12. What benefits, if any, do you concede are due Claimant? 
None. 
Answer? Page I of2 
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11. State with specificity what matters are in dispute and your reason for denying liability, together with any affirmative defenses. 
1. Defendants deny each and every allegation of the Complaint not specially admitted herein. 
2. Defendants are not aware of claimant's current medical status and therefore reserve the right to assert affirmative defenses at a later date. 
Under the Commission rules, you have 21 days from the date of service of the Complaint to answer the Complaint. A 
copy of your Answer must be mailed to the Commission and a copy must be served on all parties or their attorneys by 
regular U.S. mail or by personal service of process. Unless you deny liability, you should pay immediately the 
compensation required by law, and not cause the claimant, as well as yourself, the expense of a hearing. All 
compensation which is concededly due and accrued should be paid. Payments due should not be withheld because a 
Complaint has been filed. Rule 3.D., Judicial Rules of Practice and Procedure under the Idaho Workers' Compensation 
Law, applies. Complaints against the Industrial Special Indemnity Fund must be filed on Form I.C. 1002. 
I AM INTERESTED IN MEDIATING THIS CLAIM, IF THE OTHER PARTIES AGREE. X YES -- - NO 
DO YOU BELIEVE THIS CLAIM PRESENTS A NEW QUESTION OF LAW OR A COMPLICATED SET OF FACTS? IF SO, PLEASE STATE. 
NO. 




PPD TTD Medical I! ' $00.00 $00.00 $3,085.33 l 
,1 
PLEASE COMPLETE 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
' . 1--
thereby certify that on the\'11 t:lay of February, 20141 caused to be served a true and correct copy of the foregoing ANSWER upon: 
CLAIMANT'S NAME AND ADDRESS 
Mario Ayala 
c/o L. Clyel Berry 
PO Box 302 
Twin Falls, ID 83303-0302 
Via: personal service of process 
·r regular U.S. Mail 
Answer-Page 2 of2 
EMPLOYER AND SURETY'S 
NAME AND ADDRESS 
State Insurance Fund 
1215 W. State Street 
Boise, ID 83720 







INDUSTRIAL SPECIAL INDEMNITY FUND 
(if applicable) 
Via: personal service of process 
~ regular U.S. Mail 
416
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SUPREME COURT NO. 46186-2018 
CERTIFICATE OF APPEAL 
ROBERT J. MEYERS FARMS, INC. 





Order Appealed from: 
Attorney for Appellant: 
Attorney for Respondents: 
Appealed By: 
Appealed Against: 
Notice of Appeal Filed: 
Industrial Commission, Thomas E. Limbaugh 
Chairman presiding 
IC 2009-029533, 2001-520958, & 2013-024075 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order, 
filed April 9, 2018 and the Order on Motion for 
Reconsideration, Modification, and Consolidation, 
filed June 22, 2018. 
L. Clyel Berry 
PO BOX 83 
Twin Falls, ID 83303-0083 
Paul J. Augustine 
PO BOX 1521 
Boise, ID 83701 
Claimant/ Appellant Mario Ayala 
Defendants/Respondents Robert J. Meyers Farms, 
Inc. and State Insurance Fund 
July 25, 2018 
CERTIFICATE OF APPEAL - (MARIO AYALA) - 1 
Filed:07/27/201814:58:23 
By: Clerk - Grove, Kimber 
417
Appellate Fee Paid: 
Name of Reporter: 
Transcript Requested: 
Dated: 
$94.00 to Supreme Court and 
$100.00 to Industrial Commission 
Checks were received. 
M. Dean Willis 
PO BOX 1241 
Eagle, ID 83616 
Standard transcript has been requested. Transcript 
has been prepared and filed with the Commission. 
CERTIFICATE OF APPEAL - (MARIO AYALA) - 2 
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CERTIFICATION OF APPEAL 
I, Emma Landers, the undersigned Assistant Commission Secretary of the Industrial 
Commission of the State of Idaho, hereby CERTIFY that the foregoing are true and correct 
photocopies of the Notice of Appeal; Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order; and 
Order on Motion for Reconsideration, Modification and Consolidation, and the whole thereof, 
in IC case number 2009-029533, 2001-520958, and 2013-024075 for Mario Ayala. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the official seal of 
said Commission this 26th day of July, 2018. 
CERTIFICATION OF APPEAL- (MARIO AYALA) -1 
CERTIFICATION OF RECORD 
I, Emma Landers, the undersigned Assistant Commission Secretary of the Industrial 
Commission, do hereby certify that the foregoing record contains true and cmrect copies of all 
pleadings, documents, and papers designated to be included in the Agency's Record Supreme Court 
No. 46186-2018 on appeal by Rule 28(b)(3) of the Idaho Appellate Rules and by the Notice of 
Appeal, pursuant to the provisions of Rule 28(b). 
I further certify that all exhibits offered or admitted in this proceeding, if any, are correctly 
listed in the List of Exhibits. Said exhibits will be lodged with the Supreme Court upon settlement 
of the Reporter's Transcript and Agency's Record herein. 
DATED this 22nd day of August, 2018. 
CERTIFICATION OF RECORD (MARIO AYALA 46186-2018) -1 
419
420




ROBERT J. MEYERS FARMS, INC. 
Employer, and STATE INSURANCE FUND, 
Surety, 
Defendants/Respondents 
SUPREME COURT NO. 46186-2018 
NOTICE OF COMPLETION 
TO: STEPHEN W. KENYON, Clerk of the Courts; 
for the Appellant; and 
for the Respondents. 
YOU ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED that the Clerk's Record was completed on this date and, 
pursuant to Rule 24(a) and Rule 27(a), Idaho Appellate Rules, copies of the same have been 
served by regular U.S. mail upon each of the following: 
Attorney for Appellants: 
Paul J. Augustine 
PO BOX 1521 
Boise, ID 83701 
Attorney for Respondent: 
L. Clyel Berry 
POBOX83 
Twin Falls, ID 83303-0083 
YOU ARE FURTHER NOTIFIED that pursuant to Rule 29(a), Idaho Appellate Rules, all 
' 
parties have twenty-eight days from the date of this Notice in which to file objections to the 
Clerk's Record or Reporter's Transcript, including requests for corrections, additions or deletions. 
NOTICE OF COMPLETION (MARIO A VALA 46186-2018 ) - 1 
421
In the event no objections to the Clerk's Record or Reporter's Transcript are filed within the 
twenty-eight day period, the Clerk's Record and Repotter's Transcript shall be deemed settled. 
DATED at Boise, Idaho, this 22ND day of August, 2018. 
NOTICE OF COMPLETION (MARIO AYALA 46186-2018 ) - 2 
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STEPHAN, KV ANVIG, STONE & TRAINOR 
L. Clyel Berry - ISB # 1897 
P. 0. Box 83 





Attomey for Claimant 
BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 




ROBERT J. MEYERS FARMS, INC., 
Employer, 
and 
STATE INSURANCE FUND, 
Surety, 
Defendants/Respondents. 
LC. No. 2001-520958 
LC. No. 2009-029533 
LC. No. 2013-024075 
(SUPREME COURT NO. 46186-2018) 
CLAIMANT/APPELLANT'Sc'MOT.ICJN 
FOR CORRECTIONS, AD~ITIO$ 
AND/OR AUGMENTATIOl!l;OF/:ffl) 










COMES NOW Claimant/Appellant herein by and through counsel of record and pursuant 
to Rule 29(a) Idabo Appellant Rules and hereby objects to and/or requests corrections, additions 
and/or augmentation of/to the same, as follows: 
CLAIMANT/APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR CORRECTIONS, ADDITIONS AND/OR 
AUGMENTATION OF/TO THE AGENCY'S RECORD -1 
423
Requests for Additions to and/or Augmentation of the Agency's Record: 
1. The January 3, 2018, correspondence from the Commission to counsel, inquiring 
whether the parties were willing for the Commissioners to issue a decision on the 
record adduced, to expedite the same in light of Referee Powers having a backlog 
of cases. 
a. That January 11, 2018, correspondence to the Commission from Cly el Berry, 
as counsel for Claimant/ Appellant herein advising the Commission that in 
light of the importance of Claimant's observational credibility as 
consideration in the matter, that Claimant and his counsel preferred to wait 
for Mr. Powers' proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and 
Recommendation. 
b. Any correspondence to the Commission from Mr. Augustine, counsel for 
Defendants, responsive to the Commission's 
correspondence. 
January 3, 2018, 
All as requested by and within paragraph 6(h) upon page 6 of the July 24, 2018, 
Notice of Appeal. 
Request for Corrections: 
1. Within Claimant's Exhibits within the Exhibits List portion of the Agency's Record, 
Claimant's Exhibit 30a(l ), referencing "Defendants' Answers to Continued 
Interrogatories," the Record has the date thereof as being January 5, 2014. Request 
is made that the date be corrected to January 5, 2016. 
2. Claimant's Response to Defendants' Motion for Clarification of Conclusions of Law 
and Order, fax filed April 26, 2018, at page 183 of the Agency's Record and the 
CLAIMANT/APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR CORRECTIONS, ADDITIONS AND/OR 
AUGMENTATION OF/TO THE AGENCY'S RECORD - 2 
424
original of the same, filed upon April 27, 2018, are separated by Affidavit of 
Claimant, Mario Ayala, in Support of Motion for Reconsideration; Motion to 
Reopen; for Modification of Award upon Consideration of a Change in the Nature 
or Extent of Claimant's Disablement and/or to Correct a Manifest Injustice; and, for 
Consolidation, and are therefore out of order. Additionally, the fax cover sheet at 
page 193 of the Agency's Record, is the fax cover sheet for the documents located at 
pages 234 through 254 of the Agency's Record, and is therefore out of order. 
3. It is noted that the Record commencing at page 186 and continuing through page 211 
of the Agency's Record are out-of-order. Logically, for continuity and to avoid the 
potential for confusion, the correct and/or chronological order for said instruments 
is as follows: 
a. Claimant's Motion for Reconsideration; Motion to Reopen; for Modification 
of Award upon Consideration of a Change in the Nature or Extent of 
Claimant's Disablement and/or to Correct a Manifest Injustice; and, for 
Consolidation, filed April 30, 2018. 
b. Affidavit of Claimant, Mario Ayala, in Support of Motion for 
Reconsideration; Motion to Reopen; for Modification of A ward upon 
Consideration of a Change in the Nature or ExtentofClaimant's Disablement 
and/or to Correct a Manifest Injustice; and, for Consolidation, filed April 30, 
2018. 
c. Claimant's Memorandum in Support of Motion for Reconsideration; Motion 
to Reopen; for Modification of Award upon Consideration of a Change in the 
CLAIMANT/APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR CORRECTIONS, ADDITIONS AND/OR 
AUGMENTATION OF/TO THE AGENCY'S RECORD - 3 
425
Nature or Extent of Claimant's Disablement and/or to Correct a Manifest 
Injustice; and, for Consolidation, filed April 30, 2018. 
DATED This ,a__ day of September, 2018. 
G, STONE & TRAINOR 
By_-=:....=;;:p,c.._-4~-1---------
L. Clyel erry 
Attorneys for Claimant/ Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I am a resident attorney of the State of Idaho and that on the 
_/s!_ day of September, 2018, I served a copy of the foregoing document by depositing a true copy 
thereof in the United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to the following: 
Paul J. Augustine 
AUGUSTINE LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
P.O. Box 1521 
Boise, ID 83701 
CLAIMANT/APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR CORRECTIONS, ADDITIONS AND/OR 
AUGMENTATION OF/TO THE AGENCY'S RECORD - 4 
426
, .. \ 
STEPHAN, KV ANVIG, STONE & TRAINOR 
L. Clyel Berry - ISB #1897 
P. 0. Box 83 





Attorney for Claimant 
BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 




ROBERT J. MEYERS FARMS, INC., 
Employer, 
and 
STATE INSURANCE FUND, 
Surety, 
Defendants/Respondents. 
LC. No. 2001-520958 
LC. No. 2009-029533 
LC. No. 2013-024075 
(SUPREME COURT NO. 46186-2018) 
•-I"" ,....,. 
CLAIMANT/APPELLANT'j ::;; 
OBJECTION TO AND R&\UES:O 
ADDITIONS AND/OR '2 7o C:iJ ):;,.f'fl 
AUGMENTATION OF/TO.Trli!E-;;:. 





COMES NOW Claimant/ Appellant herein by and through counsel of record and pursuant 
to Rule 29(a) Idaho Appellant Rules and hereby objects to and/or requests additions and/or 
augmentation of/to the same, as follows: 
Requests for Additions to and/or Augmentation of the Agency's Record: 
CLAIMANT/APPELLANT'S OBJECTION TO AND REQUEST FOR ADDITIONS 
AND/OR AUGMENTATION OF/TO THE AGENCY'S RECORD -1 
427
1. Claimant's Motion to Enforce Agreement to Settlement; Alternative Motion for 
Immediate Re-Setting of Hearing; and, for Sanctions, Specifically to Encompass 
Fees, dated April 21, 2016. 
2. Defendants' Opposition to Claimant's Motion to Enforce and for Sanctions, dated 
May 3, 2016. 
3. That Order on Claimant's Motion to Enforce dated and filed June 7, 2016. 
REQUEST FOR HEARING 
Should the Commission require this matter be set for hearing, request is hereby made 
that the Commission set this matter for a telephone conference. Claimant/ Appellant's counsel's 
UNAVAILABLE dates are as follows: 
From the instant date through September 21, 2018; 
October 4 through 9, 2018; 
November 7 through 19, 2018; 
November 23, 2018; 
December 3 and December 10, 2018. 
Should the Commission need unavailable dates following December 10, 2018, upon being so 
advised counsel will immediately so provide. 
DATED This~dayofSeptember, 2018. 
STEPHAN,KV 
By_,_.,'-"'-1""-"'---\------f-------
L. Clyel erry 
Attorneys for Claimant/App Hant 
CLAIMANT/APPELLANT'S OBJECTION TO AND REQUEST FOR ADDITIONS 
AND/OR AUGMENTATION OF/TO THE AGENCY'S RECORD - 2 
428
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I am a resident attorney of the State of Idaho and that on the 
1L day of September, 2018, I served a copy of the foregoing document by depositing a true 
copy thereof in the United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to the following: 
Paul J. Augustine 
AUGUSTINE LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
P.O. Box 1521 
Boise, ID 83701 
L. 
CLAIMANT/APPELLANT'S OBJECTION TO AND REQUEST FOR ADDITIONS 
AND/OR AUGMENTATION OF/TO THE AGENCY'S RECORD - 3 
429




ROBERT J. MEYERS FARMS, TNC., 
Employer, 
and 






ORDER ON MOTION TO 
CORRECT/AUGMENT THE RECORD 
AND OBJECTION TO THE RECORD 
FI LEO 
On or about September 14'1\ Claimant filed his Objection to and Request Additions 
and/or Augmentation of/to the Agency's Record. and his Motion for Conections, Additions 
and/or Augmentation of/to the Agency's Record. Defendants filed no response. 
Claimant requests the inclusion of: 
1. The January 3, 2018 conespondence from Commission to Counsel. 
a. Claimant's response to said conespondence. 
b. Any correspondence received from Mr. Augustine in response to said 
correspondence. 1 
2. Claimant's Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement, dated April 21, 2016.
2 
3, Defendant's Opposition to Claimant's Motion to Enforce and For Sanctions, dated May 
3, 2016. 
4. The Order on Claimant's Motion to Enforce, dated and filed June 7, 2016. 
1 111ere is no correspondence ofrecord from Mr. Augustine in response to the Commission's letter. 
2 Claimant did not request the inclusion of his affidavit accompanying this Motion, Defendant's affidavit 
accompanying his Motion, Claimant's response to Defendant's Motion, or that accompanying affidavit. 
ORDER ON MOTION TO CORRECT/AUGMENT THE RECORD AND OBJECTION TO 
THERECORD-1 
430
Claimant also requests numerous corrections to the record, including a correction to a 
date listed on the exhibit list and corrections to the pagination of certain motions and orders. 
Having reviewed said Agency Record, and pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 28( c ), 
Claimant's Motions to Correct and Augment the record are GRANTED. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
\
-i m f\\,J_ I~~ " 
DATED this__,_L::l__..___day of _ _,_u:mx=:""-'. µ.,.,'- -"-""")L.___, 2018. 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
Thomas ~in, Commissimre~ 
A~@] 
· ~mmission -~lqi·e.:, 
.,;, ,J\. '\, ,/' ;/ 
.p /' o,.. \)\) ,,. . 
"<"., ,J ?•'"'@mo:,\>_"'~ \\) "'°" ',, c OF\\l~\ ,,,, CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
1
' 009 nu~ e i u ~ ~,,.,.it 
I hereby certify that on the 1ltn day of Q):,\:da2.r , 2018, a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing ORDER ON MOTION TO CORRECT/AUGMENT THE RECORD 
AND OBJECTION TO THE RECORD was served by regular United States Mail upon each 
of the following: 
L. CL YEL BERRY 
POBOX302 
TWIN FALLS ID 83303 
es! 
PAUL J. AUGUSTINE 
PO BOX 1521 
BOISE ID 8370 1 
ORDER ON MOTION TO CORRECT/AUGMENT THE RECORD AND OBJECTION TO 
THE RECORD - 2 
